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1. Eliade’s Yoga: Immortality and Freedom 
 
1.1. Genesis and importance 
 
In 1936 Mircea Eliade published his doctoral thesis Yoga, Essai sur les origines de la 
mystique indienne, simultaneously in French (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul 
Guethner) and in Romanian (Bucharest: Fundatie pentru Literature si Arta Regele 
Carol II). The first draft of this book (begun in English in India in 1929) was 
translated into Romanian by Eliade himself and reached completion in 1932. For 
the French version Eliade not only added new material (“[it] is actually over twice 
the length of the Romanian version”1), but he also rearranged the content.2 This 
becomes clear when the tables of content of both the Romanian and the French 
book are viewed synoptically.  
 
“Eliade seems to have aimed at a roughly chronological ordering of topics in 
the version of 1932 […]. The version of 1936, however, begins […] with the 
classical darśanas of Sāmkhya and Yoga (Chapters II and III) and follows 
with chapters on yoga practice and theory in Vedic, Brahmanic, and Epic 
literature; then it discusses yoga in Buddhism, tantrism, and alchemy; and it 
continues with brief dicussions of yoga in popular cults, before concluding 
with hypotheses about origins, etc. This arrangement – which was followed 
in subsequent versions also – has the effect of making the classical system of 
Patañjali in the Yoga Sūtras the norm by which the reader judges other forms 
of yoga.”3 
 
The 1936 Yoga book “suffered from unfortunate misunderstandings resulting 
from the double translation; in addition, the text was disfigured by a large 
number of linguistic and typographical errors.”4 Therefore, and encouraged by 
favourable reviews, Eliade decided to write a new edition. His corrections and 
added material finally led to a “text that differs considerably from that of the 1936 
publication. Except for a few paragraphs, the book has been entirely rewritten in 
order to adapt it as much as possible to our present views.”5 This new work was 
published in 1954 as Le Yoga: Immortalité et Liberté (Paris, Payot).6 It very quickly 
became the authoritative standard work on Yoga, described (for example) as “the 
                                                 
1 Ricketts, Eliade I, 489. 
2 For a detailed account of the genesis of the Essai, cf. Ricketts, Eliade I, 488 ff. 
3 Ricketts, Eliade I, 491-492. His dissociation from a chronological presentation of the Yoga material 
was explained by Eliade as follows: “We do not believe that the establishment of dates plays an 
essential rule in the understanding of a religious phenomenon and above all in the establishment of its 
laws of evolution.” (Quoted by Ricketts, Eliade II, 1305, Note 20), and: “We think that the value 
accorded to the ‘most ancient texts’ of the Sanskrit literature is exaggerated. They do not represent, for 
the religious history of India, anything but the conceptions of the Indo-Aryans. For knowledge of the 
religious life of the aboriginal populations – the peoples who provided the majority of the anti-Vedic 
and anti-Brahmanic reforms – the later texts are much more valuable. As for the Yoga-Sāmkhya 
practices and concepts, they were transmitted for a long time orally, outside of Brahmanism, and 
appeared in Sanskrit literature rather late. Thus, the chronology of the texts is not decisive for the 
history of the practices.” (Quoted by Ricketts, Eliade I, 492). 
4 Eliade, Yoga, xx. 
5 Eliade, Yoga, xxi. 
6 It was translated into English in 1958 (Yoga: Immortality and Freedom. London: Routledge, New York: 
Pantheon Books) and into German in 1960 (Yoga: Unsterblichkeit und Freiheit, Zürich, Stuttgart: 
Rascher). Translations into other languages followed (Spanish, Italian etc.). A second English edition 
in 1969 added corrections and more bibliographical notes (London: Routledge). 
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first really comprehensive description of yoga in a perfect synthesis”,7 “an 
indispensable reference book for the specialist”,8 “without question a standard 
work of religious science”9 or simply “groundbreaking”.10 
 
The importance of Eliade’s book is also reflected in the following observation: In 
2003, there were 143 books on Yoga in the Department of Indology at the 
University of Zurich, 46 of which contained a bibliography with secondary 
literature on the subject. 34 of these 46 bibliographies (or some 74%) listed Mircea 
Eliade’s Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, turning this book by far into the most 
quoted one. It must be noted however that the authors of 29 of those 34 
bibliographies were Western – only 5 Indian writers mentioned Eliade. Without 
pretending that the library of the Department of Indology at Zurich provides 
enough evidence for any significant statitics, we can still draw the very general 
conclusion that Eliade’s work on Yoga seems to have had a major impact mainly 
in the West. The following chapter will corroborate this impression. 
 
 
1.2. Virtually unknown in Calcutta 
 
Eliade’s work on Yoga was mostly a result of his stay in India between 1928 and 
1931. For nearly two years (from the end of 1928 until September 1930) he studied 
Sanskrit and Indian philosophy in Calcutta under the guidance of the eminent 
scholar Surendranath Dasgupta, a specialist in Yoga and Sāṃkhya. Eliade’s Yoga: 
Immortality and Freedom is dedicated to (among others) “my guru, Professor 
Surendranath Dasgupta, Principal, Sanskrit College, Calcutta” who (as he writes 
in the foreword) “lead us into the very center of Indian thought.”11 Since the 
(Western) world owes one of its foremost studies on Yoga to Calcutta (so to 
speak), we were curious to find out whether Eliade’s voice had been heard in the 
city which had provided him with so much knowledge or whether Immortality 
and Freedom had ended up being an export article only. Therefore, in January and 
February 2003, I talked to nine (some active, some retired) professors and 
lecturers of both Sanskrit and Philosophy of various universities in and around 
Calcutta.12 Only one of them has read Eliade’s book on Yoga, the others have 
either never heard about it or they have seen it but were not interested. Needless 
to say that it does not appear on any of the university department’s reading lists I 
saw. According to one of my interlocutors, the West has had absolutely no 
                                                 
7 „[...] die erste wirklich umfassende Beschreibung des Yoga in vollendeter Synthese [...].“ (Horsch, 
Eliade, 156; transl.  C.G.). 
8 „[...] zu einem unentbehrlichen Nachschlagewerk für den Fachmann.“ (Horsch, Eliade, 157; transl. 
C.G.). 
9 „[...] ohne Frage ein Standardwerk der Religionswissenschaft [...].“ (Hacker, Eliade, 318; transl. C.G.). 
10 White, Body, xiii. 
11 Eliade, Yoga, xxii. 
12 Prof. Govinda Gopal Mukhopadhyay (Sanskrit College, Calcutta; University of Burdawan), Prof. 
Debabrata Sen Sharma (University of Kurukṣetra, currently lecturer at Ramakrishna Mission, Gol 
Park), Prof. Amar Kumar Chattopadhyay (University of Calcutta, Ashutosh College), Prof. Amita 
Chattarji (Jadavpur University), Dr. Lalita Sen Gupta (Jadavpur University), Dr. Uma Dhar (Jadavpur 
University), Prof. Minati Kar (Viśvabhārati University, Shantiniketan), Prof. P. K. Sen (University of 
Calcutta), Prof. Pareshnath Bhattacharya (University of Calcutta, Presidency College). 
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influence on and no importance for the study of Yoga or Sāṃkhya in India. 
Eliade’s name however was familiar to most people I talked to (also outside the 
academic world) because of Maitreyi Devi’s Na hanyate (It Does not Die) or Eliade’s 
Maitreyi, in other words: Eliade remains in Calcutta’s memory because of the 
scandal caused by his falling in love with his preceptor’s daughter and the 
subsequent literary accounts given by the two protagonists. Arabinda Dasgupta, 
director of one of the oldest and most prestigious bookstores in Calcutta13 who 
could procure for me nearly any book I asked for, confirmed this fact. He had 
never heard that Eliade had written a book on Yoga but he did have Eliade’s 
novel in stock.  
 
 
2. Eliade in India14 
 
2.1. Eliade’s interest in Yoga 
 
In spring 1928, Mircea Eliade (then 21 years old) spent three months in Rome, 
working on his licentiate thesis on Italian Renaissance philosophy. One afternoon 
in May, at the library of the Institute for Indian Studies, he came across the first 
volume of Dasgupta’s History of Indian Philosophy and, while reading the preface, 
learned about the Maharaja Sir Manindra Chandra Nandy of Kassimbazar who 
had so generously sponsored Dasgupta’s career.15 Instantly he decides to write to 
the Maharaja, telling him that he would like to study Sanskrit and Indian 
philosophy with Dasgupta, for two years. He also sends a letter to Dasgupta 
whose Yoga as Philosophy and Religion he had bought during winter and whom he 
knew to be “the most celebrated historian of Indian philosophy.”16 In August he 
receives an answer from the Maharaja. 
 
“He congratulated me on my decision to study Indian philosophy with 
Surendranath Dasgupta, but he added that two years would not suffice. I 
would require at least five years to be able to learn Sanskrit and penetrate 
the mysteries of Indian philosophy. He was ready to offer me a five-year 
scholarship.”17 
 
                                                 
13 Dasgupta & Co. Private Ltd., 54/3, College Street, Kolkata 73, booksellers since 1886. 
14 Eliade’s stay in India is well documented (cf. Eliade, Autobiography, 143-209; Eliade, Labyrinth, 33-
64; Ricketts, Eliade I, 329-521); in this chapter I will provide only a minimum of general information 
and otherwise concentrate on events and facts related to Yoga. 
15 „It gives me the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deepest gratefulness to the Hon’ble Maharaja 
Sir Manindrachandra Nundy, K.C.I.E. Kashimbazar, Bengal, who has kindly promised to bear the 
entire expense of the publication of both volumes of the present work. […] Like many other scholars 
of Bengal, I am deeply indebted to him for the encouragement that he has given me in the pursuit of 
my studies and researches, and my feelings of attachment and gratefulness for him are too deep for 
utterance.” (Dasgupta, History, xi). 
16 Eliade, Autobiography, 145. 
17 Eliade, Autobiography, 150. 
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Apparently Eliade already then knew that he would concentrate his studies in 
India on Yoga. 
 
“Eliade had selected Yoga as his thesis subject even before leaving for India 
in 1928; he wrote to his friend Petru Comarnescu less than two months after 
arriving in Calcutta: ‘My book about the psychology and metaphysics of 
Yoga will serve as a doctoral thesis.’”18 
 
Whence this interest in Yoga in the young Romanian student? 
 
First of all, Eliade’s character had a natural affinity with certain aspects of Yoga. 
In Ordeal by Labyrinth he tells about his „war against sleep“ when he was a 
youth.19 Feeling that he was losing too much time by sleeping seven or seven and 
a half hours each night, he began to set his alarm clock two minutes earlier every 
day, gaining thus 14 minutes in one week. When he was down to six and a half 
hours he interrupted the process for three months and then resumed it. Once he 
had reached four and a half hours of sleep he started having fits of dizziness and 
had to give up. Yoga, in its endeavour to control natural processes of body and 
mind, is akin to this battle against sleep. 
 
“The body desires movement, so you immobilize it in a single position – an 
āsana; you cease to behave like a human body but like a stone or a plant 
instead. Breathing is naturally arhythmic, so prāṇāyāma forces you to breathe 
to a strict rhythm. Our psychomental life is in a constant state of agitation – 
Patañjali defines it as cittavṛtti, „whirlpools of consciousness“ – so 
„concentration“ enables one to control that whirling flux. Yoga is in a way a 
war against instinct, against life.“20 
 
Living a yogic life at Shivananda’s Svarga Ashram, Eliade, for a few months in 
1930/31, enjoyed an ascetic existence defying the laws of physiological nature.21 
Yoga thus finally enabled him (at least temporarily) to defeat sleep.  
 
                                                 
18 Ricketts, Eliade I, 487. 
19 Eliade, Labyrinth, 43-44. 
20 Eliade, Labyrinth, 44. Ricketts writes (1988, I, 352): “Eliade acknowledges that Yoga is an exercise of 
the will over the flesh, and therefore akin to his efforts from adolescence on to develop an invincible 
will.” 
21 “I was restricting myself to only a few hours of sleep, and I was able to do a great many things 
without becoming tired or bored. Outside of the hours devoted to meditation and yogic exercises, I 
read Sanskrit texts every day, I worked on my thesis, I wrote articles for Cuvântul, and at nights I 
continued Lumina ce se stinge. […] (Eliade, Autobiography, 191). “Sometimes I slept only two or three 
hours a night, yet I was never tired. I worked all the time, and I worked better than ever before. I 
understood then the basis of all that vainglorious beatitude that some ascetics, masters of Haṭhayoga, 
proclaim. I understood, too, the reason why certain yogis consider themselves to be like the gods, if 
not even superior to them, and why they talk about the transmutation and even the immortality of the 
body.” (Eliade, Autobiography, 198). 
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Another reason why Eliade felt drawn towards Yoga was his disinterest in 
monism and his preference of a philosophy which did not declare the world and 
the body to be an illusion.22 
 
“[…], that which seemed to me original, and that which tended to be 
neglected by the Indian elite as well as by Western scholars, was Tantric 
yoga. I discovered in the Tantric texts that India was not entirely ascetic, 
idealistic, and pessimistic. There exists a whole tradition that accepts life and 
the body; it does not consider them illusory nor the source of suffering, but 
exalts incarnate existence as the only mode of being in the world in which 
absolute freedom can be won. From then on I understood that India has 
known not only the desire for liberation (eliberare), but also the thirst for 
freedom (libertate); India has believed in the possibility of a blessed and 
autonomous existence, here on earth and in Time. I was to develop these 
ideas in my doctoral thesis […].”23 
 
The possibility to exploit an academically still barren field combined with the 
promise of practical experience in a world and with a body that actually existed 
attracted Eliade to Yoga. In a letter to a friend he wrote in 1936, when his Yoga, 
Essai sur les origines de la mystique indienne had been published: 
 
“I believe I have been able to demonstrate a wholly new thing: the tendency 






2.2.1. Yoga philosophy vs. Yoga practice 
 
When, in August 1928, Eliade got the Maharaja’s favourable reply to his request, 
he could hardly believe his luck. “It was like a dream”25 - which came true. After 
finishing his thesis and overcoming all adminstrative and financial obstacles 
Eliade left Bucharest at the end of November of the same year. He travelled as the 
Romanian representative for an international conference of the YMCA which was 
going to be held in Poonamallee, near Madras, in December. This explains why he 
went to South India first and how it was possible that he met Dasgupta for the 
                                                 
22 “Although he studied classical Vedānta philosophy with Dasgupta and practiced Yoga later under 
the Vedantin Shivananda, neither the ancient nor modern forms of Indian monism ever appealed to 
Eliade’s spirit.” (Ricketts, Eliade I, 381). “[…] if I became interested in such Yoga techniques, it was 
because it was impossible for me to understand India solely through what I had learned by reading 
the great Indianists and their books on Vedāntic philosophy, according to which the world is an 
illusion – maya – or through the monumental system of rituals. [...] I knew that somewhere there 
existed a third way, no less important, and that it entailed the practice of Yoga.“ (Eliade, Labyrinth, 
44) „Both Yoga and Sāṃkhya profess dualism: matter on the one hand, spirit on the other. However, it 
was not this dualism as such that interested me; it was the fact that, in both Sāṃkhya and Yoga, man, 
the world, and life are not illusory. Life is real, the world is real. And one can master the world, gain 
control of life. What is more, in Tantrism, for example, by performing certain rituals, which must be 
prepared for the use of Yoga over a long period, human life can be transfigured. [...] Life can be 
transfigured by a sacramental experience.“ (Eliade, Labyrinth, 54) 
23 Eliade, Autobiography, 176. 
24 Quoted by Ricketts, Eliade II, 745. 
25 Eliade, Autobiography, 150. 
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first time, quite by chance, in the Theosophical Library at Adyar.26 Eliade arrived 
in Calcutta on New Year’s eve of 1928 where he settled at the boarding house of 
Mrs. Perris at 82 Ripon Street. He immediately started to learn Sanskrit, “working 
for twelve hours a day with a grammar, a dictionary, and a text,”27 and he also 
attended Dasgupta’s classes at university.28  
 
“Dasgupta displayed toward Eliade the utmost consideration and gave him 
all the assistance he could. Besides lecturing in English and finding him a 
tutor, he let him come to his home two or three times a week, to work in his 
private library […].”29 
 
Soon it became evident that Eliade’s interests did not coincide with Dasgupta’s, as 
far as Yoga was concerned. Professor Dasgupta had published three books on 
Yoga philosophy30 and he was the greatest authority on the subject of Sāṃkhya-
Yoga of his time.31 He did not share Eliade’s wish to explore Tantric texts or to 
even venture out into practical Yoga experiences.32 On the other hand, Eliade 
“knew that Dasgupta had said everything essential on the subject of Yoga 
philosophy and its place in the history of Indian thought” and that “it would 
have been useless for [him] to review this problem again”33 and, last but not least, 
Yoga as a system of philosophy could not captivate Eliade’s attention as much as 
it had fascinated his preceptor’s mind: “Beside Vedānta or Mahayana, Yoga 
‘philosophy’ seemed to me rather commonplace.”34 He therefore insisted on 
including Tantric material in his thesis. 
 
“Little by little, Dasgupta let himself be persuaded. His reservations were 
mainly of a practical nature. It seemed to him that I was in danger of being 
drawn into many domains in which I could not always master the 
documentation at first hand. He was right, of course, but in the fall of 1929 I 
had an infinite faith in my capacity to learn.”35 
 
                                                 
26 “He had come there to examine certain Sanskrit manuscripts that he needed for the third volume of 
his History of Indian Philosophy. At that time he was about forty-five; he was short, almost fat, and 
his round face was lighted by a big smile.” (Eliade, Autobiography, 159). 
27 Ricketts, Eliade I, 341. 
28 „I was the only European, and for my sake Dasgupta gave his lectures in English for almost two 
years.“ (Eliade, Autobiography, 160) 
29 Ricketts, Eliade I, 343. 
30 The Study of Patañjali. Calcutta: University, 1920; Yoga as Philosophy and Religion. London, New 
York: K. Paul Trench Trubner, 1924; Yoga Philosophy in Relation to other Systems of Indian Thought. 
Calcutta: University, 1930. 
31 Cf. Ricketts, Eliade I, 487. 
32 “Dasgupta preferred me to concentrate on the history of the doctrines of yoga, or on the 
relationships among classical Yoga, Vedānta, and Buddhism. I, on the contrary, felt attracted by 
Tantrism and the different forms of popular yoga; that is, as it is found in epic poetry, legends, and 
folklore.” (Eliade, Autobiography, 176) 
33 Eliade, Autobiography, 176. 
34 Eliade, Autobiography, 176. 
35 Eliade, Autobiography, 176. “Dasgupta had some reservations about his pupil’s proposed thesis 
subject, but he approved it, perhaps because a large part of the writing would deal with Sāmkhya 
philosophy and Patañjali’s Yoga, whose texts Eliade had studied thoroughly under his supervision.” 
(Ricketts, Eliade I, 499). 
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Finally, “the title agreed upon […] was A Comparative History of Yoga Techniques” 
indicating that “the thesis was to deal with the subject historically, with emphasis 
on the practice of Yoga, rather than the underlying theory of ‘metaphysics’.”36  
 
Thus, Eliade’s preoccupation with Yoga in Calcutta ran along two lines. On the 
one hand he studied Yoga philosophy with Dasgupta, on the other hand he was 
free to pursue what interested him most,  
 
“the ‘popular’ forms of yoga that existed all around him in India, and even 
more so in the all-pervasive presence of yoga in the manifold religious 
traditions (Vaishnavite, Shaivite, Buddhist, Tantric, etc.) of India and their 
literature after a certain time.”37 
 
As a historian of religions he wanted to compile a history of Yoga and for this he 
had to study all manifestations of Yoga, not only read abouts its philosophy. 
Dasgupta, on the other hand, 
 
„[...] did not in his books speculate on the origins of yoga practice. He 
believed Yoga had developed prior to the inception of Buddhism and had 
been joined with Sāmkhya philosophy by Patañjali, sometime between the 
fourth and second centuries B. C. […] Thus, he recognized yoga practice as 
something existing prior to and independent of any philosophical school, 
but this kind of yoga was of no particular concern to him, and he paid scant 
attention to it in his books. He was interested only in the origins of yoga 
philosophy, which he seems to have regarded as something that evolved 
within Brahmanism.”38 
 
His disciple eventually filled the gap left by his master (as far as yoga practice 
was concerned) and reached the following conclusion: 
 
“It is […] difficult to admit that the structure of yogic practices in general 
appertains to the Indo-Aryan spirit. Everything urges us to believe that they 
are the creation of the Indian soil, and therefore are pre-Aryan.”39 
 
Given Dasgupta’s apparent disinterest in the practical side of Yoga it is curious to 
learn that Eliade again and again asked him to initiate him into yogic practice. 
Quite obviously he thought the professor capable of doing that.40 But Dasgupta 
never showed Eliade any exercise, even though at least once he spontaneously 
promised his pupil to do so.41 To Eliade’s pleading he would reply: “Wait a little; 
it really is essential to know it all from the philological and philosophical 
viewpoint,” and: “Practicing Yoga is even more difficult for you Europeans than 
it is for us Hindus.”42 When, in spring 1929, Eliade for the first time witnessed a 
demonstration of yogic powers in a Bengal village, Dasgupta had nothing to do 
                                                 
36 Ricketts, Eliade I, 494. 
37 Ricketts, Eliade I, 499. 
38 Ricketts, Eliade I, 499. 
39 Quoted by Ricketts, Eliade I, 501. 
40 „[...] he was from a family of pandits, in a Bengali village, so that he was master of the entire 
traditional culture of such Indian villages.“ (Eliade, Labyrinth, 36) 
41 „On the road to Shanti Niketan, without my asking him, he had promised to initiate me into the 
practice of yoga. But in the visits he made to me on Ripon Street, he concerned himself more with the 
technical vocabulary of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, on which I had begun to work, and with my doctoral thesis.” 
(Eliade, Autobiography, 175-176) 
42 Eliade, Labyrinth, 36. 
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with the event.43 But, in an indirect and sadly ironical way, Dasgupta ended up 
being responsible for a period of intense Yoga practice in Eliade’s life: When he 
expelled his beloved pupil from his house, in September 1930, Eliade took refuge 
in Rishikesh and finally got plenty of opportunities to experience what so far he 
had only read about (cf. chapter 2.3). 
 
 
2.2.2. Interlude: Yogendra’s visit of Dasgupta 
 
Eliade was not the first man to be disappointed by Dasgupta’s unwillingness to 
say or do much as far as Yoga practice was concerned. Some six years prior to 
Eliade’s arrival in India, in the early months of 1923, the young yogi Yogendra44 
travelled from the West Coast of India to Chittagong where Dasgupta used to live 
at that time. The two had met by chance, in 1922, on a boat from London to 
Bombay. 
 
“The erudite don saw the young man browsing through books in the ship’s 
library. Intrigued by this interest he casually asked him his name and where 
he had come from. Prof. Dasgupta was amazed to learn that the young man 
was not just a book worm but a great Yoga teacher, scholar and Founder of 
The Yoga Institute in India and America. Greatly impressed by his 
earnestness and knowledge the two became great friends. They sometimes 
played chess together and discussed Yoga philosophy. At parting, the 
international authority on Indian philosophy and professor of Sanskrit 
invited Swamiji to visit him in Chittagong, Bengal.”45 
 
Upon his return to India, after more than two years spent in the USA, Yogendra 
felt the need for a scientific and academic corroboration for all he had learned 
from his guru Madhavdasji, prior to his travel to the West. 
 
“It was time for more research in Yoga. The West was a witness to the 
wonders of Yoga but more proof of a scientific nature were [sic] required to 
make a lasting impact. Shri Yogendra set his mind on looking for 
documented evidence. Not much was known about the history of Yoga and 
he decided to find out more to make the history more factual. The 
apocryphal sources had to be verified and an academic investigation seemed 
to be the only way to lending authenticity to the ancient lore.”46 
 
With this in mind he set out for Chittagong where he spent two months at 
Dasgupta’s house. They talked about philosophy and Yogendra demonstrated 
Yoga at the Medical College of Chittagong, and yet he remained unsatisfied and 
ultimately disappointed. According to Yogendra’s son, Vijayadeva Yogendra, 
Dasgupta advised the young yogi from Gujarat mainly along business lines47 and 
                                                 
43 Ricketts, Eliade I, 382-383. 
44 Who, in 1918, had founded the Yogendra Institute in Santa Cruz, Bombay. 
45 Rodrigues, Yogendra, 116. 
46 Rodrigues, Yogendra, 120. 
47 “Like so many of the “intellectuals” of the time, he saw every venture in terms of “success” and 
economy. Deft in theory, but gullible when it came to practice, the doctor told Shri Yogendra his 
mission lacked appeal. There was a need for many followers, flowing yellow robes and a dedicated 
disciple – such things were indispensable in impressing the public and creating the required air of 
mysticism. […] The doctor’s suggestion was that Shri Yogendra should meet the Maharajah of 
Kashimbazar so that the yoga renaissance could be organized on a more elaborate scale. Inquiries 
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failed to understand that the latter was working “towards a noble goal in a 
singlehanded way, and with scrupulously honest and independent 
foundations.”48 Vijayadeva’s verdict about Dasgupta is as clear as it is blunt:  
 
“[…] the famous doctor did not live up to his reputation for wisdom.”49 
 
Yogendra’s other biographer, Rodrigues, finds kinder words for Dasgupta, but 
only as far as his theoretical knowledge is concerned. 
 
“The two had quite a few successful philosophical exchanges, the theorist 
could extend his empirical mind to investigate the problems posed by the 
young mind, but when it came to the practical aspects, the learned Professor 
was unable to do much.”50 
 
This is the point where Yogendra’s experience joins that of Eliade. And the Indian 
yogi and the Romanian student have yet something else in common: Both turned 
to the Himalayas looking for what they could not get in Bengal. Eliade went to 
Rishikesh and Yogendra “moved Northwards in quest of more knowledge.”51 
Whereas Eliade found what he had been searching for (cf. chapter 2.3) Yogendra’s 
“harvest” appears to have been rather mixed, according to the following account. 
 
“Shri Yogendra spent two months in Punjab – March and April 1923 visiting 
Bohar and Tillah hermitages and taking notes for a comprehensive book on 
Hathayoga which he intended to write. […] he made notes on what he saw 
in Yoga techniques. Here he came in contact with the oldest traditional 
institution of Goraksha and Matsyendra, known popularly as nathayogins. 
[…] The place [one of the maṭhs] was interesting, but not much knowledge 
was gained. […] 
Kashmir was no different. By rail or road, on foot or horseback or donkey-
back, Shri Yogendra was on the trail of knowledge but the trip yielded 
nothing, or at best, precious little.”52 
 
Since we have no first-hand testimony of how much Yogendra actually learned 
about Yoga during his visit of North India, it may be legitimate to think that it 
was a bit more than what Rodrigues would like to make us believe… And I 
would also like to add that Dasgupta’s endeavour to help Yogendra get in touch 
with a possible sponsor for his yogic mission was not as inappropriate as 
                                                                                                                                                        
revealed that the Maharaja was not in Calcutta, and Shri Yogendra, with his characteristic 
indifference, parted company with his academic colleague […].” (Yogendra, Yogendra, 71-72). 
48 Yogendra, Yogendra, 71. 
49 Yogendra, Yogendra, 71. 
50 Rodrigues, Yogendra, 120. Yogendra’s disappointment with Dasgupta’s lack of knowledge with 
Yoga practice (or unwillingness to part with any of it) did not hamper their personal relationship. 
When the young yogi started to look for a suitable wife, he also contacted the professor from Bengal 
who gave him the following answer: “I cannot propose any easy solution but I suppose if you want a 
beautiful and educated Bengali bride, you must have a residence here and you must be known as a 
man of means. Both these require that you should remain for some time in Calcutta and get properly 
introduced to the right persons and become intimate in the elite social circle of Calcutta. You cannot 
get a suitable bride with a fourteen day return ticket.” In fact Mrs. Dasgupta was so charmed with him 
from his earlier meeting that she would have been happy to suggest that her sister marry him. But 
Shri Yogendra was hardly the type who would settle down in Calcutta as would be required.” 
(Rodrigues, Yogendra, 130-131) 
51 Rodrigues, Yogendra, 122. 
52 Rodrigues, Yogendra, 124-126. 
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Vijayadeva presented it: While on his tour through North India, and encouraged 
by Pandit Thakur Dutt Sharma,Yogendra tried to open an institute near Simla, 
but “the untimely death of the Pandit’s son in Europe took the impetus from the 
scheme”53 – read: took the money from the scheme. After another failure 
Yogendra felt very frustrated: 
 
“In America money had been given freely with a sense of duty towards a 
noble cause, but in India, it seemed he was looked upon as a beggar trying to 
eke out a living.”54 
 
 
2.2.3. Dasgupta – a secret yogi? 
 
Yogendra’s visit to Chittagong gave rise to a testimony which is interesting for 
two reasons: First of all, it indicates that Yoga in the 1920-ies still belonged to the 
realm of people who had renounced the world and were free of family-ties, and, 
secondly, we very indirectly learn something about Dasgupta and Yoga. In a 
letter to Yogendra’s son, Dr. Jayadeva Yogendra, Surendranath’s daughter, 
Maitreyi Devi, wrote many years later: 
 
“Yes, I remember Yogendradada quite well. I was then eight to nine years 
old. He was handsome, very handsome indeed. […] Yogendra was accepted 
like a family member. My father and Yogendra sat in the library discussing 
philosophy. Yogendra demonstrated some yogic acts, dhouti, neti etc., for the 
benefit of my father’s friends. He would show many asanas, many 
impossible positions and postures and create a commotion among the 
professors of Chittagong College, neighbouring household friends and 
relations. At that time no one knew that Yoga could be practised by ordinary 
men […].”55 
 
Maitreyi attributes the surprised reactions to Yogendra’s demonstrations to 
everybody except her immediate family, particularly her father – this may be just 
a simple inadvertence on the part of the writer, but Dasgupta could hardly have 
been astonished, let alone shaken by them, since he himself used to practise 
āsanas when he was a boy. 
 
“During the ages of five to eight […] I could […] demonstrate the various 
Yogic postures (āsanas) and also give practical instruction to people 
regarding the complicated processes of internal and external washings 
technically known as the dhouti by the Yogins.”56 
 
His second wife and biographer comments on this as follows: 
 
“I failed to understand also how he could show the different yogic postures, 
without being initiated into them. Whenever asked about this, he used to say 
that he could not explain this fact, but added that this was no reason to 
postulate the theory that he must have acquired these practices in a previous 
birth.”57 
                                                 
53 Yogendra, Yogendra, 72. 
54 Yogendra, Yogendra, 73. 
55 Quoted by Rodrigues, Yogendra, 121. 
56 Dasgupta, Emergence, 251. 
57 Dasgupta, Quest, 47. 
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In Surama Dasgupta’s book about her husband we also read that he experienced 
spontaneous “trance-states or samādhi” from his early childhood and that these 
states “never left him and continued all through his life.”58 I will get back to this 
subject in chapter 3.4.; for the time being it is enough to notice that Dasgupta did 
have some practical experience in Yoga and that Eliade was right in assuming 
that his teacher could have helped him in this field. After all, he had encountered 
sages at Dasgupta’s who were well-versed in meditation and it is likely that 
Dasgupta did talk with them about their (and maybe even his own) experiences. 
 
“I had […] listened to other saddhu [sic] and contemplatives, in Calcutta, in 
Dasgupta’s house, and in Santiniketan, where I had met Tagore; one had 
constant opportunities to meet people who had already practiced some 
particular method of meditation.”59 
 
But Dasgupta always “kept this [mystical] side of his life as a guarded and sacred 
secret”60 and did not want to share any of it with either his favourite pupil from 
Romania or with the young yogi from Gujarat. Maybe this has got something to 
do with the fact that both āsanas and altered states of consciousness had come to 
him spontaneously, whereas the “real yogis” had to labour hard for them. 
 
 
2.2.4. Love and its consequences 
 
At the end of 1929 Dasgupta thought Eliade fit enough for a life in an Indian 
household and he invited his student to join his family. On January 2, 1930, Eliade 
moved from Ripon Street to Dasgupta’s house on Bokulbagan Road in 
Bhawanipore where he stayed until September 18. On that day, the professor 
summoned his pupil to his study and told him to leave his residence and his 
family immediately. “None of us ever saw one another again after that.”61 
September 18 also meant the end of Dasgupta’s protection and teaching of Eliade. 
Thus, instead of “three years of study at the University of Caluctta (1928-31) 
under the direction of Professor Surendranath Dasgupta”62 Eliade has benefitted 
from the guidance and vast knowledge of his tutor no longer than 21 months.63 
What had preceded the sudden and (for both sides) painful expulsion of Eliade 
was what he later called “a long, blessed, and yet terrifying dream of a summer 
night.”64 The young and promising Romanian student, then aged 23, and 
Dasgupta’s daughter Maitreyi, 16, who was just about to publish her first book of 
poems, had fallen in love with each other. They were both working on the index 
for the second volume of A History of Indian Philosophy in Dasgupta’s library when 
“one day our hands met over the little box of cards, and we could not unclasp 
them.”65  
                                                 
58 Dasgupta, Quest, 43-44. 
59 Eliade, Labyrinth, 41.  
60 Dasgupta, Quest, 45. 
61 Eliade, Autobiography, 186. 
62 Eliade, Yoga, xx. 
63 In other words: Eliade got roughly two years with Dasgupta, which, ironically, is what he had 
originally asked for, in his very first letter to the Maharaja of Kassimbazar.  
64 Eliade, Autobiography, 185. 
65 Eliade, Autobiography, 185. 
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Whatever happened afterwards remains subject to debate. According to Eliade, 
“love grew and was fulfilled as it was destined to be.”66 Back in Romania, in 1933, 
he wrote a highly autobiographical novel entitled Maitreyi, describing the tragic 
course of their secret love. Maitreyi Devi learned about the contents of this book 
only in 1972 when she met Sergui Sebastian, a friend of Eliade’s. 
 
“[…] off and on I have heard about the book, named after me, but I never 
asked anyone about the contents of that book. Is it a story, or a book of 
poems, or a dissertation? I never cared to enquire. Today I ask you, tell me, 
what is in that book?”67 
 
Upon hearing “He has written that you used to visit him at night,” she cried out: 
“Scandalous! Believe me, Sergui, that is not true!”68 and although Sebastian 
reassured her that Eliade “took shelter in the world of fantasy” and that this “was 
the only way left to him to escape from the suffering,”69 Devi immediately started 
writing her counterstatement, anxious to restore her reputation. Na hanyate (It 
Does not Die) was published in Bengali in 1974 and is a puzzlingly honest account 
of the intense and bewildering feelings both the young and old Maitreyi were 
subject to in connection with Eliade. In simple yet very poetic language 
Dasgupta’s daughter blends the events of 1930 with her life in 1972 and gives a 
rough outline of what has happened in-between. She does not even try to hide the 
fact that somehow she never got over the loss of her first love. It Does not Die 
definitely deserves a careful literary analysis but this would, unfortunately, go 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
During the nine months Eliade spent in Bhawanipore he increasingly felt that 
“the whole family was conspiring to cause us [Maitreyi and him] to be together as 
much as possible”70 and he was sure that Dasgupta would let him marry 
Maitreyi. Much later he saw that he had fallen victim to a misunderstanding. 
 
“There was no such conspiracy. It is probable that Dasgupta had something 
entirely different in mind: namely, to introduce me into his family by a kind 
of “adoption.” It is probable that he was planning to relocate to Europe. 
King Carol II was then on the throne in Romania, and Nae Ionescu [Eliade’s 
professor in Bucharest] had become one of his intimate counselors. Dasgupta 
had written the king, describing me as one with a great future in Indian 
studies, and suggesting that the king establish an Oriental institute at 
Bucharest. He had written likewise to Nae Ionescu, insisting that he allow 
me to stay three or four years in India to study with him. Perhaps Dasgupta 
had in mind to come to Romania for some length of time as a guest of the 
institute. The political situation in India was being aggravated constantly, 
and the climate of Bengal did not agree with him (he suffered from 
hypertension and was threatened with the loss of his right eye.) He would 
have liked, certainly, to have settled in Europe – to live in Rome, where 
Tucci had invited him, or in Bucharest, where he would have had me, his 
favorite pupil and, in a certain sense, his adoptive son.”71 
                                                 
66 Eliade, Autobiography, 185. 
67 Devi, It Does not Die, 12. 
68 Devi, It Does not Die, 13. 
69 Devi, It Does not Die, 14. 
70 Eliade, Autobiography, 184. 
71 Eliade, Autobiography, 184-185. 
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Whether Dasgupta’s kindness towards Eliade was motivated by any ulterior 
motive or not is impossible to tell, but it is very likely that on September 18, 1930, 
not only Eliade’s and Maitreyi’s hearts broke but also Dasgupta’s.72 Despite his 
wife’s pleading for the happiness of their love-stricken daughter he remained 
absolutely adamant and ejected his beloved student as soon as he learned about 
this illicit relationship. 
 
Eliade returns to Ripon Street for a few days and then leaves Calcutta for 
Rishikesh. 
 
“[…] I felt there was nothing to keep me in a place where, without Dasgupta, 
I had no reason for being.”73 
 
After some weeks in the Himalaya, he resorted to a way of looking at things 
which maybe consoled his wounded heart: He viewed his breakup with 
Dasgupta in the light of a real guru-disciple relationship which would outlast the 
span of their earthly life.74 Although they never met again, Dasgupta remained 
Eliade’s guru,75 and the professor, on his part, acknowledged Eliade’s help for the 
index of the second volume of his History of Indian Philosophy, published in 1932,76 
and a few years later he even contacted his former student in Europe.77  
 
 
                                                 
72 In January 1930, Dasgupta had written, in the preface to his book Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other 
Systems of Indian Thought: „I beg to acknowledge my gratefulness to [...] my friend and pupil Dr. [sic!] 
Mircea Eliade Licèncié [sic] es lettres, doctorand en philosophie of the University of Bucharest, who 
helped me in preparing the index.” 
73 Eliade, Labyrinth, 40. 
74 “[…] I understood that my drama itself followed a traditional model: it was necessary that my 
relations with Dasgupta pass beyond the phase of candor and superficiality and know the tensions 
and conflicts that characterize the beginning of true rapport between guru and disciple. Marpa, for 
instance, persecuted his favorite disciple, Milarepa, for years. I told myself that I was now in the phase 
of ‘trials.’ Although I had been banished in a brutal way from Bhawanipore, Dasgupta would 
acknowledge me someday as his true disciple – but this would take place on another plane, in 
aeternum and not in saeculum.” (Eliade, Autobiography, 189) 
75 Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, is dedicated to “my guru, Professor Surendranath Dasgupta”. 
76 “My thanks are also due to my pupils, Dr M. Eleade (Bucharest), Mr Janakiballabh Bhattacharyya, 
M.A., and my other friends, Messrs Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Durgacharan Chatterjee, M.A., Srish 
Chandra Dasgupta, M.A., and my daughter, Miss Maitreyi Devi, for the assistance they rendered me 
in getting the manuscript ready for the press, inserting diacritical marks, comparing the references 
and the like, and also in arranging the index cards.” (Preface, vii-viii) 
77 „In the spring of 1939, after I had published Yoga and the review Zalmoxis, when he was an route to 
England, Dasgupta telegraphed me from Rome that he wanted to see me. But due to conditions 
beyond our control, we were unable to meet.” (Eliade, Autobiography, 189) 
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2.3. Yoga in Rishikesh 
 
Eliade reached Rishikesh at the end of September 1930, and as soon as he saw 
Śivānanda’s Svarga Ashram he knew that this was the place where he wanted to 
stay. He was given a solitary hut which would be his home for the next six 
months. At that time, Śivānanda had been living in Rishikesh for about six years 
and he was still unknown.78 Eliade felt drawn towards the Swami  
 
„[...] because he had been given a Western education. Like Dasgupta. He 
was a man who knew the culture of India through and through and could 
also communicate it to a Westerner. He wasn’t particularly well educated in 
an academic sense, but he did have many years’ experience of the 
Himalayas: he knew all the Yoga exercises, all the meditation techniques. 
And he was a physician, which meant that he understood our problems.“79 
 
Unfortunately Eliade remains vague when it comes to describing the yoga 
practice he learnt at Svarga Ashram and which turned him into a “changed man” 
by Christmas.80 But whatever he does reveal clearly indicates that the main focus 
was on concentration and meditation rather than on physical exercises. 
 
„[...] their yoga is a private discipline, a course of treatment for the body, an 
agent of circulation in the mental torrent, a pure and powerful aid in 
exercises of concentration, meditation, and samādhi. The more successfully 
the discipline proceeds, the more silent and withdrawn the disciple 
becomes.”81 
 
Only once he mentions that he also practised āsanas.82 Apart from that, the 
sentence „treatment for the body“ in the quotation above is as close as he gets to 
the physical aspect of Yoga. Regulation of breath (prāṇāyāma) however, which can 
be regarded as a physical practice too, at least partly, is referred to as a 
preliminary exercise for meditation. 
 
„[...] he [Śivānanda] helped me a little with the practical side of breath 
control, meditation, contemplation.”83  
                                                 
78 The medical doctor from South India (who never completed medical school, though), had returned 
to India in 1923, after working as medical practitioner and assistant in Malaya for 10 years. On June 1, 
1924, he was initiated into saṃnyāsa by Paramahansa Viswananda Saraswati in Rishikesh and took up 
a solitary life at Svarga Ashram. From 1925 to 1931 he visited many pilgrimage places and, by 1933, 
his popularity started growing. (Cf. Miller, Divine Life, 92-97) 
79 Eliade, Labyrinth, 41. 
80 “What can be said about the results of the various preliminary exercises, I have described as 
precisely as I can in my works on yoga. The other exercises and experiences must be passed over in 
silence, because I am bound to remain faithful to the Indian tradition that agrees to communicate the 
secrets of initiation only from guru to desciple. Besides, I doubt that I should be able to describe 
exactly – that is, in scientific prose – certain experiences.” (Eliade, Autobiography, 190). 
81 Quoted by Ricketts, 1988, I, 351. 
82 During the night before definitely leaving the āśram, „[…] I remained motionless, seated beside the 
wall where I had learned the first yogic postures and had accustomed myself to rhythmic respiration, 
concentrating on a single mental object.“ (Eliade, Autobiography, 199) 
83 Eliade, Labyrinth, 41. 
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Prāṇāyāma as an essential element in reaching altered states of consciousness was 
also what Eliade observed in the practice of his next-door neighbour, “a nāga 
ascetic from the south [who] spent a good part of the day and night meditating.”84 
He did 
 
„[…] ’that terrifying technique by which he carries consciousness over into 
sleep – a sleep without dreams – and even into the state of catalepsy.’ The 
method entailed reducing the breathing intervals to four minutes. Eliade 
was amazed but he does not say he ever attempted to learn this kind of 
yoga.”85 
 
Yet in his short novel The Secret of Dr. Honigberger Eliade talks at length about 
exactly this method, employed by the fictitious Dr. Zerlendi in his efforts to step 
out of time and space in order to travel to the mystical place Shambala. Zerlendi 
starts with the practice of prāṇāyāma, regulating his breath “according to 
Patañjali’s text,”86 fixing his thoughts on one object. This leads him to the 
following experience (put down in his notebook): 
 
„I seemed to be in the midst of a raging sea, which gradually became calmer 
before my eyes, until nothing remained but a limitless sheet of water, 
without a single wave, without even the slightest tremor. Then came a 
feeling of abundance, which I can compare with nothing except the feeling 
that sometimes comes over you after listening to a lot of Mozart. [...] I ran 
through the exercise once again, but after some time had passed the result 
was the same: reverie, sleepiness, or an incomparable mental calm…“87 
 
Two months later Zerlendi reaches a stage where he can inhale, hold his breath 
and exhale in a rhythm of 12 seconds for each phase while he concentrates on the 
element fire.  
 
„I really don’t know how it happened, but after some time I woke up sleeping, 
or, more precisely, I woke up in sleep, without having fallen asleep in the 
true sense of the word. My body and all my senses sank into deeper and 
deeper sleep, but my mind didn’t interrupt its activity for a single instant. 
Everything in me had fallen asleep except the clarity of consciousness. I 
continued to meditate on fire, at the same time becoming aware, in some 
obscure way, that the world around me was completely changed, and that if 
I interrupted my concentration for a single instant, I too would quite 
naturally become part of this world, which was the world of sleep…”88 
 
The narrator (which Eliade explicitly identified with himself89) comments as 
follows: 
 
„He [Dr. Zerlendi] had achieved what is called in technical terms continuity 
of consciousness – passing from the consciousness of the waking state to the 
consciousness of the sleeping state without a break of any sort.“90 
 
                                                 
84 Eliade, Autobiography, 191. 
85 Ricketts, Eliade I, 351. 
86 Eliade, Honigberger, 97. 
87 Eliade, Honigberger, 97-98. 
88 Eliade, Honigberger, 98-99. 
89 Eliade, Labyrinth, 48: “[…] what other Romanian had gone to India, had written on Yoga? The 
narrator must therefore be Eliade.” 
90 Eliade, Honigberger, 99. 
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In great detail Zerlendi then describes the transformation of the world around 
him while he remains in this state of waking sleep, for example: 
 
„[...] hypnosis was completely excluded, especially since I maintained 
uninterrupted clarity of consciousness; I knew who I was, why I found 
myself in such a position, why I was breathing rhythmically, and for what 
purpose I was meditating on fire. 
And yet, I was at the same time aware that I was in a different space, a 
different world. I no longer felt my body at all, only a vague warmth in my 
head, and this too disappeared in time. Things seemed to be constantly 
flowing, yet without changing their shape very much. At first you would 
have said you were seeing everything as if through turbulent water – but the 
comparison is not at all exact. Things actually were flowing, some more 
slowly, others very rapidly, but it would be impossible to say where they 
were flowing or by what miraculous process their substance was not 
consumed by this pouring out beyond their natural limits […].“91 
 
This sounds like a report of somebody who has actually lived what he describes, 
and we can assume that Eliade is giving here an account of some of his own 
experiences with Yoga. At several occasions he has mentioned that in fiction (and 
particularly in his short novel on Dr Honigberger) he wrote about the practical 
aspect of Yoga in a way he could not have done in a scientific work.92 If Zerlendi’s 
notes really reflect (at least partly) Eliade’s yogic achievements, we can determine 
quite clearly how far they reached. Dr Zerlendi filled several pages about his 
experiences of being awake in a dreaming state, but as soon as he goes deeper in 
his meditation the notes become scarce. As the narrator (Eliade) states: 
„Concerning the transition from the state of dreaming sleep to the state of deep 
sleep without dreams I find very few details.“93 The only clear statement is that 
prāṇāyāma (in the sense of extending the time of inhaling, exhaling and holding 
the breath) is again the key exercise which leads the mind to other spheres of 
consciousness: 
 
„I have succeeded in letting still more time pass between exhalation and 
inhalation: some fifteen seconds for each phase, occasionally reaching 
twenty seconds.“94 
 
What happens in these new spheres however remains vague – Zerlendi writes a 
few lines about colours and sounds and the narrator has to resort to Mantra-Yoga 
texts in order to speculate about where the doctor’s mind has gone.95 This could 
be the point where Eliade no longer drew from his own experiences but had to 
rely on books and on his knowledge about India, occultism and psychology in 
                                                 
91 Eliade, Honigberger, 100. 
92 „In describing Zerlendi’s Yoga exercises in The Secret of Doctor Honigberger, I included certain pieces 
of information, drawn from my own experiences, that I omitted from my books on Yoga.“ (Eliade, 
Labyrinth, 47) „Later, in 1939, I tried to evoke some yogic experiences in a novella, Secretul Doctorului 
Honigberger (The Secret of Doctor Honigberger). The freedom of the artist to ‘invent’ allowed me to 
suggest more, and to do it with more precision, than it would have been possible for me to do in a 
strictly scientific description.” (Eliade, Autobiography, 190) 
93 Eliade, Honigberger, 105. 
94 Eliade, Honigberger, 105. The narrator comments: „This means that he was breathing only once a 
minute, for he held his breath for twenty seconds, took twenty seconds to inhale, and twenty to 
exhale.“ (Eliade, Honigberger, 105) 
95 Cf. Eliade, Honigberger, 105. 
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order to continue Dr Zerlendi’s story. On the one hand he keeps repeating how 
scanty, short or nebulous Zerlendi’s notes have become,96 on the other hand he 
refers to written sources in his attempt to explain the doctor’s progress.97 And 
often he is reduced to speculating about Zerlendi’s spiritual evolution.98 In the 
end, Dr Zerlendi achieves the power to step out of time and space and make 
himself invisible. The narrator flatly refuses to render these passages of the 
doctor’s notes. 
 
„And then suddenly, on the 11th of May, 1910, he returned once more to the 
yogic exercises through which one can achieve the invisibility of the body. 
For readily understandable reasons I will not reproduce here these 
astounding revelations. A strange feeling of panic seized me when I read 
these lines of Dr. Zerlendi’s. There had come to my attention up to that time 
numbers of documents, more or less authentic, which dealt with this yogic 
miracle, but never before had I seen the facts stated so plainly and in such 
detail. When I began the present account, I was still vacillating, uncertain 
whether or not I really ought to include this horrifying page. Now that I 
have got this far, after so many weeks of indecision and worry, I realize that 
things of this sort cannot be revealed.“99 
 
Eliade believed in the reality of such yogic power and he was fascinated by it.100 It 
is likely that he had some personal experiences with it, but most probably not of 
the self-achieved kind (as Zerlendi) but rather as a “victim” of somebody else’s 
deluding force. This at least is what his short novel Nights at Serampore suggests 
where the I-narrator describes an event which allegedly happened to him and 
two men called van Manen and Bogdanof. Since the latter two are historical 
people whom Eliade knew in Calcutta, and since everything the narrator tells 
about himself coincides with what we know about Eliade’s life in that city 
(address, activities etc.) we can safely assume that the narrator again is Eliade 
                                                 
96 For example: „The more startling the results of the yoga techniques become, the more reticent he is 
in telling about them.“ (Eliade, Honigberger, 105) „This is an obscure passage.“ (Eliade, Honigberger, 
107) „This passage is rather cryptic.“ (Eliade, Honigberger, 147) „Moreover, the difficulties with the 
text constantly increase. Some entries seem quite contradictory.“ (Eliade, Honigberger, 117) „And 
these entries, furthermore, are all but indecipherable.“ (Eliade, Honigberger, 118) 
97 „I recall that all the Indian occult treatises speak of the new cosmic levels which the ascetic reaches 
through yoga techniques as being just as ‘illusory’ as the cosmos to which everyone has access in his 
normal condition. On the other hand, I am not sure whether the ‘centers’ he refers to are nerve centers 
or the occult plexuses known to yoga and the other traditions.“ (Eliade, Honigberger, 107) „I wouldn’t 
go so far as to say that this refers to the negative and positive currents of European occult 
therapeutics. It is more likely that the doctor had in mind the two fluids of the Indian occult tradition, 
‘currents’ which run all through the human body, and which according to yogic and tantric teachings 
correspond to the moon and the sun.“ (Eliade, Honigberger, 108) 
98 „I must emphasize, however, that I wouldn’t dare to assert anything too positively, since I have only 
a fragmentary acquaintance with the stages of initiation he went through.“ (Eliade, Honigberger, 108) 
„I surmise that they [the entries] refer to what Dr. Zerlendi called „impersonal consciousness“.“ 
(Eliade, Honigberger, 118) „Oder handelt es sich hier um einen ‚Einfluss’, von dem er nicht spricht? 
Oder vielleicht auch setzte er sein Studium nicht im eigentlich gelehrten Sinne weiter fort, indem er 
die Texte erforschte und über sie nachdachte, sondern indem er durch die genaue Aussprache der 
heiligen Worte, die man in Indien für eine Offenbarung des Logos hält, eine geheimnisvolle Kraft zu 
erwerben versuchte, wie man es dort in Indien für möglich hält.“ (Eliade, Serampore, 161) 
99 Eliade, Honigberger, 120. 
100 „Do you think that what happens to the characters in Midnight in Serampore could happen in fact? – 
Yes, in the sense that one can have an experience so ‘convincing’ that one is forced to regard it as real.“ 
(Eliade, Labyrinth, 47) 
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himself. Nevertheless, the fictitious element is there, but only on a superficial 
level. 
 
„For example, there is mention of a Serampore forest, whereas in fact there is 
no forest there at all. So that if anyone tried to check the plot of the story in 
concreto, he would find that the author is not acting simply as a reporter, 
since the setting is an invented one. He would then be led to conclude that 
all the rest is invented – imaginary – too, which isn’t the case.“101 
 
In Nights at Serampore the yogic power belongs to somebody called Suren Bose, a 
professor from Calcutta who every once in a while retreats into the (fictitious) 
woods around Serampore to participate in tantric practices. When one night the 
three friends get lost in the forest and witness the murder of a young woman and 
the grief of her husband, in a setting which is clearly of a time long gone, and 
when later they learn that all this had happened 150 years ago, they attribute their 
being dislocated from one time and space into another to Suren Bose’s magical 
tantric power.102 
 
Nights at Serampore is an interesting text also because it ends with a conversation 
between the narrator and Śivānanda of Rishikesh who in this text is said to have 
some tantric knowledge. 
 
„[...] he himself had studied and practiced Tantra many years earlier, and I 
hoped to get from him the solution to so many mysteries which I lacked the 
experience to comprehend.“103 
 
Śivānanda, after listening to the narrator’s account of what had happened in 
Serampore, provides the standard Vedānta answer. 
 
„[...] no event in our world is real, my friend. Everything that occurs in this 
universe is illusory. Not only the death of Lila and her husband’s grief, but 
also the encounter between you, living men, and their shades – all these 
things are illusory. And in a world of appearances, in which no thing and no 
event has any permanence, any reality of its own – whoever is master of 
certain forces can do anything he wishes. Obviously he doesn’t create 
anything real either, but only a play of appearances.“104 
 
Seeing that his interlocutor is not convinced, Śivānanda proceeds to a practical 
demonstration: He transfers his disciple back to the same night, to the very same 
house of the grief-stricken Nilamvara. The narrator, terrified at this sight, faints 
and collapses at his guru’s feet. 
 
Fictitious or not, Eliade in any case attributes to his Himalayan (and Vedāntic!) 
guru the same yogic power as a practitioner of Tantra would have had. 
 
                                                 
101 Eliade, Labyrinth, 47. 
102 „[...] the fact is that in one way or another we interrupted Bose in the midst of his meditation. And 
then, in order not to be disturbed, Bose cast us, by means of his occult powers, into another space and 
another time; […] and we became witnesses, you might say, to the murder of Dāsa’s young wife…” 
(Eliade, Serampore, 54) 
103 Eliade, Serampore, 53. 
104 Eliade, Serampore, 59. 
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In real life, Eliade in Rishikesh became engaged in a tantric adventure of a 
different kind which led to his leaving the āśram earlier than he had planned to. 
Ricketts sums it up as follows. 
 
„During an absence of Shivananda from the ashram, Eliade was drawn into 
mystico-erotic Tantric yoga practices with a young woman named Jenny, an 
ex-cellist from South Africa who had come to the Himalaya ‘in search of the 
Absolute.’ […] On learning of Eliade’s interest in Tantric yoga, she drew out 
of him as much information as possible, then induced him, one night, to take 
her for his partner in a Tantric ritual, even though they had no guru to 
initiate them. Once begun, the ‘Tantric rituals’ became a nightly routine, 
until Eliade’s nāga neighbor advised him of the perils of the course he was 
pursuing. Jarred out of his ‘magical trance,’ he realized that having broken 
his brahmacārya vows, he must quit the ashram.”105 
 
Thus, in March 1931, Eliade found himself again leaving a place which initially 
had seemed so promising (Śivānanda had even evoked the possibility of Eliade’s 
becoming another Vivekananda).106  
 
“I had failed my ‘adoption’ by Dasgupta and had, therefore, lost ‘historical’ 
India. And now, as soon as Swami Shivananda’s back was turned, I had also 
lost my chance to integrate ‘eternal,’ trans-historical India. I had no right to 
remain in that ashram.”107 
 
He returns to Ripon Street in Calcutta where he stays until the end of 1931. He 
works furiously at the Imperial Library and at the library of the Asiatic Society, 
continuing his thesis on Yoga. Van Manen and Bogdanov, who were to be his 
companions in Nights at Serampore, became his friends. Eliade was mostly 
interested in pre-Aryan culture and religiosity at that time. As far as Yoga 
practice is concerned, he was introduced, in September, to a young guru at 
Howrah (Calcutta) who turned out to be “the spiritual master I needed, the one 
who could help me better, and more, than all the others.”108  
 
“He impressed me from the start by his lucidity and originality. Almost 
without my confessing them, he guessed all the trials through which I had 
passed. […] He discovered and evaluated unfailingly the experiences I was 
having in connection with the techniques of meditation; and from the second 
meeting with him he helped me to recover everything he calculated I could 
use out of my Himalayan lessons.”109 
 
Again, Yoga corresponds to meditation. 
 
                                                 
105 Ricketts, Eliade I, 355. 
106 „Swami Shivananda marveled at how quickly I mastered the rudiments of yoga practice. He 
predicted for me a sensational career: I would become a second Swami Vivekananda, destined to 
shake the Western world and bring it back to its spiritual wellsprings, no well on the way to being 
forgotten. Personally, the comparison with Vivekananda did not flatter me. Although I admired Sri 
Ramakrishna, I did not feel attracted to the suave, moralizing writings of Vivekanand; I considered his 
works of propaganda and ‘popularization’ to be hybrid and non-Indian.” (Eliade, Autobiography, 
190-191) 
107 Eliade, Autobiography, 199. 
108 Eliade, Autobiography, 208. 
109 Eliade, Autobiography, 207. 
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When Eliade’s father calls his son home for military service, Eliade complies with 
this wish, convinced that he would return to India within about two years. But, in 





Eliade spent exactly three years in India, from December 1928 until December 
1931. After one year at Ripon Street he moved to Dasgupta’s residence in 
Bokulbagan Road, early January 1930. The day he was forced to move out 
(September 18, 1930) marked the end of his studying Sanskrit and Yoga 
philosophy under the guidance of Dasgupta. Eliade travelled to Rishikesh and 
practised Yoga until March 1931, when he moved back to Calcutta and resumed 
his academic studies, this time concentrating mainly on tantric texts. In December 
he left India in order to complete his military service in Romania. 
 
Eliade’s interest in Yoga was, at least partly, due to an inborn tendency to 
develop strong will power and to control body and mind as well as a disliking for 
a monistic philosophy which declared world and body to be an illusion. His 
curiosity was not only intellectual but concerned the whole human being. 
Therefore he not only wanted to study Yoga but also to practise it. The fact that 
Dasgutpa had already published several books on Yoga philosophy certainly 
made it easier for Eliade to convince his teacher in Calcutta to let him write a 
thesis which not only incorporated Patañjali but also dealt with Tantra. He 
pursued the study of tantric source material with great fervour and was very 
much aware that he was thus exploring an academically still quite unknown area. 
In the end he was delighted to show to his Vedānta-imbued Western audience 
that India had also a tradition where life, time, the human being and the universe 
were real.  
 
Eliade’s thirst for Yoga practice was not quenched as long as he worked with 
Dasgupta. But after the painful discord between the two, when Eliade found 
himself hurled out of Calcutta and its academic life and settled in his lonely hut in 
Śivānanda’s āśram, he was finally able to start practising what before he had only 
read about. Unfortunately, he remains nearly silent as far as those practices are 
concerned and only says that parts of his yogic experiences have been woven into 
the two tales Nights at Serampore and The Secret of Dr. Honigberger. If we gather 
and analyse all the information from these various sources we see that Eliade was 
mainly engaged in exercises of concentration and meditation. He also practised 
āsanas but never commented upon them; they could be understood as part of the 
preparatory exercises which preceded prāṇāyāma. Such an interpretation is 
nourished by the narrator’s surprise in The Secret of Doctor Honigberger when he 
discovers that Dr Zerlendi “started directly with ‘that difficult experiment of 
rhythmic breathing, prāṇāyama’.”110 Breathing and its regulation is shown as the 
starting point for a journey into altered states of consciousness and it can be 
assumed that Eliade had managed to reach a state where he could remain awake 
                                                 
110 Eliade, Serampore, 97. 
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or conscious while actually having fallen asleep. The aim would have been a 
cataleptic state which Eliade had observed with his ascetic neighbour who was 
able to control his breathing to a high degree and spent the whole day meditating. 
Dr Zerlendi calls the aim of his yogic efforts “your own deliverance from futility, 
from ignorance, and from suffering.”111 Such yogic practice, after a certain point, 
leads to supernatural powers: Dr Zerlendi, Śivānanda (in the novel) as well as 
Suren Bose, through his (non described) tantric exercises, gain control over space, 
time and matter, a phenomenon which Eliade is likely to have been exposed to by 
others. 
 
When he finally meets the young guru at Howrah, yoga practice again is 
described as synonymous to meditation. 
 
Eliade’s stay in India shows a strange parallelism: Two gurus (one academic, the 
other spritual) with Western education opened the door to what Eliade called 
“historical” and “eternal” India. In both fields the young Romanian was 
progressing exceptionally fast, to the delight of his teachers. But both times his 
soaring flight met with an abrupt end and the door was shut again, both times by 
a woman. In retrospection Eliade interpreted Maitreyi and Jenny to have been the 
manifestation of some kind of divine intervention - his future lay in the West and 
not in India. 
 
“[…] eternal māyā, in her blind wisdom, had set those two girls on my path 
in order to help me find my true destiny. Neither the life of an ‘adopted 
Bengalese’ nor that of a Himalayan hermit would have allowed me to fulfill 
the possibilities with which I had come into the world.”112 
 
 
                                                 
111 Eliade, Serampore, 96. 
112 Eliade, Autobiography, 199. 
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3. Surendranath Dasgupta 
 
3.1. A dazzling career113 
 
Surendranath Dasgupta was one of the most outstanding scholars India has ever 
produced. Born in 1887 in a village called Gaila in the district of Nadia of today’s 
Bangladesh as the son of a family of eminent sanskritists and āyurvedic doctors 
he showed signs of extraordinary abilities and strange powers from a very early 
age.  
 
“During the ages of five to eight, when I had a very elementary vernacular 
education and no knowledge of Sanskrit or English, I could, in some 
intuitive manner, explain the purport of the Sanskrit verses of the Gītā. I 
could also demonstrate the various Yogic postures (āsanas) and also give 
practical instruction to people regarding the complicated processes of 
internal and external washings technically known as the dhouti by the 
Yogins. I could also give pretty satisfactory answers in a simple manner to 
most questions on Indian philosophy and religion. As a result therefore my 
house was crowded from morning till night with ardent enquirers seeking 
instruction on Indian religion and philosophy. At the age of seven I also 
delivered a lecture before a large gathering in the Theosophical Society Hall 
in Calcutta […].”114 
 
Quickly, little Surendranath became famous as “khokā bhagavān” (“the boy 
God”) and the great vaishnavite saint Vijay Krishna Goswami declared him to be 
a jātismara, one who remembers knowledge from previous births. A daily 
newspaper of 1894 (the name of which Dasgupta unfortunately does not disclose) 
collected some of the questions the boy was asked as well as his answers; for 
example: 
 
“Q. What is the relation between knowledge and devotion? A. It is through 
knowledge that devotion springs. Q. What is the nature of God? A. He is a 
spiritual illumination which cannot be compared with any physical 
illumination. Q. What is the relation between Prakṛiti (primordial-nature-
cause) and Puruṣa (the soul)? A. The creation happens spontaneously from 
the Prakṛiti under the direction of the Puruṣa and both are intimately 
associated with each other, like a lame man sitting on the shoulder of a blind 
man and directing him.”115 
 
When the publicity reached a certain level Surendranath’s father removed his son 
from Calcutta to protect him from the constant onrush of people. 
 
                                                 
113 This chapter is mainly a summary of an account of Dasgupta’s life in a collection of essays on 
indologists (Sengupta, Dasgupta [in Bengali; I thank Arup Sen Gupta for his English translation]), 
supplemented by a few details taken from Dasgupta, Quest, 285-287 (appendix: academic career & 
service; honorary offices & distinctions; works in English; works in Bengali) and from Dasgupta, 
Emergence. For more details of Dasgupta’s early and later life and career, cf. Dasgupta, Quest, 
chapters III, IV and VI. 
114 Dasgupta, Emergence, 251. 
115 Dasgupta, Emergence, 251-252. 
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Dasgupta studied at the Krishnanagar Collegiate School and College and passed 
his M.A. in Sanskrit in 1908 from the Sanskrit College. In 1910 he obtained 
another M.A., this time in philosophy. One year later he was appointed as 
assistant lecturer of Sanskrit at the Rajshahi College and within a short time he 
became professor of Sanskrit at Chittagong College. In 1915 he was awarded the 
Griffith Memorial Prize of Calcutta University, for his essay on Patañjali’s 
philosophy,116 and in 1920 he obtained his Ph.D. from the same university. From 
1920 to 1922 Dasgupta was in England where he studied European philosophy 
under Dr. McTeggart at the Trinity College of Cambridge. He got another Ph.D. 
from Cambridge (on contemporary idealists and their critics)117 and became a 
lecturer at that university. In 1921 he represented the University of Cambridge at 
the Inter-allied Congress of Philosophy at Paris. 1922 saw the publication of the 
first volume of his History of Indian Philosophy by the Cambridge University 
Press.118 Back in India he resumed his work as professor of Sanskrit at the 
Chittagong College. Still in the same year his General Introduction to Tantra 
Philosophy was published in Calcutta.119 In 1924 Dasgupta was promoted to the 
I.E.S. (Indian Education Service), as Senior Professor of European Philosophy, 
Presidency College, and Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Calcutta. His 
work Yoga as Philosophy and Religion appeared also in 1924. In the same year 
Dasgupta attended the International Philosophical Congress at Naples as a 
representative of the University of Calcutta and two years later he was at the 
same congress, this time at Harvard, representing the Bengal Educational 
Department. When the conference was over he gave lectures on Indian 
philosophy at the Universities of New York, Columbia, Chicago, Michigan, Iowa 
and Illinois. Under the auspices of the Norman Wait Harris Foundation he 
delivered six lectures on Hindu spiritual thought, published in 1927 in Chicago as 
Hindu Mysticism.120 He was invited by the University of Vienna and went there 
directly from the States. 
 
In 1931 he presided over the Great International Buddhist Religious Conference 
held in Benares, and he was appointed Principal of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta. 
While he remained in this position (until 1942) he delivered many lectures on 
Indian philosophy and culture as a visiting professor between 1935-1936 and 
again in 1939 at Rome, Milan, Breslau, Koenigsburg, Berlin, Bonn, Cologne, 
Zurich, Paris, Warsaw and various universities of England. 
 
Dasgupta had a deep knowledge in various branches of science, like chemistry, 
physics, anthropology etc. He was invited at the Rome Conference of the 
International Science Congress in 1936 and presented a lecture on scientific 
practices in Ancient India. He represented India at the International Congress of 
Religion in London in 1936 and in Paris in 1939. In 1936 an outline of his own, 
personal philosophy (which had emerged from his deep knowledge of both 
                                                 
116 Published in 1920 as The Study of Patanjali. 
117 Cf. Dasgupta, Emergence, 525. 
118 Volumes II – V were published in 1932, 1940, 1949 and 1955, respectively. 
119 Sengupta, Dasgupta, 187 calls it “an important book” but I have not been able to locate it anywhere. 
There is, however, a chapter with the same title in Dasgupta, Essays, 151-178. 
120 Dasgupta, Mysticism. 
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Indian and Western philosophy) appeared in Contemporary Indian Philosophy, ed. 
by S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead.121 When he visited Rome in 1939 he was 
given a military reception by Mussolini as a state guest and the University of 
Rome presented him with an honorary D.Litt. On that occasion he gave a lecture 
in Italian on the basic theory of Indian art. The translation of this lecture was 
posthumously published as a book in Bombay.122 He was honoroured by being 
made a fellow of the Academy of Science of Warsaw as well as a member of the 
Royal Society of Literature, London. He also became Honorary Member of the 
Poets’ Club in London. Still in 1939 (or 1941)123 Dasgupta gave a series of lectures 
on comparative religion at the University of Calcutta which were published 
posthumously.124  
 
Dasgupta was decorated with the title of C.I.E. (Commander of the Indian 
Empire) by the Government of India and as soon as he had retired from the post 
of Principal of the Sanskrit College in 1942 he was appointed Head Professor of 
the Department of Philosophy of the University of Calcutta. In 1945 he left this 
position and moved to England. He had been invited to join the University of 
Edinburgh as a professor of Sanskrit, but, being in very bad health,125 he only 
went as far as Cambridge where, at the Trinity College, he held his last lecture in 
public. He spent five years in Cambridge, facing all kinds of hardships in post-
war England and being confined to his bed most of the time. Still Dasgupta tried 
to work as much as possible, assisted by his second wife Surama Dasgupta.126 He 
returned to India in 1950 and moved to Lucknow where Surama was offered a 
post as professor of philosophy at the University. His greatest wish was to 
complete the last volume of his History of Indian Philosophy and he nearly 
succeeded: after finishing the main part of it he breathed his last on December 18, 
1952. 
 
Dasgupta was also gifted as a poet. He published several books of poems in 
Bengali and translated a selection from them into English.127 He also wrote five 
books in his mother tongue on the analysis of fine art and the theory of rasa.128 
 
In the beginning of his career Dasgupta was generously helped by the Maharaja 
Sir Manindra Chandra Nandy of Kassimbazar129 who sponsored his stay in 
                                                 
121 Dasgupta, Emergence. 
122 Dasgupta, Fundamentals. 
123 1939 according to Sengupta, Dasgupta, 188; 1941 according to Surama Dasgupta in her preface to 
Dasgupta, Outlook, vii. 
124 Dasgupta, Outlook. 
125 He was suffering from heart trouble and fell seriously ill as soon as he reached England. 
126 For a detailed account of the years in England cf. Dasgupta, Quest, 244-261. 
127 They were published after his death as Vanishing Lines, Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co, 1956. 
128 For bibliographical references of Dasgupta’s Bengali works, cf. Dasgupta, Quest, 287. 
129 “The Maharajah […] was truly a legendary figure in Bengal. He had devoted his whole life and all 
his princely fortune to educational, religious, and other benevolences throughout the state of Bengal. 
In fact, when he died, Kassimbazar was deeply in debt and passed into the hands of a receivership, 
the heir to the throne becoming a salaried employee of the holding company! The Maharajah had 
sought for years to raise the educational level of the entire population, establishing village schools 
(tolas) throughout Bengal and hiring the best pandits he could find (through competitive 
examinations). The brightest pupils were given prizes and scholarships to enable them to attend the 
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Cambridge from 1920-1922, paid for the publication of the History of Indian 
Philosophy and provided him with enough funds to “build the richest collection of 
books on philosophy and religion that I [= Eliade] had ever seen.”130 After retiring 
from the University of Calcutta Dasgupta donated his huge collection of nearly 




3.2. The fall 
 
3.2.1. A scandal, silence, and three testimonies 
 
Given Surendranath Dasgupta’s brilliant career and academic recognition both in 
India and in the West as well as his undisputed authority not only in Yoga and 
Sāṃkhya but many other academic disciplines as well, one would expect his 
home town to be proudly preserving his memory. Yet when I interviewed 
professors and lecturers in Calcutta I quickly felt that something had gone wrong 
with Dasgupta. I learned that “he has become almost forgotten,”132 that “he is 
now falling into oblivion,”133 that “he was a great man, like Radhakrishnan, but 
had no follower;”134 I was also told that “his books on Yoga do not play any role 
in academic teaching any more,”135 that his books “are just reference works which 
might be consulted by the students but which are not on the compulsory book 
list”136 and that “when Dasgupta left, the interest in the Yoga-darśana vanished 
from Calcutta.”137 One of my interlocutors was even asked to assist Dasgupta in 
helping him finish the last volume of his History but turned down the offer, 
saying that he was busy with some other work. As soon as I had come to know 
that Dasgupta had a second wife I started asking questions about his personal life 
– and met with a wall of silence. Everybody refused to talk about Dasgupta’s life 
                                                                                                                                                        
University of Calcutta - which he also personnally built up into a first-class institution. The top 
university students were awarded scholarships to study in Europe. Eliade’s professor, Dasgupta, was 
an outstanding example of what the Maharajah’s benefactions had created. He had received a 
generous allotment monthly for six years while studying at Cambridge, then thousands of dollars 
more for his personal library, plus a huge sum to underwrite the publication of his monumental 
History of Indian Philosophy (in five volumes). Besides aiding schools and scholars, the Maharajah 
built hospitals and houses of worship; a Catholic cathedral, a synagogue, and Anglican, Lutheran, and 
Armenian churches owed their existence to his beneficence. [...] A Sanskrit scholar in his own right, 
Mahindra Nandy had assembled a fabulous library which was housed in Dasgupta’s home. The 
library required three rooms: one for European books, one for Sanskrit and Tibetan manuscripts and 
editions, and a third for translations and studies by Asian scholars.” (Ricketts, Eliade I, 379-380) 
130 Eliade, Autobiography, 162. – Dasgupta dedicated Yoga as Philosophy and Religion to his great 
benefactor: „As a humble token of deepest regard and gratefulness to the Maharaja Sir 
Manindrachandra Nundy, K.C.I.E., whose noble character and self-denying charities have endeared 
him to the people of Bengal and who so kindly offered me his whole-hearted patronage in 
encouraging my zeal for learning at a time when I was in so great a need of it.” 
131 Cf. Dasgupta, Quest, 66. 
132 Prof. Debabrata Sen Sharma, January 18, 2003 (oral communication). 
133 Prof. Amar Kumar Chattopadhyay, January 19, 2003 (oral communication). 
134 Prof. Govinda Gopal Mukhopadhyay, January 26, 2003 (oral communication). 
135 Prof. Debabrata Sen Sharma, January 18, 2003 (oral communication). 
136 Prof. Amar Kumar Chattopadhyay, January 19, 2003 (oral communication). 
137 Prof. P. K. Sen, February 5, 2003 (oral communication). 
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and the drama it obviously concealed. I was warded off with sentences like, for 
example, “there was a great scandal and finally Dasgupta had to leave 
Calcutta.”138 
 
During my various stays in Calcutta I gradually came across three people who 
had witnessed the events of 1941-1945, either directly or indirectly. In the 
following three subchapters I will present their testimonies side by side in order 
to show how fragmented and partly biased and/or contradictory their statements 
are. The only undisputed fact is that Dasgupta left his wife and children; as to 
when, how and why exactly, opinions vary. 
 
 
3.2.1.1. Pareshnath Bhattacharya 
 
A direct student of Dasgupta, Prof. Pareshnath Bhattacharya139 was the first 
person who was willing to tell me about the tragic events which disrupted his 
professor’s life and career. He still has the highest respect for Dasgupta as a 
scholar, but he also turned his back on him when Dasgupta left his family. 
According to Prof. Bhattacharya Dasgupta did this for Surama Mitra, an 
extremely talented student who had been working with him for about ten years. 
Before the scandal broke out, Dasgupta once asked Bhattacharya: “Do you believe 
in monoganism?” Bhattacharya replied “yes.” Das Gupta contradicted: “No, no, 
this is not our śāstra. Yajñavalkya, for example, had two wives.”140  His student 
answered: “But these days are gone.”141  
 
According to Prof. Bhattacharya, leaflets flooded the University when the scandal 
broke out, and Dasgupta was criticised and caricatured in a weekly magazine. 
Everybody forsook the famous professor who instantly lost everything: his 
family, his friends, his reputation, his name and fame. Bhattacharya visited 
Dasgupta about a month after the outbreak of this hostility, and at the sight of his 
student the professor burst into tears and said: “You don’t know my condition. 
My son has slapped me, my daughter has slapped me.” Bhattacharya replied: 
“Why did you close the door when Surama was in your study? Why did you let 
                                                 
138 Adinath Chatterji, February 11, 2003 (oral communication). 
139 He was 90 years old in 2003, still completely sharp and clear in his head and granted me an 
interview of more than two hours. He was a bit hard of hearing but he could still read without glasses. 
140 There is a passage in Religion and the Rational Outlook, written in 1941, where Dasgupta briefly 
exposes his views on marriage and fidelity: “Sex-relations other than marital are regarded as immoral. 
But we have the evidence of the śāstras that in ancient India extramarital relation, except in the case of 
incest, and a few restrictions was regarded as unobjectionable. Again the Roman Catholic priest 
cannot marry, but with Hindu priests in the past, marriage and procreation were compulsory 
immediately after the cessation of his studentship. Among Hindu marriages we find legal status given 
to sex-unions when the girl was forcibly carried away in cases of rape, marriage with a pregnant 
woman and so on. We thus see that the status of sex-relation is only a matter of convention of a 
particular society at a particular time. It has no universality in its nature and as such any refraction of 
marriage conditions cannot be regarded as a moral fall. It is not the place here to enter into an 
elaborate discussion about the nature of morality and our views on the subject, but we are of opinion 
that whatever may appear to an individual as his duty, clear of consequences, is for him his moral 
urge, and his failure to effectuate it would be his moral fall.” (Dasgupta, Outlook, 340) 
141 Prof. Pareshnath Bhattacharya, February 13, 2003 (oral communication). 
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the affair happen?”142 In 1945 Dasgupta and Surama Mitra got married and left 
India for England. Dasgupta tried to get in touch with Bhattacharya through a 
common friend but Bhattacharya told that person to write to Dasgupta that he 
did not want to have any connection with him any more. 
 
 
3.2.1.2. Malati Guha Ray 
 
A slightly different story of the course of events was given to me in October 2004, 
by Mrs Malati Guha Ray, a 93 year old lady who was Surama Dasgupta’s first 
student (when Surama started teaching in Calcutta).143 Later on, they became 
friends: Mrs Ray lived in Lucknow when Surama and her husband returned from 
England and she went to see them nearly every day. In 2002 Ray published a 
biography on her friend, in Bengali, entitled Suramā.144 When I visited Mrs Ray, 
she gave me a brief summary of her book. As far as the tragic events of the early 
1940-ies are concerned, she clearly stated that it was Maitreyi who started the 
whole scandal. Initially, Maitreyi and Surama were close friends, but then things 
changed. 
 
After the Maitreyi – Mircea story the Dasgupta family had to move away from 
Bakulbagan Road and came to live near Hindusthan Park. Surama was then 
staying at Hindusthan Park Nr. 9, in her elder sister’s home. She used to walk to 
Dasgupta’s house in order to study and spent hours reading in his library. When 
Maitreyi started to complain about this to her mother, Dasgupta’s wife tried to 
reason with her daughter, saying that this was just a teacher-student relationship 
and that, after all, Maitreyi was helping Dasgupta a lot with his studies. But 
Maitreyi would not listen, and when Surama continued coming to her father’s 
house even after her Ph.D. thesis was completed (which was in 1941),145 she grew 
more and more vicious. According to Mrs Ray, Maitreyi, who by then was 
married and lived far away in the hills, came back home more and more often to 
check on her father and Surama. She spied on them through the shutters of the 
library and sometimes she abruptly opened the door of the study (which was 
never locked). One day, as Surama was approaching the house, Maitreyi climbed 
on the rooftop terrace and yelled at all the neighbours and people in the street: 
“Come and see what is going on in our house!” She managed to provoke her 
younger brothers and sisters and even Dasgupta’s wife, and ultimately, Dasgupta 
was beaten up by his children and thrown out of the house. After the last violent 
discussion with his wife, Dasgupta suffered a heart attack and was given shelter 
in the guestroom of Sanskrit College, supported and nursed in turn by friends 
and collegues. Since Surama was going to go to England on a scholarship, these 
friends and collegues suggested that she should take him with her. When Surama 
asked how this should be possible, how she could travel with somebody who was 
not related to her, they told her that she had to marry him. According to Mrs Ray, 
                                                 
142 Prof. Pareshnath Bhattacharya, February 13, 2003 (oral communication). 
143 The following account is based on an oral communication by Mrs Ray, October 21, 2004, at her 
home at Hindusthan Park 3, Calcutta 29. 
144 Ray, Surama. 
145 Surama Mitra was the first Indian woman ever to get a Ph.D. 
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Surama was completely shocked and said “How can I marry somebody who is so 
much older and ill and like my guru?” But she asked for a weeks’ time to think it 
over. Her family was utterly against it, but Surama came back after one week and 
said whe was willing to do it. So they got married and left for England.  
 
Mrs Ray’s account is entirely focussed on the personal side of the scandal and 
does not mention any hostile public reactions (for example at university, as in 
Pareshnath Bhattacharya’s version). She concentrates on the Maitreyi angle 
which, in a way, turns the whole story more gruesome and tragic. When I met 
her, she added a particularly horrifying anecdote to underline how thoroughly 
Dasgupta’s daughter had indoctrinated her family against their father: Chitra, 
one of Maitreyi’s sisters, hunted her father down in Cambridge. Since Dasgupta 
was very ill, his doctors had put up a note ouside the house saying that he should 
not be disturbed (apparently he was constantly visited by many people). Chitra 
called on the landlady and said that she was Dasgupta’s daughter. The landlady 
was very surprised because she had thought that Surama was Dasgupta’s only 
wife, but she asked Chitra what she wanted of her father. Chitra replied: “I have 
not come to see him, I came to kill him.” 
 
Mrs Ray certainly does her best to “beatify” her friend Surama; in her account 
there is no hint of any disreputable action or even attitude in the relation between 
Surendranath and his student. They were simply guru and disciple, linked on a 
purely intellectual level, working together on philosophical topics. Of course it is 
impossible now to ascertain up to which point Maitreyi had any reason to behave 
the way she did or whether the scandal she provoked was the result of her own 
frustrated psyche only, taking revenge on the man who had bereived her of her 
first and only great love. On another level she might also have felt jealous of 
Surama who was such a brilliant scholar whereas she herself was cut off from all 
erudition, living isolated in the hills. 
 
Given the fact that Dasgupta had started writing personal letters to Surama (even 
though full of philosophical discussions) as early as 1932,146 and taking in account 
their intense collaboration over many years, there is no doubt that they were 
united by a very strong bond. In one of his first letters, Dasgupta mentions his 
spiritual loneliness: 
 
“I have been without any companion; nobody asked me what I was doing 
and none offered to share this quest with me.”147  
 
It is equally certain that Surama with her fine intellect and sharp inquisitiveness 
became this badly missed companion and it is possible that other feelings grew in 
time. Dasgupta’s defense of polygamy in Religion and the Rational Outlook (1941)148 
at least can be interpreted as an indication that his attachment to Surama went 
beyond a purely mental one. As to Surama, we have no testimony except the one 
she herself gave to Malati Ray, according to which her feelings remained those of 
a devoted disciple towards her genius guru.  
                                                 
146 Cf. Dasgupta, Quest. 
147 Dasgupta, Quest, 80 (letter from Darjeeling, dated May 20th, 1932) 
148 Cf. supra, note 140. 
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As far as the year is concerned in which Dasgupta left his family, I got two 
different answers. Whereas Pareshnath Bhattacharya could not say when the 
scandal took place, Maitreyi Devi in her book claims that her father moved out in 
1941.149 Mrs Ray’s version however makes it sound as if Dasgupta left his family 
(or rather was thrown out by his wife and children) only in 1945. 1945 was also 
upheld by Sudhir Kumar Nandi, a retired professor of philosophy (and one of 
Dasgupta’s students at the time), who told Ratna Dutta, Mrs Ray’s daughter, that 
1941 is not acceptable and that Dasgupta left his house in 1945 and then went to 
England with Surama.150 The last and certainly most important witness however, 
Sukumar Mitra, corroborates the earlier date, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
 
 
3.2.1.3. Sukumar Mitra 
 
A retired professor of History, Sukumar Mitra as a young student was hurled 
right into the centre of events by accidentally being present in Dasgupta’s library 
the morning his family violently attacked him. He intervened, preventing 
Dasgupta from being hurt, and from that day onward, Sukumar Mitra became a 
“protector, confidant and aide”151 of the famous professor, eventually helping him 
to escape from India.152 
 
From Sukumar Mitra’s testimony the following course of events can be 
reconstructed:  
Dasgupta moved out of his Monaharpukur Road residence in 1942 “and took 
shelter at the Russa Road house of Benoy Das Gupta, a cousin of his.”153 After a 
short while “he took a large first floor apartment on rent, nearby, at Rajani Sen 
Road sometime later in 1943. He lived in the apartment for a year and a half, until 
he stole out of his country to live in Britain, in 1945.”154 In the Rajani Sen Road 
house, 
 
“Das Gupta felt freer and more cheerful, and regained, to an extent, his 
health […]. He was able to return to his work: mainly to complete the fourth 
volume of History of Indian Philosophy. Besides, he dictated a novel, a fairly 
large one, in Bengali and a brief history of Indian philosophy in Bengli too. 
He became attentive to the men and women doing researches [sic] under 
him; some of his old pupils and friends and academic colleagues resumed 
their visits to him; and he found time to educate me. It was during this 
period that we – he, I and a servant took two trips to Puri.”155 
                                                 
154 Statement S. Mitra, 2. 
155 Statement S. Mitra, 2. 
149 “In spite of her [Maitreyi’s mother’s] unwavering loyalty to her husband, her constant endeavour to 
cover up his faults, she could only postpone the ultimate collapse that happened in 1941. Father left 
her with her four minor children to fend for herself.” (It Does Not Die, 196) 
150 Oral communication to Ratna Dutta on February 5, 2005. 
151 Statement S. Mitra, 1. 
152 Sukumar Mitra granted my research assistant Arup Sen Gupta a series of interviews in Bengali 
between April 21st 2005 and May 25th 2005. Arup Sen Gupta translated them into English and I 
submitted the typed version to Mr Mitra who then corrected a few things and sent me a five pages 
long text which I am allowed to quote freely (cf. letter from S. Mitra, dated July 10, 2005). In the 
following I shall call this text “Statement S. Mitra”.  
153 Statement S. Mitra, 2. 
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In the beginning of 1945 however, 
 
“Prof. Das Gupta’s family broke in, one evening, at Rajani Sen Road House. I 
was not there then. The family took complete control over him, and often 
pestered him. Within a very short time they succeeded in isolating him, and 
rendering him miserable. His health began to deteriorate. I was the only one 
who could, in defiance of all kinds of ugly opposition and obstruction, 
manage to stick to him. It was this crisis, in fact, that drew the curtain on the 
goings-on. Slowly a plan of escape was made, and matured. Prof. Das Gupta 
and Surama Mitra got married. And finally they could be whisked out of the 
country. It was Prof. Das Gupta’s family, I’m still inclined to believe, that 
forced the conclusion.”156 
 
Like Malati Guha Roy, Sukumar Mitra also claims that Maitreyi was one of the 
foremost figures to induce the downfall of Dasgupta. 
 
“I do not know when the scandal involving Prof. Das Gupta and Surama 
Mitra began and what was its source. We, as students, heard about it. I do 
not remember ever to have read anything about it in newspapers or 
magazines or pamphlets, but I heard about its being published. Maitreyi had 
a major part in fulminating against her father.”157 
 
Maitreyi also “spoke rudely to my father and wanted him to stop me from having 
any connections with Prof. Das Gupta.”158 
 
Apart from Dasgupta’s immediate family  
 
“a powerful cabal consisting mainly of P. N. Roy, another brother of Himani 
Das Gupta [Dasgupta’s wife], P. N. Banerjee, a few Pundits and others was 
formed against Prof. Das Gupta at Calcutta to bring him to disrepute and to 
cause his downfall.”159 
 
One sentence in Surama Dasgupta’s book on her husband alludes to the enimity 
the professor was facing from certain pundits. 
 
“As Principal of the Sanskrit College, he had to face constant opposition 
from a group of persons of the orthodox community in various forms, 
mostly unjustified and biased.”160 
 
Sukumar Mitra puts it slightly more bluntly, writing that  
 
“[t]he Pundits were not exactly angry with Prof. Das Gupta. There was a 
disgruntled lot who were his critics and denigrators and questioned his right 
to be principal of the College.”161 
 
                                                 
156 Statement S. Mitra, 3. 
157 Statement S. Mitra, 4. 
158 Statement S. Mitra, 3. 
159 Statement S. Mitra, 3. 
160 Dasgupta, Quest, 56. 
161 Statement S. Mitra. 3. 
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As to Surama, she apparently was extremely possessive of Dasgupta and believed 
that nobody could take as good care of him as herself. She also was, according to 
Sukumar Mitra, 
 
“a good person, learned, affectionate and mild mannered. […] She was 
perhaps best equipped to write an intellectual and personal biography of 
Prof. Das Gupta, her guru and husband, but chose instead, to wrap him up 
in an aura of a demigod, and to conceal herself behind an untidy 
hagiography.”162 
 
As far as Dasgupta’s relationship with Surama Mitra is concerned, Sukumar 
Mitra believes that it was platonic. He still cannot understand why Dasgupta did 
not manage to stop rumours as soon as they started.  
 
“He […], it seemed to me, was at a loss as to what to do about Surama Mitra. 
Often, he opened his mind to me, and more often fell into thoughts.”163 
 
Sukumar Mitra cannot but describe the whole affair as an ultimately inexplicable 
tragedy. 
 
“In that high drama we all – Prof. Das Gupta, his family, his admirers and 
detractors, Surama Mitra and I, acted fools.”164 
 
“Things moved inexorably towards an end: the dramatis personae seemed 
all to be possessed. In this episodic entanglement, however, the real loser 
was Prof. Das Gupta who got pathetically hoist with his own petard.”165 
 
In the end a number of questions remain unanswered, summing up the tragic 
character of events which seemed to have gained, after a certain point, a drive 
which nobody could stop any more. 
 
 “My mind has since been racked by many questions: couldn’t Prof. Das 
Gupta retract his romantic steps? Couldn’t he awaken Surama Mitra to the 
utter untenability of their relationship? Couldn’t Surama Mitra wake up to 
the utter falsity of her claims of indispensability? I read the letters, all 
instinct with love, concern and intimate exchanges between a husband 
[Dasgupta] and a wife [Himani]. Hadn’t Himani Das Gupta to be more than 
human in order to remain unperturbed at the dismal deception by someone 
whom she loved, trusted and respected? Couldn’t all the friends and 
admirers of Prof. Das Gupta raise their voice against his calumniators? 
Couldn’t the calumniators have realised that they were merely debasing 
themselves? Couldn’t I take the sage counsel of my father? Was it necessary 
for Prof. Das Gupta to flee the country to redeem his health, to vindicate his 
honour and to complete his life’s great work? Was it necessary for Prof. Das 
Gupta and Surama Mitra to be acclaimed as man and wife? Ironically, a 
short time before, Prof. Das Gupta dedicated his novel to Surama Mitra as if 
she were his dear daughter.”166 
 
 
                                                 
162 Statement S. Mitra, 5. 
163 Statement S. Mitra, 2. 
164 Statement S. Mitra, 5. 
165 Statement S. Mitra, 5. 
166 Statement S. Mitra, 5. 
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3.2.3. Some official traces 
 
When I returned to Calcutta in 2003 I tried to get more information on Dasgupta, 
this time from a more official side: I visited the Sanskrit College, the Presidency 
College and the West Bengal State Archives. 
 
Apart from a marble bust of Dasgupta at the top of the stairs leading to the 
entrance of the Sanskrit College there is nothing to commemorate the man who 
was the Principal of this institution from 1931-1942. A professor of Sanskrit took 
me to the library and we searched for any book on Dasgupta – in vain. In no 
historical or commemorative volume about the Sanskrit College we found 
anything about the famous scholar. 
 
In Presidency College I met a professor of philosophy who accompanied me to 
the office and also to the library of the College. Here we came across 
Gaurangagopala Sengupta’s Bengali book on famous Indologists (which contains 
a chapter on Dasgupta167), and that was all. I was not allowed access to any 
original documents the college might still have had. 
 
In the West Bengal State Archives I went through the following Proceedings: 
March, Sept. and Dec. of 1931, June, Sept. and Dec. of 1932, March, June and Sept. 
of 1933 and all four volumes (March, June, Sept. and Dec.) of 1936, 1937, 1940, 
1942 and 1943. Each volume is entitled Proceedings of the Government of Bengal, 
Education Department, Education for the Quarter ending... Eventually I was told that 
most of the files had been destroyed and that out of those which had been 
preserved only the files dating of years with an even number are stored in 
Calcutta (those created in a year with an odd number are now either in Dhaka or 
in Bihar). Unfortunately all the files on Dasgupta had been destroyed or were no 
longer in Calcutta. The only source of information remained eight entries in the 
Proceedings from March 1931 to December 1943.168 
 
I thus learnt that in 1931, when he became the Principal of the Sanskrit College, 
Dasgupta was granted the permission to “admit research students into the 
Sanskrit College for working under him.”169 In the same year the Government 
approved that Dasgupta could “accept Mr. K. T. Behanan, an advanced student of 
the Yale University as a research student under him,”170 which is a proof of 
Dasgupta’s international renown.  
 
In 1932, Dasgupta, in his function as Secretary to the Calcutta Sanskrit 
Association, wrote two letters to the Director of Public Instruction of Bengal, the 
first dated February 18, the second one April 27.171 In the first letter he speaks in 
                                                 
167 Sengupta, Dasgupta, which I used for chapter 3.1. 
168 I cannot rule out the possibility that I might have overlooked other entries. 
169 Proceedings of the Government of Bengal, Education Department, Education for the Quarter ending 
December 1931, 8. 
170 Same proceedings, p. 10. 
171 Proceedings of the Government of Bengal, Education Department, Education for the Quarter ending 
December 1932, 30a and 30b. 
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favour of one of two candidates for the Central Organisation which have been 
elected with equal votes; he asks the Director to settle the matter quickly. In April 
Dasgupta asks for more money. 
 
“[…] the anticipated expenditure under the head “Examination charges” […] 
will be quite inadequate to meet the travelling allowance of the members of 
the Central Organisation as well as the members of the Council of the Bengal 
Sanskrit Association.” 
 
Both these incidences show that Dasgupta did not hesitate to speak his mind and 
that he might have appeared somewhat non-deferential in the eyes of some 
people. 
 
In the March volume of 1936 we read, under the heading “Leave:” 
 
“Of Dr. Surendra Nath Das Gupta, Principal, Sanskrit College, out of India, 
Ceylon and Nepal, to attend the World Conference of Faiths, to be held in 
London.”172 
 
One year later, Dasgupta was allowed to “give evidence before the Bengal 
Sanskrit Enquiry Committee,”173 but unfortunately the matter in which he was to 
speak up is not mentioned. 
 
The only entry which might carry a trace of the scandal which shook Calcutta in 
1941 and 1942 is the following one: 
 
“Dr. S. N. Das Gupta I. E. S., Sanskrit College, Calcutta, is allowed leave up 
to 15th October 1942 and called upon to retire from the following day.“174 
 
Since this note dates from March 1942, we see that Dasgupta was granted to back 
out of his academic duties six months before he officially retired. Nobody knows 
whether there is a link with the Surama scandal or not. Sukumar Mitra writes: 
 
“I don’t know why Prof. Das Gupta retired from Sanskrit College at the age 
of 56. It might be that he took early retirement to take up the professorship 
at the University.”175 
 
As soon as he had left the Sanskrit College, Dasgupta applied for a permission to 
get access to its library. 
 
“Use of the Sanskrit College Library by Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, lately Principal 
of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta.”176 
 
                                                 
172 Proceedings of the Government of Bengal, Education Department, Education for the Quarter ending March 
1936, 12. 
173 Proceedings of the Government of Bengal, Education Department, Education for the Quarter ending 
September 1937, 3. 
174 Proceedings of the Government of Bengal, Education Department, Education for the Quarter ending March 
1942, 18. 
175 Statement S. Mitra, 3. 
176 Proceedings of the Government of Bengal, Education Department, Education for the Quarter ending 
December 1942, 4. 
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I could not find any entry on his being appointed by the University of Calcutta in 
1942 (or 1943). All in all my research in the West Bengal State Archives confirmed 
what I had found before: Dasgupta has litterally been erased from public 
memory. Sukumar Mitra writes: 
 
“His books are still widely read, but personally he was long forgotten.”177 
 
After his stay in England Dasgupta never returned to Calcutta and he died 
without having met his family again. In the words of his daughter Maitreyi Devi: 
 
“My father, immensely talented and universally respected for his 
scholarship, could have risen higher and higher. Instead, he lost his family, 
peace of mind, prestige and respect. After ten years of separation from his 
devoted wife and six children, estranged from friends and relations, his 
personality mutilated, he died in disgrace. We have heard that before his 
death he told several persons secretly that he wanted to come back to 
mother to seek her forgiveness. The news reached us too late. That was the 
final tragedy of my greatly talented father and virtuous mother.”178 
 
Before ending this chapter I would like to point to a noteworthy fact if not strange 
coincidence concerning Dasgupta and Eliade. When Dasgupta in 1930 refused to 
listen to the pleading of his wife on behalf of their daughter and adamantly 
proceeded to throw out his beloved disciple, hurt, disappointed and furious, 
crushing a love he did not want to tolerate,179 he did not know that only one year 
later he would start admitting his student Surama to his home until 
 
“[g]radually, she is becoming one of us. Mother attends to her needs as she 
does to ours. Rama [= Surama] is helping father in his work and remains 
always with him.”180 
 
To put it a bit bluntly, one could say that Eliade moved out and Surama moved in 
or that one secret love was replaced by another (whatever its precise nature may 
have been). Maitreyi Devi established a direct link between Eliade’s leaving and 
Surama’s appearance181 and her mother, in a conversation with her daughter, 
indirectly (but unmistakeably) interpreted Surama as some kind of karmic fate 
befalling them, due to her husband’s failure to accept Eliade as his son-in-law. 
 
“For no fault of yours, you had to go through this trial. It’s all your father’s 
fault. And then, who knows how the wheel of karma turns? From the very 




                                                 
177 Statement S. Mitra, 5. 
178 Devi, It Does not Die, 197. 
179 Cf. Devi, It Does not Die, 117-124. 
180 Devi, It Does not Die, 154. 
181 “Exactly eleven years after Rama came to us, that is twelve years after Mircea’s departure, my 
mother’s life became a shambles.” (Devi, It Does not Die, 196) 
182 Devi, It Does not Die, 207. 
Mircea Eliade and Surendranath Dasgupta 38
3.3. Dasgupta in other people’s eyes 
 
3.3.1. The scholar 
 
Depending on who talks or writes about Dasgupta, a completely different man 
emerges in front of our eyes – from the tyrannical father and husband the range 
goes straight to sainthood. The only point where the various opinions converge is 
his tremendous learning. Several of my interlocutors equalled Dasgupta to 
Radhakrishnan, one put him even above the famous philosopher from South 
India.183 His student Pareshnath Bhattacharya told me that Dasgupta was the 
most wonderful scholar and that he had never ever seen anybody like him. 
Whenever he went to visit his professor there were always all kinds of books 
scattered around him, on a wide variety of subjects: physics, chemistry, biology, 
botany, astrology, art, philosophy and even on cooking. Dasgupta was always at 
study, whenever Bhattacharya met him. He could read from an Italian book on 
logic and translate it instantly into English. 
 
 “The width of his knowledge was wonderful, unfathomable, he had a 
tremendous horizon. He could go further and further, and still the horizon 
would recede. In width of knowledge, Dasgupta surpassed everybody else. 
[…] Dasgupta could also foretell many things, without having practised any 
Yoga. He was a genius.”184  
 
And Maitreyi Devi wrote: 
 
“My father’s talents are varied, his qualities are immeasurable. There is no 
one to equal him in erudition. Impenetrable Sanskrit texts he deciphers and 
interprets in a minute. He has never needed help to go into the depth of 
abstruse philosophy written in archaic Sanskrit. His memory is sharp. He 
has read all the books in his library, some six or seven thousand volumes. 
His powerful personality awes even learned pandits – he can defeat anyone 
in argument, he can prove to any man that that man does not know even the 
proper use of dental and cerebral “n”.”185  
 
In the last sentence of this quotation we see a hint of the irascible and 
contemptuous side of Dasgupta’s character. Sukumar Mitra also commented on 
this, writing: 
 
“Learning, however, did not confer modesty or humility on Prof. Das Gupta. 




                                                 
183 “Surendranath was extremely learned and a greater scholar than Radhakrishnan.” (Prof. Rabindra 
Kumar Das Gupta on October 23, 2003, oral communication). 
184 Prof. Pareshnath Bhattacharya, February 13, 2003 (oral communication). 
185 Devi, It Does not Die, 105. 
186 Statement S. Mitra, 4. 
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3.3.2. The head of a large family 
 
Maitreyi Devi, who had greatly suffered from Eliade’s eviction by her father and 
who later allied herself with her forsaken mother, is the only (and certainly not 
unbiased) witness of Dasgupta as a family man. 
 
“Father, when angry, lost all sense of balance. […] [He] was without a peer 
in breaking a rhythm or striking a wrong chord in a melody. Had he been in 
the heavenly court of Indra he would certainly have been banished many 
times and sent down to earth as a penalty, but this was not the court of 
heaven. This was father’s own family – so everyone had to submit to him 
with patience.”187 
 
In the following quotation, Devi attributes the tyrannical behaviour of her father 
partly to the fact that he was the head of a large household in the Bengali society – 
a role which she harshly criticises. 
 
“It is not only in our house but in every household where the master of the 
house is the most important. He is ninety five percent, and all the others 
together make up five percent only. That means that his wish, his 
convenience are more important; others hardly matter. In our family this 
attitude is stronger than in other families; the master of the house is also the 
ruling deity. […] The master of the house is the bread-earner, so he also had 
absolute right to dismiss all other views and lead every member of the 
family according to his own views. Maybe this is a necessary and useful 
custom to maintain discipline in a large joint-family, but it invariably turns 
the ruler into an arrogant and selfish person. He considers himself to be a 
god ruling over that particular household. But actually he is no god; he is 
just a human being full of weaknesses and bound down by the pleasures 
and sorrows of life like any other insignificant member of the family. Just as 
an omnipotent king is for a country, so is the master of a household for its 
members, supervising the destiny of their inferiors. Especially if that man is 
a man of qualities – his power becomes absolute.”188 
 
 
3.3.3. The professor 
 
According to Prof. Debabrata Sen Sharma, Dasgupta’s pupils could not get close 
to him because he was quite aloof. 189  This statement contrasts sharply with the 
way Dasgupta treated Eliade. Apparently he was readily willing to invest time 
and energy as soon as he had a talented student, and the enthusiasm with which 
he taught and guided his Romanian pupil is an indication that able students (at 
least to Dasgupta’s standards) did not abound. The following anecdote 
corroborates this impression.190  
 
Late Sudhindranath Chakravarti, formerly reader in philosophy at Viśva Bhārati 
University (Shantiniketan), was too poor to buy any books when he was a student 
in East Bengal. When the first three volumes of Dasgupta’s History of Philosophy 
                                                 
187 Devi, It Does not Die, 45. 
188 Devi, It Does not Die, 104-105. 
189 Oral communication, January 18, 2003. 
190 Oral communication of Prof. P. K. Sen, February 5, 2003. Sudhindranath Chakravarti was a friend of 
his and had told him this story personally. 
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had come out, the library of Mymensingh University bought them and offered to 
lend them to him for the summer break. Chakravarti took them home and not 
only read them but also copied the three volumes by hand. Later he went to 
Calcutta to continue his studies. He was very eager to meet Dasgupta, but when 
he went to his first class, Dasgupta sent word that he was ill. The same thing 
happened one week later. The third time he came but did not teach anything – he 
only asked the names of the students and where they had come from, etc. The 
fourth lesson was also spent with smalltalk. Then Chakravarti got angry and 
asked Dasgupta why he did not teach them. Dasgupta became furious and asked: 
“Are you fit to be taught philosophy?” Chakravarti replied that, of course, he was 
only a student and did not know very much, but at least he had read and even 
copied Dasgupta’s three volumes. The professor could not believe that and 
wanted to see the copies. So Chakravarti went home and brought them. When 
Dasgupta saw that he had told the truth, he changed completely. He was very 
impressed by this serious interest and he told him that as a teacher he was very 
frustrated. Hardly any of his students listened to what he said, hardly anybody 
was really interested in the subject. But from that day on, he taught them, and 
they were all spellbound. Dasgupta taught so much that they could hardly take 
notes – instead they preferred to just listen to him. According to Chakravarti, not 
even 10% of Dasgupta’s knowledge was in his books. 
 
Some of Dasgupta’s students became professors but none of them was 
important.191  It is likely that the abrupt and scandalous end of his own career 
greatly contributed to the fact that he failed to produce a follower. 
 
 
3.3.4. The saint 
 
Nearly 20 years after her husband’s death, Surama Dasgupta published An Ever-
Expanding Quest of Life and Knowledge which contains the first chapter of a never 
continued autobiography by Surendranath, three quite hagiographic chapters on 
Dasgupta’s early and late years as well as a few of his poems. The bulk of the 
book however is taken up by personal letters written by the professor to his pupil 
and later wife, from 1932 to 1943. In this chapter I would like to concentrate on 
Surama’s account of how she saw Dasgupta. Given the tragedy which had 
befallen her husband’s personal and academic life (and in which Surama played 
an important part) it is understandable that she tried her utmost to restore some 
of the famous scholar’s damaged reputation. On the one hand she made sure that 
his unpublished manuscripts got published posthumously,192 and on the other 
                                                 
191 Oral communication of Prof. Debabrata Sen Sharma, January 18, 2003, and Prof. Govinda Gopal 
Mukhopadhyay, January 26, 2003. 
192 Although the hurt Maitreyi Devi wrote about Surama that “she is continously trying to bask in the 
glory of father’s scholarship – his name and fame. By some pretext or other she includes her name in 
each of father’s books, like one demented” (It Does not Die, 225), it is very obvious that Surama did a 
lot for Dasgupta’s work and not only after he had died (Prof. P. K. Sen insisted on this point in an oral 
communication on February 5, 2003). When, in 1931, Dasgupta lost the sight of one eye, Surama 
started reading out books and manuscripts to him and he dictated to her what he wanted to write. 
“The last three volumes of his History and several other books that he wrote after or since 1930-31 
became thus a joint enterprise.” (Dasgupta, Quest, 38) 
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hand she tried to show that Dasgupta was an extraordinary man in every sense of 
the word. Right from the start of her Quest chapters, Surama leaves no doubt as to 
the saintliness of Dasgupta’s character. 
 
“Yet, there are persons who are different from the rest. They have, as it were, 
an extra-fine sensitiveness, an intellectual and also moral and spiritual 
insight into things, and a different set of values. They come as prophets, 
saints, men of extraordinary ability. Though they belong to the human 
species, they are beyond the ordinary, and they have their finer sense of 
ideals and unusual strength to follow these up. 
[…] They have brought new light into the world, opened up newer horizons, 
and discovered new dimensions of existence. They are never bound by any 
one well-laid pattern of society, they belong to all ages and to humanity as 
such. They have enriched human history by their life and thought. 
Professor Dasgupta was one such eminent man. […] 
He could […] be called both a seer and saint.”193 
 
Endowed with a prodigious memory194 and with an “inexhaustible patience and 
love,”195 he also seemed to have acquired the equanimous mind of a real yogi. 
 
“But I never saw him angry, diffident or perturbed. He seemed to be riding 
on the waves of an angry, tempestuous sea in a calm, unruffled manner. 
Never did he lose control of the situation and never did he lack in optimism 
and courage. […] In a sense he was unaffected by suffering or sorrow 
[…].”196 
 
In the eyes of his dedicated pupil and wife, Dasgupta became a guru of heroic 
stature. 
 
“His faith in God and mental strength were both unshakeable. He was never 
depressed, never afraid. Every new situation was a challenge to him and he 
rose equal to the occasion. Since he was never at a loss, never afraid, we 
depended on him in everything and knew that there was nothing to fear.”197 
 
 
                                                 
193 Dasgupta, Quest, 29-30. 
194 „He never prepared his speech, nor would he make any notes for his writing [...]. He carried his 
materials all in his head, he said. […] he not only remembered what he was writing, but should any 
important letter of reference get lost and the clerk become worried, he would come out with his 
assurance, ‘Never mind, I remember it all.’ He would refer to a text read years ago with the specific 
mention of the page and the place.” (Dasgupta, Quest, 40-41) 
195 Dasgupta, Quest, 39. „His kindness and love for all was limitless.“ (Dasgupta, Quest, 37) 
196 Dasgupta, Quest, 56. 
197 Dasgupta, Quest, 37. 
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3.4. Dasgupta’s mystical experiences (samādhi) 
 
In chapter 2.2.3. we have seen that Dasgupta, right from his childhood, used to 
fall into trance-like states. He himself publicly mentioned this fact only once – in 
his article on dependent emergence, where he exposed his own philosophical 
views.198 Otherwise he kept his mystical experiences to himself, except in some 
personal letters to Surama. Since his second wife not only translated and 
published these letters but also described her observations about Dasgupta’s 
altered states of consciousness, we get quite a detailed picture of his samādhi.199 
The external signs as noted by Surama correspond in many ways to what we 
know about yogis in trance: complete mental withdrawal, death-like physical 
condition, a blissful expression on the face. 
 
“These occurrences also seemed to be anti-biological in this that all 
physiological and mental functions seemed to have been arrested. If 
permitted to be in such states for a long period (which he was not, because 
we were fearful of any harm to his physical health), his whole body seemed 
to have become stiff, and he seemed to be unconscious or completely 
oblivious of the immediate surroundings. The longer he stayed in this state 
the more difficult it was for us to rouse him and call him back to the present 
environment. That is why we were alerted whenever there were some 
indications of such a situation coming about. […] 
There were other kinds of situations when he would softly hum a tune to 
himself and pass into samādhi. In these cases it was a state of deep, quiet 
contentment and bliss. We could make out something of this from the 
expression on his face. It was always a very sweet and a composed 
expression, and some kind of ineffable peace relaxed his lips into a smile. 
The whole countenance irradiated peace and deep contentment.”200 
 
But whereas yogis normally reach samādhi only after a long period of specific and 
rigorous physical and mental training, Dasgupta was overpowered by such states 
without any preparation or effort. 
 
“[…] any stimulus in the form of nature’s beauty or a devotional song or the 
image of Lord Krishna, which he loved very much, was enough to make his 
mind stop functioning and send him deep down into a sub-conscious state 
of awareness. This passing off into samādhi or a yogic state of mind was very 
natural and spontaneous with him. He did not have to do anything for this, 
rather it came on unawares to him, as it were, and caught him in its flow. 
[…] 
Any devotional song would start in his mind a kind of a longing or a pining 
for something unattainable. This longing would send him out of the present 
environment and rouse deeper and deeper longings associated with the 
pang of unfulfilment of attaining the highest end he sought for and also an 
indefinable sweetness associated with it. […] 
                                                 
198 „I also often spontaneously entered into a meditative trance condition as I gazed on the Ganges 
from one of the ghats (landings) or when I sat in front of the temple-deity at Kalighat. […] The 
impressions of a super-conscious trance-state which I had in my childhood never left me, and as they 
were being continually revived in me in my maturer years, it was impossible for me to deny the 
existence of the mystical state of self-absorption so much referred to in the Upaniṣads.” (Dasgupta, 
Emergence, 251-252) 
199 This term is used by both Surama and Dasgupta himself when they refer to his trance states. 
200 Dasgupta, Quest, 45. 
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There were also instances when by looking at waterfalls (for instance, the 
Narmada), the sea at Puri, or at the ocean from a ship, he would have the 
same experience.”201 
 
Dasgupta even declared simplicity and naturalness to be prerequisites for 
entering mental states which normally lie beyond everyday experience.202 The 
spiritual intuition which allows somebody to get a glimpse of the highest Reality 
manifests itself spontaneously and cannot be consciously generated. Such a 
statement obviously contradicts what yogic texts proclaim. 
 
“Our passage to the Reality is only by an emergent intuition which cannot 
be conditioned or produced by our will or any manipulation of psychic 
conditions, any more than we can produce any element of nature or category 
of life. It emerges of itself. Its emergence is grounded in its own nature, 
which is inexplicable and unknowable. It is for this reason that in the 
religious experience of those, who, by virtue of old traditions, refer to this 
Reality as God, speak of him anthropomorphically as yielding this spiritual 
experience to man by his divine grace.”203 
 
Dasgupta was unable to put his experiences into words204 and had to resort to 
metaphor in an attempt to tell Surama about them. 
 
 “Like all other mystical states, the experience that he had during those 
periods was ineffable. But he tried to give some kind of description to us at 
our request. He used to describe them as being a deep plunge into the holy 
river Ganges after which all the pollutions and ties of his worldly life 
seemed to have been washed away.”205 
 
The same image recurs in the following passage where Dasgupta talks at length 
about his samādhi experiences in relation to the Yogasūtra.  
 
“Time to time when I had experienced spontaneous, deep trance-states, I 
realised one truth and that is this: the mind goes deep within, away from the 
objects and interests of everyday life and then becomes completely detached 
from it. Just as when the body gets tired with the continual use of its 
muscles, so also the mind spends itself up in the continuous thought-
processes and conflicts and activities involved in them. When the mind, 
therefore, withdraws itself from these and rests within, it realises the 
exhaustion that comes out of the emotions of anger, envy, intolerance, 
egoism and the like which it does not otherwise understand because it gets 
itself involved in them. Patañjali has declared attachment, hatred, egoism 
and the like to be ‘afflictions’ and those mental states which are affected by 
these, as ‘afflicted states’. I have realised the truth of this. I have seen clearly 
when I came back from trance-states how much the passions and emotions 
of our everyday life are really useless afflictions. Therefore, on our waking 
up from samādhi (trance-states), our usual ties and interests become loose as 
it were and their harmfulness becomes apparent. Just as a person who has 
                                                 
201 Dasgupta, Quest, 44-45. 
202 “There is a universal in human spirit, which transcends all limitations of time and space, yet this 
can be realised in an easy and spontaneous manner. This does not require any great penance, any 
conscious attempt. I am now realising very deeply the truth, that love of God or Godhead is natural 
and can never be achieved by conscious effort.” (Dasgupta, Quest, 109; letter dated June 23, 1935, 
Paris) 
203 Dasgupta, Outlook, 307. 
204 “He could not say much about it when he came through.” (Dasgupta, Quest, 44) 
205 Dasgupta, Quest, 44-45. 
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taken a clean, refreshing bath in clear water, feels aversion for bath-oil if he 
has to soak himself again in this, so does a man feel when he wakes up from 
the state of deep meditation and comes to the ordinary conscious life. That is 
why this illustration has been used by the poets and the scriptures. A man 
coming back from samādhi realises the futility of all worldly 
achievements.”206 
 
This total detachment from worldly life as an effect of samādhi however, even 
though it helped him to remain calm and to maintain a certain mental distance in 
turbulent times, was not something Dasgupta was striving for.207 He never felt 
like leaving the world in order to become a recluse.208 Rather, his ideal was to 
have access to both this world and the beyond, without losing touch with either. 
 
“These two […] should be blended together in life […]. One can be a dweller 
of both the worlds, the day-to-day life and the other beyond this, at the same 
time.”209 
 
“I may be completely detached, yet deeply involved with all things 
concerning life.”210 
 
“Had I given myself completely to the deep states of meditation, how could 
I be so close to you and how could I be so deeply interested in all that 
happens to every one of you?”211 
 
It is important to note that Dasgupta never speaks of his mind’s activities 
stopping; all he says is that his mind gets completely withdrawn from the world. 
In this sense his samādhi was not the “real thing,” it did not lead to citta-vṛtti-
nirodhaḥ.212 But it is certain that he did experience altered states of consciousness 
which profoundly marked his personality, also because these states induced a 
deep feeling of bliss, of ānanda, in him.  
 
„The joy, that runs through the veins and nerves, deluges, as it were, all 
other considerations and plunges the individual in such a stream of mystical 
ecstasy, that the complexity of the universe loses all ist mystery, all doubts 
are resolved, and the whole personality of the individual is transformed into 
cheerfulness and blessedness.“213  
 
                                                 
206 Dasgupta, Quest, 170 (letter dated February 13, 1943, Hazaribagh). 
207 “He said he used to have a revaluation of values and lost interest in worldly life and its 
achievements. That was why he himself did not like to indulge too much in such mystical experience. 
His love of knowledge was very great and he found that mystical experiences might interfere with it. 
That was why he kept this side of his life as a guarded and sacred secret and managed to carry on the 
routine of outward life in a normal manner to all intents and purposes. But this was what kept him 
above the world and its turmoil and that was why he was never touched or affected by fear or 
frustration. His mind was serene and at peace with himself.” (Dasgupta, Quest, 45-46) 
208 “I have investigated myself; it seems that the Creator has not made my heart equipped with the 
fitness or the attitude of a yogī  who wishes to spend his life in complete loneliness away from all 
company. I do not have a great attraction towards a state of contentless meditation.” (Dasgupta, 
Quest, 169-170; letter dated February 13, 1943, Hazaribagh). 
209 Dasgupta, Quest, 140 (letter dated June 16, 1936, London). 
210 Dasgupta, Quest, 104 (letter dated April 15, 1935). 
211 Dasgupta, Quest, 103 (letter dated April 15, 1935). 
212 In the following chapter we shall see that nirodhaḥ  is in any case not something Dasgupta would 
ever have wanted to achieve. 
213 Dasgupta, Outlook, 288. 
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As a philosopher his experiences allowed him to directly verify certain claims 
made in the scriptures. Thus, he realised the true nature of the kleśas as described 
by Patañjali and he came to know that realms other than waking consciousness 
were real. 
 
“[…] it was impossible for me to deny the existence of the mystical state of 
self-absorption so much referred to in the Upaniṣads.”214  
 
Ultimately Dasgupta’s capacity or gift to withdraw his mind from the outside 
world was a way to communicate with God or to feel God’s love – and there we 
touch on the most secret and best-hidden part of Dasgupta’s personality. 
 
“He is the innermost friend, never turns away from me in disgust, never 
makes me feel ashamed. Always it is His face that is shining in my heart, 
which is becoming ever filled up by the touch of His feet. That is why I keep 
my Lord and my deep love and adoration for Him in the secret recesses of 
my heart. I cannot talk of it to others nor can I mix it up with the small, petty 
things of daily life. Today withdrawing myself from the world, from all of 




3.5. Dasgupta’s own philosophy 
 
3.5.1. Critique of Indian philosophy, particularly of Vedānta 
 
Dasgupta had a profound knowledge of both Indian and Western philosophy but 
he did not adhere to any given doctrine.216 He was the leading specialist in the 
field of Yoga philosophy of his time but it would be wrong to think that in 
Sāṃkhya and Patañjali he had found a satisfactory system answering all his 
philosophical questions. 
 
“My ways of thought are different from those of the ancients in our country, 
and also from that of the West. The more I come to know the more I think 
that I have to weave out my experience and my knowledge into a system 
which will express my attitude towards life and my achievements from 
different sources.”217 
 
Unfortunately Dasgupta was not given the time to write down his philosophy the 
way he had planned to;218 his main endeavour which he concentrated all his 
efforts upon and which kept him busy until the last day of his life was the History 
of Indian Philosophy. As far as his own system of thought is concerned, we have his 
essay Philosophy of Dependent Emergence (1936) and his personal letters to Surama 
which abound in philosophical ideas (1932-1943). We also have Religion and the 
                                                 
214 Dasgupta, Emergence, 252. 
215 Dasgupta, Quest, 149-150 (letter dated April 15, 1939, on a ship nearing Sicily). 
216 „Speaking of philosophy in general, I cannot think of any system which can give entire satisfaction. 
Each proceeds well for some distance and then breaks down suddenly.“ (Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 
6) 
217 Dasgupta, Quest, 111-112 (letter dated July 6, 1935, on board of the M/N Victoria, Indian Ocean). 
218 „For a long time he had been thinking of writing his own system of philosophy. He had thought the 
problems over and his programme was to write it out in two volumes.” (Surama Dasgupta in her 
preface to Dasgupta, Outlook, v) 
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Rational Outlook, a large volume in which Dasgupta articulated “his own ideas 
about religion and ethics.”219 Written during and after 1941 it was published 
posthumously in 1954 and represents a detailed discussion of the cultural, 
religious and philosophical history of the West, as well as of the modern 
development of physics, biology and psychology. Originally conceived as a series 
of lectures,220 Religion and the Rational Outlook mainly sums up and presents the 
facts and evolutions in all the above-mentioned fields, testifying Dasgupta’s 
tremendous knowledge and dazzling range of reading. The way in which 
Dasgupta elaborates on all the various subjects usually provides the reader with a 
first clue about his personal views about them, and in-between long passages of 
“mere” rendering of facts he also clearly expresses his own ideas. But an in-depth 
analysis of this monumental work would go far beyond the scope of this paper. I 
prefer to outline Dasgupta’s philosophy primarily as it arises from Dependent 
Emergence and his letters to Surama; these two sources provide the most concise 
view of his personal thoughts, unburdened by long scientific discussions. 
Wherever necessary or useful, however, I will refer to Religion and the Rational 
Outlook, too. 
 
When Dasgupta first came to the West, as a student of Western philosophy in 
Cambridge, he became  
 
“[…] more critical not only towards European philosophy but also towards 
Indian philosophy as a whole. I had thrown off the shackles of Hegel long 
before I went to England, but Einstein’s theory of relativity, the anekānta 
relativism of the Jains, and the realists with whom I came in contact in 
England, finally drew my mind away from all sorts of Absolutism in 
philosophy. I was getting sick of Absolutism for a long time but lacked the 
initiative to make an open revolt. My life in Cambridge invigorated me, and 
the main fruit that I reaped there was courage.”221 
 
Equipped with criticism and boldness, Dasgupta returned to India and 
reconsidered the philosophical systems of his homeland. More than a decade 
later, in 1936, he published what is probably his most outspoken evaluation of the 
strong points as well as the drawbacks of Indian philosophy. In the introductory 
pages to his essay on dependent emergence Dasgupta first praises the 
achievements of Indian thought and ascertains its value in comparison with 
Western philosophy. 
 
“Indian philosophy is like a tropical forest, where almost all types of 
thought, that have been current in the West since the days of the Greeks, can 
be found. The writings of the commentators through successive generations 
abound in logical precision of thought and true philosophical acumen, whch 
[sic] are almost unparalleled. The note of ethical purity, religious 
contentment and inwardness of mind, with which Indian philosophy rings, 
and the practical harmony between life and philosophy that forms the 
central theme of almost all systems of Indian philosophy, mark them out 
                                                 
219 Surama Dasgupta in her preface to Dasgupta, Outlook, vi. 
220 Sponsored by the Stephanos Nirmalendu lectureship which Dasgupta was offered by the Calcutta 
University in 1941. 
221 Dasgupta, Emergence, 252. 
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from systems of European philosophy, where philosophy is looked upon 
more as a theoretic science than as a science of practice.”222 
 
But – and this is Dasgupta’s first criticism – Indian philosophy aimed at a 
liberated state in some higher realm, thus depreciating the earthly existence. 
 
“But life here on earth was sorrowful and was only a life of probation. The 
real life consisted in the ushering in of a life of emancipation, which would 
absolutely extinguish this life. […] Philosophy was never blended in 
harmony with the present life as we experience it without subordinating the 
latter to some other higher forms of existence. In this view, philosophy was 
the guide for the attainment of a permanent state of being from which there 
is no fall, no change.”223 
 
And, on a more systematic and theoretical level, Dasgupta then directs his critical 
mind at what is generally perceived to be the core concepts of Hinduism: Veda, 
liberation, karma and rebirth.  
 
 “Indian philosophy, in spite of its magnificent outlook, thoroughness of 
logical dialectic, its high appreciation of moral and religious values, is closed 
all round by four walls of unproved dogmas: (1) the dogma of the 
infallibility of the Vedic wisdom, (2) the dogma of emancipation and 
bondage, (3) the dogma of the law of Karma, (4) the dogma of rebirth.”224 
 
Whereas the first dogma (suggesting that “reason is unable to discover the truth” 
and thus “a creed which is almost suicidal to any philosophy in the modern sense 
of the term”225) can be dealt with separately, the other three are closely linked and 
form a cluster of interrelated beliefs. The doctrine of emancipation says that there 
exists an unconditional, super-conscious state, “the pure self as pure 
consciousness.”226 There are two possible reactions to this statement: Either, 
everything else is regarded as illusory (Vedānta)227 or this emancipated state is not 
the only reality (Sāṃkhya).228 Neither answer is satisfactory. 
 
“Thus the assumption of the unconditioned either as the only reality or as a 
parallel reality made it difficult either to explain change or the return from 
the change to the changelessness. Had it not been for the dogma of 
                                                 
222 Dasgupta, Emergence, 252-253. 
223 Dasgupta, Emergence, 253. 
224 Dasgupta, Emergence, 253. In his presidential address at the Indian Philosophical Congress session 
at Delhi in 1936 Dasgupta repeated the same critique (cf. Dasgupta, Humanity, 63). 
225 Dasgupta, Emergence, 253. 
226 Dasgupta, Emergence, 254. 
227 „Relation of identity, or rather the identity itself, is the only reality. The act of relationing implied in 
identity, which is responsible for the notion of difference, is the nescience (avidyā) somehow subsistent 
in the identity. So long as the identity remains in the ineffable state, there is no relationing; but as soon 
as it descends into the knowable, it can only do so through the extraneous association of a relationing 
implied in its very nature. Relying on the unrelational ineffable state as the ultimate reality, the 
relationing factor implied in it is regarded as false.” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 254) 
228 „Others, however, such as the followers of the Sāṃkhya, while admitting the existence of the 
unconditioned as the ineffable super-consciousness (the puruṣas), could not restrict the concept of 
reality to it alone, and were obliged to admit another order of reality as an indefinite complex (the 
prakṛti), which somehow evolved from itself, varied forms of mutual relations, and through them, 
qualities and their appearances.” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 254) 
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emancipation, the systems would not have been fettered in this way, and a 
more rational explanation might have been effected.”229 
 
According to Dasgupta, the dogma of emancipation or liberation “led to the view 
that all our experiential states are states of bondage,”230 and bondage ultimately 
produces karma. 
 
“Bondage, thus considered, has to be regarded as the natural tendency of 
some mental states to flow towards other mental states (which in the moral 
terminology is called “tṛṣṇā” or desire), and the actual flow of it and its 
resultants are called Karma.”231 
 
The next problem is that emancipation (which Dasgupta calls “hypothetical”) is 
never experienced by anybody232 and so “the only way left was its indefinite 
postponement,” in other words: rebirth. 
 
“Such a postponement necessitated the postulation of a practically endless 
series of succeeding lives, through which the relational mental structure 
persisted.”233 
 
Rebirth, therefore, had nothing to do with (re)establishing justice but was the 
logical and necessary result of the fact that nobody ever reaches final liberation. 
 
Ultimately the cause of karma and rebirth lies in the nature of the mind, and 
freedom is only possible once the mind is annihilated. 
 
“The cause of this rebirth is tṛṣṇā or Karma, which represents the relational 
tendency and the actualisation of it, which is inherent in the very structure 
of the mind. The possibility of emancipation necessitated the postulation of 
the possibility of the destruction of mind and this implied the assumption of 
an inherent contradiction in mind, such that, while at certain stages in co-
presence with the unconditioned it would produce relational groups, at 
other stages it would cease to produce them.”234 
 
From this strong and very heretical critique of Indian philosophy as a whole it is 
possible to glean the main constituents of Dasgupta’s own philosophical ideas: 
refusal to declare this life and world as an illusion and to thus devaluate them, 
refusal of hypothetical dogmas which lie beyond the possibility of experience 
(such as emancipation, karma and rebirth) and a wish to use reason freely. His 
definition of karma also implies that he had a particular interest in the human 
mind and its workings. Of all Indian philosophical systems, Vedānta was the one 
which represented the antipode to most of Dasgupta’s convictions. 
 
                                                 
229 Dasgupta, Emergence, 254-255. 
230 Dasgupta, Emergence, 255. 
231 Dasgupta, Emergence, 255. 
232 Cf. Dasgupta, Emergence, 255. We must assume that the mystical states Dasgupta himself 
experienced were regarded by him as something else than super-conscious liberation from where 
there is no return. 
233 Dasgupta, Emergence, 255. 
234 Dasgupta, Emergence, 255. 
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“A philosophy which starts from certain a priori notions and seeks to 
deduce or distort all phenomena according to them, or which merely 
occupies itself with dealing with one or a few special kinds of experience, 
does not deserve the name of philosophy in our sense of the word. […] as an 
illustration of [this] we can take the philosophy of the Vedānta.”235 
 
To Dasgupta, the Vedāntic denial of the reality of the world had grim 
consequences for India, not only as far as philosophy was concerned but also on a 
social and political level. 
 
“The scriptures, particularly the Vedāntins, have declared the world to be a 
dream, the Buddhists have agreed to this and, in consequence, renunciation 
of life and the world has been given importance. This has led to the denial of 
the world and all that goes with it. Our prophet of love (Śrī Caitanya) spent 
his days in weeping for the love of God, but did not do anything for men in 
general. If communion with God is the only goal to be achieved, then this 
world loses its significance. Thus we tried to deny the world in our religion 
and philosophy. Hence the world also denied us and is passing us by. Those 
nations who accepted this world very staunchly, have come forward and 
defeated us.”236 
 
Dasgupta could not deny the reality of the world and therefore Sāṃkhya and 
Yoga, even though they also subscribe to the above-mentioned dogmas, were 
more acceptable to him than Vedānta.  
 
 
                                                 
235 Dasgupta, Emergence, 262-263. Dasgupta’s letters to Surama abound in passages criticising 
Vedānta, either directly or indirectly. For example: “Therefore, the way to fulfilment is not by 
negation, not by declaring that this is not, that is not, but by affirming this is that, that is that.” 
(Dasgupta, Quest, 85-86, letter dated October 6 and 7, 1932, Jaipur); “I can never accept the thought-
processes of our mind as illusion or ignorance. If the scriptures wanted to suggest this for some 
technical reason, if they wished to consider meditational knowledge as the true metaphysical 
knowledge and, therefore, they called thought-processes which were different from meditation as 
ignorance, there might be something in that. But whatever that may be, I feel very deeply the longing 
of my mind for experience and its expression and I do not know if I can be any time free from them.” 
(Dasgupta, Quest, 172, letter dated February 13, 1943, Hazaribagh); “There is no duality in Brahman; 
therefore, we can neither experience it, nor can we believe in it. I do not know what kind of truth is 
that about which we cannot say anything. In the knowledge of Brahman we become one with 
Brahman. We say truth is that which does not change. But in the state of Brahma-knowledge we 
cannot know if we are changing or not, because in that state I do not have my mind, I lose my ‘ego’ or 
‘I’. So the definition has to be modified. We call that truth in which we do not perceive any change. It 
may also be that, when we become one with Brahman, the Brahman may still be revolving like a 
spinning wheel, but I cannot have any power to move. Besides, I do not think that modern man has 
any interest in becoming merged into an all-quiet, static existence instead of trying to understand this 
practical life of ours which may have both truth and falsity. That is why it seems such a waste of 
words in trying to interpret the Vedānta. I want to experience the bigger aspect of Brahman, in our 
quest for knowledge, in our enquiry about the facts and truth of life.” (Dasgupta, Quest, 231, letter 
dated October 23, 1943, Agra). 
236 Dasgupta, Quest, 230 (letter dated October 23, 1943, Agra). Also: “Such attempts to have recourse to 
an unknown mystery in everything ignoring the visible, tangible world has been a serious handicap in 
our intellectual endeavours.” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 98) 
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3.5.2. Love of life 
 
Let us now turn away from what Dasgupta criticised to that which he was 
convinced about, believed in and propagated. First of all, Dasgupta deeply and 
intensely loved life. He loved and cherished all the possible experiences life had 
to offer him, be they happy or sad.  
 
“Life is a great experience.”237 
 
“[…] I have a positive attraction towards life and there is a strong urge to 
know and experience deeply the truths and meaning of life in its manifold 
aspects and to give expression to them. For me no experience is too small, or 
is to be treated very lightly. I love life which means a variety of experiences 
and I love to express in writing and speech the truth that I have felt. This 
gives me the greatest delight.”238 
 
In nature he saw an expression of the ever-creative life force, and to him, man 
was an integral part of this divine, immortal energy. Both life and nature were a 
source of beauty and joy. 
 
“I feel a very close relation between nature and myself so much so that even 
a tree seems to whisper its message to me.”239 
 
“It is a great mistake to say that man is outside nature. […] Does not man 
have a place in this great harmony? As far as man is only a living being, he 
reflects all the mystery and symphony of nature’s eternal music. But even in 
his conscious life of variety of thoughts and emotions, the resonance and 
reflection of nature’s music and beauty have a very great significance and 
contribution and lead to infinite joy. That is why man’s heart throbs in tune 
with the beauty of the dawn and the evenings. […] That is why I say that 
when we try to collect ourselves standing before this great grandeur of 
nature, we are bound to perceive the silent, voiceless gift of nature which 
flows deep into our intellectual and emotional life and that is how its 
offerings will come to us as great blessings, as great fulfilment.”240 
 
“That which does not die, is immortal. What is there that does not die? It is 
the living of life, the incessant flow of life which bathes us that does not 
die.”241 
 
Ultimately it is God who expresses Himself through nature, man and the 
incessant life force. 
 
                                                 
237 Dasgupta, Quest 83 (letter dated September 30, 1932, Calcutta). 
238 Dasgupta, Quest, 171 (letter dated February 13, 1943, Hazaribagh). 
239 Dasgupta, Quest, 155 (letter dated June 29, 1939, Oxford). 
240 Dasgupta, Quest, 173 (letter dated February 13, 1943, Hazaribagh). 
241 Dasgupta, Quest, 221 (letter dated October 18, 1943, Agra). 
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“I do not wish to postulate an ultimate metaphysics. But one thing is clear to 
me today and that is this: that great Being who manifests Himself in water, 
in vegetation, in everything that we see and feel, is in me also and I am a 
part of His, I am also one of His manifestations.”242 
 
“I love and appreciate the experience that flows from life and nature. So I 
come to Him quietly and enjoy my contact with Him.”243 
 
“But I am not concerned with the problem of life and death. My interest lies 
in life. So whenever I look at the vibratory movement in nature and life I 
have discovered the eternal deity of life who has made it possible for the 
universe, man and his highest values to come into being.”244 
 
Nature also supplied Dasgupta with many images for philosophical thoughts, be 
it in the waves of an ocean,245 the leaves of a tree246 or a little creeper growing into 
a strong plant.247  
The human body, so often depreciated in Indian philosophy, is equally part of the 
divine flow of life.  
 
                                                 
242 Dasgupta, Quest, 166-167 (letter dated May 21, 1924, Hazaribagh). 
243 Dasgupta, Quest, 150 (letter dated April 15, 1939, on a ship nearing Sicily). 
244 Dasgupta, Quest, 226 (letter dated October 21, 1943, Agra). 
245 “It is one thing to see one wave rising after another in the mighty ocean and it is another to discover 
how one wave is related to the other. All truths, moral, political or otherwise, are connected together 
and the mystery of their relation is worth knowing.” (Dasgupta, Quest, 11; letter dated July 6, 1935, on 
board of the M/N Victoria, Indian Ocean). 
246 “Leaves grow on the branches, they grow on the top, they grow directly on the body of the tree, but 
there is a distinct rhythm, a pattern in each one of them. Not a single leaf interfered with the growth of 
another, it makes way for others and yet at the same time grows delightfully in its own way. A single 
lotus bud contains the petals in it, but these are huddled up together. One cannot separate them, any 
such attempt just ruins those soft, tiny things. But slowly and steadily when these little bits start 
blossoming, every one of them blooms in a subtle harmony, in liveliness, in its own distinction. Yet in 
union with other parts, thus contributing to the charming composition of the whole, lies the unique 
beauty of a full-grown lotus. 
The Upanishad says – ‘Let Him develop us together.’ This togetherness (saha) signifies the unity of us 
all together with our unity with the whole, the Lord, or master. This ‘saha’ also means – He, the Lord, 
who is in all unities. Therefore, we see the whole universe lies in harmony with all that is in there. This 
unity is the rhythm of life, the symphony of all distinct and separate notes. If we transgress it, there is 
death, because separateness is false, it is destructive and that is the meaning of death.” (Dasgupta, 
Quest, 139-140; letter dates June 12, 1936, London). 
247 “The way in which life comes out of non-life and mind comes out of life, is the same which leads 
itself to the development of the spiritual truth in man depending on the mind and the body. An 
agriculturist will do harm to his crops if he obstructs light and air necessary for plant life. He plants all 
his seedlings in the open, where they will get adequate light and nourishment from the air necessary 
for their growth. So also all attempts to make the spiritual truth blossom in us must be based on the 
normal processes of life. There may be hardships, obstructions, but the spiritual life will grow and 
develop through them. A tender creeper looks almost dried up in the scorching rays of the sun, but 
out of this it slowly builds up its green foliage and flowers. So we may have hardships and difficulties 
in our ordinary life, but these can all be harmonised and made useful for the development of the 
spiritual level in life. Therefore, we should not neglect that which is usual and ordinary. Only our 
attempt should not be confined to the ordinary, but it should be directed to the development of finer 
experience and deeper joy of life. Life is valuable and it should be utilised for growing that which is 
beyond the normal and beyond the ordinary. Herein lies the real value or the truth of all existence.” 
(Dasgupta, Quest, 116-117; letter dated October 24, 1935, Darjeeling). 
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“Whatever man builds up in this life depends to a great extent on the 
materials of the body. The ancients had the mistaken notion of looking down 
on the body. If God has implanted a higher thing in the body, that thing 
should not come into conflict with it. […] So one need not look down upon 
the body. The physical energy will impart its glow to the mind and the 
spirit. We do not know what exists after the death of this body; any desire 
for a survival after death has no meaning at all. From this point of view 




3.5.3. Philosophy starts with experience 
 
In accordance with Dasgupta’s love of life and nature, his philosophy is not based 
on lofty presuppositions but on experience249 which he defines as follows. 
 
“The word experience covers for us all possible mental facts. […] All sense-
occurrences, feelings, desires, willing, the logical and the reflective 
phenomena, images or the imaginings, a priori faiths, all stock of ideas 
derived from social intercourse, all promptings of value, hopes and 
aspirations of men (civilised or uncivilised), psychological experiences of all 
descriptions, the inheritance of knowledge that we have through the works 
of other people, are all included within experience. Experience also includes 
the mystical experiences of religious men, the aesthetic experiences of the 
artists, the emotional experiences of the devotees and the supernormal 
trance experiences of the Yogins.”250 
 
Dasgupta distinguishes between individual experience and human experience as 
a whole251 and he states that experiences of feelings and emotions proceed mostly 
“from the compatibility or the incompatibility of the relations that individual 
mental states have with the bigger human experience from which they have 
bubbled up.”252 Moral, aesthetic and religious experiences are also in close 
connection to man’s social environment, yet not necessarily or exclusively. 
Dasgupta envisages the possibility of emancipation from all social bounds, 
particularly in independent and creative minds, but at the cost of conflict and 
isolation. It does not take much to understand that here he is talking primarily 
about himself. 
 
“Yet we are not entirely bound to the experiences of our immediate social 
surroundings or to the most distant human horizon of thought; for there is 
always a scope, in at least some minds, for the creation of new relations and 
new experiences as newly emergent forms with which they particularly 
identify their personalities. There they may be absolutely lonely and may 
come in such a conflict with their immediate social surroundings that they 
                                                 
248 Dasgupta, Quest, 221 (letter dated October 18, 1943, Agra). 
249 “Philosophy […] has to be founded on experience, either direct or indirect.” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 
255); “The aim and purpose of philosophy is to give a connected and systematic explanation of all our 
experiences in their mutual connection and relatedness and, through them, of the phenomena which 
they denote.” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 262) 
250 Dasgupta, Emergence, 256. 
251 “All that is felt, perceived or realised, forms the content of our individual experience, whereas all 
that is gathered or learnt from the direct experiences of other people forms the content of human 
experience in one.” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 257) 
252 Dasgupta, Emergence, 259. 
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may be smashed into pieces as it were, but still they maintain their 
confidence in their newly emergent forms of knowledge, feeling or belief. In 
such cases the validity of their beliefs does not depend upon a previous 
history of reference, but upon the new forms that have emerged out of such 
a reference and in their uniqueness possess special history. Their history is 
dominated by the creative process of their own thought.”253 
 
This passage can be interpreted as prophetical (as far as Dasgupta’s own being 
“smashed into pieces”, some years later, is concerned), on the other hand it shows 
Dasgupta’s tremendous confidence in his own experiences as well as in the power 
of his mind. Experience to him is reality.254 He cannot deny the possibility that 
“there are facts, entities or relations behind the phenomena as determinants of 
them” and that they would be real, too, but he does not want to focus on them. 
Experience will eventually lead to what lies beyond. 
 
”[…] we shall have to deal only with what is experienced; that alone has 
supreme importance for us. It is only through what is experienced that what 
is not experienced will gradually come in our view in an indirect manner.”255 
 
 
                                                
3.5.4. Philosophy and Science 
 
Did Dasgupta’s belief in the reality of this world and his love of nature, life and 
experience trigger off his insatiable knowledge about all the disciplines of modern 
science or was it the other way round? Probably an interplay was at work. 
Dasgupta’s expertise in the natural sciences however doubtlessly determined his 
way of dealing with philosophy.  
 
“The method of philosophy is that of science. It analyses experiences and the 
facts denoted by them, collects them, and arranges them in order, forms 
hypotheses and theories to explain them in relation to other experiences. It 
thus uses both the deductive and the inductive methods of science and 
attempts a systematisation of all known facts and experiences.”256 
 
Philosophy turns into the highest science of all, trying to grasp and understand 
the great laws or the general outlines which lie hidden behind the specific results 
of individual sciences (which Dasgupta describes as mere tributaries to the vast 
sea of philosophical knowledge). 
 
“[…] philosophy takes the results of those sciences and other facts arising 
out of human relations and tries to bring them together in such a system of 
relations that it may discover a common groundplan which holds them all; 
or if facts in a special universe cannot be harmonised with facts of other 
universes, philosophy would show the extent to which explanation is 
possible and what are its natural limits. Thus Physics, Chemistry, Biology, 
History, Sociology, Anthropolgy, Aesthetics, moral experiences, 
psychological experiences, mystic experiences, are all the feeders of the 
science of philosophy. Philosophy deals with all the objective, the subjective, 
 
253 Dasgupta, Emergence, 259-260. 
254 “With me reality means all that can be experienced directly or indirectly […].” (Dasgupta, 
Emergence, 263) 
255 Dasgupta, Emergence, 264. 
256 Dasgupta, Emergence, 264-265. 
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and the supra-subjective facts in their broad outline of relationship, leaving 
the study of the specific and special relationships and facts in charge of 
special departments of science.”257 
 
In his very last article, “Science, Philosophy and Religion,” published shortly after 
his death in 1953, Dasgupta even puts philosophy (and religion, which is hardly 
different from philosophy)258 on the same level as science, stating that these three 
disciplines 
 
“[…] are not in conflict with one another, but act in co-operation for the 
advancement of the superior elevation of man, or bringing about peace, 
harmony and friendship through knowledge, emotion and spiritual 
development.”259 
 
This equation is based on the fact that both religion and philosophy as well as 
science are systems of belief – religion believing in the “ultimate reality of 
thought, and the moral implication of the destiny of man in attaining higher and 
higher spiritual value,” and science believing that 
 
“[…] the real is the rational, [prompting] its votaries to move forward by 
instilling a dominant faith in the possibility of the ultimate solution of the 




                                                
3.5.5. No need for liberation 
 
Dasgupta’s philosophy was based on life, the various aspects of which could be 
studied by different branches of science. Liberation in the sense that all life 
processes come to an end was not a concept he cherished; life was immortal, 
never to stop, and therefore Dasgupta emphasised the dynamic, moving aspect of 
his philosophy. 
 
“[…] my religion is not a static or a stagnant one; there is no place for 
liberation in my religion. I cannot hold out any hope of eternal quietude. My 
religion is the religion of movement, the impulse and the impetus to express 
myself in various forms.”261 
 
“Those who have imagined the cessation of life to be its purpose, may have 
agreed to the concept of liberation, but this cannot be a goal to those who do 
not wish the display of life to end; to them liberation does not stand for a 
purpose. However much we may try to explain liberation as a state of 
realisation of the infinite, it will still be a limit since it will be a stop to the 
flow of life.”262 
 
 
257 Dasgupta, Emergence, 265. 
258 „In India we do not make much difference between philosophy and religion. Every system of 
philosophy becomes a religion when it is surcharged with spiritual feeling and emotion.” (Dasgupta, 
Science, Philosophy, 5). 
259 Dasgupta, Science, Philosophy, 6. 
260 Dasgupta, Science, Philosophy, 6. 
261 Dasgupta, Quest, 186 (letter dated February 16, 1943, Hazaribagh). 
262 Dasgupta, Quest, 93 (letter dated March 18, 1935, on board of the M/N Victoria, Aden). 
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Even the Self, traditionally conceived as a static entity, was declared by Dasgupta 
to be in motion and ever-changing. 
 
“Our scriptures say that the Brahman, or the self, or the puruṣa is ever the 
same, beyond all changes and that matter alone is changing. But I maintain 
just the opposite of this. I think matter is ever the same and the self is 
changing.”263 
 
God, “this ultimate and the highest truth of the beyond,”  
 
“[…] acts as the indwelling moving force in us, which wakes up all our sense 
faculties, vital powers and the mind.”264 
 
Thus animated by the divine life force, the human being and particularly the 
human mind retained much of Dasgupta’s interest. 
 
 
3.5.6. Mind, life and evolution 
 
Dasgupta was much intrigued by the theory of evolution which he critically 
discussed in the chapter “Biology and Religion” of Religion and the Rational 
Outlook. On the one hand he was fascinated by the concept of progress from 
simple to complex, from low to high, on the other hand he recognised that the 
evolution theory could not satisfactorily explain all the phenomena of life.  
 
“[…] in spite of all that may be said in favour of the theory of evolution as 
being a plausible explanation of the nature of the world and the various 
forms of life, that have passed away and are still existing, the theory of 
evolution can but show us only a small fragment of the puzzling questions, 
which we are unable to solve on any of its interpretations.”265 
 
In particular, the evolutionists could not account for the way in which life and 
mind should have emerged from matter. To Dasgupta 
 
“[…] the concept of life is so unique that the leap from inorganic matter to 
organic life is beyond comprehension.”266 
 
Life remains a mysterious force – after analysing the differences between 
inorganic and organic substances, Dasgupta concludes that 
 
“Life, whatever it may be, manufactures the material stuff suited for its 
manifestation by itself from other organic and inorganic substances in a 
manner and to the extent that no laboratory chemist can ever hope to do.”267 
                                                 
263 Dasgupta, Quest, 121 (letter dated April 21, 1936, Arabian Sea). 
264 Dasgupta, Quest, 241 (“The Concept of God and Spirituality,” Calcutta 1943). Cf. also: “The word 
spirituality is denoted by the term adhyātma, which means the fullness of the self and the self means 
that which is ever moving. So the word adhyātma can be interpreted as that which is all the time 
moving us. Since this is beyond the mental world, it sends its messages from beyond the mind and 
guides it.” Dasgupta, Quest, 240 („The Concept of God and Spirituality,” Calcutta 1943) 
265 Dasgupta, Outlook, 196. 
266 Dasgupta, Outlook, 196. 
267 Dasgupta, Emergence, 281 (italics C.G.). 
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Similarly, the evolution theory is unable to say when and how mind came into 
being. Dasgupta, as everybody else, could but speculate about the exact moment 
of its birth in the course of evolution. 
 
“It may well be supposed that the crude beginnings of mind-complex must 
have begun at least with the unicellular animals.”268 
 
Fully conscious about the drawbacks of the evolution theory,269 Dasgupta 
nevertheless strongly adhered to the idea of a general, linear movement in an 
upward or forward direction which he described very much in Darwinian 
terms.270 To him it was clear that nature, animals and man were all part of an 
overall progress. 
 
“[…] one point seems to be reasonably established, and that is this, that all 
through the different levels of evolution, notwithstanding their varied 
characters and capabilities, there has been a steady progress in evolving 
richer and higher form [sic] of life and mind.”271  
 
And these richer and higher forms of life and mind have one trait in common: 
they are inter-related complexes of a network-structure and as such inter-
dependent. The lineal concept of evolution is only valid on a global level; as soon 
as we get to life and mind in more detail it has to be dropped. In animals and man 
the evolutionary process led to the emerging of the following interdependent 
complexes:  
 
“[…] the life-process-complex and the body-complex, and though body-
complex is the basis of the emergent life, the body-complex is itself also an 
emergent of the life-process-complex. Neither of them can be said to be prior 
to the other. We have here a peculiar instance of two relational complexes of 
a different order, mutually determining each other, just as we have in man 
the mind-complex, determining the life-process-complex and the body-
complex. No instance of this order is available in any of the lower levels.”272 
 
“Mind” is defined by Dasgupta as 
 
“[…] a symbolic term for what is in reality a process of weaving experiences 
together in a definite and systematic order, which transforms a denotation of 
objective presentation into an experience, by associating it with meaning. In 
one sense, therefore, mind is not an entity, it is a series of relationing 
processes, not in a lineal order but in a structural order. When anything is 
presented to the mind it is not introduced at a particular point (using a 
spatial imagery) but in interconnected waves and processes of inter-
relationing.”273 
                                                 
268 Dasgupta, Emergence, 282. 
269 „The query as to how the first spark of life appeared, and the different stages of intelligence and 
consciousness evolved in their varied forms and capacities, remains unanswered; also the transition 
from one form of life to another specific form has remained unsolved.“ (Dasgupta, Outlook, 204) 
270 „As life advances from the vegetable to the animal and from the lower animals to the highest, the 
human, we have a gradual advance of a multifold differentiation of functions and activities which all 
work in a selective harmonious manner leading to the development of the body and the reproduction 
of similar bodies in it in endless series.“ (Dasgupta, Emergence, 281); “[…] as the mind emerges out of 
the body and begins to assert itself in its spontaneous existence […].” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 283) 
271 Dasgupta, Outlook, 204. 
272 Dasgupta, Emergence, 281-282. 
273 Dasgupta, Emergence, 266-267. 
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Knowledge, one of the main functions of the mind, is exclusively based on 
relations. 
 
“Our knowledge does not correspond with the object, nor is it a fact of such 
a nature that it means a modification of the entire state of the universe, nor is 
it a mystic history-less illumination or a mere product of co-operating 
collections, but it is such that we have one to one relation with the so-called 
external object and also with our mental history. It is a function of them 
both. The word “orange” has no similarity with the round yellow object, 
though it denotes it by a specified type of relationship; so our knowledge is 
related to the so-called objects which have no nature in themselves except in 
relationship with other relational complexes. […]  
Knowledge is possible only in the possibility of relational structures 
emergent from the mind-complex.”274 
 
As the mind progresses upwards, it produces what Dasgupta calls “value.” 
 
“[The mind] begins to show itself as a true individual, the integrated history 
of which, having risen above the appetite functions, begins to reveal itself in 
accordance with a selective purpose, which is its own emergent as value.”275 
 
Value is associated with “the progressive march of the higher man”276 and may 
appear as 
 
“[…] the beautiful, the good, the realisation in knowledge, the realisation in 
will, the realisation in higher non-biological emotions turning towards an 
apex as God or in any other form.”277 
 
By stating that love is the only force which can hold different minds together, 
Dasgupta definitely steps out of science into spirituality278 and clearly shows that 
the evolution of the whole creation culminates in the realisation of the divine.   
 
“In the higher evolution of man we find that thought evolves into love of 
truth, love of man and love of God.”279 
 
A mind which has risen above the biological tendencies and is guided by value 
touches on the “beginning of saintliness.”280 The mind, therefore, is the place 
where an encounter with the divine is possible, and just as Dasgupta did not want 
the life force to come to an end (through emancipation) he also never wanted to 
stop the mind from functioning (as Sāṃkhya and Yoga, for example, propagated). 
 
                                                 
274 Dasgupta, Emergence, 276-277. 
275 Dasgupta, Emergence, 283. 
276 Dasgupta, Emergence, 283. 
277 Dasgupta, Emergence, 285. 
278 “Love is thus the fundamental non-biological relationship which can cement together in a common 
goal of higher relationship all minds of the past, the present and the future. Such a possibility cannot 
happen unless and until the apperception of value as a self-emergent purpose of the mind-life is 
enthroned in the dominating position of a queen.” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 284) 
279 Dasgupta, Outlook, 334. 
280 Dasgupta, Emergence, 284. 
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“Our process, therefore, is not a process of mental annihilation but a richer 
process of mental growth, where mind assumes its true role of an emergent 
reality linked to the body as its basis but leading a life which is entirely its 
own.”281  
 
As far as a possible agent behind the various evolutionary processes is concerned, 
Dasgupta held that 
 
 “[t]here may not be sufficient grounds in admitting a personal God who 
creates the world and its denizens out of nothing, but the study of Biology 
naturally brings home to us the fact, that we cannot do without postulating 
some sort of dynamic teleology or purposiveness as controlling the chain of 
progress from the inorganic to the organic and from the lowest stages of the 
organic life to its highest development in man. The secret of life is as much 
hidden in mystery as are the various stages in the development of life.”282 
  
This statement reflects Dasgupta’s personality. Captivated and fascinated by 
science and its progress he neither could nor wanted to ignore the spellbinding 
and intriguing results it was constantly yielding, and yet he knew through his 
own experience about other realms of existence where more mysterious forces 
were at work. Even though in Dasgupta’s system of thought everything was 
interrelated and interdependent,283 up to a point where it could not be determined 
what came first,284 this whole network of body, mind, ego, knowledge and social 
surroundings (etc.) was nevertheless moving into a specific direction, namely 
forward and upward, guided by some divine force. Dasgupta managed to 
maintain a scientific discourse and to integrate all his physical, chemical and 
biological knowledge into his philosophy,285 but ultimately he claimed that a 
                                                 
281 Dasgupta, Emergence, 284. 
282 Dasgupta, Outlook, 198. 
283 “It is these processes excited in a limited field which, being in themselves relational complexes, 
behave as an indivdual [sic] that is referred to as “I” in “I perceive.”” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 272); 
“Knowledge implies the knowledge of relations. […] Knowledge is possible only in the possibility of 
relational structures emergent from the mind-complex” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 277); “A thing is 
nothing but a complex of relations.” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 277).  
284 “The distinguishing feature of life is that here the relational modes are of a dynamic nature, such 
that the reality or existence of any particular mode is dependent on other modes of a different order 
and vice versa. We have here a situation in which a particular relation-mode or function does not exist 
per se but through others, and there is thus a mutual dependence of such a nature that it is impossible 
to start with any one of them as being prior to the other. We have here a circle of revolutions in which 
any point can be regarded either as the first or as the last. Yet the first is in the last and the last is in the 
first. If this relationship is such in life, it is still more so with regard to the flowing activity of the mind-
complex, which is absolutely unrepresentable by any terms of physical notation, which behaves as an 
integrated growing whole and yet keeps its co-variant relations with life-processes, the body and the 
environment.” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 282-283) 
285 For example when he explains the process of vision: “What is presented to the eye are certain 
reflected rays of light, which have been distorted in various manners (inter-molecular or physical) by 
various objects. Thus, instead of saying that the external something – the object – is presented to us, 
we may as well say that the external something, commonly called the rays of light, impinge on the eye 
in a distorted manner, yet holding a special order among them. […] At the apex of all these processes 
(which are known only by scientific investigations of recent times and of which we are not directly 
aware) there is an emergent quality of colour-sensation, at the basis of which there are sundry 
physiological processes. This colour, again, in order that we may be explicitly conscious of it, must be 
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higher energy acted through everything, through matter and mind, tieing 
together all the various parts in a huge network of interdependence which, as a 





Dasgupta’s philosophy culminates in spirituality; he enlarged Darwin’s 
evolutionary concept by adding the spiritual dimension. 
 
“Our biological impulses are directed towards the preservation of the body, 
but with the development of these biological forces there comes a stage 
when, over and above the body, another world comes into being, and this is 
known as the mental world, or the thought world. The function of this new 
world is to help the preservation of life and the body. But if it goes on 
developing further, then we find the advent of another new world which 
may be called spiritual.”286 
 
It is important to note that Dasgupta never mentions reincarnation in this context. 
The growth of man into a spiritual being either takes place in one life or is the 
result of an interrelated evolution of humankind as a whole. 
 
On this highest level, man has the possibility to experience God directly. 
 
“[…] the great men and the saints have expressed in their speech and 
conduct the truth that they have felt God and that they have perceived 
Him.”287 
 
Dasgupta never doubted such an experience; to the one who has made it, it is an 
undeniable truth which cannot be “subject of logical discussion.”288 God cannot be 
perceived by our ordinary senses; He  
 
“[…] can only be realised through the illumination of an enlightenment or 
meditation. This truth is the subtler of the subtlest. Therefore, it can be felt 
only by realising the finer and nobler aspects of ourselves.”289 
 
It takes intuitive knowledge which is 
 
“[…] the knowledge that comes to us directly, where all ideas of analysis 
and contradiction vanish in the very sweeping wave of our intimate union 
with the object, and all the meaning and significance would be lost if we 
make any attempt to analyse the situation or the materials of our immediate 
intuition.”290 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
integrated in the mental history and be subordinated to the principles of working of the mind-
complex.” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 275) 
286 Dasgupta, Quest, 239 (“The Concept of God and Spirituality,” Calcutta 1943). 
287 Dasgupta, Quest, 236-237 (“The Concept of God and Spirituality,” Calcutta 1943). 
288 Dasgupta, Quest, 237 (“The Concept of God and Spirituality,” Calcutta 1943). 
289 Dasgupta, Quest, 241 (“The Concept of God and Spirituality,” Calcutta 1943). 
290 Dasgupta, Outlook, 150. 
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Once negative emotions like selfishness, pride, vanity and jealousy are overcome, 
the road to what Dasgupta called the “supra-biological truth” lies open. Getting 
there is, according to Dasgupta, “the dearest of all our experiences.”291  
 
 “Those who have been great and saintly, have torn asunder this veil of 
ignorance and greed, have realised the highest message and have declared 
that there is nothing in this world which can come near the greatest of all 
our chievements, which is the realisation of the highest in us. This is the 
godliness or the realisation of God in man.”292 
 
As we have seen above, it is the spiritual force which is responsible for man’s 
evolution towards higher regions. 
 
“[…] it is God who emerges within in and through our value-sense, pulling 
us up in and through the emergent ideals and with whom I may feel myself 
to be united in the deepest bonds of love. […] When a consuming love of 




                                                 
291 Dasgupta, Quest, 241 (“The Concept of God and Spirituality,” Calcutta 1943). 
292 Dasgupta, Quest, 242-243 (“The Concept of God and Spirituality,” Calcutta 1943). 
293 Dasgupta, Emergence, 285; cf. also Dasgupta, Quest, 241 (“The Concept of God and Spirituality,” 
Calcutta 1943). 
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3.5.8. Conclusions 
 
Dasgupta was a dweller of many worlds, and in particular he was a dweller of 
worlds opposing each other: East and West, science and mysticism. We have seen 
how much his philosophy was determined by the two great forces which he 
found himself subjugated to, in his heart, soul and mind: scientific interest and 
love of God. In Religion and the Rational Outlook, Dasgupta tried to define the 
qualities and values of both science and religion and to assess their relationship. 
On the one hand, science and religion deal with very diverse subjects294 and stand 
for two totally different kinds of processes or movements,295 on the other hand, 
the discrepancy between these two opposing spheres disappears as soon as a 
scientist is driven, so to speak, by a super-personal force, in his endeavour to 
discover the truth.296 The divinely inspired scientist (as well as the scientifically 
anlysing mystic) thus reunites in himself what at first glance appears to be 
incompatible.  
 
Endowed with a huge capacity to easily grasp, learn and remember facts from all 
different fields of knowledge and gifted with a natural talent for altered states of 
consciousness, Dasgupta travelled back and forth between this world and the 
beyond. Studying both Indian and Western philosophy with an open, liberal and 
increasingly critical mind, and abhorring absolutism in any form, Dasgupta’s own 
philosophical ideas were a personal mixture of traditional and independent 
thought. This endeavour to harmonise, to blend and to bring together various 
spheres of life is a key to Dasgupta’s way of thinking. His love of life and nature 
was too great and his interest in science too keen for him to declare this world as 
illusory; on the other hand his mystical experiences were just as real to him and 
thus he could not deny the existence of the spiritual world. 
 
                                                 
294 „Science is concerned with the general conditions which are observed to regulate physical 
phenomena; whereas religion is wrapped up in the contemplations of moral, spiritual and aesthetic 
values.“ (Dasgupta, Outlook, 159) 
295 “The main point which I have been trying to explain in drawing this comparison between religious 
experience and the experience that guides the poet is, that both of them reveal a dimension of 
experience which is entirely different from that of science. Science deals with concepts and their 
analysis and logic is its handmaid. Here we split up the whole into its parts, in order to arrive at more 
and more definite and precise conception of the ultimate structure of things. The investigation of 
science takes us away from the beautiful world of colours and sounds, shapes and forms, symmetric 
lines and contour, to the ultimate waves which are only mathematically definable. The attempt of 
mathematics has been to express in the symbol of numbers certain observations, which do not present 
themselves to our senses. From the world of every day reality we are led to a magical world of 
ultimates where the entire material world of extreme diversity is despoiled of all its manifold 
characters and reduced to a pantheism of mere waves. In religion and poetry we follow the opposite 
direction, the direction of sythesis and the direction of totality; and here also we are led to a magic 
world, where in the diversity of the manifold world of shapes and forms, sounds and colours, 
pleasure and pain, the beloved and the hatefull, all merge together into a solid experience which 
stands as the ultimate at the other extreme.” (Dasgupta, Outlook, 294) 
296 “I should not for a moment hesitate to say that though the vision of God does not appear to such a 
person as the mighty supernatural Being living in heaven, yet a supreme urge for the attainment of 
truth overwhelms him completely. It is here, that the difference between science and religion 
vanishes.” (Dasgupta, Outlook, 326) 
Mircea Eliade and Surendranath Dasgupta 62
“One can be a dweller of both the worlds, the day-to-day life and the other 
beyond this, at the same time. […] This truth of being true to both the 
worlds, is the quest (sādhanā) of the modern-day world. I do not wish to 
have the one-sided emphasis either of the ancients or of the modern 
thinkers. These two aspects of life should be harmonised together to give us 
a fuller view and richer content of life.”297 
 
Richness and fulness imply roundness, and all around him did Dasgupta cast his 
net of curiosity, inquisitiveness and thirst for knowledge and experience. 
Traditional Hindu thought with its central beliefs in the Vedic scriptures, 
emancipation, karma and rebirth appeared to Dasgupta like a narrow dogma, 
stifling his wish and need to use his reason freely and to rely on his own 
experience. Neither could he subscribe to the Vedāntic doctrine of the illusory 
nature of this universe, nor did he envisage a liberated state somewhere beyond 
time and space, possible only through the annihilation of the mind.298 His vision 
was a dynamic, moving one, where an ever-changing and ever-creating life force 
(God, the Self) expressed itself through this whole universe. Dasgupta felt God in 
nature and he felt Him in his life experiences as well as in his creative mind. The 
human mind, being nourished and animated by this immortal flow of life, did not 
have to be stopped or put at rest but could (and should) grow and expand until it 
reached the spiritual level.  
 
Dasgupta regretted the paralysed state of mind he found many of his compatriote 
intellectuals to be in. 
 
 “During the last fifteen years we have had some historians and interpretors 
of Indian thought but it is unfortunate that there has hardly been any 
attempt at the creation of new thought on the basis of the old in harmony 
with the new facts or relations that the present world has brought before our 
purview.”299 
 
“The present world” to Dasgupta meant European philosophy and science: 
 
“We in Indian are not in touch with the living philosophies of Europe and 
our houses are not on fire with the flames of their enlightenment.”300 
 
Yet if the West provided new impulses, there was also a lot to be revived in the 
Eastern tradition. Dasgupta pleaded both for more Indian self-confidence (which 
included “a new spirit of national consciousness”301) as well as for a global 
outlook in culture. 
 
“We should accept the experiences of the past teachers of our country as 
well as those of the teachers of other countries of the past and the present. 
And with our fresh and spontaneous imagination […] we should tackle the 
new problems that are facing us and give new life to philosophy not as the 
philosophy of India or as the philosophy of Europe but as the philosophy of 
humanity.”302 
                                                 
297 Dasgupta, Quest, 140-141 (Letter dated June 16, 1936, London). 
298 In view of these ideas it does not come as a surprise that Dasgupta faced opposition from orthodox 
circles. 
299 Dasgupta, Humanity, 64 (written in 1936). 
300 Dasgupta, Humanity, 64. 
301 Dasgupta, Humanity, 64. 
302 Dasgupta, Humanity, 65. 
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Dasgupta had unshakeable confidence in his own experience.303 To believe in 
experience is something science has taught him,304 experience is what he built his 
philosophy on; experiences were real for the experiencer and as such did not have 
to be scientifically proven. Mystical experiences such as falling into trance states 
are also experiences; we have seen that Dasgupta in these states watched his 
mind withdraw from the outside world and refresh itself within, but never did he 
mention anything about his mind coming to a standstill.  
 
Fascinated and deeply impressed (if not seduced) by natural science Dasgupta 
expected a philosopher to apply scientific methods and rigour to philosophy. 
 
“Philosophers must […] gather all possible facts in different departments of 
nature and also the various kinds of relevant human experiences.”305 
 
He thus turned philosophy into the master science; philosophy was to gather and 
arrange the results of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology etc. and to detect 
and explain the laws hidden behind all natural phenomena. He also followed the 
evolutionary theory in the sense that everything progressed from simple to 
complex, from low to high (and thus he held that life and mind emerged out of 
matter, however mysteriously that should have happened); yet at the same time 
he stated that life, as an expression of the divine, is of such a dynamic nature that 
it cannot be reduced to a linear model but must be described in terms of 
interdependent relations between various complexes, all cooperating with each 
other, and where it is not possible to determine which was there first and which 
came later.   
 
“According to our theory (the details of which cannot properly be elaborated 
and justified in this brief paper), there is no sensation, no image, no 
appearance, no apperception which appears as a singular unitary atomic 
fact. It appears in a background of a mental complex which has as its 
counter-part a pretty large area of physiological happenings and processes. 
Using physical imagery, I may say that as we grow in experience, the area 
that is determined by and determines an apperception also enlarges, and the 
relational processes involved therein also become more and more 
complicated. This complex area is structurally intimately connected with the 
entirety of the mental complex […].”306 
                                                 
303 “In our society there have been many false religions which make man indolent and lazy. In the 
name of liberation these encourage idleness, in the name of meditation these induce sleep, in the name 
of love these bring wild delusions. The god that is formless is created in material idols. This type of 
practice acts as a dam on the spontaneous development of the heart. So people think that when we 
restrain our natural impulses, we are practising self-control. We have to break into pieces many such 
useless beliefs and traditions. There are many eternal truths in our śāstras but there is also much that is 
true only conditionally, much which is influenced by contemporary needs and customs. Therefore, if 
somebody says – ‘the whole country says this, the śāstras say this, such and such a great man says this, 
or, a great sage says this,’ his statement will make no impression on me whatsoever and I shall not 
give any preference to any one opinion. I shall accept the verdict of my experience only […].” 
(Dasgupta, Quest, 187; letter dated February 16, 1943, Hazaribagh) 
304 “[Science] has taught us to believe in rationalism from a new point of view. It has taught us to 
believe in our experiences and also to believe that those experiences which may appear to be irrational 
must be admitted, and we must look forward for a new kind of rationalism which would combine the 
apparently irrational and the rational.” (Dasgupta, Outlook, 350) 
305 Dasgupta, Emergence, 262. 
306 Dasgupta, Emergence, 272. 
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The human being grows and evolves through experiences, the ultimate aim being 
the realisation of God on a spiritual level. Dasgupta’s idea of man is definitely a 
very lofty one. 
 
“The true essence of religion and morality lies in the unfolding of the sacred 
and sofot petels [sic] of human heart in the beauty of disinterested and 
purest love and sympathy, a spirit of undying faith and hope in the superior 
order of things, the broadest outlook on life which shows itself in 
harmonising the different values in a hierarchical order, so that life becomes 
worth living and ideals worth striving for. If we have a look into the lives 
and workings of great men, saints and seers, we find the same undeniable 
truth, that each one of them lived for one object, the transformation of all 
ordinary values into those of a wider a purer ones [sic]; each one of them 
showed the irresistible and unshakable conviction that egoism has to vanish 
before altruism like darkness before light, hatred and jealousy and all mean 
and cringy conflicts of passions and instincts have to melt away before the 
sweetness of love, kind and loving consideration for all fellow-beings, and 
all ties of worldly interest have to give way to the deeper and intuitive 
glimpse of a world beyond. That he ultimate end of life is realised in 
transcending and transmuting the stages it passes through, is the lesson we 
derive from biology, and this is the secret of religion as well.”307 
 
A spiritual man is also necessarily involved in a creative process which concerns 
his whole existence.308 Once this goal is reached, the human life is fulfilled; not in 
the sense that such a person will leave this world and withdraw from it but in the 
sense that he or she enjoys the entire field of his or her experiences and creative 
expressions, on all levels the human mind can reach. Dasgupta does talk of 
renunciation in this context, but his renunciation is a positive one. 
 
“I do not have a negative concept of renunciation. I love the renunciation of 
fullness where the mind is so rich in its own achievements of a beyond that, 
while it moves and works in the world, it is still not fettered by these. This 
renunciation is not antipathy or indifference to the world because of the 
sorrows and transitory joys of life, but this is due to the discovery of a new 
spiritual world in ourselves which gives us satisfaction, joy and 
completeness in its perspective and enjoyment.”309 
 
                                                 
307 Dasgupta, Outlook, 204-205. 
308 „So is the man who is transcending the limits of morality and entering the portals of spirituality. He 
is no longer in conflict with his urge, his urge is spontaneous, dancing in cadence with the dance of 
the blood in his veins. A spiritual man is thus an artist, a poet; not of words, not of colours, but of 
emotions, thoughts and volitions. He transmutes his life into a divine element, transforming his 
primitive passions into elements of new value, his vulgar emotions and volitions rising into glory and 
spontaneously building by themselves a temple of God and humanity at which he looks, like a 
spectator overwhelmed with joy and emotion. He melts into the flow of love for humanity and for his 
ideal, which though far is near, though inscrutable is easy, though unthinkable yet is simple. This 
work of the artist goes on in the life of a spiritual man, in which time and temporality is forgotten, in 
which the horrors of the passions subside, in which immorality, evil and suffering melt away in a 
divine perception, which transcends all speech and thought, which breaks open the bonds of the finite 
and the infinite, a moment’s conpresence [sic] with which is the elixir of mortal life. It is a taste of God 
in man, living through into the lives of all beings, and the culmination of the creative process. This is 
in reality the spiritual immortality that is the destiny of man to attain.” (Dasgupta, Outlook, 362-363) 
309 Dasgupta, Quest, 140-141 (letter dated June 16, 1936, London). 
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The discovery and conquest of the spiritual world brings joy and it also helps to 
remain detached in difficult situations – Dasgupta here certainly refers to his own 
experience, too. 
 
“[…] the disappointments that we have to face, will not be able to frustrate 
us, because we are full of joy of our life within. This is like the incoming tide 
of joy from an ocean. So while the mind will be full of this delight, all other 
waves of joys and sorrows will be only like passing phases.”310 
 
In the deepest layer of his soul Dasgupta was a bhakta, filled with love for God. To 
Him he surrendered in any situation of his life.  
 
 “Everything is in God’s hand.”311 
 
When he lost the sight in one eye312 and when he was cast out of society he found 
consolation in the spiritual dimension, and as much as he loved life he seemed to 
have been prepared to leave this world as soon as God wanted him to. 
 
“Whatever my Lord asks me to do, I can do. I can jump into the ocean 
should He bid me to do so. Why should I feel grief if He, who has brought 
all life into this world, takes it away? If He takes, who can keep it and if He 
preserves it, who can take it? I see my merciful Lord very easily everywhere. 
I keep my hand in Him and feel benumbed.”313 
 
“I have done whatever I could. If He permits me to live, to work, I shall do 
so. If not, whenever He will call me back, He will find that His servant is 
ever ready to quit this world and life. I feel that I am always in accord with 
the harmony of the Universe, the divine law of the will of God. In this I am 
always at peace and happiness.”314 
 
Dasgupta expressed his own philosophical views and convictions, which we have 
tried to present in this chapter 3.5., mainly from the 1930-ies onward. Let us now 




                                                 
310 Dasgupta, Quest, 141 (letter dated June 16, 1936, London). 
311 Dasgupta, Quest, 101 (letter dated March 29, 1935, Rome). 
312 “I was using my eyes for His work, He who is the vision of our eyes and the mind of our minds. If 
now He has taken it back without letting me use it any more, I should be glad even for that. I do not 
think that I have lost it, I feel that I had got it so that I could give it away. If I think that I have lost it, I 
am bound to feel sorry; if I think that I had it, i.e. possessed it so that I could give it up, then there 
would be no cause for sorrow. He let me use this eye for His work, now I find that the time had come 
for giving it up, so it is gone. That is all.” (Dasgupta, Quest, 108, letter dated May 3rd, 1935). 
313 Dasgupta, Quest, 158 (letter dated July 16, 1939, Port Said). 
314 Dasgupta, Quest, 108 (letter dated Vienna, May 3rd, 1935). 
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4. Dasgupta’s texts on Yoga 
 
4.1. Chronological outline 
 
Dasgupta considered Yoga and Sāṃkhya to be two practically identical 
systems;315 Yoga, to him, was “Pātañjala Sāṃkhya,” Patañjali’s Sāṃkhya.316 He 
dedicated three books and several chapters of other works to this subject. His 
very first text on Sāṃkhya-Yoga was written in 1914, when he was 27 years old, 
as the Griffith Prize essay, but it appeared in print only in 1920 as The Study of 
Patanjali. On June 2, 1921, at a meeting of the Quest Society, Dasgupta read a 
paper called “Yoga Psychology” which got published in 1941 in his Philosophical 
Essays.317 One year later, in 1922, the first volume of his History of Indian Philosophy 
appeared in Cambridge with one chapter (VII) dedicated to “The Kapila and the 
Pātañjala Sāṃkhya (Yoga).”318 Next came his book Yoga as Philosophy and Religion 
(1924), followed by Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought 
(published 1930 but written ten years earlier as Dasgupta’s doctorate thesis of the 
Calcutta University). His book Hindu Mysticism (1927), consisting of the six 
lectures Dasgupta delivered in America in 1926, has one chapter on “Yoga 
Mysticism”319 and in Philosophical Essays, published in 1941, we find a chapter 
entitled “An Interpretation of the Yoga Theory of the Relation of Mind and 
Body.”320 Finally, in his posthumous book Natural Science of the Ancient Hindus, 
Dasgupta also presents the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system,321 but the chapter “Theories of 
Cosmic Changes,” which contains the Sāṃkhya-Yoga passage, was originally 
composed as early as 1915 and revised in 1917. 
 
                                                 
315 „[...] they may both be regarded as two different modifications of one common system of ideas.“ 
(Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, ix).  “On almost all other fundamental points Sāṃkhya and Yoga 
are in complete agreement.” (Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 165). 
316 Dasgupta, Philosophy, 221. 
317 Dasgupta, Essays, 179-197. 
318 Dasgupta, Philosophy, 208-273. 
319 Dasgupta, Mysticism. 61-82. 
320 Dasgupta, Essays, 276-320. There is no indication as to when this text was written. 
321 Dasgupta, Science, 64-90. This book is yet another proof of Surama’s untiring attempts to keep the 
memory of her husband alive; as the editor puts it: “The publication of Natural Science of the Ancient 
Hindus by the late Professor Surendranath Dasgupta has been made possible mainly because of the 
kindness of Dr (Mrs) Surama Dasgupta, the wife of the author of this book and who herself is a 
distinguished scholar. ICPR is deeply grateful to her for giving it the manuscript of the book which 
she has preserved with scholarly care.” (General Editor’s Note) 
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Because most of Dasgupta’s texts on Yoga were published years after he had 
written them it is helpful to show the order of their creation in a chronological 
chart. 
 
Title Written Published 
The Study of Patanjali 1914 1920 
“Theories of Cosmic Changes” 1915/1917 1987 
Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems 
of Indian Thought 
1920 1930 
“Yoga Psychology” 1921 1941 
“The Kapila and the Pātañjala Sāṃkhya 
(Yoga)” 
Before 1922 1922 
Yoga as Philosophy and Religion Before 1924 1924 
“Yoga Mysticism” 1926 1927 
“An Interpretation of the Yoga Theory of 
the Relation of Mind and Body” 
Before 1941 1941 
 
We immediately see that Sāṃkhya-Yoga was a topic which kept Dasgupta busy 
for about 12 years (from 1914 to 1926). Afterwards, his mind veered more and 
more towards science, philosophy and religion in general and he was increasingly 
working on his own philosophical ideas. In all his texts written after 1926 
Sāṃkhya-Yoga is hardly ever mentioned; it appears only casually here and there 
in various contexts but does not retain Dasgupta’s interest any more. Neither is 
the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system of any major importance in the ideas and concepts 
Dasgupta is dealing with or developing from the 1930-ies onward.322 The only 
exception to this rule is the chapter “An Interpretation of the Yoga Theory of the 
Relation of Mind and Body,” published in 1941, but Dasgupta’s footnote on the 
first page immediately reveals that he is no longer dealing with the presentation 
and interpretation of the original philosophical system, based on its textual 
tradition, but wants to integrate Yogic notions into the framework of a more 
general and modern philosophy.323 
 
                                                 
322 In the 1930-ies, when he was the Principal of the Sanskrit College and travelled extensively, he 
published the second volume of his Indian Philosophy (1932) as well as Indian Idealism (in 1933, which 
deals with the Upaniṣads, Buddhism and Vedānta in a series of lectures held “years ago” [Dasgupta, 
Idealism, Preface, no page number] at the University of Patna). 1936 saw the publication of his article 
“Philosophy of Dependent Emergence” where Sāṃkhya-Yoga is hardly mentioned. The same holds 
true for his Stephanos Nirmalendu lectures, delivered in 1939 or 1941 at the Calcutta University (and 
posthumously published as Religion and the Rational Outlook). His brief presidential address at the 
Indian Philosophical Congress session at Delhi in 1936 (“The Philosophy of Humanity”, published as 
late as 1998)322 is equally devoid of Sāṃkhya-Yoga. In the fourties Dasgupta completed volumes III 
and IV of his History of Indian Philosophy (1940 and 1949) and published the Philosophical Essays (in 
1941). All his other philosophical books appeared posthumously (“Science, Philosophy and Religion” 
in 1953, Religion and the Rational Outlook in 1954, vol. V of the History in 1955, and Natural Science of the 
Ancient Hindus in 1987). 
323 “The article cannot obviously be justified as an interpretation of the Yoga texts. It represents, 
however, the way in which some of the fundamental ideas of Yoga can be utilized in our present-day 
conceptions of philosophy and science.” (Dasgupta, Relation, 276) 
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Looking at Dasgupta’s works on Yoga one cannot fail to notice that the 
differences between them are sometimes only slight - Dasgupta expressed the 
same ideas more than once. The most striking example of this occurs with The 
Study of Patanjali and Yoga as Philosophy and Religion which are virtually 
identical,324 in other words: Dasgupta’s analysis of the philosophy which he calls 
Sāṃkhya-Yoga did not undergo any substantial changes between 1914 and 1924. 
Why then did he republish his Study of Patanjali under a new name? A closer look 
reveals that Dasgupta, in 1924,  introduced few but very significant changes in his 
1914 text which call for a detailed comparison of the two books. 
 
 
4.2. Yoga as Philosophy and Religion compared to The Study of Patanjali 
 
4.2.1. Minor differences 
 
The Study of Patanjali (1914)325 Yoga as Philosophy and Religion (1924)
Sanskrit quotations and important 
Sanskrit terms are printed in 
Devanāgarī and are often not translated 
into English. 
Sanskrit quotations are not printed in 
Devanāgarī but have been translated 
into English; important Sanskrit terms 
or sūtras are given in Roman 
transliteration. 
The book is one long text without 
chapters; very brief “headlines” 
inserted in the margins of almost every 
page are the only indications of the 
content; there is an appendix on sphoṭa-
vāda. 
The text has been divided into two main 
books (Yoga metaphysics and Yoga 
ethics and practice) with 7, respectively 
8 chapters. The appendix is the same; a 
table of contents and an index have 
been added. Running titles further help 
the reader to find his way in the book. 
 
                                                 
324 Of course, Dasgupta does not state this explicitly; he simply thanks (at the end of the preface to 
Yoga as Philosophy and Religion) “Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee […] and the University of Calcutta, for 
kindly permitting me to utilize my A Study of Patañjali, which is a Calcutta University publication, for 
the present work.” (Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, x) 
325 I refer to the year when this book was written because Dasgupta published it in 1920 without any 
changes. 
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Clearly, Dasgupta wrote The Study of Patanjali for an Indian public, able to read 
and understand Sanskrit, whereas in Yoga as Philosophy and Religion he addresses 
a Western, English speaking audience. His endeavour to appeal to Western 
readers not only shows in the more scientific appearance of Yoga as Philosophy and 
Religion (rigorous structure, index, running titles), but also in the numerous 
attempts to improve both vocabulary and syntax.326 A few examples, chosen by 
chance, may suffice to illustrate this:  
 
The Study of Patanjali (1914) Yoga as Philosophy and Religion (1924)
“A more definite notion of Prakriti we 
shall get as we advance further into the 
details…” (12) 
“We shall get a more definite notion of 
prakṛti as we advance further into the 
details…” (13) 
“Again knowledge and the external 
world because they happen to be 
presented together can never be said to 
be identical.” (36) 
“Again, knowledge and the external 
world can never be said to be identical 
because they happen to be presented 
together.” (35) 
“The conative sense of speech is 
developed in accompaniment of the 
sense of hearing […].” (59) 
“The conative sense of speech is 
developed in association with the sense 
of hearing […].” (58) 
“Ordinarily our minds are engaged 
only in perception, inference etc., - all 
those mental states which we all 
naturally possess. These our ordinary 
mental states are full of Rajas and 
Tamas. When the process of our 
ordinary mental states is arrested, the 
mind flows with an abundance of sattva 
[Devanāgarī] in the saṃprajñāta 
[Devanāgarī] Samādhi; lastly when 
even the saṃprajñāta [Devanāgarī] state 
is arrested, all possible states become 
arrested thereby.” (98) 
“Ordinarily our minds are engaged 
only in perception, inference, etc. – 
those mental states which we all 
naturally possess. These ordinary 
mental states are full of rajas and tamas. 
When these are arrested, the mind flows 
with an abundance of sattva in the 
saṃprajñāta samādhi; lastly when even 
the saṃprajñāta state is arrested, all 
possible states become arrested.” (96) 
“The Yoga which after weakening the 
hold of the afflictions and dawning the 
Real truth before our mental vision…” 
(127) 
The Yoga which, after weakening the 
hold of the afflictions and causing the 
real truth to dawn upon our mental 
vision…” (126) 
“This means that we are to cultivate the 
habit of friendliness towards those who 
are happy; this will indeed remove all 
jealous feelings, and thereby cleanse the 
mind and make it pure.” (142) 
“This means that we are to cultivate the 
habit of friendliness towards those who 
are happy, which will remove all 




                                                 
326 In the preface, Dasgupta thanks Douglas Ainslie „for the numerous corrections and suggestions 
regarding the English style that he was pleased to make throughout the body of the manuscript […].” 
(Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, x) 
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4.2.2. Major differences 
 
The most substantial changes occur in the beginning and towards the end of the 
book (Dasgupta, Patanjali, 4-11 and 168-178 as against Dasgupta, Philosophy and 
Religion, 5-12 and 163-165), and they concern mainly comparisons of Patañjali 
with Western philosophers. Whereas, in 1914, Dasgupta abundantly refers to and 
discusses Aristotle, Plato, Hegel and Kant, he decided, in 1924, to cut out quite a 
few of these passages and to argue mainly along Yoga and Sāṃkhya lines. Let me 
first present the details and then draw some conclusions.  
 
Dasgupta starts his presentation of Yoga with a classification of philosophical 
systems according to the problem of the relation between mind and matter. In 
both books this passage is identical.327  
 
“An enquiry into the relations of the mental phenomena to the physical has 
sometimes given the first start to philosophy. The relation of mind to matter 
is such an important problem of philosophy that the existing philosophical 
systems may roughly be classified according to the relative importance that 
has been attached to mind or to matter. There have been chemical, 
mechanical and biological conceptions which have ignored mind as a 
separate entity and have dogmatically affirmed it to be the product of matter 
only [footnote: Ward: Naturalism and agnosticism]. There have been theories 
of the other extreme, which have dispensed with matter altogether and have 
boldly affirmed that matter as such has no reality at all, and that thought is 
the only thing which can be called Real in the highest sense. All matter as 
such is non-Being or Māyā or Avidyā. There have been Nihilists like the 
śūnyavādi Buddhists who have gone so far as to assert that neither matter 
nor mind exists. Some have asserted that matter is only thought 
externalised, some have regarded the principle of matter as the unknowable 
Thing-in-itself, some have regarded them as separate independent entities 
held within a higher reality called God, or as two of his attributes only, and 
some have regarded their difference as being only one of grades of 
intelligence, one merging slowly and imperceptibly into the other and held 
together in concord with each other by pre-established harmony.”  
 
After this “tour d’horizon” Dasgupta presents the Yoga system as “an acute 
analysis of matter and thought.”328 He first describes puruṣa, prakṛti and the three 
guṇas and then quotes Vācaspati’s Tattvavaiśāradī on the Vyāsabhāṣya III,47 where 
it says that the guṇas have two aspects, one being the perceiver or the determiner 
and the other being the perceived or the determined. In the first aspect they form 
ahaṃkāra and the senses, in the second aspect they create the tanmātras and the 
mahābhūtas. In 1924, Dasgupta immediately draws the logic conclusion:  
 
“There is no intrinsic difference in nature between the mental and the 
physical.”329  
 
                                                 
327 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 2; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 2. 
328 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 2; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 2. 
329 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 4. 
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In 1914 however, he attributes this insight not to Vācaspati (and thus to the Yoga 
system) but to Western philosophers:  
 
“Aristotle, Leibnitz, Hegel all of them asserted in their own ways that there 
was no intrinsic difference between the so-called mental and the physical.”330  
 
This sentence in The Study of Patanjali is the starting point for a longer discussion 
of similarities and differences between Aristotle and Patañjali, including a 
quotation from Vijñāna Bhikṣu’s Sāṃkhyasāra (on the theory of causation).331 In 
1924, Dasgupta eliminated this whole passage with the exception of Vijñāna 
Bhikṣu’s quotation which he turned into the major argument of a new 
paragraph.332  
 
After that, both texts continue identical until Dasgupta, in Yoga as Philosophy and 
Religion, again cuts out a few lines on Aristotle,333 inserting instead a whole page 
on the guṇas.334 The next deviation occurs when Dasgupta, in conclusion to a 
quotation from Vācaspati’s Tattvavaiśāradī on YS II,19 writes: “This state is called 
the Prakriti.”335 In his first book he goes on to compare “this state” with Hegel’s 
pure being:  
 
“This state is called the Prakriti, which may in some sense be loosely 
compared with the pure Being of Hegel. For it is like that, the beginning, the 
simple, indeterminate, unmediated and undetermined.”  
 
In 1924 however, Dasgupta eliminates this reference to Hegel, the new text 
running like this:  
 
“This state is called the prakṛti. It is the beginning, indeterminate, 
unmediated and undetermined.”  
 
The same thing happens again, after yet another quotation from Vācaspati’s 
Tattvavaiśāradī on YS II,19. Again, in 1914 Dasgupta draws the parallel to Hegel.  
 
“Thus we see that if it [prakṛti] is looked at from this narrow point of view of 
similarity, it may be compared with the pure Being of Hegel, a state of 
implicitude which is at the root of all determinate and concrete existence.”336  
 
Only six lines further down, Hegel is mentioned once more.  
 
“Had this Prakriti been the only one principle, it is clear that it could be 
compared to the absolute of Hegel or as pure Being.”337  
 
                                                 
330 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 4. 
331 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 4-5. 
332 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 4. 
333 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 6. 
334 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 5-6. 
335 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 8; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 8. 
336 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 10. 
337 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 10. 
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Yet, in Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, Dasgupta carefully cuts out all the Hegel-
sentences from his text and instead adds a new paragraph in which he insists on 
the fact that prakṛti is nothing but the guṇas and does not exist apart from them.338 
This statement also serves as a reply to “some European scholars” who “have 
often asked me whether the prakṛti were real or whether the guṇas were real.”339  
 
In 1914, Dasgupta further compares prakṛti to Spinoza’s Natura Naturans and to 
Plato’s “mother and receptacle of all visible things”340 – a paragraph which was 
dropped without replacement in 1924.  
 
From page 13 onward341 and until the very last part of the book, the two texts 
become more or less identical, presenting just minor, mostly linguistic deviations. 
It is interesting that the Western philosophers mentioned right in the beginning of 
this section are not eliminated in 1924. The obvious reason for this is that they all 





Aristotle “[…] even in Aristotle’s attempt to avoid the difficulty by his 
theory of form and matter, we are not fully satisfied, though 
he has shown much ingenuity and subtlety of thought in 
devising the ‘expedient in the single conception of 
development’.” 
His commentators “But all students of Aristotle know that it is very difficult to 
understand the true relation between form and matter, and 
the particular nature of their interaction with each other, and 
this has created a great divergence of opinion among his 
commentators.” 
Plato “[…] fights the difficulty of solving the unification of the 




“It was probably to avoid this difficulty [relation between 
form and matter] that the dualistic appearance of the 
philosophy of Descartes had to be reconstructed in the 
pantheism of Spinoza.” 
Kant „Again we find also how Kant failed to bring about the 
relation between noumenon and phenomenon, and created 
two worlds absolutely unrelated to each other. He tried to 
reconcile the schism that he effected in his Critique of Pure 
Reason by his Critique of Practical Reason, and again 
supplemented it with his Critique of Judgment, but met only 
with dubious success.” 
                                                 
338 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 9-10. 
339 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 10. 
340 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 10-11. 
341 Page 13 in both books. 
342 From Aristotle to  Spinoza: Dasgupta, Patanjali and Philosophy and Religion, 13; Kant: Dasgupta, 
Patanjali, 13; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 14. 
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These Western explanations belong to the same category as the various theories of 
the Advaita Vedāntins which ”[…] only show that the transcendent nature of the 
union of the principle of pure intelligence is very difficult to comprehend.”343  
 
At this point, Dasgupta introduces Sāṃkhya-Yoga as a powerful system 
providing profound and accurate answers to the question of how mind and 
matter are related to each other. He sets out by explaining “the relation of 
purusha with the prakṛti” and “the exact nature of [this] relation.”344 But before 
accompanying him in this enterprise, let us now move to the end of the book 
where Dasgupta replaced ten pages of The Study of Patanjali by just three in Yoga 
as Philosophy and Religion.345  
 
After a long paragraph on how the knowledge gained through samādhi is 
different from and superior to any other kind of knowledge,346 Dasgupta, in 1924, 
abandons the topic of samādhi in order to talk about a number of differences 
between Sāṃkhya and Yoga,347 reaching the following conclusion:  
 
“On almost all other fundamental points Sāṃkhya and Yoga are in complete 
agreement.”348  
 
In 1914 however, Dasgupta did not compare Patañjali to Sāṃkhya but to a few 
Western philosophers, and he starts by saying that Bergson’s concept of intuition 
is similar to samādhi. 
 
“It [the mental state reached by deep concentration] is akin to the conception 
of intuition by Bergson, the nature of which as described by Bergson applies 
in a certain measure to Samādhi.”349  
 
Afterwards, he explains how Patañjali (who “like Kant, […] does not bring about 
a schism between science and metaphysics”)350 shows the process by which the 
human mind is able to finally grasp the metaphysical reality or (in Kantian terms) 
“the thing as it is.”351  
 
                                                 
343 Dasgupta, Patanjali and Philosophy and Religion, 15. 
344 Dasgupta, Patanjali and Philosophy and Religion, 16. 
345 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 168-178 as compared to Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 163-165. 
346 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 169; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 162-163 (“[…] it [samādhi] alone can 
bring objects before our mental eye with the clearest and most unerring light of comprehensibility in 
which the true nature of the thing is at once observed. […] But samādhi has no such limitations and 
the knowledge that can be attained by it is absolutely unobstructed, true and real in the strictest sense 
of the terms.”) 
347 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 163-165. 
348 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 165. 
349 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 169. 
350 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 170. 
351 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 170. 
Mircea Eliade and Surendranath Dasgupta 74
“[…] our mind must follow an inverse process of stopping its flow from 
concepts to concepts, but concentrated [sic] itself to one concept and that 
alone, and repeat it again and again to the exclusion of all other possible 
concepts, and thus become coincided, identified as it were with it, when the 
limitations of the concept at once vanish and the thing shines before the 
mind in its true reality.”352  
 
Next, Dasgupta opposes Patañjali to “the whole philosophy from Plato to 
Plotinus.” Whereas Plato and the Neo-Platonists stated that “there is more in the 
immutable than in the moving and [that] we pass from the stable to the unstable 
by a mere diminution,”353 the author of the YS “had never any such bias as that.”  
 
“Prakriti, the sphere of the mutable and the unstable is not on that account 
less true than the Purusha – the immutable; only their realities are of two 
different kinds and neither of them can ever be reduced to the other. All evil 
is due to the want of right comprehension of their relative spheres; stable is 
always stable and unstable is always unstable and they must not be 
confused by either in any way.”354  
 
This clear distinction between two utterly different spheres which, nevertheless, 
(and this is the crucial point in Dasgupta’s argument) are equally real, seems to be 
the great advantage of the Yoga philosophy over other systems of thought, as far 
as explaining the relation between the physical and the metaphysical is 
concerned. 
 
Dasgupta evokes Plato whose “ideas” were the only reality, later opposed to the 
Aristotelian “matter” which Bergson called a “non-being,” “an illusive 
nothing.”355 And whereas for the Neo-Platonic school 
 
“[the] supreme degree of cognition is the vision of the supreme, the single 
principle of things, in which all separation between it and the soul ceases, in 
which this latter in divine rapture touches the absolute itself, and feels itself 
filled by it and illuminated by it,”356  
 
the metaphysical reality became utterly unattainable with Kant:  
 
“There is no intuition that carries us into the non-temporal […].”357 
 
According to Dasgupta, Patañjali coincides with Aristotle 
 
“[…] in conceiving an unmoved as the cause of all that is endlessly moving 
for it is into these that the former unwinds itself.”358  
 
                                                 
352 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 170-171. 
353 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 171. 
354 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 172. 
355 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 172. 
356 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 174. 
357 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 175. 
358 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 176. 
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But: This “first motionless mover”359 accounts only for all the subsequent changes 
in the material world; it cannot, however,  
 
“[…] explain the stable and “unmoved” which forms the background of all 
our conscious experiences. This “unmoved” and “unmovable” of our 
consciousness of pure shining effulgence, a constant factor of all conceptual 
mobility can never be confused with it.”360  
 
This puruṣa (as Dasgupta calls it on p. 176) is something utterly different from the 
Aristotelian “unmoved” (which would correspond to prakṛti).  
 
“[…] they are two independent realities and none of them can be said to be 
derived from the other and consequently there is no diminution of reality 
involved in the conception of matter.”361  
 
Patañjali not only proves superior to Plato362 and Aristotle363 (by postulating two 
equivalent realities) but also to Kant, because  
 
“the comprehension of this metaphysical reality is not a dream with him 
[…].”364 
 
Like the Neo-Platonists, Patañjali knows that 
 
“[…] there are other souces of right knowledge than those provided by the 
scanty scope of conceptual relativity of our thoughts.”365  
 
Dasgupta ends this philosophical excursion with an exalted paragraph, praising 
in highly poetical language the light which Patañjali and the Neo-Platonists have 
brought into the world, and encouraging everybody to make an effort and to try 
to reach the metaphysical reality, “this land of eternal sunshine, bliss and 
communion.” 
 
“The light that they have shown in the illumination of the history of world-
civilisation will manifest itself to any enquiring mind as the first beams of 
sunshine bringing messages of hope and bliss from the region of eternal 
sunshine beyond the gloomy and imperfect vision of our science and will 
always awaken us to believe that with reality which is hidden from our view 
I may stand face to face only if I possess the will to do it. Many hidden 
mysteries are daily being discovered by men of genius by this intuitive 
perception yogapratyakṣa [in Devanāgarī] but none of us try [sic] to penetrate 
methodically into the depths of this land of eternal bliss and communion. 
The face of truth is hidden by a golden veil (hiranmayeṇa pātreṇa 
satyasyāpāvṛtaṃ mukhaṃ) [in Devanāgarī] and let all mankind combine in 
their efforts to draw it away and adore the unveiled truth as it is in itself.”366  
 
                                                 
359 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 173. 
360 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 176. 
361 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 176. 
362 Plato who „had to acknowledge the separate existence [of Non-Being] though he wanted to deprive 
it of all determinate qualities.“ (Dasgupta, Patanjali, 176) 
363 Aristotle who „substituted for the independent reality of the ideas only and an ideality towards 
which matter is striving and thus made it the imanent [sic] teleology of matter.“ (Dasgupta, Patanjali, 
177)  
364 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 177. 
365 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 177. 
366 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 178. 
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4.2.3. Conclusions 
 
When Dasgupta, in 1924, published Yoga as Philosophy and Religion he virtually 
reedited a text which he had written ten years before but published only in 1920: 
The Study of Patanjali. The differences in outward appearance (structure and 
language) suggest that the later book was aimed at a Western, English speaking 
and most probably scientifically trained audience, whereas the first one seemed to 
have been produced mainly for Indians. As to the content, both books are 
practically identical, with the exception of two longer passages. It is interesting to 
note that whereas Dasgupta left the main body of the book untouched, namely 
his elaborate exposition of the Yoga system of thought, he felt the urge, in 1924, to 
heavily intervene in those sections dealing with Patañjali as compared to Western 
philosophers, by cutting out names, sentences, whole paragraphs or even several 
pages, replacing the eliminated text only partially. 
 
This change in perspective is most probably a result of the two years Dasgupta 
spent in Cambridge from 1920-1922. We have already seen that this stay provided 
Dasgupta with a more critical outlook towards both Eastern and Western 
philosophy and also gave him the courage to later on verbalise his criticism.367 
Here, in the comparison of The Study of Patanjali with Yoga as Philosophy and 
Religion, we can appreciate how interwovenly complex Dasgupta’s position was 
as far as East and West is concerned.  
 
Dasgupta’s starting point was the philosophical problem of the relation between 
matter and mind. He states that nobody, neither in the West (Greek and German 
philosophers) nor in the East (Buddhism, Vedānta) has managed to satisfactorily 
explain the nature of this relation. But, in The Study of Patanjali, Western 
philosophers are granted a certain number of insights: Aristotle, Leibnitz and 
Hegel knew that the mental and the physical are not basically different from each 
other, Hegel, Spinoza and Plato had came up with concepts that could be 
compared to the Indian prakṛti, and Bergson’s intuition was akin to samādhi. All 
this disappeared in Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, where the similarity between 
the mental and the physical appears as uniquely yogic and where neither prakṛti 
nor samādhi seem to have had any parallel concept in the West. It is as if 
Dasgupta, when he addressed a Western audience in 1924, tried to stress the 
uniqueness (and ultimately superiority) of the yoga system without letting 
Western ideas disrupt his concise and straightforward exposition of Patañjali’s 
philosophy. This would also explain why he decided to get rid of the long 
discussion of parallels and differences between Patañjali and Plato, the Neo-
Platonists and Kant on the one hand as well as Aristotle on the other. He 
preferred to sacrifice the conclusion that Patañjali is superior to all of them368 to 
having to evoke their ideas in the first place. Dasgupta shifted from one 
standpoint to another, depending on who he was writing for: when he addressed 
his own people in 1914, he was anxious to display the worth and value of 
                                                 
367 Cf. supra, chapter 3.5.1. 
368 To Plato because his prakṛti is not a non-being devoid of qualities; to Kant because through samādhi 
he showed a way how the metaphysical reality could be reached, and to Aristotle because his puruṣa 
could account for conscious experiences, which the Greek’s unmoved principle could not. 
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Western philosophy (as well as, of course, the knowledge he had about it), 
whereas ten years later, with a Western audience in mind (which, in the 
meantime, he had become closely acquainted with), he moved “his” Sāṃkhya 
philosophy more to the foreground, demonstrating its undisputable qualities. 
 
There is yet another angle to be considered. In Cambridge, Dasgupta studied 
mostly Western philosophy and got acquainted with the way philosophy was 
discussed at a Western university. After his return back to India he must have re-
read his own Patañjali text with “new eyes,” so to speak, maybe feeling all of a 
sudden insecure about the way he had presented certain Western ideas, and 
maybe anticipating a kind of criticism he must have encountered in England 
when discussing philosophical topics with his Western collegues. Whatever his 
motives may have been, the fact remains that Yoga as Philosophy and Religion has 
been purged of all those sections where Western philosophical ideas could be 
seen as similar to those expressed by Patañjali, or where the discussion of certain 
concepts called for a complex and elaborate representation of the Western 
treatment of the subject.369 But whenever the quotation of a Western thinker 
clearly and non-ambiguously showed that he had not found the solution to a 
particular problem, Dasgupta felt no need to eliminate it in 1924. We have seen 
this with Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza and Kant, failing to explain the 
nature of the relation between matter and mind,370 and there are two more 
examples.  
 
1. The question “what is the ground which underlies the manifold appearance of 
this external world which has been proved to be real?”371 is answered by Locke, 
Hume and Kant by “we cannot know it.”  
 
“Locke called this substratum substance and regarded it as unknown, but 
said that though it did not follow that it was a product of our own subjective 
thought yet it did not at the same time exist without us.”372  
 
“Hume, however, tried to explain everything from the standpoint of 
association of ideas and denied all notions of substantiality.”373  
                                                 
369 There is one exception to this rule: Dasgupta compares the nature of pure contentless universal 
consciousness to Fichte’s egohood: “Thus we see that this pure contentless universal consciousness is 
the same as the ego-universal (asmitāmātra). For this contentless universal consciousness is only 
another name for the contentless unlimited, infinite of the ego-universal. A quotation from Fichte may 
here be useful as a comparison. Thus he says in the introduction to his Science of Ethics: ‘How an object 
can ever become a subject, or how a being can ever become an object of representation: this curious 
change will never be explained by anyone who does not find a point where the objective and 
subjective are not distinguished at all, but are altogether one. Now such a point is established by, and 
made the starting point of our system. This point is the Egohood, the Intelligence, Reason, or whatever 
it may be named’.” (Dasgupta, Patanjali, 50-51; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 50). In the 
footnote however, Dasgupta immediately withdraws from any further parallels between Yoga and 
Fichte: “Nothing more than a superficial comparison with Fichte is here intended. A large majority of 
the texts and the commentary literature would oppose the attempts of all those who would like to 
interpret Sāṃkhya-yoga on Fichtean lines.” 
370 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 13; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 13-14. 
371 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 38; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 36. 
372 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 38; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 36-37. 
373 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 38; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 36-37. 
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„We know that Kant, who was much influenced by Hume, agreed to the 
existence of some such unknown reality which he called the Thing-in-itself, 
the nature of which, however, was absolutely unknowable, but whose 
influence was a great factor in all our experiences.“374  
 
2. As to the theory of evolution, Dasgupta notes that Western scientists simply 
describe it without giving any explanations:  
 
“Although the pioneers of modern scientific evolution have tried to observe 
scientifically some of the stages of the growth of the inorganic and of the 
animal worlds into the man, yet they do not give any reason for it. Theirs is 
more an experimental assertion of facts than a metaphysical account of 
evolution. According to Darwin the general form of the evolutionary process 
is that which is accomplished by ‘very slight variations which are 
accumulated by the effect of natural selection.’ And according to a later 
theory, we see that a new species is constituted all at once by the 
simultaneous appearance of several new characteristics very different from 
the old. But why this accidental variation, this seeming departure from the 
causal chain, comes into being, the evolutionists cannot explain.”375  
 
In both cases, Dasgupta clearly opposes these Western views to the yogic doctrine 
which has more to offer.  
 
“But the Bhāshya tries to penetrate deeper into the nature of this substratum 
or substance and says: […].”376 
 
“But the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine explains it from the standpoint of 
teleology or the final goal inherent in all matter, so that it may be serviceable 
to the purusha. To be serviceable to the purusha is the one moral purpose in 
all prakṛti and its manifestations in the whole material world, which guide 
the course and direction of the smallest particle of matter. From the scientific 
point of view, the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine is very much in the same 
position as modern science, for it does not explain the cause of the accidental 
variation noticed in all the stages of evolutionary process from any physical 
point of view based on the observation of facts. But it does much credit to 
the Pātañjala doctrines that they explain this accidental variation, this 
avyapadeśyatva or unpredictability of the onward course of evolution from 
a moral point of view, that of teleology, the serviceability of the purusha.”377  
 
In short: When Dasgupta reedited The Study of Patanjali in 1924 for Western 
readers, he was anxious to present a coherent Indian answer to the major 
philosophical problem of the relation between matter and mind. The Sāṃkhya-
Yoga philosophy is shown to be able to provide new solutions where Western 
philosophy (as well as certain Indian systems) had failed. Writing mainly for an 
Indian audience in 1914, Dasgupta abundantly quoted and discussed Western 
philosophers in order to show where and how they coincided with or differed 
from Patañjali; in 1924 however, Dasgupta carefully eliminated all those 
references, retaining Western quotations only when they proved to be inferior to 
what Sāṃkhya and Yoga stated.  
                                                 
374 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 39; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 37. 
375 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 77; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 76. 
376 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 39; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 37; a long paragraph on the guṇas 
follows. 
377 Dasgupta, Patanjali, 77-78; Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 67-77. 
Mircea Eliade and Surendranath Dasgupta 79
It is interesting to note that already at the age of 27 (when he wrote The Study of 
Patanjali) Dasgupta had formed some of the ideas which were to play a major role 
in his own philosophy. First of all, Sāṃkhya-Yoga was such an outstanding 
system, able to successfully tackle the problem of the nature of and relationship 
between matter and mind, because it claimed that there were two clearly defined 
and separate spheres, the physical or the mutable (prakṛti) and the metaphysical 
or the immutable (puruṣa), and that  both these spheres were real and neither 
could be reduced to the other. Here we recognise Dasgupta the scientist and the 
lover of life and nature who refused to depreciate matter in terms of inferiority to 
the immaterial spheres. 
Secondly, the theory of evolution already occupied Dasgupta’s mind, providing a 
further explanation of why he was attracted to Sāṃkhya-Yoga. Already in 1914 he 
criticised Darwin and others for not being able to explain why accidental changes 
and variations occur in the evolutionary process. Sāṃkhya-Yoga gives an answer 
to that difficult question: Evolution takes place for the sake of the puruṣa, the 
pure Spirit. Matter (prakṛti), with all the changes it constantly undergoes, has a 
purpose, it is there to serve its counterpart, the puruṣa. This “dynamic teleology 
or purposiveness”378 was to remain Dasgupta’s argument (and conviction), even 
after 25 more years of scientific study. 
 
 
4.3. Dasgupta’s Sāṃkhya-Yoga  
 
4.3.1. Reasons for treating Sāṃkhya-Yoga  
 
In the prefaces to Yoga as Philosophy and Religion and Yoga Philosophy in Relation to 
other Systems of Thought, Dasgupt mentions his motives for dealing with 
Sāṃkhya-Yoga. First of all, according to him, most people establish a link 
between Yoga and (occult) practices without knowing anything about its 
philosophy. 
 
“Yoga is often regarded as a system of practical discipline and its claims as a 
system of philosophical thought are often ignored.”379 
 
“[…] the position of Yoga as a system of philosophy has always been 
misunderstood. It is probably for this reason and for the stress that it laid on 
its disciplinary course of practices that it sometimes wandered from its true 
ideal and became associated with magic, medicine and occultism.”380 
 
“[…] it is […] erroneous to think – as many uninformed people do – that the 
only interest of Yoga lies in its practical side. The philosophical, 
psychological, cosmological, ethical, and religious doctrines, as well as its 
doctrines regarding matter and change, are extremely interesting in 
themselves, and have a definitely assured place in the history of the progress 
of human thought; and, for a right understanding of the essential features of 
the higher thoughts of India, as well as of the practical side of Yoga, their 
knowledge is indispensable.”381 
                                                 
378 Dasgupta, Outlook, 198. 
379 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, vii. 
380 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 2. 
381 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, viii. 
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His aim therefore consisted in rehabilitating the theoretical side of Yoga. 
 
“It has been my object here to show that Yoga is not merely a system of 
practices but a system of philosophy as well.”382 
 
“[…] it is necessary [….] that Yoga might stand as a system of philosophy 
and not as a branch of occultism, magic, or nervous exercise.”383 
 
But Dasgupta not only intended to modify people’s preconceived ideas about 
Yoga, he also wished to bring the Yoga philosophy to the awareness of Western 
minds (among others). 
 
“The Yoga system of thought remains altogether unrecognised in the 
modern world.”384 
 
This is why he explicitly limits himself to a “reconstruction of the Yoga doctrines 
as a systematic philosophy”, without “subjecting it to criticism.”385 Facing the 
philosophical world as a whole, Dasgupta chose to play “the part of an advocate 
and not of a critic who sits in judgment.”386 Here we recognise the Indian who is 
proud to introduce his Western collegues to an interesting system of thought 
which most of them still ignored. Contrary to Eliade who could not acquire any 
taste for the philosophical side of Yoga (cf. supra, chapter 2.2.1.), Dasgupta saw a 
huge potential in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga theory, both for Indian philosophy as a 




4.3.2. The textual sources 
 
In his History of Indian Philosophy, Dasgupta presents us with a complete list of the 
texts, commentaries and sub-commentaries he used in his analysis of Sāṃkhya 
and Yoga. The following table sums up those titles the way he mentions them in 
the History (without any specification of editions or manuscripts, etc. but with 
indication of the time of their creation, according to him.)387 
 
                                                 
382 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 5. 
383 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 3. 
384 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 6. 
385 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 6. 
386 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 6. 
387 Cf. Dasgupta, History, 212-213. – For a more modern dating of these texts, cf. Potter, Karl H. 
Bibliography of Indian Philosophies. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970. 
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Sāṃkhya 
 
Author Title Date 
Caraka ? 78 A.D. 
Vācaspati Miśra Tattvakaumudī 
(commentary on Caraka) 
9th cent. A.D. 
 
Īśvarakṛṣṇa Sāṃkhya kārikā About 200 A.D. 
Gauḍapāda Commentary on the SK Before the 9th cent. 
Rājā Rājavārttika (?); 
commentary on the SK 
Before 9th cent.; 
probably lost now 




Unknown Sāṃkhya sūtras After the 9th cent. 
Aniruddha Commentary on the SS 2nd half of the 15th cent. 
Vijñāna Bhikṣu Pravacanabhāṣya 16th cent. 
 
Vijñāna Bhikṣu Sāṃkhyasāra 16th cent. 
Unknown Tattvasamāsa 14th cent. 
Sīmānanda Sāṃkhyatattvavivecana After the 16th cent. 
Bhāvāgaṇeśa Sāmkhyatattvayāthārthya-
dīpana 




Author Title Date 
Patañjali Yogasūtra Not earlier than 147 B.C. 
Vyāsa Bhāṣya (on the YS) 400 A.D. 
Bhoja Bhojavṛtti (on the YS) 10th cent. 
Vācaspati Miśra Tattvavaiśāradī 
(commentary on Vyāsa) 
 
Vijñāna Bhikṣu Yogavārttika (comm. on 
Vyāsa) 
16th cent. 
Nāgeśa Chāyāvyākhyā (comm. on 
Vyāsa) 
17th cent.  
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Modern works 
 
Dasgupta also mentions some modern works which inspired him. Apart from his 
own Study of Patanjali, Yoga Philosophy in Relation to other Indian Systems of Thought 
and Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus (the two latter ones being 
unpublished at the time),  these are two books by Brajendra Nath Seal from 
Calcutta: Mechanical, Physical and Chemical Theories of the Ancient Hindus, 1910, and 
Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, 1915. The titles of Seal’s books are very 
revealing as they indicate a third (and not explicitly stated) motive for Dasgupta’s 
dealing with Sāṃkhya-Yoga: the analysis of matter and its relevance for (modern) 
science. 
 
Not all of those texts are of equal importance: Dasgupta, in Yoga as Philosophy and 
Religion, nearly exclusively quotes Vyāsa’s Bhāṣya, Vācaspati Miśra’s 
Tattvavaiśāradī und Vijñāna Bhikṣu’s Yogavārttika. He also refers to Patañjali and, 
more rarely, to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Gauḍapāda and Nāgeśa. Seal is quite present in the 
first part of this book (and entirely absent from the second), but the way 
Dasgupta quotes from his works makes it nearly always impossible to identify 
the exact source. Here we touch on a problematic aspect of Dasgupta’s works on 
Yoga and Sāṃkhya in general: The bibliographical references are of the utmost 
scantness, none of his books contains a bibliography, it is impossible to know 
which edition of a particular text he is using, and it regularly happens that 
Dasgupta refers to a Sanskrit source without even telling that he does so.388 The 
best annotated text is his chapter in History of Indian Philosophy, but even there we 
find specifications such as “Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya, p. 74,” without any indication of 
the edition used.389 I am convinced that this lack of academic clarity springs from 
the fact that Dasgupta had all the texts in his mind, that they all lay like open 
books in front of his inner eye and that he was able to freely jump from one to the 
other, quoting from them as he wished. To him everything must have appeared 
so crystal clear that giving a reference for each and every source seemed too 
tedious a task, and therefore he simply specified the strict minimum. This should 
not be taken as an excuse or even an absolution – the way Dasgupta failed to 
indicate all his sources carefully and unequivocally throughout his treatises is 
definitely a major drawback of his works. 
 
 
                                                 
388 For example, on p. 99 he renders YS II,5, on p. 104 YS II,13 on p. 105 YS II,14, without using 
quotation marks and on p. 115 he refers to YS II,25, on p. 119 to YS II,27 and on p. 156 to YS III, 9-15 
without the unaware reader noticing anything. There must be many more passages where the 
commentaries are concerned, but those I fail to identify because the only text I have more or less in my 
head is the YS. 
389 Dasgupta, History, 239, footnote 1. 
Mircea Eliade and Surendranath Dasgupta 83
4.3.3. The analysis of the system according to Yoga as Philosophy and Religion 
 
Since the Sāṃkhya-Yoga chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy sums up what 
Dasgupta had written in The Study of Patanjali and in Yoga Philosophy in Relation to 
other Indian Systems of Thought,390 and since Yoga as Philosophy and Religion is 
practically identical with The Study of Patanjali but represents Dasgupta’s re-
edition of his former text and, at the same time, is the last book he published on 
this subject, we can safely concentrate on Yoga as Philosophy and Religion for an in-
depth analysis of Dasgupta’s understanding of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system of 
thought.  
 
I will present Yoga as Philosophy and Religion chapter by chapter, except chapters 
IX and XIII which, since they are dedicated to karma and samādhi, two key 
concepts of our project “Yoga between Switzerland and India”, will be treated 
separately in the end.  
 
 
4.3.3.1. Table of contents 
 
In the table of contents of Yoga as Philosophy and Religion we immediately 
recognise the topics which were central to Dasgupta’s philosophical interest as a 
whole and which were to remain dear to his heart throughout his life: 
 
“III. The Reality of the External World 
IV. The Process of Evolution 
[…] 
VI. Evolution and Change of Qualities 
VII. Evolution and God 
VIII. Mind and Moral States 
[…] 
XV. Matter and Mind”391 
 





V. The Evolution of the Categories 
[…] 
IX. The Theory of Karma 
X. The Ethical Problem 
XI. Yoga Practice 
XII. The Yogāṅgas 
XIII. Stages of Samadhi 
XIV. God in Yoga392 
 
                                                 
390 “The system has been treated in detail in those two works.” (Dasgupta, History, 208, footnote 1). 
391 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, Contents. 
392 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, Contents. 
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The table of contents is divided into two parts (called “books”); the first one, 
comprising chapters I to VII, is called “Yoga Metaphysics” and the second one 
“Yoga Ethics and Practice.” The question arises whether this dichotomy 
corresponds to the title of the whole book, in other words: Does “Yoga 
Metaphysics” stand for “Philosophy” and “Yoga Ethics and Practice” for 
“Religion”? In the last text he wrote in his life, Dasgupta admitted that  
 
“[i]n India we do not make much difference between philosophy and 
religion. Every system of philosophy becomes a religion when it is 
surcharged with spiritual feeling and emotion”393, 
 
and he himself used both terms to describe his own system of thought. Yet we 
have also seen how closely related Dasgupta’s concept of philosophy was to 
science (philosophy being the master science, so to speak, collecting, comparing 
and making sense of the results of all exact sciences), and therefore the first part 
of Yoga as Philosophy and Religion could be qualified as mainly philosophical, 
dealing primarily with the external world (prakṛti and its reality) and the 
problem of evolution. The second part then, concentrating on ethical and practical 
aspects of Yoga, could correspond to certain aspects of the Indian concept of 
dharma (a term which is very often translated as “religion”), telling people how to 
live and act according to the scriptures. But this can only be a very rough 
distinction which will have to be verified (and differentiated) at the end of our 
analysis of Dasgupta’s book. After all, the spiritual aspect is also present in the 
first part (with puruṣa in chapter I and God in chapter VII), and the second part 




4.3.3.2. Prakṛti (chapter I) 
 
Dasgupta starts by a short survey of how different philosophies have tried to 
solve the problem of the relation of mind and matter and then defines the 
metaphysics of the Yoga system as  
 
“[…] an acute analysis of matter and thought.”394 
 
Based on Vācaspati’s Tattvavaiśāradī on Vyāsabhāṣya III,47, Dasgupta shows that  
 
“[t]here is no intrinsic difference in nature between the mental and the 
physical”395, 
 
the guṇas having a twofold aspect, one being the determined or the perceived (i.e. 
the mahābhūtas) and the other being the determiner or perceiver (i.e. ahaṃkāra 
and the indriyas). The mental and the physical are both modifications of the same 
thing and therefore 
 
                                                 
393 Dasgupta, Science, Philosophy, 5. 
394 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 2. 
395 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 4. 
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“[…] one is not in any way superior to the other.”396 
 
Next, Dasgupta defines the nature of the guṇas as “the absolute potentiality of all 
things, mental and physical”397 and comments on their capacity of being modified 
by mutually influencing each other. The infinite number of guṇa entitities is 
divided into three classes (sattva, rajas, tamas). Dasgupta insists on the fact that 
 
“Prakṛti is not a separate category independent of the guṇas [but is just] a 
name for the guṇa entities when they exist in a state of equilibrium.”398 
 
In this context he mentions that he has been asked by European scholars whether 
the prakṛti or the guṇas were real and he points out that this question shows how 
confused they were about the whole concept. 
 
“Apart from guṇas there is no prakṛti. […] Prakṛti as the equilibrium of the 
three guṇas is the absolute ground of all the mental and phenomenal 
modifications – pure potentiality.”399 
 
The purpose of the guṇas is to serve “the experiences and the liberation of the 
purusha, or spirit.”400 But this purpose cannot be fulfilled as long as they remain 
in a state of equilibrium – therefore evolution has to take place. The cause of 
evolution lies in the “fulfilment of the objects of the purusha.”401 
 
The last part of this chapter is dedicated to the question whether the Vedāntic 
avidyā (or māyā) can be identified with prakṛti (as later Indian thinkers have 
argued). Dasgupta opposes a quotation from Lokācārya to a (non-specified) 
passage from the Vyāsabhāṣya and concludes that avidyā “does not mean prakṛti 
according to the Pātañjala system.”402 Vācaspati Miśra’s commentary on 
Vyāsabhāṣya IV,13, too, proves that 
 
“Prakṛti being eternal is real and thus different from māyā.”403 
 
 
                                                 
396 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 4. 
397 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 5. 
398 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 6. 
399 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 10. 
400 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 7. 
401 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 8. 
402 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 12. 
403 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 12. 
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4.3.3.3. Puruṣa (chapter II) 
 
In this chapter Dasgupta first tackles the extremely difficult question of the nature 
of the relationship between puruṣa and prakṛti. 
 
“Prakṛti is a material, non-intelligent, independent principle, and the souls 
or spirits are isolated, neutral, intelligent and inactive. Then how can the one 
come into connection with the other?”404 
 
He briefly refers to Plato’s idea and non-being, Aristotle’s matter and form and 
Kant’s noumenon and phenomenon, stating that these philosophers ultimately 
failed to satisfactorily explain how these two spheres were associated with each 
other. He also evokes three different schools of Vedānta as well as Sāṃkhya-sūtra 
IV,1, concluding that 
 
“[…] all these theories only show that the transcendent nature of the union 
of the principle of pure intelligence is very difficult to comprehend.”405 
 
Finally he turns to Patañjali and Vyāsa and sets out on a long analysis of nine 
sūtras (II,6, II,20-23, II,25, III,55, IV,22 and III,35)406 which present the Sāṃkhya-
Yoga solution to the problem. The author of the Yogasūtra and his commentator 
describe the situation as follows:407 
 
The identity of puruṣa and prakṛti is only apparent, due to the way the puruṣa 
perceives what is presented to him by the mind (buddhi).408 And although puruṣa 
and buddhi are altogether different from each other (the one being, for example, 
unchanging and the other ever-changing), they are also in some aspect quite 
similar. 
 
“[…] the pure nature of sattva has a great resemblance to the pure nature of 
purusha.”409 
 
Because of this similarity in one of the three guṇas of which the mind (as part of 
prakṛti) is composed, puruṣa is reflected by the mind, and it is this reflection 
which then imparts consciousness to whatever is perceived by buddhi. But: 
 
 “The exact nature of this reflection is indeed very hard to comprehend; no 
physical illustrations can really serve to make it clear.”410  
 
                                                 
404 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 13. 
405 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 15. 
406 The list on p. 16 contains two errors: number 5 is YS II,23 and number 7 is YS III,55 (instead of II,22 
and III,25). 
407 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 16-23. 
408 Dasgupta sometimes translates buddhi as mind, sometimes as psychosis. 
409 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 22. 
410 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 18. 
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The true nature of puruṣa can only be realised once the mind is known to be in 
reality absolutely unconnected with it. This state of kaivalya is possible when the 
mind becomes all pure sattva and, being then as pure as puruṣa, 
 
“[…] reflects him in his purity […] and becomes gradually lost in prakṛti and 
cannot again serve to bind purusha.”411  
 
Whereas puruṣa is absolutely free and unconntected with prakṛti, “existing in and 
for himself,”412 the mind (buddhi) is in a position of service to him. It only exists 
“for the enjoyment and release of purusha,”413 “which are the sole causes of its 
movement.”414 
 
Next, Dasgupta turns to the question of the plurality of puruṣas (as opposed to 
the Vedāntic doctrine which proclaims only one soul). In order to expose the 
Sāṃkhya-Yoga position he resorts to Sāṃkhya-Kārikā 17 (as well as Gauḍapāda’s 
commentary on this stanza) which lists five reasons for the existence of puruṣa at 
all. Dasgupta translates it as follows: 
 
“Because an assemblage of things is for the sake of another; because there 
must be an entity different from the three guṇas and the rest (their 
modifications); because there must be a superintending power; because 
there must be someone who enjoys; and because of (the existence of) active 
exertion for the sake of abstraction or isolation (from the contact with 
prakṛti) therefore the soul exists.”415 
 
In his analysis of this passage, Dasgupta also quotes (and discusses) a modern 
commentary by a certain Davies, but without providing any information about 
this book.416 Paraphrasing SK 18, Dasgupta then says why puruṣa must be 
conceived of as being multiple: 
 
“In other words, since with the birth of one individual, all are not born; since 
with the death of one, all do not die; and since each individual has separate 
sense organs for himself; and since all beings do not work at the same time 
in the same manner; and since the qualities of the different guṇas are 
possessed differently by different individuals, purushas are many.”417 
 
The last pages of this chapter are dedicated to yet another controversy against the 
Vedāntic doctrine which holds that all knowledge of the ego is false knowledge 
because it is an illusion produced by Māyā. Yet Māyā “can neither be said to exist 
nor to non-exist”418 nor can “the nature of [her] influence over the spiritual 
principle […] be determined.”419 In Sāṃkhya-Yoga however, “prakṛti is as real as 
                                                 
411 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 22. 
412 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 19. 
413 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 19. 
414 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 23. 
415 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 24. 
416 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 25 and 26. 
417 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 26. 
418 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 27. 
419 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 28. 
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purusha himself” and the two are linked by a beginningless connection which “is 
not unreal in the Vedānta sense of the term.”420 
 
The Vedāntic supposition that only one puruṣa (as Brahman) exists gives rise to 
the following problem: 
 
“[…] if there be one spiritual principle, how should we account for the 
supposed plurality of the buddhis? For we should rather expect to find one 
buddhi and not many to serve the supposed one purusha, and this will only 
mean that there can be only one ego, his enjoyment and release.”421 
 
After demonstrating the impropriety of the Vedānta doctrine Dasgupta 
concludes: 
 
“So we see that from the position in which Sāṃkhya and Yoga stood, this 




4.3.3.4. The Reality of the External World (chapter III) 
 
Dasgupta wants to refute the idealistic position of the Buddhists as far as the 
reality of the external world is concerned. For this purpose he chooses YS IV,12 
which claims that both past and future exist in the present moment. 
 
“[…] the past has not been destroyed but has rather shifted its position and 
hidden itself in the body of the present, and the future that has not made its 
appearance exists in the present only in a potential form.”423 
 
He refuses Vācaspati’s opinion that, since neither past nor future exist, there 
cannot be a present either. 
 
Next he evokes the idealists’ claim that “external reality is not different from our 
idea of it.”424 But, Dasgupta objects, 
 
“[…] why then does it appear as existing apart, outside and independent of 
my ideas? […] Even our ideas carry with them the notion that reality exists 
outside our mental experiences.”425 
 
He supports his point by referring to Vyāsa’s Bhāṣya on YS IV,14 as well as 
Vācaspati’s commentary on it. Ultimately, 
 
“[t]he notion of externality and grossness pervades all our ideas, and if they 
are held to be false, no true thing can be known by our ideas and they 
therefore become equally false.”426 
                                                 
420 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 28. 
421 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 28. 
422 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 29. 
423 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 31-32. 
424 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 32. 
425 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 32. 
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Patañjali (in YS IV,15) offers another argument in favour of the reality of the 
outside world. Dasgupta interprets this sūtra as follows: 
 
“Thus A, B, C may perceive the same identical woman and may feel 
pleasure, pain or hatred. We see that the same common thing generates 
different feelings and ideas in different persons; external reality cannot be 
said to owe its origin to the idea or imagination of any one man, but exists 
independently of any person’s imagination in and for itself.”427 
 
The last problem raised in this chapter concerns the nature of the “ground which 
underlies the manifold appearance of this external world which has been proved 
to be real.”428 Dasgupta informs the reader that Locke called this substratum 
“substance,” contrary to Hume who “denied all notions of substantiality.”429 Kant 
resorted to the “Thing-in-itself,” the nature of which could never be known. 
According to Dasgupta, Vyāsa penetrated this problem deeper than the 
mentioned three philosophers. In his Bhāṣya on YS III,13 and IV,13, Patañjali’s 
commentator shows that it is the guṇas which form the universe. In the process of 
evolution they change their appearance (becoming more “differentiated, 
determinate and coherent”430) but at the same time remain faithful to their 
character as guṇas. 
 
“So we see that they have thus got two natures, one in which they remain 
quite unchanged as guṇas, and another in which they collocate and combine 
themselves in various ways and thus appear under the veil of a multitude of 
qualities and states of the manifold knowable.”431 
 
At this point, Dasgupta is ready to demonstrate how the evolutionary process of 
the guṇas, the substance underlying the whole universe, takes place. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
426 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 34-35. 
427 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 35. 
428 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 36. 
429 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 37. 
430 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 37 (quoted from B. N. Seal without any bibliographical details). 
431 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 38. 
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4.3.3.5. The process of evolution (chapter IV) 
 
Sāṃkhya distinguishes two kinds of evolutionary products: 
a) Those which, once created, are capable of being productive and of releasing 
other products, and 
b) those which are unable to originate anything anymore and represent the end of 
an emanation. 
The first category is called by Dasgupta “aviśesha” (“slightly specialised”) and 
the second one “viśesha” (“thoroughly specialised”).432 Buddhi (the mind), 
ahaṃkāra (the ego) and the tanmātras (subtle elements) belong to the first group 
whereas the indriyas (senses) and the mahābhūtas (gross elements) form the 
second group. Both puruṣa and prakṛti (in her balanced state) are eternal whereas 
all the products of prakṛti are “held to be non-eternal as they are produced for the 
sake of the purushas.”433 
 
Dasgupta defines evolution as “nothing but the manifestation of change, 
mutation, by the energy of rajas”434 and then proceeds to determine the duration 
of a unit of change as “the time that is taken by a paramāṇu or atom to move from 
its place.”435 In a long footnote he discusses the different definitions of atom given 
by Vyāsa and Vijñāna Bhikṣu, Vācaspati Miśra and the Patañjali himself. Atoms 
are too small and fine to be perceived by the senses and therefore they are “mere 
points without magnitude or dimension.”436 The time an atom takes to change its 
position is called a “kshaṇa,” unit of time, which now also becomes “the unit 
measure of change.”437 
 
“The change or evolution in the external world must […] be measured by 
these units of spatial motion of the atoms […].”438 
 
Evolution and the notion of time are thus intimately related, and therefore 
Dasgupta dedicates the rest of this chapter to a discussion of time and its reality. 
Referring to Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra (both on YS III,52), Dasgupta argues that 
 
“[…] the conception of time as discrete moments is the real one, whereas the 
conception of time as successive or as continuous is unreal, being only due 
to the imagination of our empirical and relative consciousness. […] A 
moment is real […] and is the essential element of the notion of succession. 
Succession involves the notion of change of moments […].”439 
 
                                                 
432 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 40. 
433 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 40. 
434 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 43. 
435 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 43. 
436 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 43. 
437 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 44. 
438 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 44. 
439 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 44. 
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Because two moments cannot co-exist only the present moment is real, but 
 
“[…] the past and future exist in the present, the former as one which has 
already had its manifestation and is thus conserved in the fact of the 
manifestation of the present. […] in a similar way it may be said that the 
manifestation of the present contains within itself the seed or the 
unmanifested state of the future, for if this had not been the case, the future 
never could have happened.”440 
 
Only a seer, “whose power of knowing is not narrowed by the senses,”441 has the 
possibility to perceive past, present and future in one moment (cf. YS III,53). 
 
Since our normal consciousness cannot grasp the individual kṣaṇas, it connects all 
the separate moments and thus imagines continuous time. Evolution or change 
which we notice to have happened in a thing after a certain while was in fact 
going on every moment. This is what Patañjali says in IV,33: 
 
“Succession involving a course of changes is associated with the 
moments.”442 
 
To which Vācaspati Miśra adds the following explanation: 
 
“Even before a thing is old there can be inferred a sequence of the subtlest, 
subtler, subtle, grossest, grosser and gross changes.”443 
 
 
4.3.3.6. The evolution of the categories (chapter V) 
 
Since in Sāṃkhya-Yoga evolution (or creation) starts with the mind, Dasgupta 
dedicates a long part of this chapter to the nature of the mind. He first states that 
Yoga distinguishes clearly between the “actionless, absolutely pure and simple 
intelligence” (puruṣa) on the one hand and the mental states “which [become] 
intelligent by coming in connection with this intelligence.”444 Thoughts or ideas 
rise in the mind, are illuminated by the puruṣa and then disappear again. Rajas is 
the energy or the principle of movement which is responsible for this constant 
change in the mind. 
 
Thought in itself consists of a “universal mould or form of knowledge which 
assumes the form of all the sensuous contents that are presented to it.”445 This 
substratum is sattva, resembling puruṣa in its purity (cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.3.), 
“the one principle of intelligibility of all our conscious states.”446 If sattva is 
completely dominant and rajas and tamas utterly suppressed, then pure 
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knowledge (“in which there is neither the knower nor the known”447) is possible. 
This is the reason why buddhi (or the mind) is often called sattva. But buddhi has 
more names; it is also the ego-universal (asmitāmātra), which Dasgupta equals to 
mahat, “the most universal thing conceivable and the one common source from 
which all other things originate.”448 After this stage of pure sattva dominance, the 
next phase arises where rajas becomes strongest. Now asmitā or ahaṃkāra,449 “the 
ego or subject which knows, feels and wills,”450 is born. Commenting on YS II,6 
and Vyāsa (on I,17), Dasgupta concludes: 
 
“Thus we find that the mind is affected by its own rajas or activity and posits 
itself as the ego or subject as activity. By reason of this position of the “I” as 
active it perceives itself in the objective, in all its conative and cognitive 
senses in its thoughts and feelings and also in the external world of 
extension and co-existence.”451 
 
The ego is nothing but “another phase or modification of the buddhi,”452 being 
buddhi under the predominance of rajas. And the ego or subject can turn back 
upon itself and make itself its own object because the guṇas have two aspects, one 
being the perceiver and the other the perceived (cf. Tattvavaiśāradī on YS III,47 
and supra, chapter 4.3.3.2.).  
 
Next, the ego develops into three directions. The preponderance of rajas leads to 
the creation of the five karmendriyas (“conative senses”), the dominance of sattva 
to the five jñānendriyas (“cognitive senses”), and tamas produces the five 
tanmātras (subtle elements) which ultimately (and still under the influence of 
tamas) develop the mahābhūtas (gross elements).453 In this process, the five 
cognitive senses are “[synchronised] with the evolution of the prakṛti on the 
tanmātric side of evolution.”454  
 
Manas, “another specialisation of the ego,”455 takes part of both the jñānendriyas 
and the karmendriyas (cf. SK 27). Dasgupta therefore calls it “the co-ordinating 
organ.”456 
 
This whole process of development or change of ahaṃkāra into senses and 
elements is only possible through the energy provided by rajas. Dasgupta quotes 
Lokācārya and Barabara Muni457 as well as Vācaspati Miśra (on SK 25) in this 
respect. 
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Now Dasgupta tackles the topic of the relation between the sense faculties and 
the sense organs. Taking the example of hearing, he states that 
 
“the faculty of hearing is seated in the ether (ākāśa) within our ear-hole. It is 
here that the power of hearing is located.  […] When the sounds of solids, 
etc., are heard, then the power of hearing located in the hollow of the ear 
stands in need of the resonance produced in the ākāśa of the ear.”458 
 
Ether contains in itself the power of hearing but it also has the quality of sound 
because it “is born out of the soniferous tanmātra”459 (cf. Vyāsabhāṣya and 
Tattvavaiśāradī on YS III,41). The other senses work in the same way but based on 
another tanmātra.460 
 
To end this chapter, Dasgupta discusses the seeming difference in the 
evolutionary process according to Sāṃkhya on the one hand and Yoga on the 
other. According to Vyāsabhāṣya on YS II,19, the tanmātras are not a product of 
asmitā but of buddhi/mahat. After a long and very detailled analysis of passages 
from the bhāṣya and other sources, Dasgupta concludes that it depends on the 
point of view one adopts: 
 
“This shows that the order of evolution as found in the Sāṃkhya works (viz. 
mahat from prakṛti, ahaṃkāra from mahat and the eleven senses and the 
tanmātras from ahaṃkāra) is true only in this sense that these modifications 
of ahaṃkāra take place directly as differentiations of characters in the body 
of mahat. As these differentiations take place through ahaṃkāra as the first 
moment in the series of transformations it is said that the transformations 
take place directly from ahaṃkāra; whereas when stress is laid on the other 
aspect it appears that the transformations are but differentiations as 
integrated in the body of the mahat, and thus it is also said that from mahat 
the six aviśeshas – namely, ahaṃkāra and the five tanmātras – come out.”461 
 
 
4.3.3.7. Evolution and change of qualities (chapter VI) 
 
This chapter first deals with the evolution of the subtle and gross elements. As far 
as the derivation of the first ones is concerned, the major Sāṃkhya treatises do not 
say anything. Vijñāna Bhikṣu simply states that the tanmātras represent 
 
“[…] that indeterminate state of matter in which they can never be 
distinguished one from the other, and they cannot be perceived to be 
possessed of different qualities of specialised in any way.”462 
 
Dasgupta adds that the tanmātras can only be perceived by yogins. 
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Looking at the evolution of the grosser elements from the subtle ones, Dasgupta 
confronts his readers with a series of partly contradictory views, derived from 
Vācaspati Miśra (on YS I, 44), Vijñāna Bhikṣu (on YS I, 45, III, 52 and IV, 14) and 
Nāgeśa (on YS I,45?). However the exact process of transition from the tanmātras 
to the atoms may be described, Dasgupta concludes that  
 
“[…] from bhūtādi [tāmasa ahaṃkāra] come the five tanmātras which can be 
compared to the Vaiśeshika atoms as they have no parts and neither 
grossness nor visible differentiation. […] 
The next one, the paramāṇu (atom), which is gross in its nature and is 
generated from the tanmātras […] may be compared with the trasareṇu of 
the Vaiśeshikas.”463 
 
Whereas Yoga recognises the doctrine of atoms, the Sāṃkhya view is not so clear.  
 
“The Sāṃkhya-kārikā does not mention the paramāṇus.”464 
 
But Dasgupta strongly believes that Sāṃkhya could not have denied the idea of 
atoms, even if that particular word is not there, and he taxes the supposition “of 
some German scholars that Sāṃkhya did not admit the paramāṇus” as “not very 
plausible.”465  
 
The third step is the evolution of the actual gross elements out of conglomerations 
of atoms. According to Dasgupta, this process is best summed up by Vijñāna 
Bhikṣu (on YS IV,4).466 
 
The bhūtas (gross elements) represent the last stage of evolution of the guṇas, but 
that does not mean that the course of evolution is finished. What has been 
described so far was the development from the aviśeṣas to the viśeṣas, which is 
called tattvāntara pariṇāma (“evolution of different categories of existence”).467 
Once all the viśeṣas (the 10 senses and the 5 gross elements) have been created, 
we can observe 
 
“[…] the evolution that takes place among the viśeshas themselves, which is 
called dharmapariṇāma or evolution by change of qualities.”468 
 
The atoms of the elements get together and form all the objects and bodies of the 
external world. Dasgupta insists on the fact that such an object or body has to be 
comprehended as an entity which is different from the atoms which compose it, 
since it has its own qualities and attributes. He also points out that such a process 
of conglomeration takes place in harmony and not confusion. 
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“[…] the different guṇas do not choose different independent courses for 
their evolution, but join together and effectuate themselves in the evolution 
of a single product.”469 
 
The atoms of the elements 
 
“[…] unite in the production of the particular substances by a common 
teleological purpose.”470 
 
For this statement, Dasgupta refers to Vyāsabhāṣya on YS IV,14. 
 
Since bodies and objects consist of atoms, a change of appearance in such an 
object or body always reflects a change in the position of the atoms. Or, in Vyāsa’s 
words (on YS III,13): 
 
“[A] dharma (quality) is merely the nature of the dharmin (substance), and it 
is the changes of the dharmin that are made explicit by the dharmas.”471 
 
Therefore, the change in appearance is called dharma-pariṇāma. This change has 
two aspects: 
 
a) lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma (the change of characteristic signs) 
With this term Dasgupta refers to the change of a thing or body in the course of 
time. 
 
“It considers the three stages of an appearance – the unmanifested when it 
exists in the futre, the manifested moment of the present, and the past when 
it has been manifested – lost to view but preserved and retained in all the 
onward stages of the evolution.”472 
 
Once more, these minute but constant changes of the atoms at every moment 
cannot be perceived by anyone except the yogins. 
 
b) avasthā-pariṇāma (the change of condition) 
This change is, materially speaking, a variation or mode of lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma.  
 
“It is on account of this that a substance is called new or old, grown or 
decayed.”473 
 
Dasgupta quotes Vyāsa and Vijñāna Bhikṣu (on YS III,13) for an illustration. 
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Next, Dasgupta defines dharmin, the substance. In particles of dust, a lump of 
earth and a jug, the substance which is common to all of these things is earth.  
 
“Earth here is the common quality which remains unchanged in all these 
stages. […] This earth therefore is regarded as the dharmin, characterised 
one, the substance; and its stages as its dharma or qualities.”474 
 
The transformation of the lump into a jug is an instance of dharma-pariṇāma. All 
the atoms of the gross elements, although they in themselves do not change, 
constantly undergo transformations in their conglomerated appearance, 
 
“[…] suffering dharma-pariṇāma as they are changed from the inorganic to 
plants and animals and back again to the inorganic.”475 
 
Dasgupta talks of “circulation of cosmic matter”476 which is true for all things.  
 
“[…] one substance may undergo endless changes of characteristic in order 
of succession; and along with the change of characteristic or dharma we 
have the lakshaṇa-pariṇāma and the avasthā-pariṇāma as old or new, which 
is evidently one of infinitesimal changes of growth and decay. […] 
There is no intrinsic difference between one thing and another, but only 
changes of character of one and the same thing.”477 
 
Turning now to modern theories of evolution, Dasgupta observes that no scientist 
has given any reason for the transformation of the inorganic to the animal to man. 
Sāṃkhya-Yoga, on the other hand,  
 
“[…] explains it from the standpoint of teleology or the final goal inherent in 
all matter, so that it may be serviceable to the purusha.”478 
 
This moral purpose in prakṛti is what distinguishes this Indian philosophy from 
Western science. The only aim of matter is “the experience and final realisation of 
the parusha [sic].”479 Otherwise, Sāṃkhya-Yoga is very similar to modern science 
 
“[…] for it does not explain the cause of the accidental variation noticed in 
all the stages of evolutionary process from any physical point of view based 
on the observation of facts.”480 
 
Dasgupta definitely prizes Sāṃkhya-Yoga for its moral point of view, but (and in 
accord with the scriptures) he keeps it limited to the explanation of why prakṛti 
undergoes this evolution; he does not apply it to the whole nature and function of 
matter. It is rajas or energy which sets and keeps all the atoms in motion, and 
since evolution is a result of the change of positions of atoms, Dasgupta states 
that 
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“[t]here is always the transformation of energy from the inorganic to the 
organic and back again from the organic. Thus the differences among things 
are solely due to the different stages which they occupy in the scale of 
evolution, as different expressions of the transformation of energy […]; the 
change of the collocation of atoms only changes potentiality into actuality 
[…].”481 
 
This reads very modern and abstract but to Dasgupta this is what Vācaspati 
expressed in his Tattvavaiśāradī on YS III,14. 
 
Time and space do have an influence on the transformation in things; two fruits 
of the same kind evolve differently growing on two different trees in different 
places. Once again it is only a yogin, endowed with the right knowledge, who  
 
“[…] can perceive the difference of their specific evolution in association 
with their points of space.”482 
 
Dharma-pariṇāma designates the changes which take place in the viśeṣas;483 the 
evolution of the aviśeṣas however is called satkāryavāda, meaning that the effect 
is dormant in the cause. 
 
“The grouping or collocation alone changes, and this brings out the 
manifestation of the latent powers of the guṇas, but without creation of 
anything absolutely new or non-existent.”484 
 
Dasgupta calls this satkāryavāda “the true” one and opposes it to the Vedāntists’ 
explanation of cause and effect 
 
“[…] which ought more properly to be called the satkāraṇavāda theory, for 
with them the cause alone is true, and all effects are illusory, being only 
impositions on the cause.” 
 
With Sāṃkhya-Yoga however the effects are as true as the cause, “due to the 
power which the substance has of transforming itself into those various 
appearances and effects.”485  
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4.3.3.8. Evolution and God (chapter VII) 
 
Prakṛti is not only substance but also power (śakti). Therefore, “the movement by 
which it actualises itself is immanent within itself and not caused from 
without.”486 As long as the guṇas are in equilibrium, their opposing tendencies 
obstruct each other and this śakti cannot move the substance into evolution or 
manifestation. 
 
“The example chosen to explain the nature of prakṛti and its modifications 
conceived as power tending towards actuality from potentiality in the Vyāsa-
bhāshya is that of a sheet of water enclosed by temporary walls within a field, 
but always tending to run out of it. As soon as the temporary wall is broken 
in some direction, the water rushes out of itself, and what one has to do is to 
break the wall at a particular place.”487 
 
Vyāsa (in his Bhāṣya on YS III,14) enumerates a few conditions which are able to 
break such a barrier – form and constitution of a thing, place, time, but also merit 
(dharma) and demerit (adharma). Dasgupta concentrates on these last two, 
referring to Vijñāna Bhikṣu and Nāgeśa (on YS III,14?) who 
 
“[…] agree here in saying that the modifications due to dharma and 
adharma are those which affect the bodies and senses. What they mean is 
possibly this, that it is dharma or adharma alone which guides the 
transformations of the bodies and senses of all living beings in general 
[…].”488 
 
Dasgupta comments that a yogin therefore gets his special body as a result of his 
particular merit, and animals and men receive a new body after death also due to 
their dharma. 
 
Here Dasgupta introduces Īśvara (God), pointing out that  
 
“[…] all the later commentators agree in holding him responsible for the 
removal of all barriers in the way of prakṛtis [sic] development. So that 
Īśvara is the root cause of all the removal of barriers, including those that are 
affected by merit and demerit.”489 
 
In their comments on YS IV,3, Vācaspati, Nāgeśa and Vijñāna Bhikṣu attribute to 
God the power of removing all the obstacles as prakṛti evolves. Dasgupta 
summarises their opinion as follows: 
 
“He by His very presence causes the obstacles, as the barriers in the way of 
prakṛti’s development, to be removed, in such a way that He stands 
ultimately responsible for the removal of all obstacles in the way of prakṛti’s 
development and thus also of all obstacles in the way of men’s performance 
of good or bad deeds.”490 
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Contrasting this view to Nīlakaṇṭha’s explanation of Śāntiparvan 300/2, which 
says that God’s will is entirely responsible for man’s good or bad actions, 
Dasgupta objects that Nīlakaṇṭha does not leave any scope for human freedom or 
responsibility. He therefore interpret’s Īśvara’s role in acquiring merit or demerit  
 
“[…] to mean only in a general way the help that is offered by Him in 
removing the obstructions of the external world in such a manner that it 
may be possible for a man to perform practically meritorious acts in the 
external world.”491 
 
Dasgupta finds this view confirmed by Vācaspati’s comment on YS III,45 (which 
also adds that man’s will is limited by the command of God). 
 
Sāṃkhya differs from Yoga in the sense that it is not Īśvara but the puruṣārtha (or 
serviceability to the puruṣa) which is the agent to remove the obstacles of prakṛti. 
Dasgupta however doubts the capacity of this “essentially non-intelligent” 
instance to guide the evolution “so as to ensure the best possible mode of serving 
all the interests of the purusha.”492 He prefers to go along with Vācaspati Miśra 
who claims that God’s aim is the fulfilment of the purpose of the puruṣa (in his 
comment on YS IV,3); this is the ultimate reason for considering God as the prime 
mover. 
 
Sāṃkhya and Yoga agree that Īśvara has no influence on the connection of puruṣa 
and prakṛti. 
 
The summary which concludes this chapter conveys Dasgupta’s point of view as 
far as Īśvara’s role is concerned. 
 
“Prakṛti itself, though a substantial entity, is also essentially of the nature of 
conserved energy existing in the potential form but always ready to flow out 
and actualise itself, if only its own immanent obstructions are removed. Its 
teleological purpose is powerless to remove its own obstruction. God by His 
very presence removes the obstacles, by which, prakṛti of itself moves in the 
evolutionary process, and thus the purpose is realised […].”493 
 
At the very end, Dasgupta briefly addresses the issue of whether the world is 
eternal or not. Since the world (prakṛti) ceases to exist for a liberated puruṣa but is 
still there for all those puruṣas who have not reached kaivalya, the eternality of 
the world “is only relative and not absolute.”494 He quotes Vyāsa (on YS IV,33) 
who says: 
 
“[…] whether the world will have an end or not cannot be directly ansered. 
The world-process gradually ceases for the wise and not for others, so no 
one-sided decision can be true.”495 
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4.3.3.9. Conclusions 
 
Chapter VII marks the end of the first part of Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, 
called “Yoga Metaphysics.” Before proceeding to the second section (“Yoga Ethics 
and Practice”) I would like to briefly get back to the question whether these first 
chapters could be understood as representing the word “Philosophy” in the main 
title of this book.  
 
Here is a list of the topics dealt with in chapters I – VII (enumerated in the order 
in which they have been treated): 
 
- there is no difference between the mental and the physical 
- nature of prakṛti and of the guṇas 
- prakṛti is different from māyā 
- relation of puruṣa and prakṛti 
- proof of the existence of puruṣa 
- plurality of puruṣas 
- reality of the external world 
- nature of atoms 
- nature of time 
- suprasensuous perception 
- nature of the mind 
- nature of the ego 
- nature of the co-ordinating organ 
- rajas as the moving energy which enables the evolutionary process to 
take place 
- nature of ether 
- order of evolution 
- creation of atoms 
- teleological purpose in the conglomeration of the atoms 
- changes in quality and substance 
- conditions which are able to break the barriers inside of prakṛti (to set 
the evolution in motion) 
- God as the removing force of these barriers 
- God’s aim is the fulfilment of the purpose of the puruṣa 
- God’s power (and its limits) 
- the eternity of the world is only relative 
 
I distinguish three main categories into which these topics can be divided: 
1. the physical (atoms, time, evolution, quality, substance, external world) 
2. the mental (mind, ego, the co-ordinating organ) 
3. the spiritual (puruṣa and Īśvara, God) 
 
Dasgupta however states right from the beginning that there is no difference 
between the mental and the physical, both realms belonging to prakṛti; therefore 
the three categories can (or even have to) be reduced to two: prakṛti on the one 
hand, evolving into both the physical and the mental universes, and puruṣa and 
Īśvara on the other. Here we reencounter the characteristic ingrediences of 
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Dasgupta’s own philosophy: a profound (scientific) interest in the nature of the 
physical and the mental reality as well as a deep love for the divine. I would 
argue that since the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system of thought is made up of exactly this 
dichotomy, giving equal importance to spirit and matter and even providing an 
explanation of how these two opposed spheres work together, this “Yoga 
Metaphysics” incorporate what Dasgupta would have termed “Philosophy.” 
 
The weakest part of the Yoga-Sāṃkhya system as presented by Dasgupta 
certainly is the nebulous relation between puruṣa and Īśvara – Dasgupta’s own 
uneasiness about these two rivalling yet strangely cooperative spiritual forces can 
be felt clearly. Yet, a theist in his heart, he seems to like the idea of Īśvara and 
therefore prefers Yoga to Sāṃkhya in this respect, but the philosophical reasoning 
for Īśvara’s role seems a bit far-fetched if not arbitrary. In Yoga Philosophy in 
Relation to other Indian Systems of Thought, Dasgupta evokes Vijñāna Bhikṣu’s 
personal view of this delicate problem which up to a certain point might mirror 
Dasgupta’s own feelings about it. 
 
“Bhikshu himself had an ardent religious zeal and he could hardly think of 
his dear Sāṃkhya to be atheistic in spite of its clear and distinct professions 
on that side.”496 
 
According to Bhikṣu, the puruṣas are all part of Īśvara, the whole, who connects 
the puruṣas with prakṛti and who brings about the disturbance of the latter, 
leading to the process of evolution. 
 
“Thus Īśvara here in the theological aspect appears as the father of us all, 
and He is always engaged in doing good to us in accordance with our moral 
conduct.”497 
 
Dasgupta adds that this idea of Bhikṣu “is an old one which appears in the 
diverse Purāṇas and in the Gītā in slightly modified forms.”498 But then he decides 
to no longer dwell on this subject 
 
“[…] as it may leave the impression that the question of determining the 
relation of Īśvara to souls was one of the main problems of the Yoga 
philosophy.”499 
 
He concludes that Īśvara in Yoga is merely of secondary importance, being only 
“one of the many objects of concentration,” someone who “may be pleased to 
remove the obstacles of the Yoga and thereby make the way smoother for the 
Yogin.”500 This rather sudden “deflation” of Īśvara culminates in a statement in 
Dasgupta’s very last article “Science, Philosophy and Religion” (where he tried to 
show that Indian philosophy and religion do not necessarily need the admission 
                                                 
496 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 254. 
497 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 257. 
498 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 257. 
499 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 258. 
500 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 258. 
Mircea Eliade and Surendranath Dasgupta 102
of a personal God but work together with science in a combined effort to build a 
rational, moral and spiritual personality in every man): 
 
“The Yoga system admits God not so much for religious reason, but more as 
a matter of courtesy.”501 
 
As in chapter 4.2.3 we can see how Dasgupta modifies his position, depending on 
who he is writing for, respectively which point he is trying to drive home. 
Comparing Sāṃkhya to the philosophies of Jainism, Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā (in 
Yoga Philosophy in Relation to other Systems of Indian Thought) he even praises the 
ultimate superiority of Sāṃkhya on the grounds that it successfully managed to 
eliminate the concept of Īśvara altogether. 
 
“But though these different systems [Jainism, Buddhism, Mīmāṃsā] agree 
with Sāṃkhya in point of atheism, yet to Sāṃkhya really belongs the credit 
of producing a systematic philosophy competent to do away with the 
hypothesis of an Īśvara as the ruler of the universe.”502 
 
In the first part of Yoga as Philosophy and Religion we could also observe how 
Dasgupta selected his sources according to what a particular text had to say about 
a particular subject. He judiciously chose those passages which best conveyed his 
own ideas or which came closest to them; sometimes he also reformulated the 
original texts in such a modern way that one had to wonder whether this was 
really what the Sanskrit source wanted to say. Dasgupta did not hesitate to refute 
the opinion of one of his ancient predecessors simply because he could not 
believe that what he said was true. Given the fact that his sources date from 
roughly the 4th to the 16th centuries his description of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system is 
hardly a historical one. What we are confronted with is Dasgupta’s own system in 
the guise of old texts. His main objective being the presentation of a coherent 
philosophical and scientific Indian reply to fundamental questions insufficiently 
answered by Western philosophers and scientists, Sāṃkhya-Yoga had to be the 
way he wanted it to be. Nevertheless, his remains 
 
“[o]ne of the most penetrating analyses of the origins and significance of the 
Sāṃkhya” […], “a truly penetrating and stimulating exposition of a 
Sāṃkhya theory.”503 
 
One last point I would like to focus on is Dasgupta’s regular mentioning of the 
fact that yogins are able to perceive all the subtle phenomenons which remain 
hidden to a normal human’s consciousness. Thus, a yogin can “see” the subtle 
elements (tanmātras) as well as the constant change of the atoms, and he can tell 
the difference in evolution of two identical things (for example: two fruits of the 
same kind) which have come into being in two different places (for example: on 
different trees). Dasgupta evokes these yogic capacities as if they were natural 
facts – never does he seem to doubt them. As he writes elsewhere: 
 
                                                 
501 Dasgupta, Science, Philosophy, 6. 
502 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 238. 
503 Larson, Sāṃkhya, 36 and 40. 
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“If we do not believe the testimony of the Yogin, there is probably no way 
for us either to prove or disprove its reality.”504 
 
 
4.3.3.10. Mind and moral states (chapter VIII) 
 
The second part of Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, entitled “Ethics and Practice”, 
starts with Dasgupta emphasising the “practical tone” of Yoga. In order to 
expound the means for attaining liberation Yoga focusses on, it is necessary to 
talk about Yoga’s ethical theories. These however imply an analysis of the mind 
which Dasgupta here, for the first time, calls citta. 
 
“I have translated both citta and buddhi as mind. The word buddhi is used 
when emphasis is laid on the intellective and cosmical functions of the mind. 
The word citta is used when emphasis is laid on the conservative side of 
mind as the repository of all experiences, memory, etc.”505 
 
He distinguishes between kāryacitta or “citta as effect” and kāraṇacitta or “citta 
as cause.”506 Whereas the kāraṇacittas are all-pervading and linked with all the 
puruṣas (and therefore infinite in number), the kāryacittas manifest themselves as 
the individual citta of a particular person in the form of his or her states of 
consciousness. A yogin has access to the kāraṇacitta and therefore “may have 
knowledge of all things at once.”507 The concept of an all-pervading citta only 
belongs to Yoga; Sāṃkhya holds that citta is simply as small or great as the body 
it occupies.  
 
This whole reasoning is mainly based on Chāyāvyākhyā IV,10 of the 17th century, 
and Dasgupta stays with this source when he defines citta as 
 
“[…] the sum or unity of the eleven senses and the ego and also of the five 
prāṇas or biomotor forces. […] It thus stands for all that is psychical in man: 
his states of consciousness including the living principle in man represented 
by the activity of the five prāṇas.”508 
 
This is clearly a modern definition of citta – originally citta only encompassed 
buddhi, ahaṃkāra and manas. 
 
Kāraṇacitta is modified into kāryacitta through the influence of rajas and tamas. 
The yogin’s task consists in overcoming this influence, in arresting the states of 
citta through concentration and in causing citta to turn back to its all-pervading 
state. Then 
 
                                                 
504 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 197. 
505 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 92, footnote. 
506 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 92-93. 
507 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 93. 
508 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 94. 
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“[…] the Yogin acquires omniscience, and finally when this citta becomes as 
pure as the form of purusha itself, the purusha becomes conscious of himself 
and is liberated from the bonds of prakṛti.”509 
 
At this point Dasgupta inserts a brief description of the content of the YS which 
may be summed up as follows.510 
 
Chapter Content 
I Yoga for somebody “whose mind is inclined towards trance-
cognition.” 
II The means for somebody with an ordinary mind; how such a person 
can reach Yoga, too. 
III “Phenomena which strengthen the faith of the Yogin on the means of 
attaining Yoga described in the second chapter.” 
IV Kaivalya, “the end of all the Yoga practices.” 
 
Next, Dasgupta lists the five classes of cittas, according to the Vyāsabhaṣya (on YS 
I,1):511 
1. kṣipta (wandering) 
2. mūḍha (forgetful) 
3. vikṣipta (occasionally steady) 
4. ekāgra (one-pointed) 
5. niruddha (restrained) 
 
Describing the wandering mind, Dasgupta  for the first time in this book refers to 
Bhojavṛtti (on YS I,2). Whereas the first three kinds of mind have no chance to 
attain “that contemplative concentration called Yoga,”512 the one-pointed mind is 
apt to reach the saṃprajñāta (“concentration on an object of knowledge”)513 state 
of samādhi. In the restrained mind, finally, “all mental states are arrested. This 
leads to kaivalya.”514 
 
Next, Dasgupta explains vṛttis as “actual states of mind” as opposed to saṃskāras 
which are “latent states.” The former ones continuously generate the latter ones 
which again try to manifest themselves as vṛttis.515 
 
“There is a circulation from vṛttis to saṃskāras and from them again to 
vṛttis. […] Thus it is not enough for a Yogin to arrest any particular class of 
mental states; he must attain such a habit of restraint that the saṃskāra thus 
generated is able to overcome, weaken and destroy the saṃskāra of those 
actual states which he has arrested by his contemplation.”516 
                                                 
509 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 95. 
510 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 95. 
511 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 95 (the exact reference to the Vyāsabhāṣya is not given by 
Dasgupta, this passage probably being too famous for him to need specification). 
512 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 96. 
513 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 96. 
514 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 96. 
515 The five vṛttis of YS I,5 ff. are only discussed in the very last chapter of  Dasgupta’s book (cf. infra, 
chapter 4.3.3.15, „matter and mind“). 
516 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 97. 
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Implicitly referring to YS II,5, Dasgupta introduces the concept of avidyā or 
nescience which is the ultimate root of all pain. Both pleasure and pain cause 
saṃskāras and  
 
“[…] these again […] naturally create their memory and thence comes 
attachment or aversion, then again action, and again pleasure and pain and 
hence impressions, memory, attachment or aversion, and again action and 
so forth.”517 
 
Caught in this vicious circle, and understanding that every state of phenomenal 
existence is ultimately painful (cf. YS II,15), the yogin will do everything to avoid 
both pleasure and pain, and he 
 
“[…] turns for refuge to right knowledge, cause of the destruction of all 
pains.”518 
 
Referring to YS II,3 (again without giving the reference), Dasgupta describes the 
four modifications which avidyā undergoes. In opposition to Patañjali, who says 
that asmitā (ego), rāga (inclination towards pleasure), dveṣa (repulsion from pain) 
and abhiniveśa (love of life) spring from nescience, Dasgupta claims that the last 
three are products of the ego, all four together being avidyā’s four heads. A little 
further down however he is again in line with Patañjali, stating that 
 
“[…] these five afflictions [kleśas] are only different aspects of avidyā and 
cannot be conceived separately from avidyā.”519 
 
Rāga, dveṣa and abhiniveśa are present in “most of our states of consciousness, 
which are therefore called the kliṣṭa vṛtti or afflicted states.”520 Opposed to these 
are the unafflicted, akliṣṭa states, namely abhyāsa (habit of steadiness) and 
vairāgya (non-attachment). As with the kleśas, the akliṣṭa vṛttis seem to stand for 
a whole range of mental states. 
 
“[They] represent such thoughts as tend towards emancipation and are 
produced from our attempts to conceive rationally our final state of 
emancipation, or to adopt suitable means for this.”521 
 
 Dasgupta clearly distinguishes them from puṇyakarma (virtuous action), 
because 
 
“[…] both puṇya and pāpa karma are said to have sprung from the 
kleśas.”522 
 
                                                 
517 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 98. 
518 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 99. 
519 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 100. 
520 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 100. 
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The kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa vṛttis rise and disappear without following any fixed rule, 
and the two categories do not get intermingled. They are of five “modifications” 
(quoting YS I,2): 
 
“pramāṇa (real cognition), viparyyaya (unreal cognition), vikalpa (logical 
abstraction and imagination), nidrā (sleep), smṛti (memory).”523 
 
At this point, Dasgupta does not say more about these vṛttis. He will get back to 
them in the last chapter of this book, “Matter and Mind.” For the time being he 
simply adds that the vṛttis, both kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa, must not be confused with the 
six kinds of mental activity mentioned in Vyāsabhāṣya II,18.  
 
This whole vṛtti-passage is not very convincing, and even after repeated reading a 
feeling of uneasiness and confusion prevails. Whereas in the Yogasūtra, abhyāsa 
and vairāgya are not called vṛttis but are the means to suppress and ultimately 
eliminate the five groups of kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa vṛttis, Dasgupta equals abhyāsa and 
vairāgya to the unafflicted states and implicitly turns all the vṛttis into afflicted 
ones. Also, the Yogasutra does not establish any link between the kleśas and the 
vṛttis, but since Dasgupta is extremely elliptic as to his sources in this passage, it 
is impossible to identify the textual basis of his analysis. At the very end of this 
chapter, Dasgupta summarises the whole subject in a way which explicitly states 
the simplification which before was only implicit. 
 
“We have seen that from avidyā spring all the kleśas or afflictions, which are 
therefore seen to be the source of the klishṭa vṛttis as well. Abhyāsa and 
vairāgya – the aklishṭa vṛttis, which spring from precepts, etc., lead to right 
knowledge, and as such are antagonistic to the modification of the guṇas on 
the avidyā side.”524 
 
The meaning or significance of the five vṛttis which he dutifully (and for the sake 
of completeness) listed (real cognition, unreal cognition, etc.) remains rather 
shadowy and the uninitiated reader will most probably forget about them. What 
remains is a clear dichotomy of afflicted and unafflicted states, the first kind 
resulting from the kleśas, the second kind standing for practice in steadiness and 
non-attachment. Dasgupta concludes: 
 
“We know also that both these sets of vṛttis – the klishṭa and the aklishṭa – 
produce their own kinds of saṃskāras, the klishṭa saṃskāra and the aklishṭa 
or prajñā saṃskāra.”525 
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4.3.3.11. The ethical problem (chapter X) 
 
Since the karma theory (chapter IX) will be treated separately (cf. infra, chapter 
4.4.) I continue with chapter X. Dasgupta first explains what happens to the mind 
during a pralaya (“involution of the cosmical world-process”). The kleśas (which 
Dasgupta now also calls the “avidyās”) remain in the prakṛti as vāsanās 
(“residual potency”),526 and 
 
“prakṛti being under the influence of these avidyās as vāsanās creates as 
modifications of itself the corresponding minds for the individual purushas, 
connected with them before the last pralaya dissolution.”527 
 
Avidyā therefore never gets lost and every person starts again at the same point 
where he or she was before the dissolution. In this context of creation, avidyā is 
defined by Dasgupta as “the end or purpose of the prakṛti” – the kleśas “hold 
within themselves the serviceability of the purushas, and are the cause of the 
connection of the purusha and the prakṛti.”528 Dasgupta here refers to YS II,24, 
without mentioning it, and he paraphrases YS II,25 by saying that 
 
“[…] when these avidyās are rooted out it is said that the purushārthatā or 
serviceability of the purusha is at an end and the purusha becomes liberated 
from the bonds of prakṛti […].”529 
 
The aim of Yoga consists in uprooting avidyā and its vāsanās through true 
knowledge (prajñā) of the nature of the puruṣa – then liberation, kaivalya, 
happens. Once the mind, after constant practice, remains stable in its “natural, 
passive, and objectless stream of flowing prajñā,”530 it has reached dharmamegha-
samādhi. In this state, one can distinguish prakṛti from puruṣa (cf. YS IV,29). Such 
a puruṣa is called jīvanmukta, an “emancipated being.” Dasgupta quotes 
Chāyāvyākhyā IV,31 which talks about the “infiniteness of consciousness,” the 
removed impurities and the omniscience which characterise this state.531 
Immediately afterwards, absolute freedom sets in; “purusha remains as he is in 
himself, and never again has any connection with the buddhi.”532 This state is 
eternal, contrary to the interlude after a pralaya. 
 
Dasgupta next talks about the seven phases of the prajñā stage (referring, without 
explicitly mentioning it, to YS II,27). The first four steps are results of a conscious 
effort on the part of the yogin, stages five to seven however represent the process 
of release of the puruṣa from prakṛti which takes place all by itself. Dasgupta’s 
source for a detailed description of these seven phases is Vyāsabhāṣya on YS 
II,15.533 
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In conclusion to this chapter, Dasgupta evokes Vyāsa’s statement about the four 
divisions of medicine (disease, the cause of disease, recovery and the medicines) 
and the way how he applied them to Yoga (saṃsāra or evolution of prakṛti, the 
cause of saṃsāra, release and the means of release).534 Having described the first 
three divisions in detail, Dasgupta now wants to turn his attention to the fourth 
step. But before tackling the chapter on Yoga practice, he reminds the reader that  
 
“[i]t is in the inherent purpose of prakṛti that man should undergo pains 
which include all phenomenal experiences of pleasures as well […]. The 
motive therefore which prompts a person towards this ethico-metaphysical 
goal is the avoidance of pain.”535 
 
Since pain is also inherent in pleasure, a yogin “is determined to avoid all 
experiences, painful or so-called pleasurable.”536 Dasgupta’s conclusion about the 
aim of Yoga could not be more poignant and clear: 
 
“[…] the complete extinguishing of all pains is identical with the 
extinguishing of all experiences, the states of vṛttis of consciousness, and this 
again is identical with the rise of prajñā or true discriminative knowledge of 
the difference in nature of prakṛti and its effects from the purusha – the 
unchangeable. These three sides are only the three aspects of the same state 
which immediately precede kaivalya. […] 
This suppression of mental states which has been described as the means of 
attaining final release, the ultimate ethical goal of life, is called Yoga.”537 
 
I quoted this passage at length because many modern interpreters of the 
Yogasūtra flinch from showing this radical side of Yoga and prefer to present a 
system which is designed for helping people to live better lives. But the ultimate 
consequence of the Yoga philosophy has to be what Dasgupta described – a way 
leading to liberation, leaving life and all its experiences behind. Any other 
interpretation has to ignore or distort the sources and must therefore be called a 
modern, personal view. 
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4.3.3.12. Yoga practice (chapter XI) 
 
This chapter mainly deals with two important means to achieve the aim of Yoga, 
namely abhyāsa (firmness of mind) and vairāgya (detachment). Dasgupta starts 
off by explaining the difference between the saṃprajñāta (cognitive) and the 
asaṃprajñāta (ultra-cognitive) (or nirbīja, seedless) state of Yoga, both of which 
“gradually [lead] us towards the attainment of our final goal.”538 In the first of 
these states, the mind remains fixed on some object, first external, then internal; as 
the internal object gradually becomes finer and finer, it ultimately “loses all its 
determinate character and he [the Yogin] is said to be in a state of suppression in 
himself.”539 All the saṃprajñāta states are positive states of the mind “and not a 
mere state of vacuity of objects or negativity.”540 In asaṃprajñāta samādhi 
 
“[…] the ordinary consciousness has been altogether surpassed and the 
mind is in its own true infinite aspect, and the potencies of the stages in 
which the mind was full of finite knowledge are also burnt, so that with the 
return of the citta to its primal cause, final emancipation is effected.”541 
 
For this whole passage Dasgupta does not indicate his textual source(s), but he 
must be referring to YS I,17 (and maybe also to YS I,51). The following 
enumeration of the nine obstructions for the mind on its way to one-pointedness 
is based on YS I,30, but again Dasgupta omits the reference. Concentration is the 
means to overcome these obstacles – concentration on either Īśvara (cf. 
Tattvavaiśāradī) or on any object (cf. Yogavārttika and Bhojavṛtti). The steadiness of 
mind necessary for this concentration is called abhyāsa (cf. YS I,13). 
Concentration on one object is not easy; one prerequisite which makes the task 
easier is faith (śraddhā) – “the firm conviction of the Yogin in the course that he 
adopts.”542 This kind of faith produces vairāgya (desirelessness), “aversion or 
dislike towards the objects of sensual pleasure and worldly desires”543 (cf. 
Yogavārttika on YS I,20). Desirelessness and faith both stand for the same process, 
one showing it from the negative, the other from the positive side. 
 
Vairāgya is of two kinds, apara and para (cf. YS I,16 and probably some 
commentary). In the first state, “the mind is indifferent to all kinds of pleasures 
and pains;”544 it has four stages, the last of which leading to para vairāgya (the 
highest detachment), giving rise to prajñā and “leading to absolute 
independence.”545  
 
Faith produces vīrya, “energy, or power of concentration (dhāraṇā),” vīrya leads 
to smṛti, “continuity of one object of thought,” and from smṛti springs samādhi, 
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“trance;” then comes prajñā and, last of all, final release.546 Dasgupta here 
implicitly quotes YS I,20. 
 
“Thus by the inclusion of śraddhā within vairāgya, its effect, and the other 
products of śraddhā with abhyāsa, we see that the abhyāsa and vairāgya are 
the two internal means for achieving the final goal of the Yogin, the supreme 
suppression and extinction of all states of consciousness […].”547 
 
Dasgupta distinguishes three kinds of Yogins: 
 
“(1) Those who have the best mental equipment. (2) Those who are 
mediocres. (3) Those who have low mental equipment.”548 
 
The purely mental practice of abhyāsa and vairāgya, as explained in this chapter, 
is meant for “a man [who] is well developed” – such a person goes directly to 
what Dasgupta calls jñānayoga, comprising dhāraṇā (concentration), dhyāna 
(meditation), and samādhi (trance).549 Other people first have to purify their 
minds before entering the path of this yoga of knowledge; they have to practise 
kriyāyoga or the yogāṅgas, the “accessories of Yoga,” which destroy avidyā 
(which here is equalled to impurity) (cf. Vyāsabhāṣya on YS II,28). 
 
It is interesting to note that Dasgupta in this chapter presents abhyāsa and 
vairāgya (with śraddhā and its products) as sufficient means for reaching the 
goal. All it takes is a well-equipped, concentrated mind. No other exercises seem 
necessary. Steadiness of mind and detachment alone can lead to samādhi.  
 
 
4.3.3.13. The yogāṅgas (chapter XII) 
 
According to the logic expounded in the above chapter, the yogāṅgas are meant 
only for people whose mind is of mediocre or even low capacity. The practice of 
the eight limbs of Yoga removes all the obstructions which hinder citta from 
evolving into the state of attainment of prajñā, true knowledge; it removes the 
impurities from the mind like an axe is splitting a piece of wood.550 
 
After enumerating these accessories of Yoga, Dasgupta rather surprisingly states 
that abhyāsa and vairāgya (including śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi and prajñā) 
are included in the yogāṅgas and should not be considered to be different from 
them. Thus, śraddhā etc. is part of tapas (ascetism),551 svādhyāya (study of the 
scriptures) and īśvarapraṇidhāna (devotion to God), and vairāgya is included in 
saṃtoṣa (contentment). Unfortunately, Dasgupta does not indicate the source of 
this classification. He briefly defines each of the eight limbs, adding that “some 
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have the mental side more predominant, while others are mostly to be actualised 
in exterior action.”552 Limbs four and five (prāṇāyāma and pratyāhāra) are 
qualified as “accessories” to the last three steps (dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi); 
they “serve to cleanse the mind of impurities and make it steady.”553 Dasgupta 
associates them with the actions mentioned in YS I,34-39, the so-called 
parikarmas, which also help to calm down the mind, and, for completion’s sake, 
he adds  
 
“[...] the remaining aids for cleansing the mind as mentioned in Yoga-sūtra 
I., viz. the cultivation of the habits of friendliness, compassion, complacency 
and indifference towards happiness, misery, virtue and vice.”554 
 
Maitrī, karuṇā, muditā and upekṣā are listed in YS I,33. They purify the mind of 
jealousy, of the desire to harm others, of envy and and anger.  
 
“Our minds become steady in proportion as their impurities are cleansed.”555 
 
Yet these mental parikarmas are too lofty for normal people; those whose mind is 
very impure have to start at a lower level, in other words: with the yamas, the 
restraints, “by which the gross impurities of ordinary minds are removed.”556 
Dasgupta stresses the particular role of ahiṃsā, non-injury, which he calls “the 
root of the other yamas;”557 in fact, the above-mentioned parikarmas as well as the 
other four yamas and the five niyamas all “only serve to make non-injury more 
and more perfect.”558 According to him, ahiṃsā “should be the greatest ethical 
motive for all our conduct,” because 
 
“[i]t is by ahiṃsā alone that we can make ourselves fit for the higher type of 
samādhi.”559 
 
In fact he argues that by practising śuklakarma, pure works, which he defines as 
“mental works of good thoughts in which perfection of ahiṃsā is attained,”560 
kaivalya can be reached directly. Unfortunately, Dasgupta does not indicate the 
textual bases for this particular importance of non-injury. 
 
Dasgupta dedicates only little space to the other four yamas (veracity, abstinence 
from stealing, restraint of the generative organ and non-appropriation of things 
not one’s own),561 and then proceeds to explain YS II,33 which says that sinful 
ideas should be removed “by habituating himself to those which are contrary to 
them.”562 He quotes Vyāsa’s Bhāṣya without saying so. Dasgupta translates 
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“vitarka” (bad or disturbing thoughts) as “sins” and follows YS II,34 in their 
classification according to whether they are actually done, caused to be done or 
permitted to be done. 
 
According to Dasgupta, the yamas (restraints) and the niyamas (observances) 
together form the so-called kriyāyoga, 
 
“[...] by the performance of which men become fit to rise gradually to the 
state of jñānayoga by samādhi and to attain kaivalya.”563 
 
Again, the reader does not know which text(s) inspired Dasgupta for this 
classification, kriyāyoga in the Yogasutra being the term which designates the first 
three niyamas only. Dasgupta, of course, is aware of this, and he somewhat 
clumsily reintroduces kriyāyoga a little bit further down as the practice by which 
those who are advanced enough may enter the Yoga path directly, without 
having to begin with the yamas. Kriyāyoga then means tapaḥ (ascetism), 
svādhyāya (the study of philosophy and repetition of the syllable Om) and 
īśvarapraṇidhāna (devotion to God).564 It is interesting that Dasgupta here 
distinguishes devotion to God from īśvarapraṇidhāna in YS I,23. In the first 
instance it meant  
 
“[...] love, homage and adoration of God, by virtue of which God by His 
grace makes samādhi easy for the Yogin.”565 
 
Now, in the context of the niyamas, devotion to God is interpreted by Dasgupta 
as  
 
“[...] the bestowal of all our actions upon the Great Teacher, God, i.e. to 
work, not for one’s own self but for God, so that a man desists from all 
desires for fruit therefrom.”566 
 
In other words, īśvarapraṇidhāna has become a synonym for karmayoga as 
defined in the Bhagavad-Gītā. This interpretation is due to the encompassing term 
“kriyāyoga,” yoga of action. 
 
Implicitly quoting YS II,2, Dasgupta then states that kriyāyoga reduces the power 
of the kleśas and leads to samādhi (here called “trance”). He thus equates the 
kriyāyoga passage YS II,1 ff. and the first three niyamas, despite the difference in 
the interpretation of īśvarapraṇidhāna. 
 
Whoever is naturally endowed with the qualities mentioned under the yamas can 
immediately take up the practice of the niyamas, and those who are further 
advanced can even skip those,  
 
                                                 
563 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 142. 
564 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 142. 
565 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 143. 
566 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 143. 
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“[...] as their afflictions [kleśas] are already in an attenuated state and their 
minds in a fit condition to adapt themselves to samādhi; they can therefore 
begin at once with jñānayoga.”567 
 
Referring to Yogavārttika II,2, Dasgupta once more reminds his readers that in 
such a case the practice of abhyāsa and vairāgya is sufficient. 
 
The remaining two niyamas, śauca (cleanliness) and saṃtoṣa (contentment), are 
only briefly mentioned by Dasgupta, before he proceeds to listing all the results 
one attains by practising the yamas and the niyamas. In this enumeration he 
closely renders YS II,35-45, once more without saying so.568 Given the fact that 
some of these results are quite surprising (insofar as they promise “control of the 
senses and fitness for the knowledge of self” [for śauca] or even samādhi straight 
away [for īśvarapraṇidhāna]),569 Dasgupta feels the necessity to quote Vācaspati 
who insisted that “it should not [...] be said [...] that the remaining seven 
yogāṅgas are useless.”570 Vijñāna Bhikṣu specifies this point in the following way: 
 
“[...] meditation on Īśvara only removes ignorance. The other accessories 
bring about samādhi by their own specific modes of operation. Moreover, it 
is by help of meditation on Īśvara that one succeedds in bringing about 
samādhi, through the performance of all the accessories of Yoga; so the 
accessories of Yoga cannot be regarded as unnecessary; [...] devotion to God 
brings in His grace and through it the yogāṅgas can be duly performed.”571 
 
Moving on to the third aṅga, āsana (posture), Dasgupta succinctly paraphrases YS 
II,46-48. This is the only passage in the whole book where Dasgupta says 
anything about this practice at all. From another text we learn that he had no 
other postures in mind but sitting: 
 
“[The yogin] must be able to control his bodily movements. He must 
therefore habituate himself to sitting in one posture for a long time, not only 
for hours and days but often for months and years together.”572 
 
In order to explain the following step, prāṇāyāma (regulation of breath) Dasgupta 
reverts to Vyāsa’s Bhaṣya on YS II,49-51,573 once more without indicating his 
source. In the end he establishes a link with YS I,34 where cessation of breath is 
mentioned as one of the means for making the mind steady (cf. supra, the 
parikarmas). Since prāṇāyāma (like āsana) will not be discussed again in this 
book, we can consult “Yoga Mysticism” once more to get a clear idea of how 
Dasgupta understood this technique and its consequences. 
 
“At first the breath that is taken in is kept perhaps for a minute and then 
slowly exhaled. The practice is continued for days and months, the period of 
the retention of the breath taken in being gradually increased. With the 
                                                 
567 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 143. 
568 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 144. 
569 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 144. 
570 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 144. 
571 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 145. 
572 Dasgupta, Mysticism. 74. 
573 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 145-147. 
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growth of breath-control, one may keep his breath suspended, without 
exhalation or inhalation, for hours, days, months and even years together. 
With the suspension of the respiratory process the body remains in a state of 
suspended animation, without any external signs of life. The heart ceases to 
beat, there is neither taking in of food nor evacutation of any sort, there is no 
movement of the body.”574 
 
For all those who could not imagine such a state to be possible for any human 
being, Dasgupta adds a rare instance of personal testimony: 
 
“I have myself seen a case where the yogin stayed in this condition for nine 
days.”575 
 
In this chapter, Dasgupta deals with pratyāhāra (abstraction), dhāraṇā 
(concentration), dhyāna (meditation) and samādhi (trance contemplation) rather 
briefly. In pratyāhāra, the mind is “altogether identified with the object of inner 
concentration or contemplation” and “the senses, which have already ceased 
coming into contact with other objects and become submerged in the citta, also 
cease along with it.”576 
 
“Dhāraṇā is the concentration of citta on a particular place. [...] Dhyāna is 
the continuance or changing flow of the mental effort in the object of 
dhāraṇā unmediated by any other break of conscious states. Samādhi, or 
trance-contemplation, results when by deep concentration mind becomes 
transformed into the shape of the object of contemplation.”577 
 
This whole passage renders, implicitly, YS II,54-III,3. Dasgupta insists on the fact 
that without āsana and prāṇāyāma the higher stages of Yoga cannot be reached. 
If, however, someone is naturally (or by the grace of God) so far advanced that he 
can easily concentrate his mind, he might start directly with dhāraṇā, the stage 
where the process of samādhi begins. The last three steps are called saṃyama (cf. 
YS III,4), “which directly leads to and is immediately followed by the saṃprajñāta 
state.”578 According to Dasgupta, saṃyama is 
 
“[...] not essential for the asaṃprajñāta state, for a person who is very far 
advanced, or one who is the special object of God’s grace, may pass at once 
by intense vairāgya and abhyāsa into the nirodha state or state of 
suppression.”579 
 
The repeated statement that the yogāṅgas are not really necessary for someone 
who is gifted or blessed enough is one of the characteristics of this chapter. In 
Patañjali we find no such assertion, and since Dasgupta fails to indicate any 
                                                 
574 Dasgupta, Mysticism, 75. 
575 Dasgupta, Mysticism, 75. I remind the reader that “Yoga Mysticism” was a lecture held in America. 
Talking to Westerners, Dasgupta obviously felt encouraged to describe the Yoga steps far more 
vividly than in his theoretical treatise Yoga as Philosophy and Religion. 
576 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 147. 
577 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 147-148. 
578 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 149. 
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4.3.3.14. God in Yoga (chapter XIV) 
 
Leaving out chapter XIII, dedicated entirely to samādhi which will be treated 
separately (cf. infra, chapter 4.5.), we come back to a topic which was already 
raised in the first part of this book, namely the role of Īśvara or God in the Yoga 
system of thought (cf. supra, chapters 4.3.3.8. and 4.3.3.9.). In his chapter 
“Evolution and God” Dasgupta described Īśvara as the agent who removed all 
the barriers within prakṛti so that the evolution could take place. The exact nature 
of the relationship between Īśvara and the other purely spiritual entity, puruṣa, 
thereby remaining rather hazy, we compared passages from other writings of 
Dasgupta on this subject and discovered that, discussing God in a more 
scientifically philosophical context, he went as far as calling Īśvara a mere “matter 
of courtesy.” Many indications however point to the fact that his heart and 
personal conviction did not leave Dasgupta any scope for speculation – God had 
to play a role in the process of liberation, and chapter XIV, “God in Yoga,” is 
unequivocal in this respect. Īśvara is defined as that puruṣa who is 
 
“[...] untouched by the afflictions or the fruits of karma, [...] always free and 
ever the Lord. He is omniscient in the highest degree, for in him is the 
furthest limit of omniscience, beyond which there is nothing. 
This Īśvara is all-merciful, [...] but he does not release all persons, because he 
helps only so far as each deserves; he does not nullify the law of karma, just 
as a king, though quite free to act in any way he likes, punishes or rewards 
people as they deserve.”580 
 
Of course, the other puruṣas are also in reality free and untouched by the kleśas, 
 
“[...] but they, seemingly at least, have to undergo the afflictions and 
consequently birth and rebirth, etc. until they are again finally released; but 
Īśvara, though he is a purusha, yet does not suffer in any way any sort of 
bondage.”581 
 
Īśvara clearly stands out as a kind of superior puruṣa, the absolutely free, 
omniscient and omnipotent Lord. Feeling the necessity to justify this point of 
view on textual grounds, Dasgupta resorts to a strangely non-philosophical or 
non-rational way of argumentation. 
 
“This nature of Īśvara has been affirmed in the scriptures and is therefore 
taken as true on their authority. The authority of the scriptures is again 
acknowledged only because they have proceeded from God or Īśvara. The 
objection that this is an argument in a circle has no place here, since the 
connection of the scriptures with Īśvara is beginningless.”582 
 
                                                 
580 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 159-160. 
581 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 159-160. 
582 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 159. 
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In short: the nature of God is beyond any logical debate, it was and always will be 
the way the sources describe it. Here we find Dasgupta arguing in a similar way 
as the Vedāntins who defend the infallibility of the Vedic wisdom - an attitude he 
elsewhere harshly criticised (cf. supra, chapter 3.5.1). Īśvara even 
 
“[...] dictates the Vedas at each evolution of the world after dissolution,”583 
 
a task traditionally fulfilled by the great Hindu Gods. Dasgupta’s Īśvara therefore 
is the unquestionable absolute which thrones above everything. Devotion to this 
God makes the Yogin’s path easy. 
 
“After describing the nature of karmayoga, and the way in which it leads to 
jñānayoga, we must now describe the third and easiest means of attaining 
salvation, the bhaktiyoga [...].”584 
 
This classification of three kinds of Yoga comes a bit as a surprise because the 
only such “label” Dasgupta used so far was jñānayoga (designating the last three 
aṅgas of the 8-fold path; cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.12). Karmayoga is a term he either 
avoided or understood as being synonymous to kriyāyoga, mentioned a few 
times but not very clearly defined. Kriyāyoga first meant the purificatory actions 
and as such were equalled to the yogāṅgas in general,585 then it only comprised 
the yamas and the niyamas,586 and finally it was the term for the first three 
niyamas (tapaḥ, svādhyāya and Īśvarapraṇidhāna).587 The third of these niyamas 
however has to be interpreted in two different ways, “according to the 
commentators.”588 
 
“In the first book [of the YS] it means love or devotion to God as the one 
centre of meditation, in the second it is used to mean the abnegation of all 
desires of the fruits of action to Īśvara [...].”589 
 
In other words: Īśvarapraṇidhāna stands for both bhaktiyoga as well as for 
karmayoga. It ensues that two terms are clearly delimitated (jñānayoga: last three 
aṅgas and bhaktiyoga: third niyama) whereas the third one (karmayoga) remains 
somewhat vague (generally understood as practices leading to jñānayoga). 
Dasgupta obviously did not ascribe too much importance to these denominations 
and therefore felt no necessity to eliminate the lack of clarity as to the definition of 
karmayoga. 
 
Through devotion (bhakti) Īśvara is stimulated to bestow His grace on his 
follower, removing all the obstacles mentioned in YS I,30-31.  
 
“So for a person who can love and adore Īśvara, this is the easiest course of 
attaining samādhi.”590 
                                                 
583 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 160. 
584 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 159. 
585 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 130; cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.12. 
586 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 142; cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.13. 
587 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 142; cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.13. 
588 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 161. 
589 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 161 (cf. also supra, chapter 4.3.3.13). 
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Bhaktiyoga, according to Dasgupta, is the method  
 
“[...] by which the tedious complexity of the Yoga process may be avoided 
and salvation speedily acquired [...].”591 
 
The next part of this chapter is dedicated to a discussion of the differences 
between the concept of Īśvara in Yoga and other philosophical systems. 
According to Rāmānuja, Īśvara is not a special puruṣa as in Yoga but is composed 
of both prakṛti (acit) and puruṣa (cit), and with Śaṃkara, apart from Īśvara 
nothing truly exists. Finally, Īśvara is the most important point of distinction 
between Yoga and Sāṃkhya. Whereas the latter “relied largely on philosophical 
thinking,” not feeling any  “pratical need for the admission of Īśvara,”592 the 
former called for a “protector of the Yogins proceeding in their arduous course of 
complete self-control and absorptive concentration.”593 According to Dasgupta, 
Īśvara had a very practical role to fulfil in Yoga, instilling hope and confidence in 
those who were engaged on the difficult yogic path.  
 
“The metaphysical functions which are ascribed to Īśvara seem to be later 
additions for the sake of rendering his position more in harmony with the 
system.”594 
 
Dasgupta ends this chapter by listing a few other differences between Yoga and 
Sāṃkhya, such as the standard distinction which considers Yoga to be practical 
and Sāṃkhya more theoretical.595 He concludes: 
 




4.3.3.15. Matter and mind (chapter XV) 
 
In the last chapter of his book Dasgupta returns to one of his favourite subjects, 
namely “theories of the physical world”597 and the workings of the mind. “Matter 
and mind” takes up some of the topics dealt with in the early chapters of Yoga as 
Philosophy and Religion; it is of purely theoretical nature and does not continue the 
practical aspects of Yoga discussed in the immediately preceding chapters. As 
such it stands out as a slightly erratic text, badly linked to the rest of the book. 
The variety of subjects raised leaves the impression that Dasgupta did not want to 
end his treatise on Yoga and Sāṃkhya without speaking his final word on certain 
topics; on the other hand it is not quite understandable why he did not include 
these additions when he was discussing the respective subjects in the earlier parts 
of the book. 
                                                                                                                                                        
590 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 161. 
591 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 162. 
592 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 164. 
593 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 163. 
594 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 163-164. 
595 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 164. 
596 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 165. 
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He sets out by contradicting “some modern investigators [who] have tried to 
understand the five bhūtas, viz. ākāśa, marut, tejas, ap and kshiti as ether, 
gaseous heat and light, liquids and solids.”598 According to Dasgupta, matter has 
to be classified according to human sensation or perception of it -  
 
“[this division] has a firm root in our nature as cognising beings and has 
therefore a better rational footing than the modern chemical division into 
elements and compounds [...].”599 
 
He describes the five elements under five aspects: sthūla (gross matter), svarūpa 
(substantive, meaning the way in which the elements appeal to the senses), 
sūkṣma (subtle), anvaya (conjunction, meaning the guṇa aspect) and arthavattva 
(purpose of use, meaning the fact that they are all serviceable to puruṣa).600 Next 
he explains the two kinds of “aggregation with regard to the structure of 
matter,”601 the first one being union or fusion of the different parts of something 
(like any vegetable or animal body), the second one describing a state where the 
parts can be distinguished from one another (like trees in a forest).  
 
Dasgupta concludes the presentation of the elements by talking in detail about 
ākāśa and the sense of hearing (cf. also supra, chapter 4.3.3.6), referring to Vijñāna 
Bhikṣu and Nāgeśa (without any indication of the exact passage), as well as to the 
Sāṃkhyasūtra II,12, very briefly evoking the topic of time and space by basically 
repeating what he had said in chapter IV (cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.5).602 
 
After dealing with matter Dasgupta turns towards the mind by stating that citta 
has two degrees. In the first one the mind has states or functions (vṛttis) and in 
the second one all the states are suppressed (nirodha).  
 
“Between the stage of complete outgoing activity of ordinary experience 
(vyutthāna) and complete suppression of all states, there are thousands of 
states of infinite variety, through which a man’s experiences have to pass, 
from the vyutthāna state to the nirodha.”603 
 
The vṛttis were briefly mentioned in chapter VIII (cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.10), in 
connection with the saṃskāras. Now Dasgupta describes them in detail. 
  
(1) pramāṇa (real cognition), including perception, inference and competent 
evidence of the Vedas, (cf. YS I,7) creates a certain kind of knowledge. This 
knowledge however has to be distinguished from real knowledge or intuition, 
called prajñā, which is 
 
“[...] superior to all other means of knowledge [...] in this, that it is altogether 
unerring, unrestricted and unlimited in its scope.”604 
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Perception etc. originates with the mind coming in touch with the external world 
through the senses, but prajñā dawns through concentration and is only fully 
developed in the samādhi state. In the preceding chapter Dasgupta already 
briefly wrote on prajñā (as opposed to perception, inference and scriptural 
evidence), saying that prajñā alone  
 
“[...] can bring objects before our mental eye with the clearest and most 
unerring light of comprehensibility in which the true nature of the thing is at 
once observed.”605 
 
Explaining perception, Dasgupta quotes Yogavārttika IV,17 which explains that 
the mind is drawn out towards an object like iron which is attracted by a magnet.  
 
“Perception [...] is distinguished from inference, etc., in this, that here the 
knowledge arrived at is predominantly of the specific and special characters 
(viśesha) of the thing and not of its generic qualities as in inference, etc.”606 
 
The evidence from the Veda is valid because God or Īśvara dictated these 
scriptures.607 
 
(2) Viparyaya (unreal cognition) is 
 
“[...] a knowledge which possesses a form that does not tally with the real 
nature of the thing either as doubt or as false knowledge.”608 
 
This definition is a close rendering of YS I,8 but Dasgupta once more gives no hint 
that he is quoting from a text (the same holds true for the presentation of the next 
three vṛttis). Viparyaya is exemplified in the kleśas. 
 
(3) Vikalpa (imagination) is also unreal knowledge, “but it is only the learned 
who can demonstrate by arguments the illusoriness of [...] imagination.”609 
 
(4) Nidrā (sleep) is a mental state because when we wake up we remember 
having slept well or badly. A yogin has to overcome all desire of sleep. 
 
(5) Smṛti (memory) “is the retaining in the mind of objects perceived”610 and is a 
result of the activities of all the five vṛttis. 
 
The feelings of sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (pain) and moha (ignorance) are 
inseparably part of all states of mind.  
 
“Knowledge and feeling are but two different aspects of the modifications 
[vṛttis] of cittas derived from parkṛti [...].”611 
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After presenting the five aspects of the senses Dasgupta tries to define “the 
relation of manas with the senses and the citta,”  manas sometimes being 
identified with cittas, sometimes being described as a sense organ, sometimes 
said to be the coordinating organ of the senses. He reaches the conclusion that 
612
 
“[...] manas is possibly the directive side of the ego by which it guides the 
cognitive and conative senses in the external world and is the cause of their 
harmonious activity for the experience of purusha.”  613
 
He then mentions a few other aspects of manas, partially referring to Yogavārttika 
II,18. 
 
The outgoing activity of the mind is a result of the kleśas, here called “emotional 
elements.”  Implicitly quoting YS II,4 Dasgupta talks about the different states 
the kleśas can be in – from germinal to fully developed. Man can go along with 
them or he may “gradually remove those emotions [...], thus narrowing their 
sphere and proceeding towards final release.”  




Returning to the mental states (vṛttis) Dasgupta adds (by partly rendering YS I,5) 
that they are either afflicted or unafflicted, 
 
“[...] according as they are moved towards outgoing activity or are actuated 
by the higher motive of emancipation by narrowing the field of experiences 
gradually to a smaller and smaller sphere and afterwards to suppress them 
altogether.”616 
 
In the end of this somewhat miscellaneous chapter Dasgupta raises the topic of 
karma and freedom of will. Somebody entering the yogic way of life will 
inevitably face the subconscious impressions (saṃskāras) of pleasurable and 
painful actions which, out of habit, he may have performed during many lives. 
But, according to Dasgupta, 
 
“[t]he free will is not curbed in any way, for it follows directly from the 
teleological purpose of prakṛti, which moves for the experience and 
liberation of purusha. So this motive of liberation, which is the basis of all 
good conduct, can never be subordinated to the other impulse, which goads 
man towards outgoing experiences.”617 
 
Thus Yoga as Philosophy and Religion ends on a very optimistic note which is 
reinforced by the following statement: 
 
“[...] if by the grace of God false knowledge (avidyā) is removed, true 
knowledge at once dawns upon the mind and all the afflictions lose their 
power.”618 
 
612 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 175. 
613 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 175. 
614 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 176. 
615 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 176. 
616 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 176. 
617 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 177. 
618 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 178. 
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4.3.3.16. Conclusions 
 
Looking back on “Ethics and Practice”, the second part of Yoga as Philosophy and 
Religion, a list of the topics treated immediately shows that Yoga for Dasgupta is 
nearly exclusively a mental affair – almost all the topics raised revolve around the 
mind, its different qualities, states and afflictions, the obstacles it encounters and 
how these can be overcome. The practical aspect of Yoga focusses entirely on the 
means by which a Yogin can purify, concentrate and ultimately eliminate the 
mind and its experiences of pleasure and pain in order to reach a kind of 
knowledge which is beyond normal consciousness. The body is only very briefly 
mentioned when it comes to sitting postures and breathing exercises – all the 
other Yogic practices take place in the mind. 
 
- citta (the mind), as effect (kāryacitta) or as cause (kāraṇacitta) 
- the five classes of cittas (from wandering to restrained) 
- vṛttis (actual states of mind) and saṃskāras (latent states) 
- for a yogin even pleasure is pain and therefore he has to avoid both 
- the kleśas (afflictions), presented as the kliṣṭa vṛttis (afflicted states) 
- abhyāsa (habit of steadiness) and vairāgya (non-attachment) as akliṣṭa 
vṛttis (non afflicted states) 
* Chapter on karma (cf. infra, chapter 4.4.) 
- avidyā (nescience) remains, even after a pralaya, and, since it is the 
ultimate cause of the relation between puruṣa and prakṛti, it has to be 
uprooted by the Yogin 
- as soon as avidyā disappears, prajñā (true knowledge) sets in, followed 
by kaivalya (liberation) 
- the seven stages of prajñā 
- the aim of Yoga consists in the complete eradication of all pains, which 
is the same as the complete extinction of all experiences and states of 
mind – only then the true discriminative knowledge (prajñā) can rise 
which is necessary for kaivalya 
- the nine obstructions on the Yoga path 
- the purely mental practice of abhyāsa and vairāgya is sufficient for 
reaching the aim, but only for somebody whose mind is already well 
concentrated 
- all the others have to first purify their minds (purification automatically 
leading to steadiness) through the practice of the eight limbs of Yoga 
- abhyāsa and vairāgya are part of these eight limbs 
- friendliness (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā), complacency (muditā) and 
indifference towards happiness, misery, virtue and vice (upekṣā) also 
help to purify the mind 
- the importance of ahiṃsā 
- description of each of the eight limbs 
* Chapter on samādhi (cf. infra, chapter 4.5.) 
- devotion to the absolute God (Īśvara) is the easiest way, because it 
stimulates God to remove the obstacles through His grace 
- the five elements of matter and how the human being perceives them 
through his senses 
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- the two degrees of citta: functioning (through the vṛttis) or suppressed 
(nirodha) 
- detailed description of the vṛttis (mental states) 
- feelings cannot be separated from the mental states 
- manas (the coordinating organ) and citta 
- the kleśas (afflictions or emotional elements) are responsible for the 
outgoing activity of the mind 
- karma and free will 
 
This list also helps to see how succinctly and smoothly Dasgupta’s argumentation 
runs, one topic logically leading to the following one – until the last chapter 
where he somewhat hurriedly picked up a few loose strings of subjects treated 
earlier on. 
 
Comparing the textual sources Dasgupta used in this part of the book to those he 
referred to in the first chapters it is striking that he quotes or paraphrases 
Patañjali far more frequently in “Ethics and Practice” than in “Yoga 
Metaphysics.” Yoga philosophy was expounded mainly from the points of view 
of the commentators, whereas for the ethical and practical aspects of Yoga 
Patañjali alone often seemed sufficient. It has to be added however that many 
passages in the second part of Yoga as Philosophy and Religion are entirely devoid 
of any textual indications, and since the majority of the sūtras Dasgupta chose to 
cite can only be identified by a well-versed reader in the subject it cannot be 
excluded that sundry references to commentators are woven into Dasgupta’s text 
in “Ethics and Practice” as well. 
 
Looking at the sūtras Dasgupta based his description of Yoga “Ethics and 
Practice” on we see that most of them are from books I and II of the Yogasūtra. 
The following (rough) clusters can be identified: 
 
YS I,1-16 Definition of Yoga and discussion of the vṛttis 
YS I,30-39 Obstacles on the way and means to make the mind steady 
YS II,1-11 Kleśa passage 
YS II,15-27 All experiences are painful; avidyā, the ultimate root cause of 
pain, has to be eradicated 
YS II,28-III,4 The eight limbs of Yoga 
  
Plus three slightly isolated sūtras: 
 
I,17 and IV,29 Different kinds of samādhi 
IV,17 Perception 
 
If we follow our hypothesis that the two parts of Yoga as Philosophy and Religion 
each represent one of the terms in this title (“Yoga Metaphysics” standing for 
“philosophy” and “Ethics and Practice” for “religion”), then what has been said 
in the beginning of this chapter “conclusions” is valid not only for Yoga but for 
Dasgupta’s understanding (or definition) of religion as a whole. It would mean 
that religion predominantly focusses on the mind. A human being on his or her 
Mircea Eliade and Surendranath Dasgupta 123
way towards liberation from earthly suffering faces a mind which is highly 
imperfect, the main drawback being fundamental ignorance (avidyā) which gives 
rise to all kinds of other mental dirt or stains (kleśas). The exclusive aim of a series 
of mostly mental exercises consists in purifying this polluted, unstable mind and 
to make it clean (clean being used by Dasgupta throughout as a synonym for 
concentrated). Only a concentrated mind has the possibility to uproot avidyā and 
to reach the level of true knowledge (prajñā) which alone is able to differentiate 
between puruṣa and prakṛti. The aim of religion (and Yoga) therefore is this 
knowledge which shines forth only in deep trance (samādhi) – it automatically 
and immediately leads to kaivalya (emancipation, liberation). This whole 
enterprise is radical; it ultimately signifies that every experience, be it (so-called) 
happy or painful, has to be extinguished from the mind, a process which also 
implies a complete withdrawal from this world full of pain. Luckily, the Yogin is 
not left alone in this gigantic task – he has the possibility to call on Īśvara, the 
highest, absolute God, who will not fail to send his grace down on a devoted 
disciple. Īśvara’s grace consists in removing obstacles and thus cleansing the 
mind. At the end of the road, the liberated Yogin steps through the door of prajñā 
and enters another dimension altogether, beyond the ordinary mental realm and 
beyond verbal description.  
 
Religion (or Yoga) therefore is a mental science, in the sense that it analyses the 
mind from all points of view and shows how one can master it, the ultimate goal 
being the annihilation of the mind itself in order to reach the absolute. Dasgupta’s 
definitions of Yoga sum this up nicely. 
 
“The word yoga is used to denote […] the arresting of the mental processes 
and states and all physical, mental and moral accessories connected with 
them. The word yoga is also used to denote mental energy by which the 
mind is disciplined and the goal of yoga attained. Patañjali defined yoga as 
the partial and complete or temporary and permanent arrest or cessation of 
mental states.”619 
 
And Dasgupta would not be Dasgupta if he did not at the same time proudly 
stress the uniqueness of such an endeavour: 
 
“The theory that mental states can be arrested by our efforts is an extremely 
original one, and up till now we know of no country other than India where 
such a possibility was ever conceived. In an interview that I had with the 
famous psychologist Dr. Sigmund Freud, he expressed great surprise, in the 
course of a long discussion, that such a thing should be conceived possible, 
but he admitted that this experiment had always been made and that 
therefore it would be hazardous to deny its possibility.”620 
 
In this statement we also see how Yoga and psychology differ. A psychologist’s 
interest focuses exclusively on the mind for mind’s sake – he would never dream 
of trying to eradicate the object of his investigation. A Yogin however wants to 
know the mind only in order to be able to use its mechanism for dominating and 
ultimately overcoming it – his true aim lies far beyond the mental world. The 
                                                 
619 Dasgupta, Relation, 276. 
620 Dasgupta, Relation, 276. 
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mind as mind is his enemy and source of unending pain and therefore he tries to 
remain with it for as short a while as possible. Mind is simply the way or medium 
through which he advances beyond it. This spiritual dimension (alluded to by 




4.4. Karma (chapter IX) 
 
Karma and samādhi being two key concepts of the project “Yoga between 
Switzerland and India” I kept the two corresponding chapters of Yoga as 
Philosophy and Religion (IX: the theory of karma and XIII: stages of samādhi) for a 
separate discussion.  
 
 
4.4.1. Dasgupta’s personal opinion 
 
Before we look at the way Dasgupta presents karma and rebirth in the context of 
his treatise on Yoga I would like to cite a few passages of other texts where the 
famous philosopher expressed his philosophical thoughts and personal views 
about this subject. We have already seen (cf. supra, chapter 3.5.1) that, from a 
philosophical point of view, he considered the theory of karma to be one of the 
four unproved dogmas of Indian philosophy.621 Rebirth is another such dogma, a 
concept which became necessary as soon as the possibility of final liberation was 
established – a liberation which, according to Dasgupta, nobody ever reaches.622 
Such dogmas are nothing but 
 
“[…] extraneous assumptions […] which do not directly explain experience, 
but which are brought in from outside […] and hamper the progress of 
philosophical speculations and blur the philosophical outlook.”623 
 
In a letter to Surama, Dasgupta provides another explanation of why the belief in 
karma and rebirth came into being. According to this idea (which is still 
philosophically critical) the karma theory is closely linked to punishment, fear 
and subsequent obedience to the scriptures. 
 
“Man has made some laws for supporting and establishing the society and 
the state. There is provision for punishment for transgressing any such laws. 
Man knows that there are cases of transgressions where such punishments 
are not available, but there is no way to deal with them. Therefore, he 
believes that the truth of the order of social and individual life is so 
pervasive, that even if man fails to punish, nature will inflict punishment. 
The external world is also amenable to man-made moral laws or beliefs. The 
theory of karma originates from such a belief. 
[…] 
The ancient belief was that the instructions of the scriptures were right and 
these gave us support. From this stemmed the concept of virtue and vice, 
                                                 
621 Cf. Dasgupta, Emergence, 253. 
622 Cf. Dasgupta, Emergence, 255. 
623 Dasgupta, Emergence, 255. 
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reward and punishment, so that out of fear (in biological sense) man would 
follow scriptural injunctions. […] So since the scriptures stood for God’s 
command these became authoritative. Thus the devotee made a 
reconciliation of their faith in God and the scriptures, and since the latter 
spoke about karma and its results, the karma theory had its full play.”624 
 
Karma and rebirth as an unproved dogma or a man-made instrument for justice 
and social stability – it does not take much to gather that Dasgupta was 
personally far from being convinced about such a theory. Talking to Surama 
about the fact that as a boy he could show many yogic postures without having 
been taught any āsanas, he added that 
 
“[…] this was no reason to postulate the theory that [I] must have acquired 
these practices in a previous birth.”625 
 
Surama diplomatically described Dasgupta’s attitude as follows: 
 
“He had an open mind towards the assumptions of Indian philosophy, 
about the theory of rebirth and karma.”626 
 
This critical openness made it impossible for Dasgupta to find solace in the 
promise of a next life, even if this meant facing the full blow of grief. 
 
“We have heard much of the theory of rebirth. The writers of scriptures say 
that death is not true, because our soul is immortal, imperishable. Poets have 
said that we reach deathlessness through death just as the spring follows 
winter. But the leaf that we see die in winter, never comes back in spring. 
The person we lost in death has never been seen by us in another form or 
birth. A new day comes every day, but that particular day that has gone by 
cannot be brought back even by the Master of all destinies. We do not know 
what is the nature of this everlasting immortal soul, and even if we come to 
know it somehow; we have no interest in it or any desire for such an 
immortality. We love the person who was with us in flesh and blood, whom 
we could serve, take care of, whose affection we felt, with whom we talked. 
After leaving such a dear one in the cremation ground, we have never met 
him again; yet our heart longs for, pines after that person, that living form of 
his, in which we are interested. The suffering and grief that is brought by 
death has no remedy. Only we can think of the fact that this is the truth of all 
life, herein lies the dignity of life, that it disappears in death.”627 
 
Dasgupta admitted that death is a mystery beyond man’s comprehension. 
 
“We do not know what exists after the death of this body; any desire for a 
survival after death has no meaning at all. From this point of view Hindu 
scriptures had plunged into a whirlpool, the result of which has not been 
good.”628 
 
                                                 
624 Dasgupta, Quest, 132-133 (letter dated May 13, 1936, Vienna). 
625 Dasgupta, Quest, 47. 
626 Dasgupta, Quest, 47. 
627 Dasgupta, Quest, 144 (letter dated July 6, 1936, London). 
628 Dasgupta, Quest, 221 (letter dated October 18, 1943, Agra). 
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Possibly it was his tremendous love for and confidence in life which liberated him 
from the need to find an answer to the riddle of death and to adhere to any 
dogma in this respect. 
 
“That which does not die, is immortal. What is there that does not die? It is 
the living of life, the incessant flow of life which bathes us that does not 
die.”629 
 
Life is full of variety and therefore also full of dissimilarity and inequality. 
According to Dasgupta it is futile to try to define the exact cause for the nature of 
everbody and everything and to construct a world of sameness. 
 
“The theory of rebirth in our country tried to give an explanation of each 
and every individual being and event; that is why it became involved in 
endless complications. It can be easily seen that it is not possible to explain 
every event in a man’s life or every trait of his character with reference to his 
good or bad deeds in a previous existence. […] the world-system that we are 
discussing does not follow the democratic principle of equality. We cannot 
ask why all the trees are not mango-trees, why all gases are not 
hydrogen.”630 
 
Summing up we can say that, starting from the assumption that human beings 
cannot know the nature of their soul nor what will happen after death, Dasgupta 
accepted things as he experienced them: People die never to come back, and the 
variety of life inevitably includes inequalities. The theory of karma and rebirth 
ultimately gets tangled up in its attempts to straighten out seeming injustice by 
reference to previous lives and to provide consolation for loss through the 
prospect of future existences. Dasgupta could not acquire a taste for what to him 
remained an unproved dogma, created by men for various historical and 
philosophical reasons which are inherent to the system of Hinduism. 
 
 
4.4.2. Karma in Yoga 
 
When Dasgupta describes the theory of karma in chapter IX of Yoga as Philosophy 
and Religion no trace of his personal opinion remains. He presents the whole 
system faithful to the textual sources and in accordance with the traditional views 
on karma and rebirth. He sets out by implicitly referring to YS IV,7 and its 
comments, introducing the division of actions (both mental as well as external) 
into four categories: 
 
1. kṛṣṇa (black) 
2. śukla (white) 
3. śuklakṛṣṇa (white and black) 
4. aśuklākṛṣṇa (neither white nor black)631 
 
                                                 
629 Dasgupta, Quest, 221 (letter dated October 18, 1943, Agra). 
630 Dasgupta, Quest, 200-201 (letter dated April 5, 1943, Calcutta). 
631 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 102. 
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Whereas kṛṣṇa karma is “wicked actions called also adharma (demerit),” the 
śukla karma comprehends “virtuous or meritorious deeds” which belong “to 
those who resort to study and meditation.”632 The latter actions are purely mental, 
in opposition to the third category which exclusively concerns the motor senses. 
Śuklakṛṣṇa karma “are the actions achieved in the external world by the motor or 
active senses.” They are always tainted by wickedness “since all external actions 
entail some harm to other living beings.”633 The good (white) side of the 
śuklakṛṣṇa karma (for example helping others and doing good) is called dharma 
because it creates pleasure and happiness for the one who does them; the 
opposite side is adharma since it causes suffering and pain. 
 
“In all our ordinary states of existence we are always under the influence of 
dharma and adharma, which are therefore called vehicles of actions.”634 
 
The last category, finally, “is of those who have renounced everything, whose 
afflictions have been destroyed and whose present body is the last one they will 
have.”635 Dasgupta calls them “karma-sannyāsis”, by which denomination he 
means those who “dedicate to Īśvara the fruits of all vehicles of action, brought 
about by the practice of Yoga.”636  
 
Karmāśaya (accumulation of karma, called by Dasgupta, like dharma and 
adharma, “vehicle of actions”),637 is the result of the four passions kāma (desire), 
lobha (avarice), moha (ignorance) and krodha (anger), which again stem from the 
afflictions (kleśas). As long as this root exists, the accumulation of karma “ripens 
into life-state, life-experience and life-time”638 (implicit quotation from YS II,13). It 
is therefore vital to destroy the kleśas.  
 
There are two kinds of karmāśaya. They either designate the seeds of actions 
which ripen in this or else in another life (implicit quotation from YS II,12), and 
both categories  
 
“[…] are conducive to pleasure or pain, according as they are products of 
puṇyakarmāśaya (virtue) or pāpa karmāśaya (vice or demerit).”639 [Implicit 
quotation from YS II,14]. 
 
The accumulated karma is experienced in a determined order, “the principal ones 
being manifested earlier in life.”640  
                                                 
632 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 102. 
633 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 102. 
634 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 103. 
635 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 103. 
636 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 103. 
637 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 104. 
638 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 104. 
639 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 105. 
640 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 106. 
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Next, Dasgupta opposes karmāśaya to the vāsanās (residual potency caused by 
the kleśas, mainly avidyā), by introducing the distinction between ekabhavika 
and anekabhavika. Ekabhavika means “accumulated in one life” and applies to 
the karmāśaya which is generally considered to be the product of one life. The 
vāsanās however are called anekabhavika because they have been 
 
“accumulated from thousands of previous lives since eternity, the mind 
being pervaded all over with them, as a fishing-net is covered all over with 
knots.”641  
 
Whereas the first ones are responsible for the production of one life after the other 
(according to their ripening), the latter ones are  
 
“[…] the cause of the instinctive tendencies, or habits of deriving pleasures 
and pains peculiar to different animal lives.”642 
 
Dasgupta mentions the example of the karmāśaya of a dog-life ripening in a 
person. 
 
“[H]is corresponding vāsanās of a previous dog-life are at once revived and 
he begins to take interest in his dog-life in the manner of a dog; the same 
principle applies to the virtue of individuals as men or as gods (IV.8).”643 
 
Quoting Nāgeśa’s Chāyāvyākhyā on YS IV,8 Dasgupta insists that if the vāsanās 
were not activated according to the ripening of their corresponding karma they 
would be present all the time and “a man would take interest in eating grass and 
derive pleasure from it.”644 
 
In the following passage Dasgupta elucidates YS IV,9 which states that memory 
(smṛiti) and impressions (saṃskāras) are of the same nature. In the process he 
equates vāsanā with saṃskāra, saying that “vāsanās are of the nature of 
saṃskāras or impressions […].”645 Experiences remain as impressions in the mind 
and can be revived from one moment to the next (if the right cause is there). Then 
they pass from the latent state (saṃskāra or vāsanā) to the manifested state 
(smṛti), even if the first and the second life (as a dog, for example) are separated 
by thousands of years and many different lives (as human beings as well as other 
animals).  
 
The fact that vāsanās are beginningless can be proved by the inborn fear manifest 
in a baby which is thrown up into the air and starts to cry.  
 
“[…] this baby has never learnt in this life from experience that a fall on the 
ground will cause pain, for it has never fallen on the ground and suffered 
pain therefrom; so the cause of this fear cannot be sought in the experiences 
of this life, but in the memory of past experiences of fall and pain arising 
                                                 
641 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 106. 
642 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 107. 
643 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 107. 
644 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 107. 
645 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 108. 
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therefrom, which is innate in this life as vāsanā and causes this instinctive 
fear.”646 
 
And since in that life where the baby experienced falling on the ground the fear of 
falling was already present, as a memory of yet an earlier life, and so on, vāsanās 
are without beginning.647 
 
In the last section of this chapter Dasgupta discusses a controversy between 
Vācaspati on the one hand and Vijñāna Bhikṣu and Nāgeśa on the other, in their 
comments on YS II,13, concerning ekabhavikatva (accumulation in one life) of the 
karmāśaya.648 He sums up their different positions as follows: 
 
“Ekabhavika means that which is produced from the accumulation of 
karmas in one life in the life which succeeds it. Vācaspati, however, takes it 
also to mean that action which attains fruition in the same life in which it is 
performed, whereas what Vijñāna Bhikshu understands by ekabhavika is 
that action alone which is produced in the life immediately succeeding the 
life in which it was accumulated.”649 
 
The chapter ends with a classification in form of a table of the whole karma-





Given Dasgupta’s scepticism about the theory of karma and rebirth and given the 
fact that only six sūtras deal with this topic at all (YS II,12-14 and IV,7-9), the 
question may be asked why Dasgupta felt the necessity to dedicate a whole 
chapter to karma. The answer can only be that karma is a central part of Yoga 
without which the system would be incomplete. One can only speculate about 
how he felt writing about the ripening of karma in one life or over several 
existences, and the vāsanās of animal lives lurking somewhere in the 
subconscious mind of everybody, ready to revive any time. This can hardly be the 
chapter he would have liked to discuss with Western collegues – and yet he had 
to include it in his presentation of Yoga because karmāśaya, the accumulation of 
karma, is so intimately linked to the kleśas the uprooting or destruction of which 
is the main task of a Yogin. It is the kleśas which produce vāsanās (residual 
potency) and saṃskāras (impressions or latent mental states) which again give 
rise to the vṛttis (actual mental states) which then create more saṃskāras etc.651 – 
and the kleśas also produce the four passions of desire, avarice, ignorance and 
anger (hardly any different from the kleśas themselves) which are directly 
responsible for the accumulation of karma. It is not an exaggeration to say that 
the kleśas are at the very centre of Yoga thought and practice, the eight-fold path 
                                                 
646 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 109. 
647 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 109. 
648 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 109-112. 
649 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 112. 
650 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 112. 
651 Cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.10. 
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and other mental practices (such as abhyāsa, vairāgya, maitrī, karuṇā, muditā and 
upekṣā) being described essentially as cleansing processes for the impure (read: 
unsteady) mind. The kleśas and their products represent the mental dirt a Yogin 
has to get rid of in order to reach concentration, samādhi and ultimately the 
liberating knowledge (prajñā). As long as he does not succeed in this task he will 
be reborn again and again, due to the ripening of his karmāśaya, according to the 
nature of his kleśas. The best way out of this endless circle, according to 
Dasgupta, seems to be īśvarapraṇidhāna, devotion to Īśvara, the absolute God. 
On the one hand, He will show His grace by removing some (or even much) dirt 
from the mind; on the other hand, by dedicating to Him all the fruits of any 
action, a Yogin accumulates the best kind of karma, the one which is neither 
white nor black. The real “karma-saṃnyāsins” (or karma-yogins) however are 
those “whose afflictions [kleśas] have been destroyed and whose present body is 
the last one they will have,”652 in other words: yogins at a very advanced state just 
prior to perfection. Let us now have a look at these very last stages of the Yoga 
path, the various phases of trance (samādhi) a Yogin goes through before 
reaching final liberation. 
 
 
4.5. Samādhi (chapter XIII) 
 
Similarly to the chapter on karma, “Stages of samādhi” is also devoid of any 
personal statement. Dasgupta limits himself to faithfully present what the 
scriptures had to say about the subject. He sets off by describing the relation 
between a thing (artha), its concept (jñāna) and its name (śabda), three aspects 
which are all different from each other. 
 
“But still, by force of association, the word or name stands both for the thing 
and its concept; the function of mind, by virtue of which despite this 
unreality or want of their having any real identity of connection they seem 
to be so much associated that the name cannot be differentiated from the 
thing or its idea, is called vikalpa.”653 
 
Then he introduces the four categories of saṃprajñāta samādhi (“absorptive 
concentration [on] an object”),654 called savitarka, nirvitarka, savicāra and 
nirvicāra. In savitarka samādhi 
 
“[…] the mind seems to become one with the thing, together with its name 
and concept […]; it is the lowest stage, because here the gross object does not 
appear to the mind in its true reality, but only in the false illusory way in 
which it appears associated with the concept and the name in ordinary 
life.”655 
                                                 
654 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 150. 
655 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 150. 
652 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 103 (cf. also supra, chapter 4.4.2). 
653 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 150. 
Mircea Eliade and Surendranath Dasgupta 131
In this stage the mind is not yet steady and has not gone beyond ordinary 
consciousness.  
 
Nirvitarka arises when a steady mind  
 
“[…] can become one with its object, divested of all other associations of 
name and concept, so that it is in direct touch with the reality of the thing, 
uncontaminated by associations.”656 
 
Whereas in nirvitarka samādhi the mind concentrates on and becomes one with 
gross material objects as well as the senses, in the following stage, savicāra 
samādhi, it reaches the level of the subtle elements (tanmātras). The mind “sinks 
deeper and deeper into [the object’s] finer constituents.”657  
 
“This is a state of feelingless representation of one uniform tanmātric state, 
when the object appears as a conglomeration of tanmātras of rūpa, rasa or 
gandha, as the case might be.”658 
 
Apart from the subtle elements, ego, buddhi and prakṛti are further objects of 
concentration in savicāra samādhi. The notions of time, space and causality, 
which remain associated with this state, will vanish altogether in the fourth kind 
of samādhi, the nirvicāra state. 
 
So far Dasgupta’s exposition was based on YS I,42-44 (and probably the 
corresponding comments). He (implicitly) moves on to YS I,17 when he next 
introduces a further differentiation in the various samādhi states. Savicāra and 
nirvicāra, both characterised by concentration on and communion with subtle 
objects (tanmātras etc.), are also called vicārānugata. 
 
“But when the object of communion is the senses, the samādhi is called 
ānandānugata, and when the object of communion is the subtle cause the 
ego (asmitā), the samādhi is known as asmitānugata.”659 
 
Vācaspati Mitra and Vijñāna Bhikṣu disagree as far as the objects of concentration 
of the last two categories of samādhi (ānandānugata and asmitānugata) are 
concerned, and their opinion also differs regarding the number of varieties or 
stages of samādhi.660 Whereas Vācaspati holds that there are two forms each of 
ānandānugata and asmitānugata samādhi (adding up to a total of eight varieties), 
Bhikṣu accepts only one kind of each stage (and ends up with six varieties). 
Dasgupta presents Bhikṣu’s system in a table.661 
                                                 
656 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 151. 
657 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 151. 
658 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 152. 
659 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 153. 
660 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 153. 
661 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 154. 
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In nirvicāra samādhi the mind will be purified and prajñā, true knowledge 
(which Dasgupta described elsewhere)662 arises.  
 
“When, however, this prajñā is also suppressed, we have what is called the 
state of nirbīja samādhi, at the end of which comes final prajñā leading to the 
dissolution of the citta and the absolute freedom of the purusha.”663 
 
In chapter XI, Dasgupta equated nirbīja with asaṃprajñāta, a term which is 
entirely absent from his chapter on samādhi. Nirbīja also means nirodha, the 
suppression or dissolution of the mind and all its saṃskāras (cf. YS I,51).  
 
Finally, Dasgupta gives a definition of samādhi: 
 
“Samādhi we have seen is the mind’s becoming one with an object by a 
process of acute concentration upon it and a continuous repetition of it with 
the exclusion of all other thoughts of all kinds.”664 
 
Referring to YS III,9-15 Dasgupta then describes the continuous transformations 
of the mind (pariṇāma) from the ordinary state to nirodha.665 
 
”Here also, therefore, we see that the same dharma, lakshaṇa, 
avasthāpariṇāma which we have already described at some length with 
regard to sensible objects apply also to the mental states.”666 
 
In other words: Matter and mind, both being composed of the same constituents 
(guṇas), are subjugated to the same processes. 
 
The chapter ends with a list in table form of the vibhūtis, the miraculous powers a 
yogin achieves through saṃyama (the practice of the last three steps of the eight-
fold path).667 This list is (once more implicitly) based on YS III,16-36. These 
powers are said to “strengthen the faith or belief of the Yogin in the processes of 
Yoga as the path of salvation.”668 They help him to keep on striving for his aim. 
“Divested from the ideal, they have no value.”669 
 
There is one instance in this chapter which could be interpreted as a personal 
statement of Dasgupta. He writes that samādhi cannot be adequately described 
but has to be personally experienced,670 adding that  
 
“[…] no teacher can tell him [the yogin] whether a certain stage which 
follows is higher or lower, for Yoga itself is its own teacher.”671 
 
                                                 
662 Cf. supra, chapters 4.3.3.11 and 15 (among others). 
663 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 154. 
664 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 155. 
665 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 155-156. 
666 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 155-156 (cf. also supra, chapter 4.3.3.7). 
667 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 156-158. 
668 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 156. 
669 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 158. 
670 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 155. 
671 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 155. 
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This might be a hint to the fact that Dasgupta was, after all, a yogi – without a 
guru but following his own inner instructions. In chapter 3.4 above we have seen 
that Dasgupta spontaneously experienced trance-like states of mind which both 
he as well as Surama called samādhi. During such states his mind would detach 
itself completely from the outside world, take a rest and refresh itself. It is 
reasonable to suppose that Dasgupta never went beyond any of the saṃprajñāta 
categories since he was vehemently opposed to having his active and creative 
mental force stop; never did he mention that his mind came to a total standstill or 
even reached dissolution of itself (as required for the nirodha state). But his mind 
must have had by nature a tremendous capacity for concentration, and because 
Dasgupta also entirely relied on God and His grace he might have personally 





4.6.1. Table of the sūtras referred to  
 
Since Dasgupta’s treatise on Yoga is based to about 90% or even 95% on the YS 
and its commentaries,672 and since I intend to compare Eliade’s and Dasgupta’s 
exposition of Yoga according to Patañjali, I restrict myself to a presentation of 
these sources. The following table lists the sūtras from the YS Dasgupta quoted, 
paraphrased or referred to in Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, either explicitly or 
implicitly. It shows that he commented nearly the entire YS. In fact, since it is very 
probable that I failed to identify every single quotation Dasgupta wove unmarked 
into his text I am enclined to say that Patañjali’s treatise is fully present, either in 
the form of original sūtras or as chosen parts of the commentary on them. For the 
following table however I could only register those sources which Dasgupta 














I,1 Vyāsabhaṣya Five classes of citta, definition of 
vṛttis (states) 
VIII 
I,2 Patañjali and Bhojavṛtti Five classes of citta, definition of 
vṛttis (states) 
VIII 
I,5 Patañjali (and maybe 
some commentary) 
Mental states (vṛttis) are either 
afflicted or unafflicted 
XV 
I,7-11 Patañjali The five vṛttis (mental states) XV 
I,13 Patañjali and 
Yogavārttika 
Abhyāsa (steadiness of the mind) XI 
                                                 
672 Some of the exceptions are the references to Sāṃkhyakārikā 17 and 18 in chapter II, to SK 27 in 
chapter V, the Sāṃkhyasūtra II,12 in chapter XV and Tattvatraya, Barabara’s Bhāṣya on Tattvatraya and 
Tattvakaumudī on SK 25 in chapter V, apart from some quotations from Seal in the first part of the 
book. 
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I,16 Patañjali (and probably 
some commentary) 
Stages of vairāgya XI 
I,17 Vyāsabhāṣya Nature of ahaṃkāra (ego) V 
I,17 Patañjali (and probably 
some commentary) 
Saṃprajñāta and asaṃprajñāta 
samādhi 
XI 
I,17 Patañjali, Tattvavaiśāradī 
and Yogavārttika 
Further differentiation of the four 
samādhi states 
XIII 
I,20 Patañjali and 
Yogavārttika 
Products of śraddhā (faith) XI 




The nine obstructions of the mind XI 
I,30-31 Patañjali Devotion to Īśvara removes the 
obstacles mentioned in I,30-31 
XIV 
I,33 Patañjali (and probably 
commentaries) 
Maitrī (friendliness), karuṇā 
(compassion), muditā 
(complacency) and upekṣā 
(indifference towards happiness, 
misery, virtue and vice) 
XII 
I,34-39 Patañjali The parikarmas (actions which 
calm down the mind) 
XII 
I,36 Vyāsabhāṣya Nature of buddhi (mind) V 
I,40 Patañjali Nature of paramāṇu (atom) and 
time 
IV 
I,42-44 Patañjali, Tattvavaiśāradī 
and Yogavārttika 
Four kinds of samādhi (savitarka, 
nirvitarka, savicāra, nirvicāra) 
XIII 
I,44  Tattvavaiśāradī Creation of atoms VI 
I,45 Yogavārttika, 
Chāyāvyākhyā 
Nature of paramāṇu (atom) and 
time 
IV 
I,45 Vyāsabhāṣya Order of evolution V 
I,45 Yogavārttika, 
Chāyāvyākhyā 
Creation of atoms VI 
I,51 Patañjali Nirbīja samādhi (seedless trance) XIII 
II,1 Patañjali The niyamas (observances) and 
kriyāyoga 
XII 
II,2 Patañjali The results of kriyāyoga XII 
II,2 Yogavārttika For advanced minds the practice 
of abhyāsa and vairāgya is 
sufficient 
XII 
II,3 Patañjali Avidyā (nescience) and its 
modifications 
VIII 
II,4 Patañjali The kleśas (afflictions) XV 
II,5 Patañjali Avidyā (nescience) and its 
modifications 
VIII 
II,6 Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
Relation of puruṣa and prakṛti II 
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II,6 Patañjali Nature of ahaṃkāra (ego) V 
II,12 Patañjali Two kinds of karmāśaya 
(accumulation of karma) and their 
results 
IX 
II,13 Patañjali The kleśas (afflictions) are the 





Controversy about the 
accumulation of karma in one life 
IX 
II,14 Patañjali Two kinds of karmāśaya and their 
results 
IX 
II,15 Patañjali Everything is painful VIII 




Nature of prakṛti and of the 
guṇas 
I 
II,18 Vyāsabhāṣya Nature of buddhi (mind) V 
II,18 Yogavārttika Modes of manas (mind) XV 
II,19 Vyāsabhāṣya, 
Yogavārttika 
Nature of prakṛti and of the 
guṇas 
I 




Order of evolution V 
II,20-23 Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
Relation of puruṣa and prakṛti II 
II,24-25 Patañjali Avidyā (nescience) is the cause of 
the connection of the puruṣa and 
the prakṛti, therefore it has to be 
uprooted 
X 
II,25 Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
Relation of puruṣa and prakṛti II 
II,27 Patañjali The seven stages of prajñā X 
II,28 Vyāsyabhāṣya The yogāṅgas as means of 
purification 
XI 
II,28-III,3 Patañjali and 
commentaries 
The yogāṅgas XII 
II,32 Patañjali The niyamas (observances) and 
kriyāyoga 
XII 
II,33 Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
Removing sinful ideas by 
concentrating on their opposites 
XII 




Results obtained by the practice 
of the yamas and niyamas 
XII 
II,46-48 Patañjali āsana XII 
II,49-53 Patañjali, Vyāsabhāṣya Prāṇāyāma XII 
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II,54-III,3 Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya  
(for dhāraṇā) 
Pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna, 
samādhi 
XII 
III,4 Patañjali Saṃyama XII 
III,9-15 Patañjali The transformations (pariṇāma) 
of the mind from ordinary to 
nirodha 
XIII 
III,13 Vyāsabhāṣya and 
Yogavārttika  
Changes in dharma (quality) and 
dharmin (substance) 
VI 






Conditions which are able to 
break the barriers inside of 
prakṛti (to set the evolution in 
motion) 
VII 
III,15 Tattvavaiśāradī  Changes in dharma (quality) and 
dharmin (substance) 
VI 
III,16-36 Patañjali Siddhis (miraculous powers) XIII 
III,35  Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
Relation of puruṣa and prakṛti II 
III,45 Tattvavaiśāradī Īśvara’s power VII 
III,47 Tattvavaiśāradī No difference between the mental 
and the physical 
I 




Nature of paramāṇu (atom) and 
time 
IV 
III,52 Yogavārttika  Creation of atoms VI 
III,53 Patañjali Suprasensuous perception IV 
III,53 Vyāsabhāṣya Changes in dharma (quality) and 
dharmin (substance) 
VI 
III,55 Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya 




Īśvara as removing force of the 
barriers; His aim is the fulfilment 
of the purpose of the puruṣa 
VII 
IV,7 Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya  
(and maybe other 
comments, too) 
Four categories of karma (action) IX 
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IV,8 Patañjali and 
Chāyāvyākhyā 
According to the ripening of 
karma, certain vāsanās 
(impressions) are activated 
 
IX 
IV,9 Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
Saṃskāras (impressions) and 
smṛti (memory) are of the same 
nature 
IX 
IV,10 Chāyāvyākhyā kāryacitta, kāraṇacitta, definition 
of citta (mind) 
VIII 
IV,12 Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
The reality of the external world III 
IV,13 
and 16 




Prakṛti different from māyā I 
IV,14 Vyāsabhāṣya and 
Tattvavaiśāradī 
The reality of the external world III 
IV,14 Yogavārttika  Creation of atoms VI 
IV,14 Vyāsabhāṣya Teleological purpose in the 
conglomeration of the atoms 
VI 
IV,15 Patañjali The reality of the external world III 
IV,17 Yogavārttika Perception XV 
IV,22 Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
Relation of puruṣa and prakṛti II 
IV,29 Patañjali True knowledge in 
dharmamegha-saṃādhi 
X 
IV,33 Patañjali,  
Tattvavaiśāradī 
Nature of paramāṇu (atom) and 
time 
IV 
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4.6.2. Some general results 
 
Dasgupta wrote Yoga as Philosophy and Religion as well as his other texts on Yoga 
in order to rehabilitate the theoretical part of Yoga and in order to make this 
system of thought known to the modern world (cf. supra, chapter 4.3.1). Having 
reached the end of his exposition of the subject (and without wanting to repeat all 
the conclusions drawn in chapters 4.3.3.9, 4.3.3.16 and 4.4.3) we can point out a 
few major characteristics of this enterprise. 
 
1. “Yoga as philosophy” mainly means the metaphysical backdrop of Sāṃkhya 
against which Patañjali dressed up his system of practice. In this first part of 
his book, Dasgupta quotes far more from commentators on the Yogasūtra than 
from Patañjali’s text itself. He raises topics of general philosophical and 
scientific interest which he uses to demonstrate the superiority of Sāṃkhya-
Yoga both over Western als well as certain Indian philosophies (mostly 
Vedānta and Buddhism).  
 
2. “Yoga as religion” primarily designates the various techniques which allow 
the Yogin to purify and concentrate his mind and to ultimately reach the 
liberating knowledge (prajñā). For this part of his book Dasgupta seems to 
rely more on Patañjali than on the commentators. He focuses on a few famous 
passages (thus YS I,1-16, YS II,1-11, YS II,15-27 and YS II,28-III,4) which he 
interrelates freely with one another, the vṛttis (YS I,1-11) being a result of the 
kleśas (YS II,1-11) and the main affliction (avidyā) representing the 
metaphysical nescience about the eternal separation of puruṣa and prakṛti, 
thus leading to fundamental suffering (YS II,15-27) and an accumulation of 
karma (karmāśaya). All these mental pollutions, the real obstacles on the path 
of the Yogin (cf. also YS I,30-31), can be eradicated through the practice of the 
eight limbs (YS II,28-III,4) and, in case of an already advanced mind, through 
abhyāsa and vairāgya (YS I,12-16) and some other virtuous mental attitudes 
(YS I,33). 
 
3. The aim of Yoga is prajñā, the true knowledge which liberates the puruṣa from 
prakṛti and sets him free in kaivalya. This knowledge dawns during the 
various states of saṃprajñāta samādhi and attains its full force in the last 
phase, called asaṃprajñāta or nirodha. Therefore 
 
“[…] it is clear that the main stress of the Yoga philosophy is on the method 
of samādhi.”673  
 
In this respect I would like to point out that, since “the cessation of all mental 
states is yoga”674 (cf. YS I,2), it cannot surprise that yoga has been equalled to 
samādhi (cf. Vyāsabhāṣya on YS I,1). 
                                                 
673 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 162. 
674 Dasgupta, Mysticism, 70. 
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4. Dasgupta’s use of the Sanskrit sources is entirely non-historical – he quotes 
both the original texts (Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā) as well as the Sanskrit 
commentaries, from the second to the 17th century A.D., side by side. He is not 
interested in presenting the historical evolution of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system 
but seems to consider the various sources as one single text which he can 
freely dive in and choose those passages which are most apt to support his 
argument in exposing a certain topic. This is more apparent in the first part of 
the book than in the second. Also, when two commentators (mostly Vācaspati 
and Bhikṣu) do not agree upon an important issue, Dasgupta shows and 
comments their discrepancy and often expresses his preference for one or the 
other.  
 
5. The ambiguity of Dasgupta’s position between East and West, which we 
detected in the way he reedited his book between 1914 and 1924 (cf. supra, 
chapter 4.2), could be observed again in his presentation of the role of Īśvara 
(cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.9). Dasgupta adjusts his discourse depending on who 
he is addressing. An expert in Western science and philosophy, he is, at the 
same time, a proud representative of certain Indian traditions which he is 
eager to show to his Western collegues in the best possible light. Suffering 
from the intellectual apathy and blind faith of his countrymen in certain 
beliefs he nevertheless did not become an unconditional follower of 
everything Western but kept a critical mind towards both East and West. He 
accepted the theory of evolution but enriched it by the Sāmkhya-Yoga 
explanation that the cause of evolution had to be seen in the serviceability of 
prakṛti to puruṣa and its aim in the liberation of the latter; he could not think 
of creation without a supervising God (Īśvara), thus distancing himself from 
Sāṃkhya which he otherwise fervently defended; he turned against Vedānta 
and its concept of māyā and he refused to believe in karma and reincarnation. 
On the one hand he relied on (scientific) reason, on the other hand his mystical 
side prevented him from being overrational. Thus he had to find his own 
position in nearly every matter, drawing from his knowledge about and 
experience with both India and the West, a position which he sometimes 
openly declared (for example in his letters to Surama) and sometimes 
preferred to keep hidden (for example when he presents the karma theory in 
his Yoga book). 
 
6. Dasgupta had no doubts about the supranatural powers of the Yogins; again 
and again he points out that they can see, hear and know things which lie 
beyond normal people’s perception. On the one hand he personally witnessed 
certain Yogic feats, on the other hand he himself was endowed with a natural 
talent for trance-like states. In terms of Patañjali’s classification of samādhi 
stages it is very difficult to determine how far Dasgupta’s own experiences 
went, but the fact that he emphasises first-hand knowledge in this respect and 
at the same time was completely against any mind ever stopping its activities, 
it can be safely assumed that he never reached (nor tried to reach) the nirodha 
state but remained on one of the saṃprajñāta levels. 
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5. Eliade’s presentation of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra in Yoga. 
Immortality and Freedom in comparison with Dasgupta’s  
Yoga as Philosophy and Religion 
 
Let us now turn to Dasgupta’s famous Romanian pupil who wrote one of the 
most authoritative books on Yoga. As we have seen in chapter 1.1, Yoga. 
Immortality and Freedom is the third version of a book which evolved over more 
than two decades (1932, 1936, 1954). It would be highly interesting to study the 
transformations which Eliade’s work underwent in the course of those years, but 
unfortunately such an analysis would by far exceed the time and space at our 
disposal. I will therefore concentrate on the final version of 1954 which, after all, 
is the one which achieved international renown – the 1932 Romanian text was 
never translated into another language and the 1936 French version suffered, 
according to Eliade himself, from various imperfections (cf. supra, chapter 1.1). By 
1954 Eliade had entirely rewritten his book “in order to adapt it as much as 
possible to our present views.”675  
 
Since this paper focuses on the relationship and the intellectual exchange between 
Eliade and his teacher Dasgupta I will limit my analysis of Eliade’s concept of 
Yoga to the first section of his book, dedicated to the presentation of Patañjali’s 
Yogasūtra. As we proceed through Eliade’s text we will continuously compare his 
statements to what his teacher Dasgupta wrote on the subject and thus discover 
step by step how Eliade absorbed, accepted, adapted, changed and transformed 
this material, according to the specific topic or matter he is dealing with. The 
main text of reference will be Yoga as Philosophy and Religion which has been 
discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
 
 
5.1. Why Yoga? (foreword) 
 
Eliade sets out with a brief historical survey of the various, mostly inadequate 
attempts of the West to discover and interpret India, attempts which were guided 
and determined by the spirit and problems of the time in which they were made. 
Writing in 1954, Eliade states that 
 
“[e]verything leads to the belief that, at the present moment, a more accurate 
knowledge of Indian thought has become possible.”676 
 
As far as philosophy is concerned, Eliade declares that modern Western ideas 
have reached a stage where they can learn from ancient Indian wisdom. 
 
“It is the human condition, and above all the temporality of the human 
being, that constitutes the object of the most recent Western philosophy. […] 
Now, this problem of the “conditioning” of man (and its corollary, rather 
neglected in the West: his “deconditioning”) constitutes the central problem 
of Indian thought. […] The West, therefore, might well learn: (1) what India 
                                                 
675 Eliade, Yoga, xxi. 
676 Eliade, Yoga, xv. 
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thinks of the multiple “conditionings” of the human being; (2) how it has 
approached the problem of the temporality and historicity of man; (3) what 
solution it has found for the anxiety and despair that inevitably follow upon 
consciousness of temporality, the matrix of all “conditionings.”677 
 
According to Eliade, Indian sages have explored the unconscious long before the 
West discovered depth psychology. He calls saṃskāras and vāsanās 
(“impregnations, residues, latencies”)678 “contents and structures of the 
unconscious,”679 and claims that Yoga shows a way how to burn them, in other 
words: how to decondition the unconscious. Interpreting māyā as “not only 
cosmic illusion but also, and above all, historicity, […] existence in time and 
history,”680 Eliade equates what Western philosophy calls “being situated, being 
constituted by temporality and historicity” with “existence in māyā.”681 Therefore, 
whatever India says about māyā is also relevant for the West of the 1950-ies. 
Eliade’s concern however is not that the West should simply accept solutions 
offered by India – his aim is a more fundamental one. 
 
“[I]t is essential that we know and understand a thought that has held a 
place of the first importance in the history of universal spirituality. And it is 
essential that we know it now. For, on the one hand, it is from now on that, 
any cultural provincialism having been outstripped by the very course of 
history, we are forced – Westerners and non-Westerners alike – to think in 
terms of universal history and to forge universal spiritual values. And, on 
the other hand, it is now that the problem of man’s situation in the world 
dominates the philosophical consciousness of Europe – and, to repeat, this 
problem is at the very center of Indian thought.”682 
 
Addressing Western philosophers, psychologists and seekers alike, Eliade 
cautions them against a possible disappointment at their reading his book. They 
may “find the jargon of Indian philosophy outmoded, lacking in precision, 
unserviceable.”683 Yet he remains convinced that nevertheless “the great 
discoveries of Indian thought will in the end be recognized,”684 such as, for 
example,  
 
“[…] that of consciousness as witness, of consciousness freed from its 
psychophysiological structures and their temporal conditioning, the 
consciousness of the “liberated” man, of him, that is, who has succeeded in 
emancipating himself from temporality and thereafter knows the true, 
inexpressible freedom.”685 
 
                                                 
677 Eliade, Yoga, xvi. 
678 Eliade, Yoga, xvii. 
679 Eliade, Yoga, xvii. 
680 Eliade, Yoga, xviii. Eliade justifies this translation on the following grounds: “[…] māyā is illusion 
because it does not participate in Being, because it is “becoming,” “temporality” – cosmic becoming, to 
be sure, but also historical becoming.” (Eliade, Yoga, xviii) 
681 Eliade, Yoga, xviii. 
682 Eliade, Yoga, xix—xx. 
683 Eliade, Yoga, xx. 
684 Eliade, Yoga, xx. 
685 Eliade, Yoga, xx. 
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According to Eliade, all Indian philosophies and mystical techniques aim at this 
absolute freedom, and Yoga, “through one of [its] many forms,”686 is the best way 
to reach there.  
 
We see that Dasgupta’s and Eliade’s motivation for writing on Yoga is both 
similar and different. Dasgupta’s wish to throw light on the neglected or even 
completely ignored philosophical side of Yoga, too one-sidedly understood as a 
magical or occult practice, corresponds to Eliade’s endeavour to bring one aspect 
of the philosophical wisdom of India to the attention of the West. Both authors 
saw in Yoga a precious and valuable knowledge worth to be reestablished and 
presented to an interested public. Both felt that the right moment for such an 
enterprise had come. But whereas Dasgupta wrote both for a Western as well as 
an Indian audience, Eliade exclusively addressed the West, and if for Dasgupta 
the term Yoga designated only Sāṃkhya-Yoga according to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Patañjali 
and their commentators, Eliade included all other aspects of Yoga, too, such as 
Tantrism, Buddhism, alchemy, etc.  
 
 
5.2. Eliade’s acknowledgment of Dasgupta 
 
On the remaining pages of his foreword to Yoga. Immortality and Freedom, Eliade 
mentions Dasgupta several times, acknowledging the influence the latter had on 
his work. Writing nearly 25 years after their tragic rupture, Eliade still remembers 
his “guru” (who had died only two years before the publication of the French 
version of his book). 
 
We already pointed out that, as far as the time he spent with Dasgupta is 
concerned, Eliade considerably modified the truth. Instead of the “three years of 
study at the University of Calcutta (1928-31) under the direction of Professor 
Surendranath Dasgupta”687 he worked no longer than 21 months with the Indian 
erudite (cf. supra, chapter 2.2.4). Eliade also tries to make his stay in India sound 
longer than it actually was, by adding “a residence of six months (1931) in the 
āśram of Rishikesh, Himālaya”688 to the alleged three years with Dasgupta. In 
reality, these months were part of his overall three years in India. It is obvious 
that Eliade was anxious to enhance the authenticity of his book by claiming a 
maximum amount of first-hand expertise, gained in the land of Yoga itself. 
                                                 
686 Eliade, Yoga, xx. 
687 Eliade, Yoga, xx. Towards the end of his foreword, Eliade mentions the three years a second time: 
“[…] for three years he [Dasgupta] was our professor of Sanskrit, our master, and our guru.” (Eliade, 
Yoga, xxii). 
688 Eliade, Yoga, xx. 
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Eliade mentions Dasgupta as his “professor of Sanskrit, […] master and […] 
guru” and as the one who “lead [him] into the very center of Indian thought.”689 
As far as Yoga is concerned, however, a careful reading of the foreword reveals 
that Dasgupta only counts as expert for Patañjali (or the yoga-darśana), a topic 
which Eliade had no wish to spend much time (or energy) on. 
 
“If in translating the Yogasūtras and their commentaries we sometimes 
deviate from current interpretations, we do so in view of the oral teaching of 
our Hindu masters, especially of Professsor Surendranath Dasgupta, with 
whom we translated and discussed all the important texts of the yoga-
darśana. 
[…] Excellent books are available on the system of Patañjali – notably those 
by Dasgupta; hence we have not considered it necessary to discuss this 
subject at length.”690 
 
In chapter 2.2.1 we already noted Eliade’s reluctance to treat the Yoga philosophy 
– on the one hand it appeared to him as “commonplace”691 when compared to 
Vedānta or Mahāyāna, on the other hand he felt that Dasgupta had treated the 
matter extensively. He therefore readily refers the reader to the works of his 
famous master, not claiming any originality in his own presentation of the yoga-
darśana (to which he dedicated roughly a fourth of his book, i.e. the first two of 
eight chapters or 98 of 358 pages). It will be our task to investigate whether Eliade 
rendered Dasgupta as faithfully as he pretends, respectively to point out the 
differences between the Indian model and Eliade’s adaptation. 
 
We already know that the young Romanian’s whole interest was directed at more 
popular and practical expressions of Yoga (cf. chapter 2.2.1) 
 
“Instead [of Patañjali], we have emphasized less known or inadequately 
studied aspects: the ideas, the symbolism, and the methods of Yoga, as they 
are expressed in tantrism, in alchemy, in folklore, in the aboriginal devotion 
of India.”692 
 
For these however he fails to mention any Indian authority (parallel to Dasgupta 
for the Yogasūtra) and it is legitimate to assume that chapters three to eight of his 
book represent Eliade’s original contribution to the history of Yoga. Since this 
research is concentrating on how exactly Eliade digested and used what he had 
learned from Dasgupta, in other words, on how much of Dasgupta’s teaching 
ever reached the West through Eliade, I will focus on the subject matter which 
was treated by both: Patañjali. 
 
                                                 
689 Eliade, Yoga, xxii. It is highly interesting to note that in the dedication to the 1936 version of his 
book, Eliade did not refer to Dasgupta as his guru but simply as his “maître,” and he did not mention 
him once in the whole introduction.  
690 Eliade, Yoga, xxi. 
691 Eliade, Autobiography, 176. 
692 Eliade, Yoga, xxii. 
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5.3. Structure 
 
Looking at Eliade’s presentation of Patañjali and his commentators it is striking to 
observe that the Romanian religionist chose to divide his material into two 
sections, entitled “The Doctrines of Yoga” and “Techniques of Autonomy,” 
respectively. We immediately feel reminded of Dasgupta’s dichotomy “Yoga 
Metaphysics” and “Yoga Ethics and Practice.” The titles of the subchapters 
confirm this impression: 
 
The doctrines of Yoga (chapter I) 
 
1. Point of Departure 
2. The Equation Pain-Existence 
3. The “Self” 
4. Substance 
5. The Relation Spirit-Nature 
6. How is Liberation possible? 
7. The Structure of Psychic Experience 
8. The Subconscious 
 
Techniques of autonomy (chapter II) 
 
1. Concentration “on a Single Point” 
2. Yogic Postures (āsana) and Respiratory Discipline (prāṇāyāma) 
3. Excursus: Prāṇāyāma in Extra-Indian Asceticism 
4. Yogic Concentration and Meditation 
5. The Role of Īśvara 
6. Enstasis and Hypnosis 
7. Samādhi “with Support” 
8. The Siddhis or “Miraculous Powers” 
9. Samādhi “without Support” and Final Liberation 
10. Reintegration and Freedom 
 
The first section is clearly rather theoretical in nature whereas the second one 
deals with more practical aspects. Seven titles can be directly related to five 







The “Self” I Puruṣa I 
Substance I Prakṛti I 
Yogic postures (āsana) and 
respiratory discipline 
(prāṇāyāma) 
II The yogāṅgas II 
Yogic concentration and 
meditation 
II The yogāṅgas II 
The Role of Īśvara II God in Yoga  II 
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Samādhi “with Support” II Stages of Samadhi II 
Samādhi “without Support” 
and Final Liberation 
II Stages of Samadhi II 
 
 
The tables of content reveal that certain subjects have been assessed differently by 
the two authors. Thus Eliade dedicates a whole chapter to the miraculous powers 
(siddhis) whereas Dasgupta integrated them in “Stages of Samadhi;” on the other 
hand we miss a separate treatment of karma in Eliade (as a counterpart to 
Dasgupta’s “Theory of Karma”). And evolution, one of Dasgupta’s favourite 
topics dealt with in no less than four chapters of his book, is only briefly 
mentioned by Eliade (as evolution of the Sāṃkhya factors in his chapter on 
substance). Very generally speaking one could say that Dasgupta’s interest in 
natural science (“The Reality of the External World,” the four chapters on 
evolution and “Matter and mind”) has been replaced in Eliade by chapters on 
psychology, parapsychology and liberation (“The Structure of Psychic 
Experience,” “The Subconscious,” “Enstasis and Hypnosis,” “How is Liberation 
possible” and “Samādhi without Support and Final Liberation”). Eliade’s 
“Excursus: Prāṇāyāma in Extra-Indian Asceticism” further points to one of the 
most fundamental differences between Dasgupta and his Romanian pupil: Eliade 
is most interested in “universal spiritual values,”693 and he therefore time and 
again includes non-Indian material or perspectives in his book, his vision 
encompassing religious doctrines and creeds from cultures around the globe. 
Dasgupta on the other hand strictly concentrated on Sāṃkhya and Yoga, the only 
non-Indian references being to European philosophers.  
 
 
5.4. The Doctrines of Yoga (chapter I) 
 
5.4.1. Point of Departure (subchapter I,1) 
 
Eliade starts with what he calls 
 
“four basic and interdependent concepts [which] bring us directly to the core 
of Indian spirituality. They are karma, māyā, nirvāṇa, and yoga.”694  
 
Since on the page immediately preceding this statement, the last one of the 
foreword, Eliade had written that Dasgupta “lead [him] into the very center of 
Indian thought,”695 the nearly identical wording of these two sentences creates an 
implicit link, suggesting that the four concepts are derived from the Calcuttan 
philosopher. We know that Dasgupta indeed did mention four very similar basic 
ideas of Indian philosophy, but whereas to him these were “four walls of 
                                                 
693 Eliade, Yoga, xix. 
694 Eliade, Yoga, 3. 
695 Eliade, Yoga, xxii. 
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unproved dogmas”696 which ultimately represent an important restriction of the 
philosophical expression of his country, Eliade shows no sign of criticism or even 
scepticism but depicts them as THE unquestioned truths of what he calls “Indian 
spirituality.”697 A closer comparison reveals that three concepts coincide and the 
fourth one has been very significantly replaced by Eliade: 
 
Eliade: „four basic [...] concepts [which] 
bring us directly to the core of Indian 
spirituality” 
Dasgupta: „four walls of unproved 
dogmas“ 
Karma 
(“The law of universal causality, which 
connects man with the cosmos and 
condemns him to transmigrate 
indefinitely.”)698 
Dogma of the law of Karma 
(“[…] the assumption of the 
unconditioned as emancipation led to 
the view that all our experiential states 
are states of bondage. Bondage […] has 
to be regarded as the natural tendency 
of some mental states to flow toward 
other mental states (which in the moral 
terminology is called ‘tṛṣṇā’ or desire), 
and the actual flow of it and its 
resultants are called Karma.”)699 
Māyā 
(“The mysterious process that 
engenders and maintains the cosmos 
and, in so doing, makes possible the 
‘eternal return’ of existences.”)700 
Dogma of rebirth  
Since emancipation is never reached (cf. 
infra), “the only way left was its 
indefinite postponement [which] 
necessitated the postulation of a 
practically endless series of succeeding 
lives […]. The cause of this rebirth is 
tṛṣṇā or Karma […].”701 
Nirvāṇa 
(“Absolute reality, […] pure Being, the 
Absolute, […] the Self (ātman), brahman, 
the unconditioned, the transcendent, 
the immortal, the indestructible, 
nirvāṇa, etc.”)702 
Dogma of emancipation and bondage 
(“An ineffable super-conscious state 
[…], an unchangeable condition or state 
from which there is no fall. […] the pure 
self as pure consciousness.”)703 
Emancipation is “hypothetical” and “is 
never experienced by any one of us 
[…].”704 
 
                                                 
696 “[…] (1) the dogma of the infallibility of the Vedic wisdom, (2) the dogma of emancipation and 
bondage, (3) the dogma of the law of Karma, (4) the dogma of rebirth.” (Dasgupta, Emergence, 253; cf. 
supra, chapter 3.5.1.). 
697 Dasgupta never used this term – he only spoke of philosophy, thought or religion. 
698 Eliade, Yoga, 3. 
699 Dasgupta, Emergence, 255. 
700 Eliade, Yoga, 3. 
701 Dasgupta, Emergence, 255. 
702 Eliade, Yoga, 3. 
703 Dasgupta, Emergence, 254. 
704 Dasgupta, Emergence, 255. 
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Yoga 
(“The means of attaining to Being, the 
effectual techniques for gaining 
liberation. This corpus of means 
constitutes Yoga properly speaking.”)705 
Dogma of the infallibility of the Vedic 
wisdom 
(“A creed which is almost suicidal to 
any philosophy in the modern sense of 
the term.”706) 
 
Whereas in Dasgupta’s list only the first three dogmas are closely connected with 
each other and the fourth one stands apart, Eliade chose to drop that fourth, very 
Hindu one, and instead introduced Yoga which he could directly link to the first 
three concepts. In opposition to Dasgupta, who ruled out the possibility (and 
even the need)707 for anybody to gain the postulated liberation, freedom is what 
Eliade focussed his attention upon,708 Yoga encompassing the means by which 
this emancipation could be reached.  
 
“The word yoga serves, in general, to designate any ascetic technique and any 
method of meditation.”709 
 
This definition of Yoga is close to Dasgupta’s “Yoga Ethics and Practice,” in the 
sense that it emphasises the practical aspect of it, but on the other hand it is far 
wider and more universal than just the techniques offered by Patañjali. Eliade’s 
understanding of Yoga as one of the basic concepts of “Indian spirituality” allows 
him to extend the scope and to call Yoga “any ascetic technique and any method 
of meditation.” Yoga thus turns into something not only pan-Indian but also 
(potentially at least) universal. With Dasgupta, however, Yoga remained a clearly 
defined set of mental practices within a philosophical system which he defended 
against other Indian doctrines (Vedānta, Buddhism); it was therefore neither 
universal nor even generally Indian.  
 
Eliade next emphasizes Yoga’s initiatory structure, in relation with which he 
introduces his famous notion of the profane (as opposed to the sacred). All these 
concepts are absent from Dasgupta’s works on Yoga.  
 
“[…] as in other religious initiations, the yogin begins by forsaking the 
profane world (family, society) and, guided by his guru, applies himself to 
passing successively beyond the behaviour patterns and values proper to the 
human condition. […] The analogy between Yoga and initiation becomes 
even more marked if we think of the initiatory rites – primitive or other – 
that pursue the creation of a ‘new body,’ a ‘mystical body’ […]. The 
initiatory rebirth is defined, by all forms of Yoga, as access to a nonprofane 
                                                 
705 Eliade, Yoga, 3. 
706 Dasgupta, Emergence, 253. 
707 Cf. supra, chapter 3.5.5. 
708 Already on the second page of his book, Elide defines the Indian concept of freedom: “To “free 
oneself” is equivalent to forcing another plane of existence, to appropriating another mode of being 
transcending the human condition. This is as much as to say that, for India, not only is metaphysical 
knowledge translated into terms of rupture and death (“breaking” the human condition, one “dies” to 
all that was human); it also necessarily implies a consequence of a mystical nature: rebirth to a 
nonconditioned mode of being. And this is liberation, absolute freedom.” (Eliade, Yoga, 4) 
709 Eliade, Yoga, 4. 
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and hardly describable mode of being, to which the Indian schools give 
various names: mokṣa, nirvāṇa, asaṃskṛta, etc.”710 
 
Eliade mentions three reasons for starting his treatise with the classic Yoga 
according to Patañjali and his commentators, which is “the best known in the 
West.”711 
 
“[F]irst, because Patañjali’s exposition is a ‘system of philosophy;’ second, 
because a great many practical indications concerning ascetic techniques and 
contemplative methods are summarized in it […]; finally, because Patañjali’s 
Yoga-sūtras are the result of an enormous effort not only to bring together 
and classify a series of ascetic practices and contemplative formulas that 
India had known from time immemorial, but also to validate them from a 
theoretical point of view by establishing their bases, justifying them, and 
incorporating them into a philosophy.”712 
 
This statement reads like an elaboration on Dasgupta’s evaluation of the 
Yogasūtra: 
 
“Patañjali’s work is […] the earliest systematic compilation on the subject 
that is known to us.”713 
 
Introducing the fact that Patañjali “rehandles the Sāṃkhya philosophy in its 
broad outlines,”714 Eliade proceeds to a presentation of the textual tradition of 




Author Title Date 
Īśvarakṛṣṇa Sāṃkhyakārikā Not later than the fifth 
century A.D. 
Vācaspati Miśra Tattvakaumudī 
(commentary on the SK) 
9th cent. A.D. 
Vijñāna Bhikṣu Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya Probably 14th cent. A.D. 




                                                 
710 Eliade, Yoga, 5-6. 
711 Eliade, Yoga, 6. 
712 Eliade, Yoga, 6-7. 
713 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, vii. 
714 Eliade, Yoga, 7. 
715 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 8-9. 
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Yoga 
 
Author Title Date 
Patañjali Yogasūtra Controversial, but 
ultimately “of little 
relevance, for the 
techniques of ascesis and 
meditation set forth by 
Patañjali are certainly of 
considerable 
antiquitiy.”716 
Vyāsa Yogabhāṣya 7th – 8th cent. A.D. 
Vācaspati Miśra Tattvavaiśāradī 9th cent. A.D. 
Bhoja Rājamārtaṇḍa Beginning of the 11th cent. 
A.D. 
Rāmānanda Sarasvati Maṇiprabhā 16th cent. A.D. 
Vijñāna Bhikṣu Yogavārttika (on Vyāsa’s 
Yogabhāṣya) 
Probably 14th cent. A.D. 
 
This list is much shorter than the one given by Dasgupta (cf. chapter 4.3.2), and 
the dating of certain texts has been actualised, according to the latest research. 
Vācaspati Miśra’s Tattvakaumudī, which for Dasgupta was a commentary on 
Caraka, has turned into a comment on the Sāṃkhyakārikā with Eliade. And 
whereas Dasgupta hardly quoted any of the Sāṃkhya titles he enumerated (at 
least not explicitly), Eliade used all the texts he mentions. In fact, he even 
repeatedly refers to one more, absent from his list: The Sāṃkhyasūtra. Generally 
speaking Eliade’s treatment of the Sanskrit sources is much more transparent 
than Dasgupta’s. He not only included them in his vast bibliography, specifying 
the exact edition or translation he used, but he also clearly indicates the passages 
he is quoting from. Nevertheless, there are certain instances where he just 
mentions Patañjali without further details (particularly in the sub-chapter “The 
Subconscious”). 
 
It is also worth noticing that Eliade’s approach to the Yoga darśana is as non-
historical as Dasgupta’s – Eliade too quotes from the different comments as if 
they were all part of one and the same book.  
 
After these preliminaries (the four basic concepts, Yoga as initiation, textual 
sources) Eliade introduces the “fundamental affirmation (more or less explicitly 
formulated) that the cosmos exists and endures because of man’s lack of 
knowledge,”717 taken from the Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophy but immediately 
applied to India in general:  
                                                 
716 Eliade, Yoga, 9. 
717 Eliade, Yoga, 9. 
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“[Here] we find the reason for the Indian depreciation of life and the cosmos 
– a depreciation that none of the great constructions of post-Vedic Indian 
thought attempted to hide. […] In religious terms, it could almost be said 
that India rejects the profane cosmos and profane life, because it thirsts for a 
sacred world and a sacred mode of being.”718 
 
The addition in parenthesis “more or less explicitly formulated” and the careful 
phrasing “it could almost be said” are subtle indications that Eliade is aware of 
the fact that he is straining his sources to the utmost in his attempt to reformulate 
them in new terms, terms such as “cosmos,” “sacred” and “profane.” Thus, man 
is suffering because of his 
 
“solidarity with the cosmos, […] his participation, active and passive, direct 
or indirect, in nature. Let us translate: solidarity with a desacralized world, 
participation in a profane nature.”719  
 
Eliade is actually translating the Sanskrit sources into a new terminology. He 
opposes sacred Being to non-sacred, profane non-being and states that  
 
“the road toward freedom necessarily leads to a desolidarization from the 
cosmos and profane life.”720 
 
He also points out the ambivalent function of the cosmos and life, tieing man to 
suffering and reincarnation and at the same time increasing in him the wish for 
liberation. 
 
“Thus the forms and illusions of the cosmos – and this by virtue of, not in 
spite of, their inherent magic, and by virtue of the suffering that their 
indefatigable becoming ceaselessly feeds – put themselves at the service of 
man, whose supreme end is emancipation, salvation.”721 
 
This last quotation shows how Eliade mixes Vedānta and Sāṃkhya: “illusions” 
and “magic” clearly refer to the Vedāntic māyā, whereas the “indefatigable 
becoming” and the idea of the serviceability of nature apply to prakṛti.722 Eliade, 
in opposition to Dasgupta, had apparently no wish to distinguish between 
different systems of Indian thought but, on the contrary, to fuse them into one big 




                                                 
718 Eliade, Yoga, 9-10. 
719 Eliade, Yoga, 10. 
720 Eliade, Yoga, 10. 
721 Eliade, Yoga, 11. 
722 The last point is underlined by a quotation from the Sāṃkhyasūtra III,47. 
723 Eliade, Yoga, xix. Cf. supra, chapter 5.1. 
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5.4.2. The Equation Pain-Existence (subchapter I,2) 
 
Beginning with Patañjali’s famous sūtra II,15 “all is suffering for the sage,” Eliade 
declares that this “universal suffering […] is a leitmotiv of all post-Upaniṣadic 
Indian speculation.”724 Once more, Yoga serves as starting point for a more 
general statement about Indian thought. Eliade quotes Buddha, Aniruddha’s 
comment on the Sāṃkhyasūtra II,1 and Sāṃkhyakārikā 1, all emphasising suffering, 
and then concludes that nevertheless, “no Indian philosophy or gnosis falls into 
despair.”725 Eliade discusses suffering and the possibility to overcome it in 
completely general terms, pointing out that the certainty that there is a way to put 
an end to it is “shared by all Indian philosophies and mysticisms.”726 Shortly 
afterwards he repeats: 
 
“To ‘emancipate’ oneself from suffering – such is the goal of all Indian 
philosophies and all Indian mysticisms.”727 
 
Vedānta and Sāṃkhya try to attain this aim through knowledge (which Eliade 
also calls “gnosis”),728 Yoga and Buddhism by means of techniques.729 Quotations 
from the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad I,12, Bhoja (comment on YS IV,22) and Vācaspati 
Miśra, all underlining the fact that Indian philosophy values only that kind of 
knowledge which leads to liberation, are followed by the next general statement 
about India as a whole: 
 
“In India metaphysical knowledge always has a soteriological purpose.”730 
 
Eliade explains that even logic (Nyāya) has a such a foundation, and that 
liberating knowledge is so highly valued because human suffering springs from a 
fundamental ignorance about one’s Self. 
 
After these general remarks Eliade adds a last paragraph dedicated entirely to 
Yoga and Sāṃkhya and some differences between these two darśanas. In 
Sāṃkhya and Yoga suffering is defined as the confusion between the Self and 
what Eliade calls the “psychomental experience.”731 Sāṃkhya therefore 
propagates the thorough knowledge of the “essence and the forms of nature 
(prakṛti) and the laws that govern its evolution;”732 Yoga however “finds value 
only in the practice of contemplation, which is alone capable of revealing the 
autonomy and omnipotence of Spirit experimentally.”733 Since Yoga is based on 
Sāṃkhya, Eliade wants to first expound how this darśana conceives “Substance 
and Spirit, together with the cause of their false solidarity.”734 
 
                                                 
724 Eliade, Yoga, 11. 
725 Eliade, Yoga, 12. 
726 Eliade, Yoga, 12. 
727 Eliade, Yoga, 12. 
728 For example on p. 15. 
729 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 12. 
730 Eliade, Yoga, 13. 
731 Eliade, Yoga, 15. 
732 Eliade, Yoga, 15. 
733 Eliade, Yoga, 15. 
734 Eliade, Yoga, 15. 
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5.4.3. The “Self” (subchapter I,3) 
 
Unlike Dasgupta, who first wrote on Prakṛti and then on Puruṣa, Eliade chooses 
to start with the Self which he first describes in the context of various Indian 
philosophies (Buddhism, materialism, Nyāya, Vedānta, and finally Sāṃkhya and 
Yoga). As to the definition of Puruṣa he quotes Sāṃkhyasūtra III,75, I,146-147, I,162 
and Sāṃkhyakārikā 19, and he briefly mentions the mysterious relation between 
Spirit and substance by referring to Vyāsa (on YS I,4 and II,23) and Vācaspati 
Miśra (on YS I,4 and Tattvakaumudī 31). Eliade dedicates more than one page to 
the fact that the origin of this strange association between Puruṣa and prakṛti is 
never formally discussed in Sāṃkhya-Yoga but is simply accepted on the grounds 
that the solution to this problem exceeds the possibilities of human 
comprehension. 
 
“The cause and the origin of this paradoxical association between the Self 
and life (that is, ‘matter’) could be understood only by an instrument of 
knowledge other than the buddhi, one in no way implying matter. Now, 
such knowledge is impossible in the present condition of humanity. It 
‘reveals’ itself only to him who, having broken his fetters, has passed beyond 
the human condition […].”735 
 
Avidyā, nescience, is the cause of bondage (and therefore of human suffering), 
which Eliade defines by quoting YS II,5 as well as Vyāsa’s and Bhoja’s 
commentary on YS II,18 and II,20, respectively. 
 
Comparing this chapter to what Dasgupta wrote on the same subject we note that 
the Indian philosopher emphasised other aspects than his Romanian disciple 
when introducing puruṣa. He evokes Western as well as other Indian attempts to 
explain the relationship between the spiritual and the material realms, he explains 
the similarity between puruṣa and prakṛti on the basis of sattva, he illustrates the 
process of perception and he discusses the plurality of puruṣas. Eliade, however, 
never refers to Western philosophers, and when he mentions other Indian 
systems of thought (for example Vedānta) it is usually with an aim of showing the 
similarities with Sāṃkhya instead of the differences. Also, he obviously felt no 
necessity to dive so deeply into Sāṃkhya as to tackle sattva guṇa in relation to 
puruṣa and prakṛti – the statement that the connection between these two entities 
has no beginning, is due to the teleological function of prakṛti and cannot be 
understood by a normal human being fully served his purpose. When evoking 
the problem of the relation between puruṣa and prakṛti he does so only in a 
footnote, saying that 
 
“[t]his ‘correlation’ […] constitutes one of the greatest difficulties of Indian 
speculation in general [and is] explained by Sāṃkhya and Yoga through the 
teleological instinct of nature (prakṛti), which, without knowing it, ‘works’ 
for the deliverance of Spirit.”736  
 
The other two topics however, perception and the plurality of puruṣas, will be 
dealt with later by Eliade (in subchapters I,5 and I,6, respectively).  
                                                 
735 Eliade, Yoga, 18. 
736 Eliade, Yoga, 17, footnote 19. 
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5.4.4. Substance (subchapter I,4) 
  
Eliade states that Patañjali (in YS IV, 2-3 and I,16, II,15, 19 and IV, 13, 32 and 34) 
refers to prakṛti and the guṇas “only in passing […] and only to define their 
relationships with psychomental life and the techniques of liberation.”737 Patañjali 
obviously assumed that his students were familiar with the Sāṃkhya analysis of 
matter, which is the reason why Eliade feels the necessity to set out on a longer 
exposition of this theory for his Western audience. He first defines prakṛti and 
then the guṇas, following Dasgupta in saying that “these guṇas must not be 
regarded as different from prakṛti […],”738 and that they have a 
 
“twofold character: objective on the one hand, since they constitute the 
phenomena of the external world, and, on the other hand, subjective, since 
they support, nourish, and condition psychomental life.”739 
 
In this quotation we can observe how Eliade replaced the technical Sāṃkhya 
vocabulary by more modern or more easily understandable terms. Dasgupta also 
spoke of the “twofold aspect” of the guṇas but he described them as follows: 
 
“In the aspect of the determined or the perceived, the guṇas evolve 
themselves as the five infra-atomic potentials, the five gross elements and 
their compounds. In the aspect of perceiver or determiner, they form the 
modifications of the ego together with the senses.”740 
 
Next, Eliade turns to the evolution of the 25 tattvas, a subject which he deals with 
for just a little more than three pages, as opposed to Dasgupta who dedicated 
several chapters to it. Eliade quite considerably simplified the demonstration of 
the evolutionary process by renouncing to mention the distinction between the 
aviśeṣa and the viśeṣa tattvas, the atoms, the problem of time (in Dasgupta related 
to the atoms), the exact evolution of the atoms from the tanmātras,741 as well as 
the different categories of pariṇāma (dharma-pariṇāma as lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma and 
avasthā-pariṇāma), the influence of time and space on the transformation of 
things, and by touching only very briefly, in a footnote, on the relation between 
the sense faculties and the sense organs. He also does not mention conflicting 
ideas about certain aspects of the evolutionary process among various 
commentators of Sāṃkhya.742 With Eliade, prakṛti quite straightforwardly evolves 
into mahat and ahaṃkāra and from there into two opposite directions, 
 
                                                 
737 Eliade, Yoga, 19. 
738 Eliade, Yoga, 19. Cf. “Prakṛti is not a separate category independent of the guṇas […].” (Dasgupta, 
Philosophy and Religion, 6) 
739 Eliade, Yoga, 19-20. 
740 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 3. 
741 Whereas Dasgupta discusses a series of contradictory views on this problem without reaching a 
final conclusion as to how exactly the subtle elements evolve into the grosser ones, Eliade deals with 
this problem in three lines, giving a very general description: “By a process of condensation that tends 
to produce structures increasingly gross, these tanmātras give rise to atoms (paramāṇu) […].” (Eliade, 
Yoga, 21) 
742 For all these topics, cf. supra, chapters 4.3.3.5. – 4.3.3.7. 
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“one of which leads to the world of objective phenomena and the other to 
that of subjective phenomena (sensible and psychomental).”743 
 
This distinction between an objective and a subjective universe was alluded to by 
Dasgupta in his article “Yoga Psychology,”744 but in Yoga as Philosophy and Religion 
Dasgupta only talks of a development into three directions (karmendriyas, 
jñānendriyas and the tanmātras), according to the dominance of one of the three 
guṇas. Eliade, of course, also mentions the guṇas in this context, but the 
tripartition remains subject to the main dichotomy. Manas, which Dasgupta calls 
“the co-ordinating organ,”745 turns into “the inner sense” with Eliade,746 and 
whereas Dasgupta does not specify which guṇa is responsible for its creation, 
Eliade says that manas appears together with the jñānendriyas under the 
influence of sattva. As far as the coordinating function of manas is concerned, 
Dasgupta refers to SK 27 and Eliade to Aniruddha in his comment on 
Sāṃkhyasūtra II,40 and 42. 
 
The conclusion which has to be drawn from this evolution of prakṛti into 23 
tattvas, namely that matter and mind are ultimately the same,747 is stressed by 
both Dasgupta and Eliade, but in a completely different way. Dasgupta, the 
philosopher, saw in Sāṃkhya and Yoga “[…] an acute analysis of matter and 
thought”748 which proved superior to Western as well as certain Indian attempts 
to define the relationship between these two entities. Eliade, however, describes 
the fact that senses and material elements are all produced by ahaṃkāra in purely 
psychological terms, defining ahaṃkāra quite daringly as “self-knowledge” 
(referring to SK 24)749 and stating that “the genesis of the world is a psychic act.”750  
 
“[I]t is from this self-knowledge (which, of course, is absolutely different 
form the ‘awakening’ of the puruṣa) that the evolution of the physical world 
derives; and [the] objective and psychophysiological phenomena have a 
common matrix, the only difference between them being the formula of the 
guṇas, sattva predominating in psychic phenomena, rajas in psycho-
physiological phenomena (passion, activity of the senses, etc.), while the 
phenomena of ‘matter’ are constituted by the increasingly inert and dense 
products of tamas (tanmātra, aṇu, bhūtāni).”751 
 
This is a completely different language from Dasgupta’s who would never have 
spoken of self-knowledge or even of the (clearly Jungian) “principle of individuation 
                                                 
743 Eliade, Yoga, 20. 
744 “[…] the combination of these three different types of reals […] is said to produce both mind and 
senses on the one hand and the objective world of matter on the other.” (Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 
181) 
745 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 59. 
746 Eliade, Yoga, 20. 
747 In Eliade’s words: “Thus man’s body, as well as his “states of consciousness” and even his 
“intelligence,” are all creations of one and the same substance.” (Eliade, Yoga, 21) 
748 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 2. 
749 Eliade, Yoga, 23. The term which Eliade translates as “self-knowledge” is abhimāna, explained by 
Monier-Williams as “high opinion of one’s self, self-conceit, pride, haughtiness” and translated by 
Larsen als “self-conceit” (Larsen, Sāṃkhya, 263). 
750 Eliade, Yoga, 23. 
751 Eliade, Yoga, 23. 
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through ‘consciousness of self””752 in this context. Eliade obviously saw in the 
evolution theory according to Sāṃkhya an interesting psychological system 
which depicts the relationship between man and the cosmos (one of Eliade’s 
favourite terms) in a way he must have thought attractive for a Western audience: 
 
“The guṇas impregnate the whole universe and establish an organic 
sympathy between man and the cosmos, these two entities being pervaded 
by the same pain of existence […]. In fact, the difference between the cosmos 
and man is only a difference of degree, not of essence.”753 
 
Furthermore, it is decisive to note that Eliade attributes “the capital importance 
[of the above mentioned] principle of individuation” not only to Sāṃkhya but to 
“almost all Indian systems”754 (without giving any examples however), yet again 
presenting to the West a nearly uniform Indian idea.  
 
Briefly defining pariṇāma, the notion of evolution in Sāṃkhya, as “the realization 
of the potentialities that exist in prakṛti,”755 Eliade indirectly criticises Dasgupta by 
adding that a comparison between this kind of evolution with Western 
evolutionism 
 
“[…] is to be guilty of great confusion. No new form, Sāṃkhya affirms, goes 
beyond the possibilities of existence that were already present in the 
universe. In fact, for Sāṃkhya, nothing is created, in the Western sense of the 
word.”756 
 
Dasgupta however did not focus on this aspect of evolution, on how something 
could have come out of nothing, but on the way things developed from simple to 
complex (which can be observed whether a new thing is created or whether 
something already existent transforms into something else) and then on the 
reason why evolution existed at all. This last point led him to praise the 
teleological function of prakṛti which, according to him, provided a satisfactory 
(and, in comparison to the West, superior) answer to this question. Eliade on his 
part presents the fact that “every compound exists in view of another” as 
something which “common sense”757 tells us. Quoting SK 17 plus commentaries, 
Vācaspati Miśra’s Tattvakaumudī 120 as well as Sāṃkhyasūtra I,140-144, with the 
comments of Aniruddha and Vijñāna Bhikṣu, he is quite emphatic on the 
Sāṃkhya opinion that “if the mission of creation were not to serve Spirit, it would 
be absurd, meaningless.”758 As with any Sāṃkhya or Yoga idea Eliade personally 
(or for the sake of what he is trying to convey) subscribes to, the concept of a 
“superintendent,” 
 
“[…] an entity that transcends the categories of Substance (guṇa) and that 
exists in view of itself,”759 
                                                 
752 Eliade, Yoga, 23. 
753 Eliade, Yoga, 24. 
754 Eliade, Yoga, 23. 
755 Eliade, Yoga, 22. 
756 Eliade, Yoga, 22. 
757 Eliade, Yoga, 24. 
758 Eliade, Yoga, 25. 
759 Eliade, Yoga, 25. 
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which in itself is a proof for the existence of what Eliade calls “spirit,” is 
immediately presented as something generally Indian, “an axiom abundantly 
repeated in Indian literature and adopted by Yoga.”760 Quoting Tattvakaumudī 121, 
Eliade ends this chapter with a definition of the Self which, even though it clearly 
describes the puruṣa, has this pan-Indian touch about it. 
 
“Spirit, the Self, is a simple and irreducible principle, autonomous, static, 
non-productive, not implicated in mental or sensory activity, etc.”761 
 
 
5.4.5. The Relation Spirit-Nature (subchapter I,5) 
 
To begin with, Eliade dwells on how buddhi (translated by Eliade as 
“intelligence,” by Dasgupta as “mind”), in its purest state as translucent sattva, is 
able to reflect puruṣa. 
 
“Comprehension of the external world is possible only by virtue of this 
reflection of puruṣa in intelligence.”762 
 
YS II,20 illustrates the fact that the puruṣa remains absolutely untouched by what 
he thus perceives. Eliade also quotes YS I,41 which uses the image of a crystal and 
a flower reflected in it in order to visualise the relation between Spirit (puruṣa) 
and intelligence (buddhi). He then adds that  
 
“[f]rom all eternity, Spirit has found itself drawn into this illusory relation 
with psychomental life (that is, with “matter”). This is owing to ignorance 
(avidyā), and as long as avidyā persists, existence is present (by virtue of 
karma), and with it suffering.”763 
 
Quoting Sāṃkhyasūtra III,41, Eliade defines avidyā as “confusing the motionless 
and eternal puruṣa with the flux of psychomental life”764 and derives from it “the 
law of existence” which says that as long as I equate “I want” to “Spirit wants” I 
continue to live in illusion and therefore suffering. This law, according to Eliade, 
is universally valid, and there is only one way out of it, namely “adequate 
knowledge of Spirit.”765 Once more, Eliade thus manages to reach a level of 
universal spirituality which was his proclaimed aim (cf. foreword), and he 
immediately undermines this by stating that “Sāṃkhya only prolongs the 
tradition of the Upaniṣads,” quoting Chāndogya Upaniṣad VII,1,3 (“He who knows 
the ātman crosses over [the ocean of suffering].)”766 This “ocean of suffering” now 
can be eliminated in a way which, “in our opinion, has not been sufficiently 
                                                 
760 Eliade, Yoga, 25. Eliade refers to Sāṃkhyasūtra I,66, Vācaspati Miśra 122, YS IV,24, and, as the only 
non-Sāṃkhya or Yoga source, to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II,4,5. 
761 Eliade, Yoga, 26. 
762 Eliade, Yoga, 26. 
763 Eliade, Yoga, 27. 
764 Eliade, Yoga, 27. 
765 Eliade, Yoga, 28. 
766 Eliade, Yoga, 28. 
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emphasized.”767 Eliade points out that, in order to be liberated from suffering, 
Sāṃkhya and Yoga 
 
“deny suffering as such, thus doing away with all relation between suffering 
and the Self.”768  
 
As soon as man understands that the Self is (and always has been) free, 
everything belonging to the mental and emotional sphere no longer affects him. 
Henceforth it is man’s own decision whether he wants to continue to be subject to 
suffering (which is “a cosmic fact”769) or not. 
 
The last section of this chapter is dedicated to liberation through awakening and 
revelation.  
 
“Knowledge is a simple ‘awakening’ that unveils the essence of the Self, of 
Spirit.”770 
 
Eliade quotes several passages from the Sāṃkhyasūtra, all expounding that neither 
hope nor religious rites are of any value (hope prolonging man’s misery and rites 
creating new karma); all that counts in Sāṃkhya is metaphysical knowledge (cf. 
Sāṃkhyasūtra IV,11, III,23, III,26 and I,84 ff.). As to how it is possible that buddhi, 
a part of matter, is able to realise the cognitive process necessary for liberation, 
Eliade refers to prakṛti’s teleological instinct, acting for the disentanglement of 
puruṣa (also described in YS II,18). Once intelligence (buddhi) has led man to the 
threshold of awakening, “liberation is obtained almost automatically.”771 This 
process of “mukti” is illustrated by SK 59, 61 and Sāṃkhyasūtra III,69, and the 
situation of a “jīvan-mukta” (one who is liberated in this life) by SK 67-68 and 
Sāṃkhyasūtra III,82. 
 
The topics raised by Eliade in “The Relation Spirit-Nature” are part of Dasgupta’s 
chapters “Prakṛti” and “Puruṣa” (except, of course, Eliade’s universal “law of 
suffering” and his interpretation of man’s eliminating this “cosmic fact” through 
a denial of suffering as such). 
 
5.4.6. How is Liberation possible? (subchapter I,6) 
 
Having paved the way in the previous chapters, Eliade finally reaches his 
favourite subject, liberation, but since he already mentioned quite a few aspects of 
this topic he cannot avoid repeating himself every now and then. He starts off by 
(once more) underlining a Sāṃkhya-Yoga statement with a Vedāntic quotation: 
 
“Sāṃkhya-Yoga has, then, understood that ‘Spirit [puruṣa] can be neither 
born nor destroyed, is neither bound nor active [actively seeking 
                                                 
767 Eliade, Yoga, 28. 
768 Eliade, Yoga, 28. 
769 Eliade, Yoga, 28. 
770 Eliade, Yoga, 29. 
771 Eliade, Yoga, 30. 
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deliverance], neither thirsts for freedom nor is liberated.’ [Gauḍapāda, 
Māṇḍūkya-kārikā II,32]”772 
 
This eternally free Spirit however lets itself be entangled (at least in an illusory 
manner) with matter, and Eliade asks the logical questions: 
 
“[…] why are men condemned to suffer in ignorance or to struggle for a 
freedom they already possess? If puruṣa is perfectly pure and static, why 
does it permit impurity, becoming, experience, pain, and history?”773 
 
Such logic, however, is futile with “Indian philosophy” – “Reality must be 
accepted as it is.”774 
 
The next paragraph is one of the rare instances where Eliade points out 
contradictory ideas among Indian systems of thought. He explains that Sāṃkhya 
has been attacked by both Buddhism and Vedānta because it maintained the 
reality of both Spirit and matter, assigning to the puruṣa a contradictory position, 
both completely isolated and yet strangely related to prakṛti and therefore vital 
for creation. This paradox was avoided by Buddhism and Vedānta alike, one 
eliminating Spirit, the other matter.  
 
Vedānta also criticised Sāṃkhya for its doctrine of the plurality of puruṣas, which 
Eliade classifies as 
 
“[…] a tragic and paradoxical conception of Spirit, which is thus cut off not 
only from the world of phenomena but also from other liberated ‘selves.’”775 
 
Yet Sāṃkhya and Yoga had to postulate this multiplicity, for all the reasons 
Dasgupta already mentioned in his book, referring to SK17 (which Eliade omits, 
quoting SK 18 instead).776 Nevertheless, Eliade does not hide his disapproval of 
this doctrine777 and therefore prefers not to linger on it but move on to a closer 
examination of liberation. Once more, he incorporates the Sāṃkhya and Yoga 
notion of mokṣa into Indian thought in general. 
 
“As it is for most Indian schools of philosophy – except, of course, those 
influenced by mystical devotion (bhakti) – so here, too, liberation is in fact a 
liberation from the idea of evil and pain.” 
 
He evokes the life of a liberated man who will still act but without being involved 
in his actions. Such a person will not create any “new karmic nucleuses”778 and, in 
                                                 
772 Eliade, Yoga, 31. 
773 Eliade, Yoga, 32. 
774 Eliade, Yoga, 32. 
775 Eliade, Yoga, 33. 
776 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 26 (chapter “Puruṣa”). 
777 „The paradox is obvious: this doctrine reduces the infinite variety of phenomena to a single 
principle, matter (prakṛti); it sees the physical universe, life, and consciousness as derived from a single 
matrix – and yet it postulates the plurality of spirits, although by their nature these are essentially 
identical. Thus it unites what would appear to be so different – the physical, the biotic, and the mental 
– and isolates what, especially in India, seems so unique and universal – Spirit.” (Eliade, Yoga, 33) 
778 Eliade, Yoga, 34. 
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a way, he will not even experience his own liberation, being already beyond the 
psychophysical processes. Eliade emphasises the fact that the liberated “Indian” 
leads a “transpersonal existence” in a “situation of mere witness,”779 and he 
protests against the (probably current Western) idea that “India has sought 
liberation only negatively.”780 None of these thoughts have been expressed in this 
way by Dasgupta. The same holds true for Eliade’s analysis of how Sāṃkhya 
ignores or denies human suffering (a thought he takes up from the previous 
chapter). Such a denial of suffering 
 
“[…] can be realized only through the destruction of the human personality. 
The Yoga practices proposed by Patañjali have the same goal.”781 
 
Eliade clearly addresses Western psychologists when he evokes something as 
radical as the sacrifice of the human condition and personality, and he hastens to 
point out that such an attitude is only seemingly pessimistic. Giving up 
personality (“the vehicle of suffering and drama”)782 for eternal freedom means 
giving up the lesser for the higher. 
 
“[…] this sacrifice is lavishly compensated for by the conquest of absolute 
freedom, which it makes possible.”783  
 
And, once more, this is a pan-Indian truth: 
 
[…] for India, what matters most is not so much the salvation of the 
personality as obtaining absolute freedom.”784 
 
Eliade immediately forestalls a “probable objection of the Westerner”785 who 
might think his personality to be too great a sacrifice. To this, Sāṃkhya and Yoga 
simply answer that as long as man has not risen above the psychomental level he 
cannot know anything about the transcendental states which are of a completely 
different category altogether. 
 
With subchapter 6, Eliade’s discussion of Sāṃkhya ends; from now on he will 
concentrate on Yoga and its techniques. Let us therefore briefly sum up the topics 
he raised so far. 
 
                                                 
779 Eliade, Yoga, 34. 
780 Eliade, Yoga, 34. 
781 Eliade, Yoga, 35. 
782 Eliade, Yoga, 35. 
783 Eliade, Yoga, 35. 
784 Eliade, Yoga, 35. 
785 Eliade, Yoga, 35. 
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Subchapters 1-6, topics discussed by Eliade 
 
- the four basic and independent concepts of Indian spirituality 
- the initiatory structure of Yoga 
- list of sources used 
- the cosmos exists because of man’s lack of knowledge 
- man suffers because of his solidarity with the cosmos 
- freedom comes when man desolidarises himself from the cosmos and 
profane life 
- to overcome suffering is the goal of all Indian philosophies and all 
Indian mysticisms 
- Sāṃkhya tries to reach the aim through knowledge, Yoga through 
practice 
- the Self and its paradoxical relation with prakṛti 
- avidyā is the cause of bondage and human suffering 
- definition of prakṛti and the guṇas 
- evolution of the tattvas 
- ahaṃkāra is self-knowledge 
- matter and mind are the same, the genesis of the world is a psychic act 
- man is not essentially different from the cosmos 
- the teleological function of prakṛti 
- the sattva aspect of buddhi and its capacity to reflect the puruṣa 
- avidyā as cause of all suffering 
- Sāṃkhya and Yoga deny suffering as such in order to overcome it 
- the process of mukti happens nearly automatically, once buddhi has 
lead man to the threshold of awakening 
- if Spirit is eternally free, why does it let itself be entangled with matter? 
No answer – it simply is like this 
- the paradoxical function of puruṣa, Sāṃkhya criticised for it by 
Buddhism and Vedānta 
- the plurality of puruṣas 
- a denial of suffering is only possible through the destruction of the 
human personality 
- the sacrifice of one’s personality is necessary for reaching the 
transcendental sphere and, ultimately, absolute liberation 
 
As far as Sāṃkhya is concerned, Eliade certainly presented the central, basic 
topics (puruṣa and its function, plurality of puruṣas, prakṛti and its teleological 
function, the guṇas, the evolution of the tattvas and the process of perception in 
buddhi). Compared to Dasgupta, however, he left out quite a few related subjects, 
mainly concerning matter (nature and the creation of atoms, changes in quality 
and substance, nature of the five elements and how the human being perceives 
them through the senses, the reality and relative eternity of the external world) 
and evolution (function of rajas, order of evolution, conditions which are able to 
break the barriers inside of prakṛti etc.). Instead he focussed on suffering and 
liberation which he described in both psychological as well as universal terms.  
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If we look at the Sanskrit texts which Eliade used in subchapters 1 to 6, we notice 
that out of 48 references to original sources only 16 (or exactly one third) concern 
Patañjali and his tradition – all the other quotations allude to Sāṃkhya and 
Vedānta texts. This stands out in great contrast to Dasgupta who drew nearly 
exclusively on the YS and its comments, also in the purely Sāṃkhistic chapters of 
his book. But also in his use of the Yogasūtra Eliade proves to be quite 
independent of Dasgupta; far from simply quoting the same sūtras or the same 
passages from the various bhāṣyas he refers to different passages in different 
contexts. Only YS II,5, II,15 and II,23 seem to have been used in the same way by 
both Eliade and Dasgupta; for all the other sūtras which are quoted in both texts, 
either the exact source or the topic varies from master to disciple.  
 














Relation between puruṣa and prakṛti I,3 
I,16 Patañjali The guṇas I,4 
I,41 Patañjali Purity of puruṣa remains, even if he 
perceives what is presented to him 
by buddhi 
I,5 
II,5 Patañjali Definition of avidyā (nescience) I,3 
II,15 Patañjali Everything is suffering I,2 
II,15 and 
19 
Patañjali The guṇas I,4 
II,18 Vyāsabhāṣya Definition of avidyā (nescience) I,3 
II,18 Patañjali, 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
The teleological function of prakṛti I,5 
II,20 Bhojavṛtti Definition of avidyā (nescience) I,3 
II,20 Patañjali, 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
Purity of puruṣa remains, even if he 
perceives what is presented to him 
by buddhi 
I,5 
II,23 Vyāsabhāṣya Relation between puruṣa and prakṛti I,3 
IV,2-3 Patañjali Prakṛti I,4 
IV,13 Patañjali The guṇas I,4 
IV,22 Bhojavṛtti Only knowledge leading to liberation 
is of value 
I,2 
IV,24 Patañjali Creation exists in view of another, 




Patañjali The guṇas I,4 
 
                                                 
786 To be compared with Dasgupta’s list in chapter 4.6.1. 
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List of the other sources referred to by Eliade in subchapters 1 to 6 (arranged in 
the order of the texts given by Eliade in his presentation of the sources, cf. chapter 
5.4.1. plus the Sāṃkhyasūtra which he forgot to mention). 
 











Sāṃkhyakārikā 1 Īśvarakṛṣṇa Everything is suffering I,2 
Sāṃkhyakārikā 14 Īśvarakṛṣṇa Direct link between cause and 
effect (theory of causation) 
I,4 
Sāṃkhyakārikā 17787 Īśvarakṛṣṇa Every compound exists in 
view of another 
I,4 
Sāṃkhyakārikā 18 Īśvarakṛṣṇa Reasons for the plurality of 
puruṣas 
I,6 
Sāṃkhyakārikā 19 Īśvarakṛṣṇa Definition of puruṣa I,3 
Sāṃkhyakārikā 24 Īśvarakṛṣṇa Ahaṃkāra (as “self-
knowledge”) 
I,4 
Sāṃkhyakārikā 59  
and 61 
Īśvarakṛṣṇa Process of liberation I,5 
Sāṃkhyakārikā 67-68  Īśvarakṛṣṇa The jīvan-mukta I,5 
Tattvakaumudī 1 Vācaspati 
Miśra 
Only knowledge leading to 
liberation is of value 
I,2 
Tattvakaumudī 31 Vācaspati 
Miśra 
Relation between Puruṣa and 
prakṛti 
I,3 




Necessity that something has 
to exist before the creation can 
start 
I,4 
Tattvakaumudī 120 Vācaspati 
Miśra 
Every compound exists in 
view of another 
I,4 
Tattvakaumudī 121-123 Vācaspati 
Miśra 
Creation exists in view of 
another, therefore spirit 






Direct link between cause and 
effect (theory of causation) 
I,4 
                                                 
787 Dasgupta also quotes SK 17 and 18 in order to prove the existence and the necessity for the plurality 
of puruṣas (in chapter II of Yoga as Philosophy and Religion). 






Every compound exists in 
view of another 
 
I,4 
Sāṃkhyasūtra I,66 Unknown Creation exists in view of 
another, therefore spirit 
(puruṣa) exists, too 
I,4 
Sāṃkhyasūtra I,84 ff., 
III,23, III,26 and IV,11 
Unknown Religious rites are useless, all 





Unknown Necessity that something has 
to exist before the creation can 
start 
I,4 
Sāṃkhyasūtra I,140-144 Unknown Every compound exists in 




Unknown Definition of puruṣa I,2 
Sāṃkhyasūtra III,41 Unknown Definition of avidyā I,5 
Sāṃkhyasūtra III,47 Unknown Creation (sṛṣṭi) serves the soul I,1 
Sāṃkhyasūtra III,69 Unknown Process of liberation I,5 
Sāṃkhyasūtra III,82  Unknown The jīvan-mukta I,5 
Comment on  
Sāṃkhyasūtra I,41 
Aniruddha Necessity that something has 
to exist before the creation can 
start 
I,4 
Comment on  
Sāṃkhyasūtra I,140-144 
Aniruddha Every compound exists in 
view of another 
I,4 
Comment on  
Sāṃkhyasūtra II,1 
Aniruddha Everything is suffering I,2 
Comment on  
Sāṃkhyasūtra II,40  
and 42 
Aniruddha Manas (coordinating function 








Unknown Only knowledge leading to 




Unknown Creation exists in view of 
another, therefore spirit 











Only knowledge leading to 
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5.4.7. The Structure of Psychic Experience (subchapter I,7) 
 
In this chapter Eliade leaves Sāṃkhya behind and starts his interpretation of 
Yoga. As a general remark I would like to state that the vacillation between 
Sāṃkhya and Yoga on the one hand and Indian spirituality on the other, which 
Eliade dexterously stage-managed in subchapters 1 to 6, by mixing one with the 
other in a way which created the impression that whatever was true for Sāṃkhya-
Yoga was also valid for India as a whole and vice-versa, continues in this chapter 
with Patañjali and Tantra Yoga. Eliade sets out by announcing classic Yoga 
according to Patañjali788 and he quotes the YS and Vyāsa (among others), but time 
and again he adds thoughts and elements from Tantric texts or interprets 
Patañjali in a slightly hazy way, blurring the distinctions between the two. To put 
it a bit bluntly, Patañjali appears to be an early Tantric where personal 
experiences of life as well as of various mental states are vital. But let us take it 
step by step and observe Eliade’s procedure in detail. 
 
Whereas Sāṃkhya provides the “gnosis,”789 Yoga deals with the means of how to 
reach final liberation. Eliade speaks of “an ascetic technique and a method of 
contemplation,”790 which together constitute the yoga-darśana. A few lines further 
down however, he equals darśana to gnosis and adds that Yoga also needs a 
practice (abhyāsa) in the form of “an ascesis (tapas) – in short, a physiological 
technique […].”791 This slightly confusing passage leads to a still more puzzling 
one. Eliade, after quoting Patañjali’s definition of Yoga as “the suppression of 
states of consciousness”792 (according to YS I,2), concludes that 
 
“[…] yogic technique presupposes an experimental knowledge of all the 
‘states’ that ‘agitate’ a normal, secular, unilluminated ‘consciousness.’”793 
 
He adds that these states of consciousness, though limitless in number, “fall into 
three categories, respectively corresponding to three possibilities of 
experience.”794 
 
“(1) errors and illusions (dreams, hallucinations; errors in perception, 
confusions, etc.); (2) the sum total of normal psychological experiences 
(everything felt, perceived, or thought by the nonadept, by him who does 
not practice Yoga); (3) the parapsychological experiences brought on by the 
yogic technique and, of course, accessible only to adepts.”795 
 
For none of these categories Eliade refers to any Sanskrit source or term and in 
fact there is no such classification in Patañjali. The first category partly covers the 
five vṛttis (errors in perception and dreams corresponding to viparyaya and 
                                                 
788 “Classic Yoga begins where Sāṃkhya leaves off. Patañjali takes over the Sāṃkhya dialectic almost 
in its entirety…” (Eliade, Yoga, 36) 
789 Eliade, Yoga, 36. 
790 Eliade, Yoga, 36. 
791 Eliade, Yoga, 36. 
792 Eliade, Yoga, 36. 
793 Eliade, Yoga, 36. 
794 Eliade, Yoga, 36. 
795 Eliade, Yoga, 36. 
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nidrā, and illusions maybe referring to Patañjali’s vikalpa), and the third category 
could stand for all the supranormal powers (siddhis) a Yogin acquires through 
his practice, but for the second category the Indian sources do not provide any 
parallels (unless Eliade had the kleśas in mind, interpreting them in a very 
modern way). There is, maybe, a faint allusion to the three states of consciousness 
as defined in the Upaniṣads – in this case the second category could roughly 
correspond to the waking consciousness (vaiśvānara) whereas the first one would 
cover part of the second state, the dreaming consciousness (taijasa), and the third 
one could be a reflection of suṣupti, the dreamless state where the consciousness 
is said to be close to ātman. But none of these parallels work satisfactorily because 
Eliade’s categories are his own – partly inspired by Indian sources but heavily 
influenced by modern psychology and esoterics (cf., for example, the term 
“adept”). Yet Eliade explicitly attributes this categorisation to Patañjali,796 and he 
even adds that this Indian sage designated three sciences or groups of sciences 
corresponding to the three categories: 
 
“The theory of knowledge, for example, together with logic, has the duty of 
preventing errors of the senses and conceptual confusions. ‘Psychology,’ 
law, ethics, have as their object the sum total of the normal man’s states of 
consciousness, which, at the same time, they evaluate and classify. […] 
metaphysics recognizes as valid only a third category of ‘states,’ principally 
those which precede enstasis (samādhi) and prepare deliverance.”797  
 
Logic, psychology and metaphysics as apt methods for dealing with errors and 
illusions, normal psychological as well as parapsychological experiences… Since 
Eliade does not mention any sources for these “sciences” we can again but 
speculate what terms from Patañjali he could have had in mind. “The theory of 
knowledge” could correspond to pramāṇa, “right knowledge,” consisting of 
pratyakṣa (direct perception), anumāna (inference) and āgamāḥ (knowledge 
handed down by tradition) (cf. YS I,7), but how could pramāṇa, one of the five 
vṛttis, be a means to tackle other vṛttis (such as error and sleep)? “Logic” is the 
science expounded by another Indian darśana, nyāya, and is certainly part of 
Patañjali’s argumentation as a whole, but it is not mentioned explicitly in the YS. 
“Psychology” is equalled by Eliade to law and ethics, which could be rendered in 
Sanskrit as dharma and/or yama and niyama. Patañjali says a lot about these last 
two terms and nothing about the first one, but all of them carry such specific 
cultural meanings that they only very partially qualify for parallels to (Western) 
psychology.798 “Metaphysics” finally can only refer to prajñā, the liberating 
knowledge which dawns during the various phases of samādhi, yet again the 
analogy is fragmentary. But it is doubtful whether Eliade was actually thinking 
about specific Indian terms or categories at all when he wrote this passage – his 
perspective is entirely Western, only vaguely shrouded in an Eastern gown. Yet 
Eliade insists on Patañjali being the author of these categories and sciences: 
                                                 
796 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 36. 
797 Eliade, Yoga, 36-37. 
798 They are ahiṃsā (harmlessness), satya (veracity), asteya (abstinence from stealing), brahmacārya 
(continence, chastity), aparigraha (renouncing of possessions), śauca (purity), saṃtoṣa (contented-
ness), tapas (austerity), svādhyāya (recitation of the Vedas or any other sacred text) and 
īśvarapraṇidhāna (devotion to the Lord). 
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“The purpose of Patañjali’s Yoga, then, is to abolish the first two categories 
of experiences (respectively produced by logical and metaphysical error) 
and to replace them by an “experience” that is enstatic, suprasensory, and 
extrarational. By virtue of samādhi, the yogin finally passes permanently 
beyond the human condition – which is dramatic, produced by suffering 
and consummated in suffering – and at last obtains the total freedom to 
which the Indian soul so ardently aspires.”799 
 
Eliade thus depicts Patañjali to his Western audience as the perfect representative 
of the “Indian soul” and its innermost longings. To support his argument he 
immediately adds Vyāsa’s “modalities of consciousness”800 (Dasgupta’s “five 
classes of cittas;” cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.10), kṣipta, mūḍha, vikṣipta, ekāgra and 
niruddha (Bhāṣya on YS I,1), stating that  
 
“[o]nly the last two […] are yogic “states” – i.e., brought on by ascesis and 
meditation.”801 
 
And he establishes an indirect and very subtle link to his three “categories of 
experiences” by referring to Vyāsa’s comment on YS I,2 which says that human 
consciousness manifests itself in three different ways, “according to which of the 
three guṇas is predominant in it,”802 concluding that  
 
“[…] the immemorial Indian tradition according to which man (the 
microcosm) is homologous with the macrocosm is preserved intact by 
Patañjali’s Yoga; it alters the tradition only by transposing the homology 
into the vocabulary of its own “physics,” according to which the three guṇas 
are equally present in nature and life on the one hand and in states of 
consciousness on the other.”803 
 
Again, Patañjali serves as an example for the “immemorial Indian tradition” of 
the correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm (or man and cosmos).  
 
Let us stop here for a moment and recapitulate Eliade’s procedure in this very 
crucial passage of his book. First, he introduces three categories or possibilities of 
experiences and three corresponding sciences which are all much closer to 
Western psychology than to Indian philosophy. Nevertheless Eliade repeatedly 
attributes them to Patañjali but without giving a single source reference. Then he 
describes the five citta bhūmis (mental planes) and the three ways in which the 
human consciousness can express itself (according to the guṇas), clearly 
indicating the Sanskrit texts (Vyāsa on YS I,1 and I,2). Without explicitly 
establishing a link between these three passages (respectively between the 
various states of consciousness listed in each of them), the mere juxtaposition of 
three different categorisations is likely to produce, in the mind of a reader who is 
unacquainted with Patañjali, the impression that they all describe roughly the 
same. And that two of them are based on an Indian source easily eclipses the fact 
                                                 
799 Eliade, Yoga, 37. 
800 Eliade, Yoga, 37. 
801 Eliade, Yoga, 37. 
802 Eliade, Yoga, 38. 
803 Eliade, Yoga, 38. 
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that the third one is not. In this manner Eliade very subtly equates Western 
psychology with Patañjali (whom he also manages to depict as a perfect example 
of the Indian soul and immemorial Indian tradition, thus lifting him up to the 
universal level he wants Yoga to be on) and paves the way for his main argument 
(exposed on the last pages of this chapter) which says that unless one first 
experiences all those states of consciousness one cannot eliminate them.  
 
Eliade’s tendency to blur terminology is confirmed by the next paragraph where, 
in a generous, all-including gesture, he blends or intermingles the categories he 
has listed above into what he calls “different groups, species, and varietes of 
‘states of consciousness.’”804 Interestingly he now calls them cittavṛtti, a term he 
has not used so far but which has a very specific meaning in Patañjali’s 
philosophy (cf. YS I,5 ff). Eliade chooses not to elaborate upon it at this point but 
emphasises that Yoga aims at destroying all those cittavṛtti, and that 
 
“[…] this destruction cannot be accomplished unless one begins by having, 
as it were, ‘experimental knowledge’ of the structure, origin, and intensity of 
that which is to be destroyed.”805 
 
Experimental knowledge means “method, technique, practice” – in other words 
“acting (kriyā) and […] practicing asceticism (tapas).”806 In this context Eliade 
mentions books II and III of the YS which  
 
“[…] are more particularly devoted to this yogic activity (purifications, 
bodily attitudes, breathing techniques, etc.).”807 
 
At best, this statement is a huge exaggeration; Patañjali dedicates exactly one 
sūtra (II,40) to “purification” (śauca, puritiy, the first of the niyamas), three sūtras 
(II,46-48) to “bodily attitudes” (āsana, most probably referring exclusively to 
sitting in the YS) and five (II,49-53) to “breathing techniques” (prāṇāyāma). And 
even if we consider all the eight limbs of Yoga to be purificatory exercises (as can 
be deduced from YS II,28), still large parts of books II and III would be dedicated 
to other topics than Yoga practice. But Eliade puts practice to the fore because it 
leads to “faith (śraddhā) in the efficacy of the method”808 and because it provides 
an experience, more exactly: a yogic experience. 
 
“Denial of the reality of the yogic experience, or criticism of certain of its 
aspects, is inadmissible from a man who has no direct knowledge of its 
practice, for yogic states go beyond the condition that circumscribes us when 
we criticize them.”809 
                                                 
804 Eliade, Yoga, 38. 
805 Eliade, Yoga, 38. 
806 Eliade, Yoga, 39. 
807 Eliade, Yoga, 39. 
808 Eliade, Yoga, 39. Eliade refers to Vyāsabhāṣya I,34 for this. 
809 Eliade, Yoga, 39. 
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Eliade thus forestalls all potential criticism by devaluating it beforehand, and to 
undermine his point he quotes Tantratattva I,125 (a much later text) which says 
that 
 
“[i]t is always the mark of a weak, feminine nature to endeavour to establish 
one’s superiority on the issue of a verbal quarrel, whereas it is the sign of a 
man to desire to conquer the world by the strength of one’s own arms.”810  
 
This manly demeanour of relying on one’s own experience instead of mere 
arguments “expresses a characteristic attitude of the yogic and tantric schools.”811 
At this moment of his book, Eliade imperceptibly introduces Tantra as an 
equivalent of Yoga and he immediately switches over to purely Tantric sources 
for the rest of this chapter. First he mentions abhyāsa, but not as “habit of 
steadiness” or “firmness of mind” which, as akliṣṭa vṛtti (together with vairāgya), 
is antagonistic to avidyā and therefore an important mental means for reaching 
the yogic aim of extinguishing all states of consciousness (as with Dasgupta, cf. 
supra, chapters 4.3.3.10 and 4.3.3.12), but as “practice,” “exercise,” “application,” 
referring only to “Haṭha-yogic treatises.”812 He quotes a passage from the Śiva 
Saṃhitā (IV, 9-11) where abhyāsa is rendered throughout as “practice,” but he 
omits giving this text’s definition of what this practice comprises. Instead, he 
paraphrases it himself, in a string of three terms which appear to be synonymous: 
 
“[A]ll [those tantric texts] emphasize the necessity for direct experience, for 
realization, for practice.”813 
 
If abhyāsa is interpreted as equivalent to experience, and since Eliade defined 
“experimental knowledge” as “method, technique, practice” (or kriyā [acting] 
and tapas [asceticism]) (cf. supra), then the distinction between all these terms 
vanishes and practising Yoga becomes the same as experiencing all states of 
consciousness and, in a next step (which Eliade does not hesitate to take), 
experiencing all states of life. 
 
“Patañjali, and after him countless yogic and tantric masters, know that the 
cittavṛttis, the “eddies of consciousness,” cannot be controlled and, finally, 
done away with, unless they are first known “experimentally.” In other 
words, one cannot free oneself from existence (saṃsāra) if one does not 
know life concretely.”814 
 
In this quotation we can observe how Patañjali turns into a proto-yogin and also a 
proto-tantric. Eliade strives to link haṭha yoga and tantra directly to Patañjali, by 
way of shifts both concerning the language as well as the content (avoiding clear 
terminology by associating notions until their meanings get blurred), and by 
unprecise information (like stating that books II and III of the YS are devoted to 
purificatory, postural and breathing techniques). His assertion that the yogin first 
has to know life in all its aspects is only an assumption or a conjecture – nothing 
                                                 
810 Eliade, Yoga, 39-40. 
811 Eliade, Yoga, 40. 
812 Eliade, Yoga, 40. 
813 Eliade, Yoga, 40. 
814 Eliade, Yoga, 40. 
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in the YS supports this statement. Of course one can argue that Patañjali’s path to 
liberation starts at a point where the yogin is sufficiently disgusted with or 
disillusioned about life and is therefore eager to get rid of all experiences 
altogether, and from this point of view one can presuppose that he has passed 
through a phase of experimental knowledge about the world. But Patañjali does 
not emphasise this state which in his eyes would have to be called pre-yogic – he 
is only interested in how a yogin can step out of the world’s ensnarement. Let us 
briefly recall what Dasgupta wrote about experience and Yoga: 
 
 “A Yogin […] feels pain in pleasure as well, and therefore is determined to 
avoid all experiences, painful or so-called pleasurable.”815  
 
“[…] the complete extinguishing of all pains is identical with the 
extinguishing of all experiences […].”816 
 
Worldly experience is equated by Dasgupta with the vṛttis which a yogin strives 
to overcome: 
 
“All the psychic states described above, viz. pramāṇa, viparyyaya, etc. [i.e. 
the five vṛttis] are either afflicted or unafflicted according as they are moved 
towards outgoing activity or are actuated by the higher motive of 
emancipation by narrowing the field of experiences gradually to a smaller 
and smaller sphere and afterwards to suppress them altogether.”817 
 
What a contrast to Eliade’s following assertion: 
 
“Indeed, it is only through experiences that freedom is gained. […] we can 
already recognize in Yoga a tendency that is specifically its own, and one 
that, therefore, we have not encountered in the Sāṃkhya darśana. It is a 
tendency toward the concrete, toward the act, toward experimental 
verification.”818 
 
Given the fact that Dasgupta personally loved life and its multifarious 
experiences (cf. supra, chapters 3.5.2. – 3.5.7) one can presume that he would have 
gladly emphasised such an aspect in Patañjali and his commentators if, according 
to him, it had been there. For obvious reasons Eliade also finds it hard to detect a 
suitable passage in the Patañjali tradition (he does not quote a single such source 
in this context) and therefore turns towards later texts. Yet again, he does not miss 
the chance to link these other forms of yoga to Patañjali: 
 
“Even Patañjali’s “classic” Yoga (and still more the other kinds of Yogas) 
accords the greatest importance to experience – that is, to knowledge of the 
different states of consciousness. […] This tendency toward concrete, 
experimental knowledge, in view of finally mastering that of which one has, 
so to speak, taken possession through knowing it, will be carried to its 
extreme by tantrism.”819 
                                                 
815 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 121. 
816 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 122. 
817 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 176. 
818 Eliade, Yoga, 40-41. 
819 Eliade, Yoga, 41. 
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This quotation marks the end of subchapter 7 which provided us with substantial 
insights as to Eliade’s remolding of yogic material. 
 
 
5.4.8. The Subconscious (subchapter I,8) 
 
The most striking feature about this chapter is that Eliade hardly quotes any 
sources. He presents the kleśas, the vāsanās and the vṛttis in a relatively free 
order and compares them to psychological findings and theories. 
 
He sets out by stating that Patañjali, analysing the “psychic individuality,” 
discovered five “’matrices’ producing psychomental states (cittavṛtti).”820  
Surprisingly these five cittavṛtti are here rendered as the five kleśas – Eliade 
enumerates avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dveśa and abhiniveśa (i.e. the kleśas) instead of 
pramāṇa, viparyaya, vikalpa, nidrā and smṛti (i.e. the vṛttis). He provides some 
kind of indirect justification of this quite drastic encroachment upon Patañjali’s 
text by calling the vṛttis “’painful’ (kleśa);”821 but this is an incorrect translation, 
painful being an adjective (kliṣṭa, cf. YS I,5) and kleśa a noun. Obviously, kleśa is 
derived from kliṣṭa, but in Patañjali it figures as a terminus technicus for what 
Dasgupta called “mental states” or “emotional elements” (cf. supra, chapters 
4.3.3.10 and 4.3.3.15) and which, according to him, are at the root of the five vṛttis 
(Patañjali does not establish an explicit link between vṛttis and kleśas). By calling 
the vṛttis kleśas Eliade provides yet another example for the terminological 
haziness which is part of his way of dealing with the Yogic sources. This is 
particularly grave since Eliade, with his knowledge of Sanskrit and use of 
Sanskrit terms, eludes every criticism on this level, shrouding himself in an aura 
of absolute expertise (not to mention his alleged three years with Dasgupta!).  
 
These vṛttis (or rather kleśas) “constitute the psychomental stream” and have to 
be worked with and manipulated by the yogin.822 According to Eliade it is not 
enough to eliminate avidyā, the fundamental ignorance which is the “ontological 
cause”823 of the vṛttis (kleśas), because the vāsanās, “reserves of latencies in the 
subconscious,”824 are lurking behind them, ready to immediately replace any 
abolished mental state. From this we have to conclude that the last source of the 
psychomental stream (to speak in Eliade’s terms) is constituted by the vāsanās 
and not by avidyā. Such a statement contradicts Dasgupta’s presentation 
according to which it is avidyā which produces the kleśas (or afflictions) which 
then give rise to the vāsanās (residual potency) and the saṃskāras (impressions or 
latent mental states), which again create the vṛttis (actual mental states). The 
uprooting of avidyā is presented throughout Dasgupta’s account as THE ultimate 
condition for liberation to take place (cf. also YS II,15-25). For Eliade however, 
 
                                                 
820 Eliade, Yoga, 41. 
821 Eliade, Yoga, 41. 
822 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 41. 
823 Eliade, Yoga, 41.  
824 Eliade, Yoga, 42. 
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“the concept of vāsanā […] is of primary importance in Yoga psychology; in 
Patañjali’s text, the term has the meaning ‘specific subconscious 
sensations.’”825  
 
Unfortunately, Eliade once more deprives his reader of an indication as to where 
exactly Patañjali says this (and it would indeed be hard to find a sūtra of such a 
content…). 
 
The vāsanās not only “constantly feed the psychomental stream, the infinite series 
of cittavṛttis,” but they are also “in the highest degree elusive, difficult to control 
and master.”826  
 
“In psychological terms, human existence is a continuous actualization of 
the subconscious through experiences. The vāsanās condition the specific 
character of each individual; and this conditioning is in accordance both 
with his heredity and with his karmic situation. Indeed, everything that 
defines the intransmissible specificity of the individual, as well as the 
structure of human instincts, is produced by the vāsanās, by the 
subconscious.”827 
 
By the end of this quotation, the vāsanās have become synonymous with the 
subconscious, and, in conformity with what he already wrote in his foreword,828 
Eliade again claims that 
 
“[i]t is only through Yoga that they [the vāsanās] can be known, controlled, 
‘burned.’”829 
 
This deconditioning of the subconscious seems to be the aspect of Yoga which 
fascinated Eliade most and which he was keenest on informing the West about 
(cf. also supra, chapter 5.1). He repeats it once more a bit further down: 
 
“[…] for yogic psychology and technique the role of the subconscious 
(vāsanā) is considerable, because it conditions not only a man’s actual 
experience but also his native predispositions, as well as his future voluntary 
decisions. Hence it is useless to try to change states of consciousness 
(cittavṛtti) as long as the psychomental latencies (vāsanā) have not also been 
controlled and mastered. If the ‘destruction’ of the cittavṛttis is to succeed, it 
is indispensable that the circuit ‘subconscious-consciousness’ be broken. 
This is what Yoga attempts to attain by the application of a series of 
techniques, all of which, broadly speaking, aim at annihilating the 
psychomental flux, undertake to ‘arrest’ it.”830 
                                                 
825 Eliade, Yoga, 42. 
826 Eliade, Yoga, 42. 
827 Eliade, Yoga, 42. 
828 “[…] the great obstacles to the ascetic and contemplative life arose from the activity of the 
unconscious, from the saṃskāras and the vāsanās – “impregnations,” “residues,” “latencies” – that 
constitute what depth psychology calls the contents and structures of the unconscious. […] for India, 
knowledge of the systems of “conditioning” could not be an end in itself; it was not knowing them 
that mattered, but mastering them; if the contents of the unconscious were worked upon, it was in 
order to “burn” them. We shall see by what methods Yoga conceives that it arrives at these surprising 
results.” (Eliade, Yoga, xvii) 
829 Eliade, Yoga, 43. 
830 Eliade, Yoga, 44-45. 
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He next describes “the continuous circuit established between the different 
biomental levels,” characteristic for human consciousness “as well as the entire 
cosmos.”831 Vāsanās (subliminal latencies) create vṛttis (psychomental states) and 
these produce karma (acts) which again lead to new vāsanās…832 This cycle 
(which two pages further down is called “subconscious-consciousness,” as a 
result of yet another one of Eliade’s shift of terminology)833 is somewhat simpler 
than Dasgupta’s chain of mental states,834 mainly because Eliade does not 
distinguish between kleśas and vṛttis and leaves out avidyā. To eliminate (or 
“burn”) the vāsanas “means that the Self (puruṣa) detaches itself from the flux of 
psychic life,”835 an event which simultaneously liberates a fragment of matter 
(through a process which is not easy to comprehend – Eliade talks of the mental 
energy, “determined by the karmic law and projected by ignorance,” which 
emerges from asmitā [“personality”] and returns to prakṛti).836 Yogic technique is 
the means to step out of this otherwise endless circuit and, according to Eliade,  
 
“the yogin contributes, directly and personally, to the repose of matter, to 
abolishing at least a fragment of the cosmos.”837 
 
Obviously, it is prakṛti’s exit from stage (cf. SK 59) which in Eliade’s language is 
rendered as “the repose of matter” or “abolishing a fragment of the cosmos” – a 
terminology Dasgupta would never have used. 
 
Next Eliade claims that  
 
“[…] according to Patañjali, a consciousness filled with “painful” (kliṣṭa, 
“impure”) states cannot also contain states that are “pure” (akliṣṭa).”838 
 
This contradicts Dasgupta who wrote that 
 
“[t]here is no hard and fast rule with regard to the appearance of these 
klishṭa and aklishṭa states, so that in the stream of the klishṭa states or in the 
intervals thereof, aklishṭa states may also appear […].”839 
 
In any case, Eliade provides no textual source for his statement but focuses on 
suffering, which is due to the above mentioned predominance of painful states. 
                                                 
831 Eliade, Yoga, 43. 
832 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 43. 
833 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 44-45. 
834 Which says that avidyā creates the kleśas which are doubly active: On the one hand they produce 
the vāsanās and the saṃskāras which then create the vṛttis which again produce more saṃskāras; on 
the other hand the kleśas are also the cause of the four passions which are responsible for the 
accumulation of karma. 
835 Eliade, Yoga, 43. 
836 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 43-44. 
837 Eliade, Yoga, 44. 
838 Eliade, Yoga, 44. 
839 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 100-101. 
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“Pain is a universal datum, but few are they who have the courage for 
renunciation and the strength to travel the road of deliverance to the end, for 
as long as life is dominated by kliṣṭas, every virtue that goes beyond them is 
immediately blocked, doomed to be abortive.”840 
 
Suffering however triggers off the longing for pure (akliṣṭa) states, a longing 
which in turn gives rise to the desire for knowledge. 
 
“[…] it is through knowledge that the nature of experience is revealed and 
that kliṣṭas can be cast aside as the result of higher cognitive process (viveka, 
‘metaphysical discrimination’).”841 
 
Eliade ends this chapter with an evaluation of 
 
“[…] the profundity of the psychological analyses that we owe to Patañjali 
and his commentators. Long before psychoanalysis, Yoga showed the 
importance of the role played by the subconscious.”842 
 
He adds that on the one hand the vāsanās want to actualise themselves, but on 
the other hand there is also “the thirst for extinction, for ‘repose,’ that occurs at all 
levels of the cosmos.”843 Eliade interprets the fact that every vāsanā which has 
manifested itself and perishes immediately afterwards as the expression of a 
“thirst to cease to be what one is.”844 This allows him to draw the following 
conclusion: 
 
“[…] every ‘form,’ every ‘appearance,’ and every ‘state’ – of whatever kind – 
that inhabits the universe is driven by the same instinct for liberation by 
which man is driven. The whole cosmos has the same tendency as man to 
return to the primordial Unity.”845 
 
 
5.4.9. Dasgupta’s article “Yoga Psychology” 
 
After so much psychology from Eliade it is time to examine Dasgupta’s article 
“Yoga Psychology,” read at a meeting of the Quest Society on June 2nd, 1921 in 
England.846 Composed in a comparatively non-technical language, for a spiritually 
interested but not India-specialised Western audience, it presents what Dasgupta 
alternatively calls “Yoga-psychology” and “Yoga system” in far more general 
terms than his Yoga as Philosophy and Religion. In this short article Dasgupta 
speaks of the subconscious far more often than in his Yoga book (where this word 
appears exactly once in the index) and in fact we find sentences which are very 
similar to some of Eliade’s assertions. For example:  
 
                                                 
840 Eliade, Yoga, 44. 
841 Eliade, Yoga, 44. 
842 Eliade, Yoga, 45. 
843 Eliade, Yoga, 45. 
844 Eliade, Yoga, 45. 
845 Eliade, Yoga, 45-46. 
846 This Society was founded by G. R. S. Mead, who was formerly an important member of the 
Theosophical Society of Blavatsky. 
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“The existence of the mental states in potential forms in the sub-conscious is 
the root-idea of Yoga-psychology.”847 
 
Or, as far as the conditioning of the human being is concerned: 
 
“These semi-effaced mental states often determine the mode and nature of 
our choice. In most cases, when we think that we are acting freely, we are in 
reality being determined by these hidden experiences of the past operating 
unseen. These semi-effaced mental states which reveal themselves as 
unaccountable tendencies of the mind, are technically called vāsanā.”848 
 
And, as to the aim of Yoga: 
 
“The significance of the Yoga theory of psychology with regard to ethical 
conduct is that it is possible to control not only our external conduct but also 
our inner thought.  
[…] 
A Yogin seeks deliverance from every bondage, even from the bondage of 
his mind.”849 
 
So there is, undoubtedly, a major concordance between Dasgupta and Eliade in 
these fundamental statements (among which we also find Eliade’s favourite 
conception that Yoga is able to control the subconscious). Dasgupta, like Eliade, 
wanted to present his English audience with something they could not only relate 
to but something which also went beyond what they might so far have heard 
about Western psychology. Yet many differences between the two remain, apart 
from the discrepancies already discussed in the preceding chapters. Thus, 
Dasgupta insists on the fact that consciousness is conferred by the self (puruṣa): 
 
“[…] our conscious experiences are made conscious by some entity other 
than themselves […].”850 
 
In other words: Yoga psychology provides a proof for the existence of the self,851 
an evidence which Eliade did not consider necessary to supply. For him, the 
existence of the Absolute or the Transcendent was self-evident, being one of his 
four “basic [...] concepts [which] bring us directly to the core of Indian 
spirituality” (cf. supra, chapter 5.4.1) and “an axiom abundantly repeated in 
Indian literature and adopted by Yoga.”852 
 
Dasgupta also writes a lot more about the guṇas (which he calls “feeling-
substances”)853  and their teleological function than Eliade for whom the fact that 
                                                 
847 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 186. 
848 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 190. 
849 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 194. 
850 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 185-186; cf. also 183. 
851 Cf. Also the following passage: „The only psychological ground on which the self can be inferred is 
the necessity of accounting for the peculiar trait of consciousness, viz., of its illuminating, which 
cannot be said to belong to the mental states themselves.” (Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 186) 
852 Eliade, Yoga, 25. 
853 Cf. Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 186-188. 
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“every compound exists in view of another” is something which “common sense” 
tells us.854 
Instead of interpreting the manifestation of vāsanās as an expression of their wish 
to become liberated (because at the moment of manifestation they are destroyed 
and therefore return to some “primordial unity”) Dasgupta focuses on the fact 
that every perception and every experience passes away into the subconscious 
“and may be revived partially or completely later on.”855 According to him, 
 
“[t]here is nothing which comes into being from nothing, and there is 
nothing which is absolutely destroyed.”856 
 
Nowhere in his writings Dasgupta mentions anything like the “return to 
primordial unity.” 
 
In “Yoga Psychology” Dasgupta describes the “ordinary mental processes” which 
with him are the five vṛttis857 (and not the kleśas). He stresses the importance of 
will power and concentration to “attain final emancipation from the bonds of all 
worldly experience”858 and talks at some length about the “law of contrary mental 
states (pratipakṣa-bhāvanā).”859 This law is based on YS II,33 and says that evil or 
bad thoughts can be uprooted by the opposite positive or good thought. 
Dasgupta admits that in such a case 
 
“[…] any sub-conscious mental state or tendency can be ultimately 
destroyed by generating opposite mental states.”860 
 
He talks of different levels or layers in the subconscious and how a good thought 
has to grow stronger and stronger in order to go deeper and deeper into the 
subconscious until it destroys the roots of the opposite evil.861 This process (which 
involves another law according to which “the repetition of any mental state will 
strengthen the corresponding impression of it in the sub-conscious”)862 is the only 
way to overcome negative subconscious impressions. Eliade will mention 
pratipakṣa-bhāvanā in his next chapter but in a very different light (cf. infra, 
chapter 5.5.1). 
 
As to the practical aspect of Yoga, Dasgupta mentions only yama and niyama (for 
the “attainment of perfect morality and self-control”)863 and then dhāraṇā 
(attempt to “restrain [the] mind from the many different objects of thought”) and 
dhyāna (“to hold one object only continually to [one’s] attention”).864 Not one 
word about the intermediate stages āsana, prāṇāyāma and pratyāhāra, and 
                                                 
854 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 24. 
855 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 189. 
856 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 189. 
857 Cf. Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 191-192. 
858 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 192. 
859 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 192. 
860 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 193. 
861 Cf. Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 193-194. 
862 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 193. 
863 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 194. 
864 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 195. 
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certainly no emphasis whatsoever on physiological techniques (as with Eliade, cf. 
supra, chapter 5.4.7). Once the mind has become absolutely still it has reached 
samādhi which gives rise to prajñā. 
 
“It is this knowledge alone which the Yogin considers to be supremely 
real.”865 
 
Eliade hardly ever mentions prajñā – his understanding of liberation is more in 
terms of unity than in terms of knowledge. The two following quotations should 
suffice to show the fundamental difference between Eliade’s esoterico-religious 
language and Dasgupta’s orthodox and close-to-the sources vocabulary. 
 
“Through samādhi, the yogin transcends opposites and, in a unique 
experience, unites emptiness and superabundance, life and death, Being and 
nonbeing. Nor is this all. Like all paradoxical states, samādhi is equivalent to 
a reintegration of the different modalities of the real in a single modality – 
the undifferentiated completeness of precreation, the primordial Unity.”866 
 
“In this part of the Yoga theory there seem to be three things which may 
appear to us as assumptions, but which the Yogins affirm to be undeniable 
facts of experience. These are: firstly, that the changeful processes of the 
mind can at a certain state be brought to a standstill; secondly, that such a 
state can give us a new grade or dimension of knowledge; and thirdly, that, 
as a culmination and highest advancement of this knowledge, the pure 
individual self as pure intelligence can be known.”867 
 
To conclude: The comparison of Dasgupta’s talk on Yoga psychology in 1921 (in 
which he addressed a Western audience and therefore had to present his topic in 
a somewhat simpler form than in his Yoga as Philosophy and Religion) with what 
we have read by Eliade so far, shows that already Dasgupta interpreted Yoga in 
terms of Western psychology, describing vāsanās and saṃskāras as subconscious 
impressions and the passage from vṛttis to vāsanās as a passage from the 
conscious to the subconscious level (etc.). Nevertheless, the discrepancies 
between Eliade’s and Dasgupta’s account of the Yoga system by far outnumber 
the points in which they coincide, corroborating the results obtained by the 
analysis of Eliade’s first chapter of his book (“The Doctrines of Yoga”). 
 
 
                                                 
865 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 196. 
866 Eliade, Yoga, 98. 
867 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 196. 
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5.4.10. Conclusions 
 
Let us first look at the Sanskrit sources Eliade referred to in subchapters 7 and 8, 
in order to compare them to the passages referred to in subchapter 1 to 6 (cf. 
supra, chapter 5.4.6) and to Dasgupta’s list (cf. supra, chapter 4.6.1). 
 












I,1 Vyāsabhāṣya The modalities of consciousness (citta 
bhūmi) 
I,7 
I,2 Patañjali Definition of Yoga as “the 
suppression of states of 
consciousness” 
I,7 
I,2 Vyāsabhāṣya The influence of the guṇas on human 
consciousness 
I,7 
I,8 Patañjali Ignorance (avidyā) I,8 
I,34  Vyāsabhāṣya Practice leads to belief (śraddhā) I,7 
II,1 Tattvavaiśāradī On kriyā (action) I,7 
II,3 Patañjali, 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
The kleśas I,8 
III,6 Vyāsabhāṣya One can only pass on to the next step 
in Yoga once the preceding level is 
mastered 
I,7 
IV,9 Vyāsabhāṣya The vāsanās originate from memory I,8 
 
 





Author Topic (as discussed 
by Eliade) 
Sub-chapter (of 







Women rely on texts, 
men on their own 
experience 
I,7 
Śiva Saṃhitā IV, 
9-11 
Unknown Practice (abhyāsa) I,7 
 
These lists show once more that Eliade used the sources quite independently from 
his master: the coincidences with Dasgupta are only slight (YS I,1, I,8, II,3 and 
IV,9). As opposed to the subchapters 1 to 6, the majority of the passages quoted 
are derived from the Yogasūtra; Sāṃkhya as well as Vedāntic texts have been 
dropped completely. Generally speaking Eliade, in these two very psychological 
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chapters, refers to Indian sources far less than in subchapters 1-6: 11 quotations 
on the 11 pages taken up by chapters 7 and 8 (one quotation per page), as against 
48 quotations on the 33 pages of the first 6 chapters (1,45 quotations per page), 
corresponds roughly to a drop of 30%.  
 
In order to complete the analysis of Eliade’s first chapter of Yoga. Immortality and 
Freedom, let us briefly recapitulate the subjects he dwelled upon in subchapters 7 
and 8 (for subchapters 1 – 6, cf. supra, chapter 5.4.6).  
 
Subchapters 7 and 8, topics discussed by Eliade 
 
- the Yoga darśana consists of an ascetic technique and a method of 
contemplation 
- the Yoga darśana is a gnosis and needs a practice (abhyāsa) in the form 
of an ascesis (tapas) – in short, a physiological technique 
- there are three categories of states of consciousness and three groups of 
corresponding sciences (all attributed to Patañjali but without any 
indication of the source) 
- Vyāsa’s five modalities of consciousness 
- Patañjali is the perfect representative of the “Indian soul” and the 
“immemorial Indian tradition” of the correspondence between 
microcosm and macrocosm 
- Yoga’s aim to destroy the cittavṛtti can only be reached if one has 
experimental knowledge of those mental states 
- experimental knowledge means method, technique, practice or: acting 
and practising asceticism 
- abhyāsa is practice and experience 
- a yogin has to experience all states of life; experience leads to freedom 
- the five cittavṛttis are explained as being the kleśas which constitute the 
psychomental stream 
- this psychomental stream is constantly fed by the vāsanās, the specific 
subconscious sensations 
- the Yogin has to control and master his subconscious (the vāsanās) 
- the normal mind is filled with painful states which accounts for the fact 
that pain is universal. Other states hardly stand a chance to manifest 
themselves. 
- pain triggers off the desire for knowledge  
- every vāsanā which manifests itself perishes at the same time – this is a 
proof for the fact that everything in the universe has a tendency to 
return to the primordial unity. 
 
Only a minute part of these themes can be traced back to or find a parallel in 
Dasgupta,868 the overwhelming part of them represent Eliade’s own 
interpretation.  
 
                                                 
868 Dasgupta also lists Vyāsa’s five modalities of consciousness; he would agree to Yoga’s aim being to 
destroy the cittavṛtti and he also showed that the vāsanās have an urge to manifest themselves as 
vṛttis which means that the Yogin has to control them. 
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As far as Dasgupta is concerned it is interesting to note that in his speech “Yoga 
Psychology,” directed at a British audience in 1921, he freely interpreted Patañjali 
in terms of conscious – subconscious. In Yoga as Philosophy and Religion however, 
he refrained from using this terminology; the vāsanās are no longer “mental 
states in potential forms in the sub-conscious”869 but simply a “residual 
potency”870 and saṃskāras are only “latent [mental] states,”871 not “subconscious” 
ones. Very striking is the fact that Dasgupta, in Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, 
does not once mention what he called the “law of contrary mental states 
(pratipakṣa-bhāvanā),”872 described by Patañjali in YS II,33 and which, according to 
Dasgupta in 1921, was the only way to overcome negative subconscious 
impressions. It is as if Dasgupta, after his two years in Cambridge and after 
revising his first version of the Yoga system in 1924, decided to present Patañjali’s 
philosophy in a way which lent itself less to immediate identifications with 
Western psychological concepts. Eliade, 30 years later, annihilates this careful 
distance of his (undoubtedly proud Indian) master and, taking a Western point of 
view, incorporates Yoga into psychology, certainly exceeding the limits of what 
Patañjali and his commentators might have agreed to be legitimate parallels with 
Jung or Freud. 
 
 
5.5. Techniques of Autonomy (chapter II) 
 
5.5.1. Concentration “on a Single Point” (subchapter II,1) 
 
After “The Doctrines of Yoga,” with its six subchapters using mainly Sāṃkhya 
sources and two subchapters drawing more on Patañjali, and all of them heavily 
tainted by Eliade’s own interest in psychology and esoterics, let us now turn to 
“Techniques of Autonomy” which promises less theory and more practice. 
 
Eliade sets out by talking about ekāgratā, the “determined and continuous 
concentration,”873 which he equals to yogaḥ cittavṛttinirodhaḥ (YS I,2). Ekāgratā is 
a vital technique since the normal mind (“profane consciousness”)874 is at the 
mercy of the senses and the subconscious and therefore not master of itself. 
According to Eliade, Yoga practice begins with ekāgratā, but it soon becomes 
clear that the “ability to intervene, at will and directly, in the functioning of these 
two sources of mental ‘whirlwinds’ (cittavṛtti)”875 (namely sense activity and the 
activity of the subconscious [here surprisingly called “saṃskāra” and not 
vāsanā]) presupposes a series of exercises and techniques, in short: the eight 
aṅgas. Eliade’s definition of these members of Yoga is quite orthodox and without 
surprises. In this subchapter he deals with the yamas and the niyamas, relying 
mostly on Vyāsa’s commentary (on YS II,30 and II,32) and pointing out twice that 
                                                 
869 Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 186. 
870 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 99. 
871 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 97. 
872 Dasgupta, Yoga Psychology, 192. 
873 Eliade, Yoga, 47. 
874 Eliade, Yoga, 47. 
875 Eliade, Yoga, 48. 
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these ethical preliminaries have “nothing specifically yogic” about them,876 
meaning that they are universal.877 
 
The only passage which asks for a comment is the one on pratipakṣa-bhāvana. 
Eliade refuses the standard translation of vitarka as “bad or guilty thoughts” but 
chooses the (lexically also correct) translation of this word as “doubt, 
uncertainty.”878 
 
“[…] Patañjali is evidently referring to the “temptation by doubt” that all 
ascetic treatises recognize and combat.”879 
 
Patañjali’s explanation of vitarka however (in YS II,34 which Eliade even 
mentions in a footnote) hardly allows the interpretation as “doubt” – he clearly 
refers to the opposite states of the yamas and niyamas (“hiṃsā etc.”), making it 
evident that he is talking about what happens when the yogin is attacked by 
thoughts contradicting the ten ideals represented by the first two aṅgas. For such 
a case he recommends the practice of bringing to mind the positive opposite 
thought, in other words the practice of the concentration on the yamas and 
niyamas (what Dasgupta called “the law of contrary mental states,” cf. supra, 
chapter 5.4.9). Once more, Patañjali’s “evidence” is not what Eliade pretends it to 
be; and once more the Romanian religionist manages to arrange things in a 
deluding way: First, he does not quote his source (YS II,34) but just globally 
indicates it, then he somewhat devitalises his “doubt”-argumentation by 
suddenly equalling “doubts” (now in the plural!) to (the more correct) “vices,”880 
and finally he refers to a note in the back of his book where he describes the 
obstacles a yogi is facing, implying that they are what Patañjali explains in YS 
II,34 (whereas, in reality, these nine obstacles are listed in YS I,30 and have 
nothing to do with the yamas and niyamas). All of this happens so smoothly and 
fast in only one sentence (“In the following sūtra [note: Yoga-sūtras, II,34], 
Patañjali explains the nature of these “doubts” or “vices.” [note: see note II,1, on 
the obstacles to yogic concentration]”)881 that an unprepared reader would never 
notice the shifts and would be convinced that Eliade is faithfully rendering 
Patañjali’s text. 
 
The “doubts” or “vices” of YS II,34 having become the “obstacles” of YS I,30, 
Eliade points out that  
 
“the yogin’s struggle against any of these ‘obstacles’ is magical in 
character.”882 
                                                 
876 Eliade, Yoga, 49 (and 51: these exercises “in general, have no yogic structure”). 
877 “The first two groups, yama and niyama, obviously constitute the necessary preliminaries for any 
type of asceticism […].” (Eliade, Yoga, 49) 
878 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 51. 
879 Eliade, Yoga, 51-52. 
880 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 52. 
881 Eliade, Yoga, 52. These obstacles are sickness, languor, indecision, insensibility, softness (inertia of 
mind and body), sensuality, false knowledge, inability to see the reality and instability (cf. Eliade, 
Yoga, 381). 
882 Eliade, Yoga, 52. 
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The yogin, by conquering temptations, gains magical powers or “siddhis” – but 
what Eliade describes as such in this context are simply the results of practising 
the yamas and the niyamas and refer exclusively to YS II,37-43. Thus, someone 
who practises asteya (who refuses to steal) “sees all jewels come to him,” and 
śauca leads to “disgust with one’s own body, and cessation of contact with other 
bodies,” as well as to “ekāgratā – that is, authority over the senses and ability to 
know the soul.”883 Eliade further quotes the outcome of practising saṃtoṣa, 
contentment and tapas, asceticism – the first gives an “inexpressible happiness” 
and the second “removes impurities and establishes a new power over the senses 
– that is, the possibility of passing beyond their limits (clairvoyance, 
clairaudience, mind reading, etc.) or of suppressing them at will.”884 None of these 
are called “siddhis” by Patañjali in the second chapter, and only the results of 
tapas can qualify as such as explained by Patañjali in chapter III (cf. YS III,16 and 
III,19). 
 
With this chapter ends Eliade’s discussion of the first two steps of the Yoga path 
(yama and niyama). Once more we encountered Eliade’s fondness for everything 
universal – yama and niyama have, “in general, […] no yogic structure,”885 and 
trouble arising from doubt is something which “all ascetic treatises recognize and 
combat.”886 The more universal Yoga can be the better – even if the scriptural 
evidence has to be modified (and partly falsified) to reach this aim (cf. vitarka). 
 
What interested Eliade most in the yamas and niyamas, apart from their 
universality, were the (at least partly) magical powers gained by their practice. 
 
“The concept of this almost physical equilibrium between renunciation and 
the magical fruits of renunciation is remarkable.”887 
 
We could also see that Eliade’s handling of terminology in this chapter was again 
rather shady or imprecise; whenever he moves on slightly precarious grounds 
(which he was certainly aware of) he has a tendency to string together a series of 
terms producing the impression that they are all more or less synonymous (in this 
case “doubts,” “vices,” “obstacles,” “temptation”). This allows him to interpret 
Patañjali in the way he wants him to be for his Western audience. A very complex 
example of Eliade’s modification of his Indian sources can be found in footnote 5 
of this chapter, inserted after the word “Īśvara” in the text.888 In it, Eliade refers to 
a passage in Yoga as Philosophy and Religion where Dasgupta remarks that 
 
“the late commentators […] believe that Īśvara removes the barriers created 
by prakṛti, barriers that are powerful obstacles on the yogin’s path.”889  
 
                                                 
883 Eliade, Yoga, 52. 
884 Eliade, Yoga, 52. 
885 Eliade, Yoga, 51. 
886 Eliade, Yoga, 51-52. 
887 Eliade, Yoga, 52. 
888 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 50. 
889 Eliade, Yoga, 50. 
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This statement is true and false at the same time. It is true in the sense that Īśvara 
IS said to remove barriers in prakṛti, but the barriers Dasgupta is speaking of are 
those inherent in prakṛti, retaining her energy in potential form; as soon as these 
barriers are removed, the evolutionary process can start.890 Without this 
(admittedly rather complicated) Sāṃkhya background a reader of Eliade’s book 
might be lead to think that Īśvara is removing the obstacles Eliade alludes to a 
little bit later on (and which get mixed up with vitarka – doubt or the temptations 
represented by the opposites of the yamas and niyamas). Of course, such a 
conclusion would again not be wrong because Īśvara does help the devoted yogin 
and does remove the obstacles from his path (cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.14; Dasgupta 
even explicitly mentions the obstacles listed in YS I,30-31), but this cannot be 
deduced from the above passage. Eliade cannot be said to forcefully distort 
Patañjali but he certainly simplifies the theoretical background, takes shortcuts 
and leaves out whatever would be too technical. He retains exactly those terms 
and passages which serve his purpose, which is to depict Yoga as a perfect 
example for THE Indian spirituality which is universal in the sense that it shows 
how the profane man yearns and aspires to be liberated in the sacred Primordial 
Unity. Yoga is also initiatory and magical and anticipates the Western discovery 
of the subconscious by many hundred (if not thousand) years. 
 
 
5.5.2. Yogic Postures (āsana) and Respiratory Discipline (prāṇāyāma) 
(subchapter II,2) 
 
The third aṅga (āsana) marks the beginning of the “yogic technique, properly 
speaking.”891 It is interesting to observe how Eliade maintains a perfect ambiguity 
as to the exact nature of āsana. On the one hand he mentions the lists of āsanas 
given in the haṭha yoga texts (without specifying any of the non-sitting postures 
though!), on the other hand he speaks of “the well-known yogic posture,” 
“position of meditation”892 or “meditational positions.”893 Never does he explicitly 
talk of “sitting postures” but the only āsana he describes in detail is padmāsana, 
“one of the easiest and most common of the meditational positions.”894 And in his 
note II,2 Eliade writes of “the yogic posture” and about the fact that “a number of 
the seals found at Mohenjo-daro represent divinities in the āsana position,”895 
both statements undoubtedly referring to sitting āsanas. 
 
According to Eliade, Patañjali only very briefly talks about āsana (three sūtras 
alltogether) because “āsana is learned from a guru and not from descriptions.”896 
This explanation however is not very convincing since it does not apply to the 
                                                 
890 Cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.8. 
891 Eliade, Yoga, 53. 
892 Eliade, Yoga, 53. 
893 Eliade, Yoga, 54. 
894 Eliade, Yoga, 54. Padmāsana might be one of the most common postures but it is certainly not the 
easiest one; and the variation Eliade describes (quoting Gheraṇḍa Saṃhitā II,8) is clearly baddha 
padmāsana, an even more difficult exercise. 
895 Eliade, Yoga, 382. 
896 Eliade, Yoga, 53. 
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haṭha yoga texts where postures are amply described.897 In any case Eliade treats 
the Yogasūtra and the haṭha yoga tradition as one and the same, quoting mostly 
from Patañjali but repeatedly alluding to tantric works and thus implying that 
Patañjali practised identical exercises as his haṭha yogic followers. This mixture of 
traditions cannot be traced back to Dasgupta who made it clear that āsana with 
Patañjali exclusively meant sitting postures (cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.13).  
 
Eliade also points out that “āsana is one of the characteristic techniques of Indian 
asceticism”898 which can already be found in the Upaniṣads, in Vedic literature, in 
the Mahābhārata and in the Purāṇas. In note II,2 he lists a few passages from such 
texts, never making it clear however what exactly the term āsana means, 
vacillating between “the yogic posture” and “the postures” (in plural, when 
talking about haṭha yoga sources). As with the yamas and niyamas he insists on 
the “very marked magical value”899 of āsanas in the haṭha yoga tradition, 
“magical” here referring to the healing and other effects ascribed to the postures.  
 
“Āsana gives the body a stable rigidity, at the same time reducing physical effort 
to a minimum”900 (cf. YS II,46) and it is perfected “when the mind is transformed 
into infinity”901 (cf. YS II,47). Whereas with Dasgupta, āsana is simply necessary 
for the higher yogic stages but does not otherwise retain his attention in any way, 
Eliade sees in āsana “the first concrete step taken for the purpose of abolishing the 
modalities of human existence”902 in the sense that āsana is an ekāgratā on the 
physical level, a concentration of the body in a single position. 
 
“Just as ekāgratā puts an end to the fluctuation and dispersion of the states 
of consciousness, so āsana puts an end to the mobility and disposability of 
the body, by reducing the infinity of possible positions to a single 
archetypal, iconographic posture. We shall soon see that the tendency 
toward ‘unification’ and ‘totalization’ is a feature of all yogic techniques.”903 
 
A (Jungian!) archetypal posture standing for a unification process – this definition 
of āsana is very Eliadian and quite remote from Dasgupta. 
 
Āsana, the “refusal to move,” is followed by “a long series of refusals of every 
kind,” the most important one being prāṇāyāma, the fourth member of the path 
and defined by Eliade as “the disciplining of respiration” or “the “refusal” to 
breathe like the majority of mankind, that is, nonrhythmically.”904 As with āsana 
before, Patañjali dedicates only very few sūtras to prāṇāyāma, but this time not 
because these techniques have to be learnt from a guru but because Patañjali “is 
primarily concerned with the theoretical bases of ascetic practices.”905 
                                                 
897 “Lists and descriptions of āsanas are to be found in most of the tantric and Haṭha-yogic treatises.” 
(Eliade, Yoga, 54) 
898 Eliade, Yoga, 53. 
899 Eliade, Yoga, 382. 
900 Eliade, Yoga, 53. 
901 Eliade, Yoga, 53. 
902 Eliade, Yoga, 54. 
903 Eliade, Yoga, 55. 
904 All quotations in this sentence: Eliade, Yoga, 55. 
905 Eliade, Yoga, 55. 
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Bhoja’s commentary on YS I,34 contains a remark which fascinates Eliade more 
than anything else in connection with breathing: 
 
“[T]here [is] always a connection between respiration and consciousness 
[…].”906 
 
This relation serves as an instrument for what Eliade calls “unifying 
consciousness,”907 which means that a yogi who breathes rhythmically and slowly 
can 
 
“penetrate – that is, he can experience, in perfect lucidity – certain states of 
consciousness that are inaccessible in a waking condition, particularly the 
states of consciousness that are peculiar to sleep.”908 
 
Prāṇāyāma, according to Eliade, is the means to reach the four (Vedāntic) 
modalities of consciousness, 
 
“diurnal consciousness, consciousness in sleep with dreams, consciousness 
in sleep without dreams, and ‘cataleptic consciousness.’”909 
 
For this statement Eliade does not refer to any Yoga text but quite obviously to his 
own observations in Rishikesh where 
 
“numerous sannyāsis admitted to us that the goal of prāṇāyāma was to make 
the practitioner enter the state called turīya, the “cataleptic” state.”910  
 
And he seems to be remembering his own practical efforts at Svārgaśram when 
he says that 
 
“experience of the four modalities of consciousness (to which a particular 
respiratory rhythm naturally corresponds), together with unification of 
consciousness (resulting from the yogin’s getting rid of the discontinuity 
between these four modalities), can only be realised after long practice.”911 
 
Since this aim is so hard to reach, the immediate goal of prāṇāyāma is to make 
breathing rhythmical, irregular breathing producing “a dangerous psychic 
fluidity with consequent instability and diffusion of attention.”912 A yogin has to 
harmonize his inhalation, exhalation and the retention of the inhaled air. 
 
“These three moments must each fill an equal space of time.”913 
 
With practice, the duration of these three phases can be increasingly extended, 
slowing down the respiration until it can be suspended at will. 
                                                 
906 Eliade, Yoga, 55. 
907 Eliade, Yoga, 56. 
908 Eliade, Yoga, 56. 
909 Eliade, Yoga, 56. 
910 Eliade, Yoga, 57, note 24. 
911 Eliade, Yoga, 57. 
912 Eliade, Yoga, 57. 
913 Eliade, Yoga, 58. 
Mircea Eliade and Surendranath Dasgupta 185
Eliade ends this chapter with a discussion of mātrāprāmāṇa, “the unit of 
measurement for the duration of respiration.”914 He quotes two later texts (the 
Skanda Purāṇa and the Yogacintāmaṇi) but again refers to the “practice of 
prāṇāyāma”915 which, maybe, was his own during his stay in Rishikesh. 
 
Eliade’s fascination with breathing (or rather with the connection of breathing 
with consciousness) is clearly noticeable in this chapter. Many passages recall the 
exercises practised by Dr. Zerlendi in Eliade’s short novel The Secret of Dr. 
Honigberger (cf. supra, chapter 2.3). Even though Eliade avoids talking directly 
about his own efforts, certain sentences do read like a personal statement.916 
 
Dasgupta had treated āsana and prāṇāyāma very briefly and nearly casually; on 
āsana he said practically nothing, and although he called prāṇāyāma “accessory” 
to the last three aṅgas of yoga (together with pratyāhāra) he did not show much 
interest in its practice. On the theoretical or philosophical level, Dasgupta saw 
prāṇāyāma as a means to “cleanse the mind of impurities and make it steady”917 
(cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.13), in other words: to help the mind concentrate better. 
Eliade’s focus and vocabulary is quite different; he never talks of impurities, and 
instead of concentration he uses the term “unification.” A unified consciousness 
(concentrated mind?) can penetrate the four Vedāntic stages of consciousness 
(which Dasgupta of course never mentions, not mingling other philosophical 
systems with Yoga and Sāṃkhya), and this unification is achieved through 
rhythmic and slow breathing. Eliade was undoubtedly influenced by his 
encounter with Vedāntic ascetics in Rishikesh and we can safely assume that he 
had some experience with breathing rhythmically. Furthermore, his professed 
interest in yogic practice in general accounts for the fact that with him both āsana 
and prāṇāyāma acquire more weight and significance than with Dasgupta. 
Eliade’s predilection for this subject is also underlined by the next chapter, an 
excursus on breathing in other cultures than India.  
 
 
                                                 
914 Eliade, Yoga, 58. 
915 Eliade, Yoga, 59. 
916 For example: “In the first days of practice, concentration on the vital function of respiration 
produces an inexpressible sensation of harmony, a rhythmic and melodic plenitude, a leveling of all 
physiological unevennesses. Later it brings an obscure feeling of presence in one’s own body, a calm 
consciousness of one’s own greatness. Obviously, these are simple data, accessible to everyone, 
experienced by all who attempt this preliminary discipline of respiration.” (Eliade, Yoga, 58) 
917 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 137. 
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5.5.3. Excursus: Prāṇāyāma in Extra-Indian Asceticism (subchapter II,3) 
 
Eliade presents breathing techniques of Taoism, Islamic mysticism and 
Hesychasm, referring to numerous studies on these respective subjects. In all 
three domains he postulates an Indian influence, even though such an impact has 
only been proved for parts of Islam.918 In the case of Taoism, it can only be 
maintained with important restrictions919 and, as far as Hesychasm is concerned, 
the Indian influence is nothing more but a hypothesis.920 The crucial point to 
remember here is the fact that Eliade does not consider the possibility of 
spontaneous similar developments in different cultures but favours a vision 
where India is the origin of certain techniques which spread out to other 
countries. This corresponds to his endeavour to depict Yoga as a model practice 
and philosophy, ideally representing Indian spirituality as a whole. Eliade seems 
to be more interested in similarities than in differences, with a marked tendency 
to “overlook” or even suppress discrepancies. 
 
 
5.5.4. Yogic Concentration and Meditation (subchapter II,4) 
 
Eliade now turns towards the next steps in Yoga (i.e. pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā and 
dhyāna), but only after a discussion of what the Yogin has achieved so far.  
 
“Motionless, breathing rhythmically, eyes and attention fixed on a single 
point, the yogin experiences a passing beyond the secular modality of 
existence. […] the psychomental stream is no longer either invaded or 
directed by distractions, automatisms, and memory: it is ‘concentrated,’ 
‘unified.’”921 
 
Concentrated in this way, “the yogin’s sensation of his body is wholly different 
from that of the noninitiate;”922 according to Eliade he now feels similar to a plant. 
And although such a “return to the vegetable modality of life”923 does not at all 
correspond to the goals of Yoga, Eliade nevertheless establishes a link between 
the vegetable correspondences of yogic posture, respiration and concentration 
and “the archaic symbolism of ‘rebirth.’”924 Referring to embryonic respiration of 
Taoism, to the embryonic position in which many peoples bury their dead as well 
as to the fact that certain ceremonies of initiation are performed in a closed space, 
symbolising the womb, Eliade interprets “the yogin’s bodily position and 
‘embryonic respiration’ […] as embryonic, vegetative ontological modalities.”925 
                                                 
918 “[…] there is no doubt that certain Moslem mystics of India borrowed and practiced yogic 
exercises.” (Eliade, Yoga, 62) 
919 “It is probable that, at least in its neo-Taoistic form, this discipline of the breaths was influenced by 
tantric Yoga […].” (Eliade, Yoga, 61) 
920 „But it is none the less true that the two techniques are phenomenologically similar enough to raise 
the question of a possible influence of Indian mystical physiology on Hesychasm. We shall not enter 
upon this comparative study here.” (Eliade, Yoga, 65 
921 Eliade, Yoga, 66. 
922 Eliade, Yoga, 66. 
923 Eliade, Yoga, 67. 
924 Eliade, Yoga, 67. 
925 Eliade, Yoga, 68. 
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Whereas the analogies to a plant-like life are still more or less comprehensible 
(motionless body, very slow breathing), the analogy with embryos and rebirth 
seems very farfetched indeed. Apart from “garbhāsana” (womb posture) there is 
no yogic position whatsoever evoking the image of an embryo, and no 
prāṇāyāma is called embryonic. Eliade cannot quote a single Yogic text for these 
speculations but has to rely on a circular argument: In the previous chapter he 
likened Taoistic breathing techniques (called “embryonic”) to certain aspects of 
prāṇāyāma (but also pointing out the fundamental differencies between the two 
practices), and now prāṇāyāma has become embryonic, full stop. Of course the 
yogin IS engaged in a practice leading him out of normal life and consciousness 
into a different reality altogether, and this process can indeed be compared to 
death and rebirth, but the embryo imagery is utterly alian to the Yoga tradition 
and references to (non-Indian) burial rituals and initiation ceremonies in closed 
spaces seem superfluous in this connection. 
 
Eliade continues by stating that “āsana and ekāgratā imitate a divine archetype.”926 
Yoga practice means to renounce the human condition and this “has a religious 
value in the sense that the yogin imitates Īśvara’s mode of being: immobility, 
concentration on self.”927 
 
It goes without saying that in Dasgupta there are no such ideas, neither for the 
plant and embryo analogies nor for the archetype image. Yet Eliade is again very 
close to the sources when he writes that prāṇāyāma leads to concentration 
(dhāraṇā, the sixth member of Yoga) of the mind (cf. YS II,52-53). He goes on: 
 
“The yogin can test the quality of his concentration by pratyāhāra (a term 
usually translated ‘withdrawal of the senses’ or ‘abstraction,’ which we 
prefer to translate ‘ability to free sense activity from the domination of 
external objects.’)”928 
 
This again is a somewhat novel idea – to corroborate the achievements of a certain 
level with the help of the preceding stage (pratyāhāra being the fifth member of 
Yoga). Eliade’s interpretation of pratyāhāra is far more elaborate than what 
Dasgupta wrote about this member of Yoga. In fact, Dasgupta treated pratyāhāra 
as briefly as āsana, simply stating that in pratyāhāra the the mind is “altogether 
identified with the object of inner concentration or contemplation” and “the 
senses, which have already ceased coming into contact with other objects and 
become submerged in the citta, also cease along with it.”929 In “Yoga Psychology” 
he left out members three to five altogether. Eliade however ventures out on a 
slightly unorthodox definition, suggesting that pratyāhāra 
 
“could be understood as the faculty through which the intellect (citta) 
possesses sensations as if the contact were real,”930  
 
                                                 
926 Eliade, Yoga, 68. 
927 Eliade, Yoga, 68. 
928 Eliade, Yoga, 68. 
929 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 147. 
930 Eliade, Yoga, 68. 
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in other words: citta keeps its capacity to represent sensory impressions, even 
though the senses are no longer active. 
 
“Instead of knowing through forms (rūpa) and mental states (cittavṛtti), as 
formely, the yogin now contemplates the essence (tattva) of all objects 
directly.”931 
 
According to Eliade, cittavṛtti nirodhaḥ is already achieved at the pratyāhāra 
level932 – how then, if the senses, the sensory activity, memory and even “the 
dynamism of the subconscious”933 have been mastered, does the yogin wish to 
even contemplate any objects any more, directly or indirectly? With Dasgupta 
(and Patañjali), the nirodha state is the very last one, and then absolutely 
everything ceases – if this phase is advanced to member five of the path, then the 
last three aṅgas become somewhat superfluous. But to Eliade pratyāhāra simply 
marks the end of “psychophysiological ascesis;”934 now the yogin is ready for the 
mental exercises called saṃyama, consisting of the last three steps of the path, i.e. 
“concentration (dhāraṇā), meditation properly speaking (dhyāna), and stasis 
(samādhi).”935 These become possible only 
 
“when the yogin has succeeded in attaining perfect mastery over his body, 
his subconscious, and his psychomental flux.”936 
 
Eliade translates “antarāṅga” (the inner members, standing for saṃyama) as 
“subtle,” and explains this denomination as “the fact that they imply no new 
physiological technique.”937 Yet the problem remains – what is left to be achieved 
in these last steps if the subconscious (vāsanā) and the psychomental flux 
(cittavṛtti) have already been mastered? And what is the difference between 
psychophysiological and mental? According to Dasgupta, both prāṇāyāma and 
pratyāhāra were predominantly mental exercises, in the sense that they had a 
cleansing or concentrating effect on the mind. 
 
Eliade’s elaboration on steps six and seven of Yoga (from p. 70 onward) is more 
confusing than clarifying. First of all, he has to distinguish dhāraṇā (the sixth 
aṅga, which Dasgupta defined as “the concentration of citta on a particular 
place,”938 following YS III,1), from ekāgratā, because ekāgratā (“whose sole 
purpose is to arrest the psychomental flux and ‘fix it on a single point,’”)939 
according to him, has already been achieved in the preceding step. The dhāraṇā 
ekāgratā (so to speak) then serves “the purpose of comprehension.”940 
Unfortunately such an interpretation cannot be deduced from the sources – Eliade 
                                                 
931 Eliade, Yoga, 69. 
932 “By realizing cittavṛtti nirodhaḥ (i.e., the suppression of psychomental states), the citta abides in itself 
(svarūpamātre).” (Eliade, Yoga, 69) 
933 Eliade, Yoga, 69. 
934 Eliade, Yoga, 69.  
935 Eliade, Yoga, 69-70. 
936 Eliade, Yoga, 69. 
937 Eliade, Yoga, 70. 
938 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 147. 
939 Eliade, Yoga, 70. 
940 Eliade, Yoga, 70. 
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simply quotes YS III,1 and then Vyāsa’s comment which specifies some of the 
places on which concentration is fixed (such as the lotus of the heart, the light 
within the head, the tip of the nose, or on any external object). As to the 
comprehension aspect of dhāraṇā Eliade mentions his note II,3, “On Yogic 
Concentration,”941 but this note is nothing but an accumulation of references to 
sundry secondary literature and does not elucidate what the yogin will 
comprehend through the practice of dhāraṇā. The only hint we finally get is 
Eliade’s elaboration on Vyāsa’s comment on YS I,36 which states that 
“concentration on the ‘lotus of the heart’” leads to an “experience of pure light.”942 
Eliade gladly catches hold of this detail and tells his readers that such an 
experience is already described in the Upaniṣads and “in all the post-Upaniṣadic 
mystical methods of India,”943 in other words: He digresses from the main topic 
(which is that of comprehension achieved in dhāraṇā as opposed to ekāgratā) by 
evoking an item from a passage where the term dhāraṇā does not occur a single 
time (YS I,36 is part of a series of sūtras dealing with various methods to calm 
down the mind) but which can be used as an example for the pan-Indianness of 
Yoga. And since Vācaspati Miśra (in his comment on Vyāsa’s statement on YS 
I,36) adds a long description of the lotus of the heart, all Eliade needs to do is to 
quote Vācaspati in order to reach a tantric topic: 
 
“It [Vācaspati’s text] introduces us to a ‘mystical’ or ‘subtle physiology,’ 
concerned with ‘organs’ that reveal their existence only in the course of 
yogic exercises in concentration and meditation.”944 
 
This allows him to draw the following conclusion: 
 
“[…] it is important even now to point out that the tradition of classic Yoga, 
represented by Patañjali, knew and employed the schemata of ‘mystical 
physiology,’ which were later to play a considerable role in the history of 
Indian spirituality.”945 
 
According to Eliade’s logic the practice of dhāraṇā would therefore allow the 
yogin to experience (and thus comprehend) his subtle or mystical physiology – 
this would be the gain in knowledge as opposed to simple ekāgratā, 
concentration on one point. I would like to add that Patañjali in I,36 simply 
speaks of “perception which is free from sorrow and is radiant,”946 that the “lotus 
of the heart” was introduced by Vyāsa and that all the tantric physiological 
details were added only by Vācaspati Miśra. Nowhere in Patañjali’s text do we 
find anything resembling a description of cakras or nāḍīs or the like. Let us also 
remember that this whole digression was due to Eliade’s interpretation of 
dhāraṇā as an ekāgratā “for the purpose of comprehension,” an interpretation 
which lacks textual evidence and for which there is also no parallel in Dasgupta. 
                                                 
941 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 388. 
942 Eliade, Yoga, 70. 
943 Eliade, Yoga, 70. 
944 Eliade, Yoga, 71. 
945 Eliade, Yoga, 71. 
946 Quoted from Hariharānanda Āraṇya’s translation in Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali with Bhāsvatī. 
Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 2000, 82. 
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Next, Eliade establishes a link between prāṇāyāma, dhāraṇā and dhyāna by 
referring to Vijñāna Bhikṣu’s quotation of the Īśvara Gītā. 
 
“’The time necessary for concentration of the mind on an object [dhāraṇā] is 
equal to the time taken by twelve prāṇāyāmas’ (i.e., by twelve controlled, 
equal, and retarded respirations). By prolonging this concentration on an 
object twelve times, one obtains ‘yogic meditation,’ dhyāna.”947 
 
For Dasgupta, dhyāna was an uninterrupted flow of concentration on one 
object,948 following Patañjali’s definition of YS III,2; Eliade takes up this idea by 
rendering the same sūtra as “a current of unified thought”949 and by adding 
Vyāsa’s comment as well as Vijñāna Bhikṣu’s gloss, which both highlight the 
uninterruptedness of concentration on one object achieved by dhāraṇā. Yet for 
Eliade dhyāna is more: 
 
“[…] dhyāna makes it possible to ‘penetrate’ objects, to ‘assimilate’ them 
magically.”950 
 
He gives an example for this magic assimilation or penetration: “the yogic 
meditation on the subject of ‘fire,’ as it is taught today.”951 Is Eliade referring to 
exercises he himself practised in Rishikesh some 25 years before the publication of 
Yoga. Immortality and Freedom? In any case it is curious to notice that Zerlendi (in 
The Secret of Dr. Honigberger, cf. supra, chapter 2.3) is also meditating on fire while 
practising prāṇāyāma. Whatever Eliade’s sources may be, he makes it very clear 
that what he writes about the meditation on fire “is no more than a rough 
approximation” and that “its most specific exercises are, in any case, 
indescribable.”952 Nevertheless, Eliade mentions eight stages of meditation 
through which a yogin passes when concentrating on some glowing coals placed 
in front of him.953 But the act of penetration into the essence of fire is what he 
cannot explain – he simply distinguishes it from any “poetic imagination” or from 
“an intuition of the Bergsonian type” which he qualifies as “two irrational 
‘flights.’” 954 Yogic meditation is different – it is always lucid because the yogin 
keeps constant control over the “mental continuum.” Such a meditation is, 
 
“finally, an instrument for taking possession of, for ‘assimilating,’ the 
real.”955 
 
                                                 
947 Eliade, Yoga, 71. 
948 “Dhyāna is the continuance or changing flow of the mental effort in the object of dhāraṇā 
unmediated by any other break of conscious states.” (Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 148; cf. 
supra, chapter 4.3.3.13) 
949 Eliade, Yoga, 72. 
950 Eliade, Yoga, 72. 
951 Eliade, Yoga, 72. 
952 Eliade, Yoga, 73. 
953 The yogin understands combustion and its deeper meaning, he understands the analogy between 
combustion in the coal and combustion in the human body; he obtains a vision of existence as “fire;” 
he penetrates the astral plane (sun), the physiological plane (body) and the plane of infinitesimals 
(“the seed of fire”); he sees prakṛti as “fire;” he masters the inner fire by prāṇāyāma, the suspension of 
respiration, and he manages to master the glowing coals before him because he has obtained complete 
mastery over fire (cf. Eliade, Yoga, 72-73). 
954 Eliade, Yoga, 73. 
955 Eliade, Yoga, 73. 
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This sentence marks the end of this subchapter in which Eliade undertook the 
meritorious effort of rendering pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā and dhyāna somewhat more 
concrete and palpable for his Western audience. Patañjali wrote no more than 
four sūtras on these stages of Yoga, Vyāsa added only a few explanatory 
sentences and Dasgupta treated these phases equally briefly. It is however 
debatable whether Eliade succeeded in his endeavour because his explanations 
not only disarrange the order of Patañjali’s path (ekāgratā [which Eliade himself 
equalled to cittavṛtti nirodhaḥ, cf. chapter 5.5.1.] being already achieved on stage 
five [pratyāhāra], turning dhāraṇā and dhyāna into somewhat superfluous 
exercises) but also serve primarily Eliade’s own vision of Yoga (Yoga as a pan-
Indian ascetic and magical discipline). The insight or comprehension gained by 
the yogin through dhāraṇā and dhyāna, qualified as mental practices (as opposed 
to the preceding steps which were psychophysiological), concerns the mystical 
physiology of the human body and the magical penetration and possession of 
reality (“mystical” and “magical” being favourite Eliade terms, utterly absent 
from Dasgupta’s books on Yoga). The question arises why a yogin, after having 
conquered his mind and subconscious in the nirodha state, still wanted to 
continue practising mental concentration (dhāraṇā etc.) and whether he felt any 
interest or need to comprehend his cakras and nāḍīs or to penetrate reality and its 
elements. The answer according to Patañjali can only be “no” – once the cittavṛtti 
have come to a standstill, the whole of prakṛti vanishes and all that is left is the 
puruṣa, entirely isolated from his material counterpart. The whole aim of Yogic 
meditation is to become free from body and mind – insight into the functioning of 
subtle things and mastery over the elements are described in Patañjali as side-
effects of saṃyama (cf. the siddhis in YS III) but never as something a yogin is 
striving for or as something necessary for achieving samādhi. One has to assume 
that it was Eliade’s own fascination with everything mystical and magical which 
made him interpret the higher steps of Yoga in such a light. 
 
 
5.5.5. The Role of Īśvara (subchapter II,5) 
 
Before proceding to the last step, samādhi, Eliade tackles the subject of Īśvara, 
Dasgupta’s “God in Yoga” (cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.14). Like the Indian professor, 
Eliade explains that Īśvara is “a puruṣa that has been free since all eternity, never 
touched by the kleśas”956 (cf. YS I,24), and he emphasises the help Īśvara can 
extend to a yogin for “a more speedy arrival at samādhi.”957 But whereas, 
according to Dasgupta, God’s grace is stimulated by love and devotion,958 Eliade 
holds that Īśvara  
 
“does not submit to being summoned by rituals, or devotion, or faith in his 
‘mercy;’ but his essence instinctively ‘collaborates,’ as it were, with the Self 
that seeks emancipation through Yoga.”959 
 
                                                 
956 Eliade, Yoga, 74. 
957 Eliade, Yoga, 73. 
958 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 161. 
959 Eliade, Yoga, 74. 
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He claims that Patañjali in YS II,45 talks of  
 
“a ‘metaphysical sympathy’ between Īśvara and the puruṣa, a sympathy 
explained by their structural correspondence.”960 
 
YS II,45 however simply says “From devotion to the Lord, perfection in 
samādhi,” and it takes all of Eliade’s power of interpretation to read a 
metaphysical sympathy and a structural correspondence into this sentence and to 
claim that, still according to this same sūtra (which, Eliade, by the way avoids 
quoting), 
 
“this divine aid is not the effect of a ‘desire’ or a ‘feeling’ – for God can have 
neither desires nor emotions […].”961 
 
In chapters 4.3.3.8 and 4.3.3.14 we have shown Dasgupta’s ambiguous attitude 
towards the concept of Īśvara in Yoga:  in a more scientific or purely 
philosophical context he admitted that Īśvara was a mere “matter of courtesy” in 
the Yoga system of thought; personally however he saw in this yogic God an 
absolute entity throning above everything, being equal to the Highest God. With 
Eliade things are different – he prefers Īśvara’s limited role in Patañjali to the 
God-like image which some of the comments turn Īśvara into. 
 
He starts off by stating that for Sāṃkhya “the role of God in man’s acquisition of 
freedom is of no importance”962 (due to prakṛti’s teleological function), and that 
Patañjali only felt the need to introduce Īśvara because some yogins who have 
practised devotion to this God have been helped in their quest of samādhi.  
 
“In other words: alongside the tradition of a purely magical Yoga – one that 
called upon nothing but the will and personal powers of the ascetic – there 
was another, a ‘mystical’ tradition, in which the last stages of Yoga practice 
were at least made easier by devotion – even though an extremely rarefied, 
extremely ‘intellectual’ devotion – to a God.”963 
 
In this passage we finally get a clear definition of what Eliade calls “magical” and 
“mystical.” Ascetic yogic practices are magical (because they also yield magical 
results, cf. supra) as well as atheistic, and mystical means devotion to some God 
through emotion. But because Īśvara (according to Eliade) does not react to 
feelings his adoration has to be more intellectual. This leads Eliade to the 
following conclusion: 
 
“All in all, Īśvara is only an archetype of the yogin – a macroyogin; very 
probably a patron of certain yogic sects.”964  
 
More than once he insists on the minor importance Patañjali accorded to this 
Īśvara in his magical, classic Yoga, and he seems to regret the rise of mysticism 
                                                 
960 Eliade, Yoga, 74. 
961 Eliade, Yoga, 73. 
962 Eliade, Yoga, 74. 
963 Eliade, Yoga, 75. 
964 Eliade, Yoga, 75. 
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over the centuries, reflected in later commentators like Vācaspati Miśra and 
Vijñāna Bhikṣu who gave Īśvara an increasingly active role.965 Eliade’s fascination 
and interest clearly lied with magic, a term Dasgupta only used in combination 
with “occultism,” both words standing for an erroneous understanding of 
Yoga.966 The polarity “magic vs. mysticism” is exclusively an Eliadian concept 
which has no antecedent in Dasgupta. 
 
 
5.5.6. Enstasis and Hypnosis (subchapter II,6) 
 
The yogin engaged in the last three steps of Yoga (saṃyama) “does not require 
the application of any new technique”967 as he moves from dhāraṇā to dhyāna 
and on to samādhi (which Eliade translates as “stasis,” “enstasis” or 
“conjunction”).968 He first emphasises the fact that samādhi is very difficult to 
understand, because 
 
“[…] samādhi expresses an experience that is completely indescribable [and] 
its modalities are very numerous.”969 
 
He first defines the word in a “gnosiological sense:” 
 
“[…] samādhi is the state of contemplation in which thought grasps the form 
of the object directly, without the help of categories and the imagination 
(kalpaṇā); the state in which the object is revealed ‘in itself’ (svarūpa), in its 
essentials, and as if ‘empty of itself’ (arthamātranirbhāsaṃ svarūpa-
śūnyamiva).”970 
 
This definition more or less corresponds to Dasgupta’s: 
 
“Samādhi, or trance-contemplation, results when by deep concentration 
mind becomes transformed into the shape of the object of contemplation.”971 
 
Eliade quotes Vācaspati Miśra commenting on YS III,3 (by quoting Viṣṇu Purāṇa 
VI, 7, 90), saying that 
 
“[t]here is a real coincidence between knowledge of the object and the object of 
knowledge; […] illusion and imagination (kalpaṇā) are thus wholly done away 
with by samādhi.”972 
                                                 
965 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 76. 
966 “[…] the position of Yoga as a system of philosophy has always been misunderstood. It is probably 
for this reason and for the stress that it laid on its disciplinary course of practices that it sometimes 
wandered from its true ideal and became associated with magic, medicine and occultism.” (Dasgupta, 
Yoga Philosophy, 2), and: “[…] it is necessary [….] that Yoga might stand as a system of philosophy 
and not as a branch of occultism, magic, or nervous exercise.” (Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 3) Cf. 
supra, chapter 4.3.1. 
967 Eliade, Yoga, 77. 
968 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 76 and 77, also footnote 79. 
969 Eliade, Yoga, 77. 
970 Eliade, Yoga, 77; reference to YS III,3. 
971 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 148 (cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.13). 
972 Eliade, Yoga, 77. 
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The second part of this chapter is taken up by a discussion of the difference 
between samādhi and hypnotic trance. Eliade already raised this topic in The 
Secret of Dr. Honigberger – Zerlendi, while meditating on fire, is aware of the fact 
that he is wide awake and not subject to any kind of hypnosis (cf. supra, chapter 
2.3). Eliade classifies hypnosis as 
 
“an automatic damming of the ‘stream of consciousness’ and not a yogic 
ekāgratā,”973 
 
illustrating an Indian example of hypnotic trance with a passage from the 
Mahābhārata. Referring to Dasgupta’s Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems 
of Indian Thought he states that hypnosis belongs  
 
“to a merely occasional and provisional state of concentration (vikṣipta). […] 
The state of vikṣipta is only a paralysis (emotional or volitional in origin) of 
the mental flux; this stoppage must not be confused with samādhi, which is 
obtained only through ekāgratā […].”974 
 
Dasgupta, in the corresponding passage, is equally anxious to distinguish yogic 
samādhi (which “presupposes a very high degree of moral perfection”) from 
European trance experiences (which “do not show any real spiritual 
development”).975 He therewith possibly tried to counteract earlier (and in his 
eyes erroneous) Indian assertions according to which yogic trance is nothing else 
but self-hypnosis and therefore on a par with European methods.976 Hypnosis (or 
Mesmerism) therefore proves to be a topic reflecting the situation of encounter 
between India and Europe in a nutshell: At the end of the 19th century, Indian 
authors were eager to show that their indigenous mental methods could do the 
same (and even more)977 as Western ones, insisting that what Europe had 
invented India had known for a long time; later on such statements were revised 
in the sense that the fundamental difference between hypnosis and yogic trance 
was emphasised, the Indian achievement now being not only of a totally different 




                                                 
973 Eliade, Yoga, 78. 
974 Eliade, Yoga, 78-79. 
975 Both quotations are from Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy, 355. 
976 Cf. for example: “No yoga is possible without laya [dissolution]. What is laya? Whose laya? It is 
citta’s laya. As soon as citta attains laya, in an indefinable manner, its condition can be called laya. 
This laya yoga, if to be defined in brief for the English readers, [would be called] Self mesmerism, and 
to explain it to the unlettered Bengali readers it would be sufficient to say that it is to lose the external 
senses by effort or to voluntarily dissolve the mind.” (Vedāntavāgīśa, Pātañjala Darśana, 3-4. (I thank 
Arup Sen Gupta for the English translation). 
977 “And the second point to be mentioned is that there is no good result apart from the taking away of 
the consciousness of the subjugated, innovated by the English. But there are many many good results 
to our laya yoga, innovated by our yogis.” (Same source as in the previous footnote, p. 4). 
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5.5.7. The Siddhis or “Miraculous Powers” (subchapter II,8) 
 
Parallel to the way Dasgupta’s account of the Yoga system was presented, I 
would like to treat the topics of karma and samādhi separately, at the end of the 
Eliade section. This means that subchapters II,7 and II,9 will be discussed later 
and that we proceed now to the siddhis, dealt with in subchapter II,8.  
 
There is a huge discrepancy between Dasgupta and Eliade in the treatment of the 
miraculous powers (vibhūti or siddhi) which a Yogin acquires through the 
practice of the last three limbs of the eightfolg path (saṃyama). Dasgupta merely 
dedicated two pages of Yoga as Philosophy and Religion to this subject, emphasising 
the fact that they  
 
“gradually deepen the faith śraddhā of the Yogin in the performance of his 
deeds and thus help towards his main goal or ideal by always pushing or 
drawing him forward towards it by the greater and greater strengthening of 
his faith.”978 
 
He lists the 19 powers in a simple table, not giving any details about them except 
that “they are said to happen as a result of mental union with different objects”979 
and that “divested from the ideal they have no value.”980 Eliade however, with his 
pronounced interest in magical practices, dwells on this aspect of Yoga for a 
whole chapter. He interprets the siddhis as a 
 
“taking possession of zones of consciousness and sectors of reality that had 
previously been, so to speak, invulnerable,”981  
 
the act of taking possession being the magical penetration or assimilation typical 
for Yogic meditation (as already described in subchapter II,4). The first siddhi 
Eliade comments on is the knowledge of previous lives, emerging from saṃyama 
on the saṃskāras (YS III,17). He states that  
 
“’emerging from time’ constitutes one of the major themes of Indian 
asceticism. One succeeds in emerging from time by traveling back through it 
(‘against the fur,’ pratiloman) – that is, by reintegrating the primordial instant 
that had launched the first existence, the existence that is at the base of the 
entire cycle of transmigrations, the ‘seed-existence.’”982 
 
Thus Yoga presents us with yet another typical example for “Indian asceticism” 
in general. And Patañjali also  
 
“mentions all the legendary ‘powers’ that obsess Indian mythology, folklore, 
and metaphysics with equal intensity.”983  
 
                                                 
978 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 158 (cf. supra, chapter 4.5). 
979 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 157. 
980 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 158. 
981 Eliade, Yoga, 85. 
982 Eliade, Yoga, 86. 
983 Eliade, Yoga, 86. 
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Eliade quotes the power of making one’s body invisible, “a miracle mentioned by 
countless Indian religious, alchemical, and folklore texts.”984 Since Patañjali says 
very little about it (cf. YS III,20), Eliade adds Vācaspati Miśra’s comment which 
reveals a typical aspect of Yoga: 
 
“Indeed, the general tendency of the more important yogic texts is to explain 
any parapsychological and occult phenomenon in terms of the ‘powers’ 
acquired by the practitioner and to exclude any supernatural 
intervention.”985 
 
After a brief enumeration of further vibhūtis (YS II,21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30 and 
33), Eliade once more repeats his main statement about Yogic meditation: 
 
“The ‘knowledge’ obtained through the techniques of saṃyama is in fact a 
possession, an assimilation of the realities on which the yogin meditates. 
Whatever is meditated is – through the magical virtue of meditation – 
assimilated, possessed.”986 
 
The rest of the chapter could be interpreted as a detailled illustration of 
Dasgupta’s statement “divested from the ideal they [the vibhūtis] have no value.” 
Eliade quotes YS III,51 and Vyāsa’s commentary which both warn the yogin to 
give in to heavenly temptation. Magic is something the yogin has to resist. 
 
“Only a new renunciation and a victorious struggle against the temptation 
of magic bring the ascetic a new spiritual enrichment. […] For it is samādhi, 
not the ‘occult powers,’ which represents true ‘mastery.’”987 
 
And yet –  
 
“nostalgia for the ‘divine condition’ conquered by force, magically, has 
never ceased to obsess ascetics and yogins”988 – 
 
and to retain Eliade’s interest, we could add. “Magic” is a key term in Eliade’s 
book on Yoga, particularly in the haṭha yoga parts (cf. for example the chapter 
“Shamanistic Magic and the Quest for Immortality”),989 and it was his fascination 
with magical yogic practices and powers which directed him towards Tantrism.990 
Here we touch again on one of the fundamental differences between Eliade and 
Das Gupta – the latter, with his devotional character, saw in the vibhūtis nothing 
more than an element which helps to strengthen the yogin’s faith, whereas his 




                                                 
984 Eliade, Yoga, 87. 
985 Eliade, Yoga, 87. 
986 Eliade, Yoga, 88. 
987 Eliade, Yoga, 89-90. 
988 Eliade, Yoga, 90. 
989 Eliade, Yoga, 311-334. 
990 Cf. also supra, chapter 2.3.  
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5.5.8. Reintegration and Freedom (subchapter II,10) 
 
In this last chapter of the Patañjali section of Yoga. Immortality and Freedom all the 
scattered hints and allusions to Eliade’s world picture finally come together; what 
had been interspersed here and there on the first hundred pages of the book 
breaks through at last and clearly manifests itself. Eliade no longer makes an 
effort to speak in Patañjali’s or even Indian terms but very freely and openly uses 
his own vocabulary which is miles apart from anything Dasgupta would ever 
have said or written. The “sacred” and the “profane,” “cosmicization” and 
“unification,” “superconsciousness” and “reintegration,” “primordial Unity” and 
“the coincidence of opposites” – this is Eliade’s terminology which (according to 
him) not only describes what India as a whole has to offer to the West but also 
what Yoga in particular stands for. “Reintegration and Freedom” is devoid of any 
quotation from Indian sources, since it sums up the preceding chapters in a new 
language and a new light.  
 
Eliade first paraphrases Patañjali’s aim as follows: 
 
“[T]o emancipate man from his human condition, to conquer absolute 
freedom, to realize the unconditioned.”991  
 
The various techniques leading to this aim are all “antisocial, or, indeed, 
antihuman”992 in the sense that the yogin counteracts the never-ending 
movements of life with a static, firm attitude on all levels of his being, in posture 
(immobile), breath (suppressed) and mind (fixed on one spot). 
 
“This complete opposition to life is not new, either in India or elsewhere; the 
archaic and universal polarity between the sacred and the profane is clearly 
to be seen in it.”993 
 
The Indian yogin imitates or re-enacts the  “archaic and universal” role of a man 
who 
 
“thirsts for the unconditioned, for freedom, for ‘power’ – in a word, for one 
of the countless modalities of the sacred.”994 
 
During the process of dissociating himself from life, the yogin mainly proceeds 
through “unification.” He unifies his respiration by making it rhythmical as in 
deep sleep (a practice which Eliade derived from his stay in Rishikesh and not 
from Patañjali or one of the commentators; cf. supra, chapter 5.5.2), he unifies 
thought through ekāgratā which ends in “an unbroken psychic continuum,”995 
and āsana fixes the body in a single archetypal posture (cf. supra, chapter 5.5.2). 
“Unification” in all these statements is used in the sense of “limitation” – the 
multiple possibilities of breathing, thinking and holding one’s body are all 
                                                 
991 Eliade, Yoga, 95. 
992 Eliade, Yoga, 95. 
993 Eliade, Yoga, 96. 
994 Eliade, Yoga, 96. 
995 Eliade, Yoga, 97. 
Mircea Eliade and Surendranath Dasgupta 198
reduced to just one modality. But Eliade stretches the meaning of this term 
(through a series of nearly synonymous words) until it gains a new significance, 
one of mending and healing: 
 
“[A]ll these exercises pursue the same goal, which is to abolish multiplicity 
and fragmentation, to reintegrate, to unify, to make whole.”996 
 
Thus, āsana now allows the yogin to feel his body as a “totality,” a “unity,”997 and 
the yogin discovers a new life, one “that is deeper and truer (because “in 
rhythm”) – the very life of the cosmos.”998 This “cosmicization” of man is a 
process Eliade “divines […] in all the psychophysiological techniques of Yoga, 
from āsana to ekāgratā.”999  
 
“Final liberation cannot be obtained without experience of a preliminary 
stage of ‘cosmicization’; one cannot pass directly from chaos to freedom. The 
intermediate phase is the ‘cosmos’ – that is, realization of rhythm on all the 
planes of biomental life.”1000 
 
To sum up: In the first part of his interpretation of Patañjali in this chapter, Eliade 
emphasized the static, immobile attitude of the yogin (dissociation from life 
through fixity opposing the flowing stream of life); he explicitly mentioned the 
“static posture, the immobility of āsana,” the possibility “of holding [the] breath 
indefinitely,” and the fixation of “thought on a single point.”1001 This explanation 
by all means corresponds to the Indian texts, even though the vocabulary is partly 
completely different (cf. “antisocial,” “antihuman,” “the unconditioned,” “sacred 
and profane” being purely Eliadian terms). Dasgupta, very possibly, might not 
have objected to such an explanation, seeing it as an illustration of nirodha 
(extinguishing, suppression).1002 
In the paragraph where Eliade talks about unification though, he unnoticeably 
departs from the Patañjali tradition as he slides towards a vision of rhythm 
ending with the notion of cosmos (opposed to chaos because it is well-regulated 
through rhythm). He primarily does this by interpreting prāṇāyāma no longer as 
suppressing breath but as slow, deep, rhythmical breathing, like in deep sleep (it 
is significant that he starts the examples of unification with breath, adding the 
step which in Patañjali precedes this practice [āsana] only at the end). Ekāgratā 
then is “an unbroken psychic continuum” which implies a flow and, as such, 
might have an element of rhythm in it, and āsana provides the yogin with a 
feeling of unity on the physical level which prepares what Eliade in the next 
                                                 
996 Eliade, Yoga, 97. 
997 Eliade, Yoga, 97. 
998 Eliade, Yoga, 97. 
999 Eliade, Yoga, 97. 
1000 Eliade, Yoga, 97. 
1001 Eliade, Yoga, 95-96. 
1002 Cf. Dasgupta’s definition of the aim of Yoga: “[…] the complete extinguishing of all pains is 
identical with the extinguishing of all experiences, the states of vṛttis of consciousness, and this again 
is identical with the rise of prajñā or true discriminative knowledge of the difference in nature of 
prakṛti and its effects from the purusha – the unchangeable. […] This suppression of mental states 
which has been described as the means of attaining final release, the ultimate ethical goal of life, is 
called Yoga.” Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 122. 
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paragraph explains as “realization of rhythm on all the planes of biomental 
life.”1003 He stresses the importance of the moon, acting as unifying factor in the 
universe by his virtue of measuring time and of making “an infinity of 
hetereogeneous realities integral parts of the same complex”1004 (a somewhat 
obscure statement) and then adds: 
 
“A considerable proportion of Indian mystical physiology is based upon the 
identification of ‘suns’ and ‘moons’ in the human body.”1005 
 
Thus we have moved from rhythm to cosmos and from the moon back to the 
human body. None of all this can be found in Patañjali or his tradition, but Eliade 
needs the cosmos in his world picture and therefore incorporates it from other 
sources. 
 
“To be sure, this ‘cosmicization’ is only an intermediate phase, which 
Patañjali scarcely indicates; but it is exceptionally important in other Indian 
mystical schools.”1006 
 
After unification and cosmicization man is recasted “in new, gigantic 
dimensions” of “macranthropic experiences”1007 which represent yet another 
temporary stage. The ultimate goal is only reached once the yogin manages to 
dissociate himself completely from the cosmos, “thus becoming impervious to 
experiences, unconditioned, and autonomous.”1008  
 
According to Eliade, samādhi is “by its very nature a paradoxical state, for it is 
empty and at the same time fills being and thought to repletion.”1009 This idea of 
paradox has certainly not been expressed in the Yoga tradition and Eliade has to 
explain it further. He does this by giving a sundry list of paradoxes from Indian 
religion (Vedic sacrifice, where the brick of the altar coincides with Prajāpati, 
prāṇāyāma, where life is present in holding the breath, the “fundamental tantric 
experience” of holding back the semen, where life coincides with death).1010 
 
“Regarded from this point of view (that of the phenomenology of paradox), 
samādhi is seen to be situated on a line well known in the history of religions 
and mysticisms – that of the coincidence of opposites.”1011 
 
Here we observe how Eliade, in order to arrive at the concept of the coincidence 
of opposites, imposes the idea of paradox on all kinds of examples until also 
samādhi somehow fits into it. He can do this only by adopting a mystic-religionist 
perspective. Once his argument has reached this point, he is free to take the 
                                                 
1003 Eliade, Yoga, 97. 
1004 Eliade, Yoga, 97. 
1005 Eliade, Yoga, 97. 
1006 Eliade, Yoga, 97-98. 
1007 Eliade, Yoga, 98. 
1008 Eliade, Yoga, 98. 
1009 Eliade, Yoga, 98. 
1010 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 98. 
1011 Eliade, Yoga, 98. 
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reader one step further towards another of his favourite concepts, the primordial 
Unity: 
 
“Through samādhi, the yogin transcends opposites and, in a unique 
experience, unites emptiness and superabundance, life and death, Being and 
nonbeing. […] Like all paradoxical states, samādhi is equivalent to a 
reintegration of the different modalities of the real in a single modality – the 
undifferentiated completeness of precreation, the primordial Unity.”1012 
 
What a difference in terminology from Dasgupta who spoke of samādhi simply 
as trance experience which gives rise to prajñā, the discriminative knowledge, 
distinguishing between puruṣa and prakṛti and thus leading to the ultimate 
liberation of the puruṣa. The question has to be asked whether kaivalya, the 
isolation of the puruṣa from prakṛti, can really be equalled to “the recovery […] of 
the initial nonduality.”1013 Strictly speaking, in Sāṃkhya the duality always 
remains, prakṛti being as eternal as puruṣa, and thus this system does not know 
any primordial Unity where the two opposing principles would ever have been 
melted together. But Eliade, with his pronounced wish to present Yoga-Sāṃkhya 
as a continuation of the Upaniṣadic tradition and as a part of Indian spirituality as 
a whole readily sacrifices the inherent duality of this system in favour of 
(Vedāntic) monism.  
 
The remaining two pages of this chapter are dedicated to a defense of Yogic 
samādhi as true liberation, as opposed to “countless varieties of spiritual 
escape”1014 such as drug-induced trances and ecstasies. The Yogin reaches the 
cataleptic state “with the utmost lucidity;” he attains what Eliade calls 
“transconsciousness” or “superconsciousness.”1015 Transconsciousness is equalled 
to “knowledge-possession of the Self, the puruṣa,”1016 superconsciousness remains 
unexplained (and is maybe the same). The Yogin returns to the primordial Unity, 
the original completeness or the beginning, “enriched by the dimensions of 
freedom and transconsciousness.”1017 By reaching the paradoxical mode of being 
“which exists only in the Supreme Being, Īśvara,”1018 the Yogin shows that Yoga is 
initiatory – he dies and is reborn. 
 
“[…] the candidate does not return to the profane world to which he has just 
died during his initiation; he finds a sacred world corresponding to a new 
mode of being that is inaccessible to the ‘natural’ (profane) level of existence.”1019 
 
And once more, Yoga is not an isolated phenomenon: 
 
“[…] Yoga, like many other mysticisms, issues on the plane of paradox and 
not on a commonplace and easy extinction of consciousness.”1020 
                                                 
1012 Eliade, Yoga, 98. 
1013 Eliade, Yoga, 99. 
1014 Eliade, Yoga, 99. 
1015 Eliade, Yoga, 99. 
1016 Eliade, Yoga, 99. 
1017 Eliade, Yoga, 99. 
1018 This is the only instance where Eliade interprets Īśvara as the Supreme Being (God) – before he had 
reached the conclusion that “All in all, Īśvara is only an archetype of the yogin – a macroyogin; very 
probably a patron of certain yogic sects.” (Eliade, Yoga, 75) 
1019 Eliade, Yoga, 100. 
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5.6. Samādhi 
 
After this quotation-free chapter where Eliade gave free rein to his interpretation 
and terminology, it is rather strange to return to the two chapters which 
immediately precede “Reintegration and Freedom,” discussing samādhi 
(subchapters II,7 and II,9). Both chapters abound in quotations from the Yogasūtra 
and its commentaries, and Eliade discusses all the modalities of samādhi, not 
refraining from using the whole technical vocabulary. The contrast between 
Eliade’s presentation of samādhi and his ultimate interpretation of it in 
subchapter II,10 could not be more striking.  
 
 
5.6.1. Samādhi “with Support” (subchapter II,7) 
 
At first sight this chapter looks like it could be very close to what Dasgupta said 
about the aim of Yoga (cf. supra, chapter 4.3.3.12 and 4.5). In order to corroborate 
or refute this impression, let us compare how the two authors define and describe 
the various stages of samādhi.1021 I highlight the passages which correspond most 




Dasgupta  Eliade 
saṃprajñāta “cognitive;” all the saṃprajñāta 
states are positive states of the 
mind “and not a mere state of 
vacuity of objects or 
negativity.”1022 The mind 
remains fixed on some object, 
first external, then internal.1023 
“[…] absorptive concentration 
[on] an object.”1024 
“enstasis with support” or 
“differentiated enstasis”1025 
asaṃprajñāta “ultra-cognitive” or nirbīja 
(seedless) state of Yoga,1026 also 
called nirodha (state of 
suppression).1027 As the internal 
object gradually becomes finer 
and finer, it ultimately “loses all 
“undifferentiated stasis” 
“[…] all “consciousness” 
vanishes, the entire series of 
mental functions are 
blocked.”1031 
“[…] asamprajñāta samādhi 
                                                                                                                                                        
1020 Eliade, Yoga, 99. 
1021 I briefly recall the basic structure of the various samādhi stages: There is the fundamental 
dichotomy between saṃprajñāta and asaṃprajñāta samādhi, the first category consisting of six sub-
groups (savitarka, nirvitarka, savicāra, nirvicāra, ānandānugata and asmitānugata); this is the 
classification according to Vijñāna Bhikṣu, Vācaspati suggests eight sub-groups (cf. Dasgupta, 
Philosophy and Religion, 153). 
1022 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 124. 
1023 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 124. 
1024 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 150. 
1025 Eliade, Yoga, 79. 
1026 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 124. 
1027 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 155. 
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its determinate character and he 
[the Yogin] is said to be in a 
state of suppression in 
himself.”1028 
“[…] the ordinary 
consciousness has been 
altogether surpassed and the 
mind is in its own true infinite 
aspect, and the potencies of the 
stages in which the mind was 
full of finite knowledge are also 
burnt, so that with the return of 
the citta to its primal cause, final 
emancipation is effected.”1029 
“Purusha attains absolute 
freedom.”1030 
 
destroys the “impressions 
[saṃskāra] of all antecedent 
mental functions” and even 
succeeds in arresting the karmic 
forces already set in motion by 
the yogin’s past activity.”1032 
savitarka “the mind seems to become 
one with the thing, together 
with its name and concept […]; 
it is the lowest stage, because 
here the gross object does not 
appear to the mind in its true 
reality, but only in the false 
illusory way in which it appears 
associated with the concept and 
the name in ordinary life.”1033 
“argumentative” [reference to 
YS I,42], “because it 
presupposes a preliminary 
analysis; thought identifes with 
the object of meditation in ‘its 
essential wholeness;’ for an 
object is composed of a thing, a 
notion, and a word, and, during 
meditation, these three ‘aspects’ 
of its reality are in perfect 
coincidence with the yogin’s 
thought (citta). Savitarka samādhi 
is obtained through objects 
considered under their 
substantial (sthūla, ‘coarse’) 
aspect; it is a ‘direct perception’ 
of objects, but one that extends 





                                                                                                                                                        
1028 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 124. 
1029 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 125. 
1030 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 125. 
1031 Eliade, Yoga, 80. 
1032 Eliade, Yoga, 80. 
1033 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 150. 
1034 Eliade, Yoga, 79. Eliade adds a commentary by Vijñāna Bhikṣu who applied savitarka samādhi on 
the visualisation of Viṣṇu. – As to “thing, notion and word,” Eliade is referring to artha, jñāna and 
śabda which Dasgupta discusses in the opening paragraph of his chapter on samādhi (cf. supra, 
chapter 4.5). 
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nirvitarka The mind “can become one 
with its object, divested of all 
other associations of name and 
concept, so that it is in direct 
touch with the reality of the 
thing, uncontaminated by 
associations.”1035 
“nonargumentative” 
“In this meditation, thought is 
freed from the presence of the 
‘I,’ for the cognitive act (‘I know 
this object,’ or ‘This object is 
mind’) is no longer produced; it 
is thought that is (becomes) the 
given object. [reference to YS 
I,43] The object is no longer 
known through associations 
[…], it is grasped directly, in its 
existential nakedness, as a 
concrete and irreducible 
datum.”1036 
savicāra The mind reaches the level of 
the subtle elements, it “sinks 
deeper and deeper into [the 
object’s] finer constituents. […] 
This is a state of feelingless 
representation of one uniform 
tanmātric state, when the object 
appears as a conglomeration of 
tanmātras of rūpa, rasa or 
gandha, as the case might 
be.”1037 
Ego, buddhi and prakṛti are 
also objects of concentration at 
this stage; time, space and 
causality remain associated 
with it. 
“reflective” 
“thought no longer stops at the 
exterior aspect of material 
objects […]; on the contrary, it 
directly knows those 
infinitesimal nucleuses of 
energy which the Sāṃkhya and 
Yoga treatises call tanmātras. 
The yogin meditates on the 
“subtle” (sūkṣma) aspect of 
matter; he penetrates, 
Vijñānabhikṣu tells us, to 
ahaṃkāra and prakṛti, but this 
meditation is still accompanied 
by consciousness of time and 
space […].”1038 
nirvicāra The notions of time, space and 
causality vanish.1039 
“superreflective”1040 
“[…] (when the yogin 
‘assimilates them [the 
tanmātras] in an ideal fashion,’ 
without any resultant feeling of 
suffering, or pleasure, or 
violence, or inertia, etc., and 
without consciousness of time 
and space), the yogin obtains 
the state of nirvicāra. Thought 
then becomes one with these 
infinitesimal nucleuses of 
                                                 
1035 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 151. 
1036 Eliade, Yoga, 81-82. Eliade also adds a description by Vyāsa (on YS I,43). 
1037 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 151-152. 
1038 Eliade, Yoga, 82-83. 
1039 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 152. 
1040 Eliade, Yoga, 80. 
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energy which constitute the true 
foundation of the physical 
universe. It is a real descent into 
the very essence of the physical 
world, and not only into 
qualified and individual 
phenomena.”1041 
ānandānugata “[…] when the object of 
communion is the senses, the 
samādhi is called ānandānugata 
[…].”1042 
“[…] when, abandoning all 
perception, even that of ‘subtle’ 
realities, one experiences the 
happiness of the eternal 
luminosity and consciousness of 
Self that belong to sattva 
[…].”1043 
asmitānugata “[…] when the object of 
communion is the subtle cause 
the ego (asmitā), the samādhi is 
known as asmitānugata.”1044 
“[…] which one reaches at the 
moment that the intellect, 
buddhi, completely isolated from 
the external world, reflects only 
the Self.”1045 
 
Generally speaking, the concordance between Dasgupta and Eliade is much 
greater in this chapter than in others. Of course, the terminology is different in 
places but certain key statements are absolutely identical. Eliade remains close to 
the Sanskrit sources and profusely quotes from the comments (mostly Vijñāna 
Bhikṣu) in order to make each modality of samādhi as clearly understandable as 
possible. Dasgupta also faithfully rendered the texts but (as always) he failed to 
mention the majority of the passages he was quoting or alluding to. This is a 
chapter where Dasgupta’s sources could (at least partly) be reconstructed on the 
basis of Eliade’s references. 
 
Dasgupta and Eliade are closest in their definition of savicāra and nirvicāra 
samādhi, but when it comes to the last two modalities, ānandānugata and 
asmitānugata, their statements have nothing in common. The reason for this 
divergence can be found in Dasgupta’s account where the difference in opinion 
between Vācaspati Miśra on the one hand and Vijñāna Bhikṣu on the other is 
expounded.1046 As it happens Dasgupta followed Vācaspati’s definition of a-
nandānugata and asmitānugata whereas Eliade preferred Bhikṣu’s explanation of 
these states.  
 
Another difference can be detected in Eliade’s avoiding the term “nirodha” (cf. 
Dasgupta’s definition of asaṃprajñāta samādhi). “Suppression” (which is 
                                                                                                                                                        
1041 Eliade, Yoga, 83. Eliade refers to Vyāsa’s and Vācaspati Miśra’s commentaries on YS I,44-45 (for 
both savicāra and nirvicāra). 
1042 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 153. 
1043 Eliade, Yoga, 84. 
1044 Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 153. 
1045 Eliade, Yoga, 84. 
1046 Cf. Dasgupta, Philosophy and Religion, 153. 
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Dasgupta’s translation of this word) probably sounded too radical or drastic to 
Eliade’s psychologically trained mind; in his whole presentation of the Patañjali 
system he only mentions “nirodha” thrice, and only once he calls it 
“suppression.”1047 The first time he does not translate this term at all1048 and later 
on he renders it as “final arrest of all psychomental experience.”1049 To “arrest,” 
“vanish” or “block” are the terms Eliade definitely preferred to “suppress” (cf. 
supra, his definition of asaṃprajñāta samādhi). 
 
If we look at other parts of this chapter, not summed up in the above table, we 
find that Eliade distinguishes saṃprajñāta from asaṃprajñāta samādhi by calling 
the latter a “raptus,” an “unprovoked enstasis.”1050 Whereas the first kind of 
samādhi is obtained through dhāraṇā and dhyāna, the second one “comes 
without being summoned, without being provoked, without special preparation 
for it.”  The contradiction inherent in this statement becomes evident when 
Eliade has to admit that also asaṃprajñāta samādhi “is always owing to 
prolonged efforts on the yogin’s part” and that “it is the crown of the 




Other than Dasgupta (who only writes of supreme knowledge [prajñā], fully 
gained in asaṃprajñāta samādhi and immediately leading to final liberation), 
Eliade sees in the various stages of saṃprajñāta samādhi an interplay of state and 
knowledge.  
 
“Contemplation makes enstasis possible; enstasis, in turn, permits a deeper 
penetration into reality, by provoking (or facilitating) a new contemplation, 
a new yogic ‘state.’ This passing from ‘knowledge’ to ‘state’ must be 
constantly borne in mind, for, in our opinion, it is the characteristic feature 
of samādhi (as it is, indeed, of all Indian ‘meditation’).  1053
 
Whatever other forms of Indian meditation Eliade might have had in mind, Yoga 
once more stands out as a prototype for a central aspect of Indian spirituality. 
Eliade continues along these lines by adding that 
 
“[t]he ‘rupture of plane’ that India seeks to realize, which is the paradoxical 
passage from being to knowing, takes place in samādhi.”  1054
 
He ends this chapter by referring to Vijñāna Bhikṣu, a representative of the 
mystical yogins, that in asaṃprajñāta samādhi not only puruṣa is perceived but 
also God (Īśvara), as the twenty-sixth principle of Sāṃkhya. 
 
 
                                                 
1047 Eliade, Yoga, 69: „cittavṛtti nirodhaḥ (i.e., the suppression of psychomental states).” 
1048 Cf. Eliade, Yoga, 47. 
1049 Eliade, Yoga, 93. 
1050 Eliade, Yoga, 80. 
1051 Eliade, Yoga, 80. 
1052 Eliade, Yoga, 80. 
1053 Eliade, Yoga, 82. 
1054 Eliade, Yoga, 82. 
Mircea Eliade and Surendranath Dasgupta 206
5.6.2. Samādhi “without Support” and Final Liberation (subchapter II,9) 
 
This chapter is nearly entirely dedicated to a faithful presentation of what various 
commentators wrote about asaṃprajñāta samādhi, and then it suddenly takes an 
unexpected but highly interesting turn towards Eliade’s own interpretation. 
 
Eliade first describes the transition from saṃprajñāta samādhi to the highest state 
which takes place as soon as the difference between the yogin’s consciousness on 
the one hand and the puruṣa on the other disappears (cf. Vyāsa on YS I,2 and I,18 
and YS I,51). 
 
“[…] now every vṛtti is eliminated, ‘burned;’ nothing remains but the 
unconscious impressions (saṃskāra), and at a certain moment even these 
imperceptible saṃskāras are consumed, whereupon true stasis ‘without 
seed’ (nirbīja samādhi) ensues.”1055 
 
Based on (the quite obscure and most variously translated) YS I,19 and Vyāsa’s 
comment on it Eliade distinguishes a “natural way” (bhava) and a “way of 
technique” (upāya) which lead to samādhi. The second path (followed by the 
yogins) is superior to the first one (which belongs to the gods) because it is 
durable. According to Vijñāna Bhikṣu upāya means to practise saṃyama on 
Īśvara and bhava to achieve final liberation spontaneously, just by desiring it. 
 
“[…] it is no longer a conquest achieved by technical means, it is a 
spontaneous operation; it is called bhava, ‘natural.’”   1056
                                                
 
Going back to the transition from saṃprajñāta to asaṃprajñāta samādhi, Eliade 
next quotes Vyāsa (on YS III,55) and then Vācaspati Miśra (on YS I,21), who 
describe this process and its final state in purely Sāṃkhyan terms. 
 
“[…] the yogin realizes ‘absolute isolation’ (kaivalya) – that is, liberation of 
purusa from the dominance of prakṛti. […] the ‘fruit’ of samprajñāta samādhi is 
asamprajñāta samādhi, and the ‘fruit’ of the latter is kaivalya, liberation.”1057 
 
Eliade too is perfectly able to express the state of Yogic freedom in a language 
which remains very close to Yogic sources: 
 
“Intellect (buddhi), having accomplished its mission, withdraws, detaching 
itself from the puruṣa and returning into prakṛti. The Self remains free, 
autonomous; it contemplates itself. ‘Human’ consciousness is suppressed; 
that is, it no longer functions, its constitutent elements being reabsorbed into 
the primordial substance. The yogin attains deliverance; like a dead man, he 
has no more relation with life; he is ‘dead in life.’ He is the jīvan-mukta, the 
‘liberated in life.’ He no longer lives in time and under the domination of 




1055 Eliade, Yoga, 91. 
1056 Eliade, Yoga, 92. 
1057 Eliade, Yoga, 93. 
1058 Eliade, Yoga, 93-94. 
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But then he suddenly and explicitly branches off, leaving traditional Sāṃkhya 
behind. 
 
“Such would be the situation of the yogin in asamprajñāta samādhi, as long as 
it was viewed from outside and judged from the point of view of the 
dialectic of liberation and of the relations between the Self and Substance, as 
elaborated by Sāṃkhya. In reality, if we take into account the ‘experience’ of 
the various samādhis, the yogin’s situation is more paradoxical and infinitely 
more grandiose.”1059 
 
This must be considered as the key passage not only of this chapter but maybe of 
the entire first hundred pages of Eliade’s book (dedicated to the discussion of 
Patañjali). Eliade obviously considers Sāṃkhya to be somewhat limited in its 
possibilities to adequately render the full dimensions of the state of liberation. “In 
reality” things are far more complex, meaningful and marvellous than what 
Sāṃkhya was able to express, and it is Eliade’s wish and desire to find words for 
these additional dimensions. The terms which are apt to describe the Yogin’s 
freedom are “appropriation,” “paradox,” “complete absorption of the known by 
the knower” and “being.”  
 
Eliade sets out by giving his own interpretation of what is meant by ”reflection of 
the puruṣa.”1060 For him, the knowledge or direct revelation of the puruṣa is 
equivalent to an “appropriation,” “an ontological modality inaccessible to the 
noninitiate.”1061 And this, to him, is a paradox because it is impossible to say 
whether this state is a “contemplation of the Self or […] an ontological 
transformation of the human being.”1062 
 
“[…] the modalities of the real are abolished, being (puruṣa) coincides with 
nonbeing (‘man,’ properly speaking), knowledge is transformed into 
magical ‘mastery,’ in virtue of the complete absorption of the known by the 
knower. […] The self-revelation of the puruṣa is equivalent to a taking 
possession of being in all its completeness. In asamprajñāta samādhi, the yogin 
is actually all Being.” 
 
The yogin, mortal yet immortal, with a body yet liberated, thus fulfils what 
“Indian spirituality has tended from its beginnings.” 
 
“What else are the ‘men-gods’ of whom we spoke earlier, if not the 
‘geometric point’ where the divine and the human coincide, as do being and 
nonbeing, eternity and death, the whole and the part? And, more perhaps 
than any other civilization, India has always lived under the sign of ‘men-
gods.’”1063 
 
This is the last sentence of this second chapter on samādhi which paves the way 
for subchapter II,10, “Reintegration and Freedom” (cf. supra, chapter 5.5.8). 
 
                                                 
1059 Eliade, Yoga, 94. 
1060 Eliade, Yoga, 94. 
1061 Eliade, Yoga, 94. 
1062 Eliade, Yoga, 94. 
1063 Eliade, Yoga, 95. 
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5.6.3. Conclusions 
 
Eliade’s presentation of samādhi is a strangely mixed affair – a particularly 
faithful rendering of the Indian sources is followed by a very free interpretation of 
the highest Yogic state in completely non-Indian terms, culminating in the 
following chapter, “Reintegration and Freedom.” Apparently Eliade saw no 
contradiction in this but felt that he simply rephrased in his own words what 
Patañjali, “in reality,” wanted to say. But the discrepancy between the Sāṃkhya-
Yoga language and Eliade’s terminology could not be bigger and the question 
must be asked whether both really mean the same. Is the uprooting of avidyā and 
its vāsanās through true discriminate knowledge (prajñā) of the distinction 
between puruṣa and prakṛti, is the extinguishing of all mental activities and of all 
experiences, is kaivalya, the eternal isolation of puruṣa from prakṛti, really 
identical to magical mastery, to taking possession of being in all its completeness, 
to a paradoxical state of mortal and immortal, empty and full, to the coincidence 





Whereas Dasgupta dedicated a whole chapter to the theory of karma (IX), Eliade 
does not treat this subject anywhere in detail. He neither mentions Patañjali’s 
sūtras discussing this topic (YS II,12-14 and IV,7-8) nor does he refer to any 
theoretical Indian background about the accumulation of results of action and 
consequent rebirth. Nevertheless, karma is present is his book, but rather in a way 
which makes it clear that Eliade supposes his readership to be familiar with it. 
Karma is presented as a concept which is part and parcel of the spiritual and 
esoteric world picture Eliade tries to impart to his Western audience. In the 
Patañjali section (chapters I and II), karma is mentioned nine times; eight times in 
chapter I (dedicated to the doctrines of Yoga) and only once in the more practical 
chapter II. 
 
1. We find karma already on the first page of Eliade’s book – it is the first of the 
“four basic and interdependent concepts […] which bring us directly to the 
core of Indian spirituality; […] the law of universal causality, which connects 
man with the cosmos and condemns him to transmigrate indefinitely.”1064 
Such a fundamental law does not seem to need any further explanation at this 
point. It appears as an unquestionable pillar of India’s spiritual tradition. 
 
2. In the following chapter we read that life and the cosmos “fling man into 
suffering and, by virtue of karma, enmesh him in the infinite cycle of 
transmigrations.”1065 This sums up the classical understanding of the 
mechanism between action and rebirth. 
 
                                                 
1064 Eliade, Yoga, 3. 
1065 Eliade, Yoga, 11. 
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3. One page further down, Eliade states that the human condition is “determined 
by karma,” and this time he adds an explanatory footnote, “recalling” the 
meaning of this term to his reader (“work, action; destiny (ineluctable 
consequence of acts performed in a previous existence); product, effect, 
etc.”1066). Since this is the first instance where karma is defined in this book, the 
phrase “let us recall” must refer to a knowledge Eliade believes his audience 
to have acquired from other sources. At the same time he evokes the 
possibility that the infinite cycle can be interrupted: “each [individual] can 
annul the karmic forces by which it is governed.”1067 
 
4. In subchapter I,5, Eliade explains that ignorance (avidyā) leads to existence, 
“by virtue of karma,” and, therefore to suffering. “All our acts and intentions 
[…] are conditioned and governed by karma.”1068  
 
5. Talking of the liberated man who has overcome avidyā, Eliade shows how the 
karmic determination is abolished: “Since the force of ignorance no longer 
acts, new karmic nucleuses are no longer created.”1069 
6. In his chapter about the subconscious (I,8) Eliade evokes the relationship 
between vāsanas (subconscious impressions) and karma, saying that “the 
vāsanās condition the specific character of each individual; and this 
conditioning is in accordance both with his heredity and with his karmic 
situation. […] The subconscious is transmitted either ‘impersonally,’ from 
generation to generation (through language, mores, civilization – ethnic and 
historical transmission), or directly (through karmic transmigration […]).”1070 
 
7. Shortly afterwards he establishes a link between cittavṛtti, karma and vāsanā: 
“Man’s acts (karma), instigated by psychomental states (cittavṛtti), in their turn 
instigate other cittavṛttis. But these states of consciouness themselves result 
from the actualization of subliminal latencies, vāsanās. Hence the circuit 
latency-consciousness-acts-latencies, etc. (vāsanā-vṛtti-karma-vāsanā, etc.) offers 
no point at which there is a solution of continuity.”1071 
 
8. Still in the same chapter Eliade recalls the fact that everything returns into the 
subconscious “because of karmic ‘sowings.’”1072  
 
9. Describing samādhi without support Eliade points out that this state “even 
succeeds in arresting the karmic forces already set in motion by the yogin’s 
past activity.”1073 
 
                                                 
1066 Eliade, Yoga, 12. 
1067 Eliade, Yoga, 12. 
1068 Eliade, Yoga, 27. 
1069 Eliade, Yoga, 34. 
1070 Eliade, Yoga, 42. 
1071 Eliade, Yoga, 43. 
1072 Eliade, Yoga, 46. 
1073 Eliade, Yoga, 80. 
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Eliade’s reader learns three things about karma: 
 
1. The human existence is determined by karma; rebirth is a result of 
fundamental ignorance and leads to suffering. This is a universal law. (cf. 
points 1-4) 
 
2. The endless circle of transmigration can be abolished if man manages to 
overcome this ignorance – for example through Yoga. (cf. points 5 and 9) 
 
3. Karma can be “seen” or “studied” in the subconscious; acts leave an 
impression in the subconscious mind which in turn instigate new impulses 
which lead to new actions. (cf. points 6-8). 
 
Compared to Dasgupta’s presentation of karma and rebirth, Eliade’s view must 
be called heavily simplified in the sense that it is stripped from the whole 
technical and theoretical framework of the Indian texts. The Romanian religionist 
conceals the fact that Patañjali and his commentators speak of various categories 
of karma (white, black, black and white, neither black nor white, accomplished 
mentally or through the senses, karma ripening in one or in several lives, 
accumulated in one or over many existences, including animal ones), and his 
circuit “latency-consciousness-acts-latencies, etc. (vāsanā-vṛtti-karma-vāsanā, etc.)” 
merely renders the basic mechanism of the far more complex structure kleśas-
vāsanās/saṃskāras-vṛttis-saṃskāras on the one hand, and kleśas-four passions 
(desire, avarice, ignorance and anger)-karmāśaya (accumulation of karma) on the 
other hand, as explained by Dasgupta (cf. chapter 4.4.3). In other words: Eliade 
presents a straightforward, neutral, de-Indianised concept of karma to his 
Western audience which avoids any reference to possible inconsistencies and 
controversies within the Yogic discussions about this topic (not to mention other 
Indian systems of thought!1074). Dasgupta never had this urge to unify at all cost 
but always freely pointed to contradictory views within the Patañjali tradition 
(for example: Vācaspati’s and Vijñāna Bhikṣu’s as well as Nāgeśa’s differing 
opinions on YS II,13, concerning one category of karmāśaya; cf. supra, chapter 
4.4.2). Had Eliade delved deeper into this complicated subject, the Indianness 
(and therefore partly alien character) of the karma concept would have clearly 
appeared, jeopardising Eliade’s sustained effort to present Yoga as something 
universal. He therefore had no choice but to drop any in-depth discussion of 
Patañjali’s sūtras on karma. 
 
 
                                                 
1074 Cf. for example Wilhelm Halbfass. Karma und Wiedergeburt im indischen Denken.  München: 
Hugendubel, 2000 (Diederichs Gelbe Reihe 161). 
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5.8. Conclusions  
 
In the second chapter of his book (“Techniques for Autonomy”), Eliade profusely 
quoted from the Yogasūtra and its commentaries, hardly using any other sources 
any more (just the Skanda-Purāṇa, Yogacintāmaṇi and the MBh once each). Let us 












I,2 Patañjali Definition of Yoga II,1; II,4 
I,2 Vyāsabhāṣya Nirbīja samādhi; difference 
between citta and puruṣa 
II,7; II,9 
I,9 Patañjali, Vyāsabhāṣya, 
Tattvavaiśāradī and 
Yogasārasaṃgraha1075 




Four kinds of samādhi II,7 
I,18 Patañjali, Vyāsabhāṣya  asaṃprajñāta or nirbīja samādhi II,9 
I,21 Tattvavaiśāradī Transition from saṃprajñāta to 
asaṃprajñāta samādhi 
II,9 
I,24 Patañjali and 
Vyāsabhāṣya 
Definition of Īśvara II,5 
I,26 Patañjali Īśvara is not bound by time II,5 
I,30 Patañjali Nine obstacles on the path II,1 
I,34 Bhojavṛtti Connection between prāṇāyāma 
and mental states 
II,2 
I,36 Vyāsabhāṣya and 
Tattvavaiśāradī 
Lotos of the heart II,4 
I,41 Patañjali, Vyāsabhāṣya 
and Tattvavaiśāradī 
samāpatti II,7 
I,42-45 Patañjali, Vyāsabhāṣya, 
Tattvavaiśāradī and 
Yogasārasaṃgraha 
Four kinds of samādhi II,7 
I,48 Patañjali, 
Yogasārasaṃgraha 
Absolute knowledge II,7 
I,51 Patañjali asaṃprajñāta or nirbīja samādhi II,9 





The yamas and niyamas II,1 
II,33-34 Patañjali Bad thoughts (vitarka) and how 
to deal with them 
II,1 
                                                 
1075 From chapter II,4 onwards, Eliade frequently quotes from this work (by Vijñāna Bhikṣu) which he 
omitted from the list of his sources (cf. supra, chapter 5.4.1). 
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II,37-43 Patañjali Results of some yamas and 
niyamas 
II,1 
II,45 Patañjali Result of īśvarapraṇidhāna II,5 
II,46-48 Patañjali āsana II,2 
II,49-50 Patañjali prāṇāyāma II,2 
II,52-53 Patañjali Results of prāṇāyāma II,4 
II,54 Vyāsabhāṣya prajñā knows all things as they 
are 
II,4 
III,1 Patañjali and 
Tattvavaiśāradī 
Definition of dhāraṇā 
(concentration) 
II,4 
III,2 Patañjali, Vyāsabhāṣya 
and Yogasārasaṃgraha 
Definition of dhyāna (meditation) II,4 
III,3 Patañjali, Tattvavaiśāradī 
and Yogasārasaṃgraha 
Definition of samādhi II,6 




33, 37, 44 
Patañjali, Vyāsabhāṣya 
(III,19 and 26), 
Tattvavaiśāradī (III,20 
and 30), Bhojavṛtti 
(III,44) 
The vibhūti II,8 
III,51 Patañjali, Vyāsabhāṣya Warning of heavenly temptation II,8 








Looking back to the quotations of subchapters I,1-6 and I,7-8 (cf. supra, chapters 
5.4.6 and 5.4.10) we have seen that in his presentation of the Sāṃkhya theory 
Eliade referred to the Sāṃkhyasūtra, the Sāṃkhyakārikā and the Tattvakaumudī far 
more often than to Patañjali. The Yogasūtra was mostly used for a discussion of 
avidyā (II,5 and 15-20), prakṛti and the guṇas (I,4 and 16, and IV, 2-3, 13, 32-34) as 
well as puruṣa (I,4 and 41 and IV,24). In the following two chapters (I,7-8), very 
psychological in content, Eliade dropped nearly all other Indian sources and 
focussed on a few Patañjali sūtras which talk about consciousness (I,1-2 and IV,9), 
including the kleśas (II,3) and avidyā (I,8). These sūtras however only served as a 
minimal background illustration of Eliade’s own psychological view of Yoga. In 
the ten subchapters of the second part (on Yoga technique or practice), Patañjali 
(and the commentators) are again widely present, at the cost of other Indian texts 
(exception: subchapters 3 and 10 which are entirely free from any references to 
Indian sources). The sūtras on samādhi are quoted (I,2, 9, 17-18, 21, 41-45 and 51; 
III,3 and 55; IV,29), Īśvara is discussed (I,24 and 26) and the eight limbs described 
in detail (II,29-III,3). Eliade also evokes the supranatural powers (III,16-44). 
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Comparing the list of the sūtras quoted by Eliade with the list of sūtras used by 
Dasgupta we can identify six groups of sūtras (and thus six topics) which Eliade 
omitted from his presentation of the Patañjali Yoga system: 
 
1. YS I,5-11: the vṛttis.  
Eliade does mention this term (for example on p.38) but when he actually 
presents the vṛttis in detail he lists the kleśas (on p.41). 
 
2. YS I,13-16: abhyāsa and vairāgya. 
Eliade interprets abhyāsa as ascesis or experience, without ever mentioning 
Patañjali’s definition of this term. Vairāgya is completely absent. This stands 
out in great contrast to Dasgupta to whom abhyāsa and vairāgya were of the 
utmost importance. He presented them as akliṣṭa vṛttis (unafflicted states; cf. 
supra, chapter 4.3.3.10) and as two efficient means to reach the aim of Yoga for 
those whose mind is naturally (or through the grace of God) pure enough (cf. 
supra, chapter 4.3.3.12). With Eliade, this alternative road to samādhi is closed, 
the only way he talks about is the eightfold path. 
 
3. YS I,33: maitrī, karuṇā, muditā and upekṣā. 
These mental attitudes which played an important part in Dasgupta are left 
out by Eliade. 
 
4. YS II,12-14 and IV,7-8: karma. 
As we have seen above (cf. supra, chapter 5.7) Eliade mentions karma in 
general terms but avoids ever quoting a passage from Patañjali concerning this 
subject. 
 
5. YS I,40, 44-45, III,52, IV,14 and 33: nature and creation of atoms, and: 
IV,12-16 and 33: the reality and relative eternity of the external world. 
These more scientific topics fascinated Dasgupta but were left out by Eliade. 
Some of these sūtras are present in Eliade but with a different focus (for 
example I,42-44: four kinds of samādhi). 
 
6. III,9-15: Transformation (pariṇāma); changes in quality (dharma) and 
substance (dharmin). 
Yet another very technical subject which Eliade chose not to evoke. 
 
All in all Eliade’s account of Patañjali’s classical Yoga is more selective and partial 
than Dasgupta’s; Eliade chose only those sections of the Yoga philosophy which 
suited his purpose and he did not hesitate to cast the Indian terminology into a 
completely different language. It would be a very interesting (and also necessary) 
task to analyse Eliade’s vocabulary in terms of what he knew his audience to be 
accustomed to and to expect from him. After all he was given a research grant by 
the Bollingen Foundation of New York “to devote several years to the present 
work,”1076 a foundation named after the small Swiss village where C. G. Jung had 
a private rural retreat. The Bollingen Series (of which Yoga. Immortality and 
                                                 
1076 Eliade, Yoga, xxii. 
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Freedom is volume LVI) consists of works by Jung and Freud, of various 
contributions by Eliade and other religionists (such as J. Campbell, for example) 
as well as of translations and interpretations of mythological and religious books 
from various cultures (Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, etc.).1077 Eliade’s 
endeavour to present Yoga as a pan-Indian and ultimately universal practice 
certainly matches the profile of the Bollingen Series. 
 
Dasgupta also had a specific interest in presenting Yoga to his audience and he 
also assessed Patañjali according to his needs, but even in doing so he remained 
far closer to the sources and gave a far fuller vision of all the aspects treated in the 
Indian texts than Eliade. 
 
As to the details of Eliade’s and Dasgupta’s procedure I would like to refer to the 
various chapters entitled “Conclusions” (4.2.3, 4.3.3.9, 4.3.3.16, 4.4.3., 4.6., 5.4.10, 
5.6.3. and 5.8); a summary at this point could but repeat in an incomplete way 
what has been stated more elaborately and accurately above.  
                                                 
1077 Cf. http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/catalogs/series/bs.html 
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6. Appendix: Dasgupta in Switzerland 
 
6.1. The 1939 visit 
 
This book is part of a project about the encounter of India and Switzerland 
through Yoga, and therefore Dasgupta’s visit to Zurich cannot be omitted from it. 
According to Surama Dasgupta, her husband “lectured on the Concept of 
Psychology in Zurich (Switzerland) at the Psychological Institute of Jung in 
1939.”1078 This information is only partly correct and calls for amendment. 
 
The Institute of C. G. Jung was created only in 1948 as an offspring of the 
Psychological Club, founded already in 1916. This Club still exists and is located 
in Zurich, on Gemeindestrasse 27. The Institute of Jung was originally situated in 
the same building before it was transferred to Küsnacht in 1979. According to the 
librarian of the Psychological Club, Surendranath Dasgupta held a lecture on May 
3rd, 1939 at Gemeindestrasse 27 on “The Relation of Mind and Body according to 
Yoga.”1079 Unfortunately, there is no copy of this lecture at the Club library, but it 
is likely that Dasgupta used part of it in his long essay entitled “An Interpretation 
of the Yoga Theory of the Relation of Mind and Body” in Philosophical Essays, 
published in 1941.1080 
 
Dasgupta’s short visit of Zurich in the spring of 1939 was part of an extended 
lecture tour through Europe (cf. supra, chapter 3.1.) which was triggered off by the 
conferment of an honorary doctorate on Dasgupta by the University of Rome. 
Dasgupta left Bombay on April 5, 1939, travelling to Naples and Rome. It was 
during his stay in the Italian capital that he contacted Eliade (cf. supra, chapter 
2.2.4). On April 26 he departed from Rome, spent a few days in Milan and 
reached Zurich on May 1st. The day following his lecture he continued his journey 
to Warsaw.1081  
 
In September 2004, as I was leafing through old newspaper cuttings collected at 
the Yogendra Institute in Bombay, I came across a short note from the Evening 
News, Bombay, dated 24th July 1939, saying that Dr. Dasgupta had arrived that 
day on board the M. V. “Victoria”. 
 
“Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, Principal of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, also 
returned to India. He was invited to Rome and was awarded the Honorary 
Doctorate of Literature. He delivered a course of lectures in Milan and 
Zurich on Indian art, medicine and mysticism. He delivered an address at 
the International Conference of Religions in Paris and during his visit of 
London was made an honorary Fellow of the Pests Club, London. Dr. Das 
Gupta also visited Warsaw on the invitation of the educational authorities 
                                                 
1078 Dasgupta, Quest, 286. 
1079 Oral communication of Mrs Seel, May 8, 2003. 
1080 Dasgupta, Essays, 276-320. 
1081 In a letter to Surama, dated April 23, 1939, Dasgupta describes these activities as follows (for some 
unknown reason avoiding to mention Zurich or Switzerland): “I am having a highly packed 
programme. My lectures on Art were very much welcomed here [in Rome]. Then I shall have to talk 
on Yoga Psychology. After that I shall start for Warsaw where I shall speak on Indian Medicine and 
also on Indian Mysticism.” (Dasgupta, Quest, 151). 
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there and discussed with them questions relating to cultural and intellectual 
co-operation between Indian and Poland. As a result of the talks the Polish 
authorities have sent to India Dr. Maryla Falk to be Reader in the Calcutta 
University.” 
 
Next to this cutting there was another one, of a photograph taken of a smiling, 
garlanded Surendranath standing next to Dr. Falk, the headline reading 
“Prominent arrivals by the ‘Victoria’” (The Evening News of India, Tuesday, July 25, 
1939). Thus we know that his trip to Europe which included a visit to Zurich 








Dasgupta, by the way, seems to have been to Switzerland before, since in a letter 
to Surama, dated May 20, 1932, he describes rock-climbing in the Alps. 
 
“In Switzerland I saw people climbing the Alps. Three of them start together 
tied with one another by a piece of rope. The first one cuts the ice with an 
axe, makes a space for one foot-step, then he proceeds and makes room for 
the others behind him. If any one of them slips, the others pull him up and 




                                                 
1082 Dasgupta, Quest, 80. 
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6.2. An exchange of letters between Dasgupta and C. G. Jung 
 
Dasgupta’s stay in Zurich in 1939 was a result of his personal acquaintance with 
C. G. Jung. The two had met in Calcutta early in 1938 when Jung, invited by the 
British Government of India, participated in “an Indian scientific congress.”1083 As 
soon as Dasgupta knew that he would be going to Rome he contacted Jung, 
initiating a correspondence which is almost entirely extant and preserved in 
Zurich.1084 The ten letters (seven by Dasgupta and three by Jung) were written 
over a period of three months and are registered under the following call 
numbers.1085  
 
1. Dasgupta to Jung, 27-01-1939 (Hs 1056:7857) 
2. Jung to Dasgupta, 02-02-1939 (Hs 1056:8404) 
3. Dasgupta to Jung, 28-02-1939 (Hs 1056:7856) 
4. Dasgupta to Jung, 01-04-1939 (Hs 1056:7858) 
5. Jung to Dasgupta, 17-04-1939 (Hs 1056:8405) 
6. Dasgupta to Jung, 19-04-1939 (Hs 1056:7859) 
7. Dasgupta to Jung, 22-04-1939 (Hs 1056:7560) 
8. Dasgupta to Jung, 24-04-1939 (Hs 1056:7561) 
9. Jung to Dasgupta, 25-04-1939 (Hs 1056:8406)  
10. Dasgupta to Jung, 25-04-1939 (Hs 1056:7862)  
 
                                                 
1083 Jung, Indien, 569 (translation C. G.). Unfortunately, Jung does not specify the topic of this congress. 
Alfred Ribi has reconstructed as many details as possible concerning Jung’s trip to India (cf. Ribi, 
Jung, 201-207). Referring to Jung’s own “Erinnerungen” (Remembrances), he notes that Jung claims to 
have been invited to India for the 25th anniversary of the University of Calcutta (“aus Anlass des 
25jährigen Bestehens der Universität Calcutta,” Ribi, Jung, 202). Since this University was founded as 
early as 1857, however, this statement cannot be correct. Hartnack informs us that it was the 
Department of Psychology of the University of Calcutta which celebrated its 25th anniversary in 1938 
(cf. Hartnack, Psychoanalysis, 102), and we also learn that in the same year the Indian Science 
Congress Association published a book called The Progress of Science in India during the Past Twenty-
Five Years in which Girindrasekhar Bose, the famous psychologist of Calcutta at the time, wrote on the 
“Progress of Psychology in India during the Past Twenty-Five Years” (cf. Hartnack, Psychoanalysis, 
117, footnote 43). It looks like the anniversary of the Department of Psychology was organised by the 
Indian Science Congress Association (which corresponds to Jung’s assertion that he participated in an 
Indian Scientific Congress). After all, the Department of Psychology was part of the College of Science 
at Calcutta University (and not of the arts complex; cf. Hartnack, Psychoanalysis, 91). According to 
Paramahansa Yogananda (Autobiography of a Yogi. Los Angeles: Self Realization Fellowship, 1985 
[eleventh edition], 264) Jung even “received an honorary degree from the University of Calcutta.” As 
to Jung’s entire Indian sojourn, he reached Bombay in December 1937 and visited Ellora, Ajanta, Agra, 
Allahabad, Benares, Sanchi and Darjeeling before reaching Calcutta early January 1938 (cf. Ribi, Jung). 
From January 3 to 13 he was hospitalised there with dysentery and then he went on to Bhubaneshwar 
and Puri before returning to Calcutta. On January 14 and 15 he visited Belur Math north of the city 
where he attended the consecration ceremony of the Sri Ramakrishna Temple. Jung continued his 
journey to Hyderabad and from there to South India (Mysore, Madurai, Trivandrum etc.); his trip 
ended in Sri Lanka in February 1938. 
1084 At the Jung Archive which is located at the Archives of the Swiss Federal Institute Zurich in the 
ETH-library. 
1085 I thank the Trust for the Works of C. G. Jung (Stiftung der Werke von C. G. Jung, represented by 
Paul & Peter Fritz AG, Literary Agency, Zurich) for granting me the non-exclusive, one-time right to 
publish Jung’s letters in this electronical form (permission dated June 18, 2008). The original copyright 
remains with the above mentioned Trust. 
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The first letter1086 
 
Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 27th January 1939 
 
Dear Prof. Jung, 
 
I regret to say that I lost your address which you so kindly gave to me and 
consequently I could not write to you even when you were pleased to send me 
your charming book. But now I have been able to get your address from a friend 
of mine and beg to offer you my best thanks for your book which was so 
illustrating and instructive. I am proceeding to Rome for the investiture of an 
Hony. Doctorate which the University of Rome has recently conferred on me and 
I hope to be in Rome from 18th to 26th April 1939 C/o Istituto Italiano per il Medio 
Ed Estremo Oriente Via Merulana, Rome. I have a mind to visit Zurich if you are 
there and to deliver a few lectures there – if the same can be arranged. I shall 
leave Calcutta on the 1st of April and in Rome my address will be C/o Istituto 
Italiano per il Medio Ed Estremo Oriente via Merulana, Rome. I shall be glad to 
hear from you. My wife and daughter and my pupil Miss S. Mitra join with me in 
offering you our heartiest good wishes of the New Year. 
 
With best regards, 
Yours sincerely, 




Unfortunately, Dasgupta does not mention the title of the book which Jung has 
sent him. 
 
Dasgupta is inviting himself to Zurich. When he received Jung’s book he did not 
bother to try to find out Jung's lost address. Now that he wants to go to Zurich all 
he had to do was to ask a friend about it.  
 
“Miss S. Mitra” is Surama. Quite obviously, Jung had met Dasgupta’s wife and 
daughter as well as Surama when he was in Calcutta, probably at one of the 
“numerous formal dinners and receptions” he attended.1087 
 
 
                                                 
1086 All the letters are written on a type-writer, except Nr. 7 (hand-written by Dasgupta). Punctuation 
and orthography (capital and small letters, Umlaut or not in "Zurich", etc.) corresponds in every case 
to the original. 
1087 Jung, Indien, 569 (translation C. G.). 
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The second letter 
 
February 2nd, 1939 
 
Professor S. N. Das Gupta, 
48-8 Manoharpukur Road, 




Dear Professor Das Gupta, 
 
I have just received your very kind letter of January 27th. When I saw you in 
Calcutta I had a feeling as if we were going to meet again in not too far a future. 
So I hope sincerely that my anticipation will come true. 
At the moment I am not yet able to make any definite propositions as to the 
lectures in Zürich, but I have already written to Professor Abegg, our Sanskritist, 
who surely enjoys the prospect of meeting you in Zürich. I hope we can arrange 
something satisfactory. I also would be very much obliged to you, if you would 
let me know what fee you expect. 
Please give my best regards to Mrs. Das Gupta and also to your daughter who 
surely will enjoy her first visit to Europe. 
 
Hoping you are always in good health 







Jung replies by return of mail with a very positive, open letter. He remembers 
Dasgupta well and seems to be fond of him. 
 
If Jung assumes that Dasgupta's wife and daughter will be travelling with him, it 
might be due to an echo he has in his mind of Dasgupta's letter where it says: "My 
wife and daughter and my pupil Miss S. Mitra join with me..." The sentence goes 
on "in offering you our heartiest good wishes of the New Year", but Jung seems to 
have forgotten this part (cf. also Jung's next letter [fifth letter of the 
correspondence] where he again assumes that Mrs. and Miss Dasgupta are going 
to travel with their husband/father). 
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The third letter 
 
Feb. 28th, 1939 
 
Dear Prof. Jung, 
 
Many thanks for your kind letter. I hope to finish my work in Rome and Milan by 
the 27th or 28th April and I shall then proceed to Zurich. I shall intimate you the 
exact date and hour of my arrival in Zurich. I wonder if you consider it desirable 
to have a lecture on Yoga Psychology or the relation of mind and body according 
to Yoga in your Psychological Institute. About my fees I do not know anything. I 
shall be glad to accept any suitable honorarium that the authorities there may be 
pleased to afford for me. 
 
With kindest regards of my wife, daughter and myself, 
I remain, 
Yours sincerely, 
Sd / S. N. Das Gupta 
 
[address added at the bottom of the page:] 








Somebody (most probably Jung himself) underlined the words "the relation of 
mind and body according to Yoga" and marked this passage by a little cross in the 
left margin of the letter, thus indicating his preferance. 
 
The signature "S. N. Das Gupta" is typed, not hand-written – this may be an 
indication that this letter is a copy and not the original sent by Dasgupta (cf. 
fourth letter). 
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The fourth letter 
 
Sanskrit College, Calcutta The 1st April 1939 
 
Dear Prof. Jung, 
 
In reply to your letter of the 2nd July [error for 2nd February], I wrote to you on the 
28th Feb, 1939, but I have not heard anything in reply. I wonder if that letter of 
mine reached you safely. A copy of that letter is being enclosed. I do not also 
know if I can expect an invitation to your University. I shall be free from Rome on 
the 26th April and from Italy on the 30th April, 1939. I shall be glad to know if it 
will be possible for you to arrange some lectures for me in Zürich in the 1st week 
of May, 1939. I have not heard anything from Prof. Abegg. My wife and daughter 
can not accompany me and they send their best regards and respects to you. You 
may write to me if it so please you cf. Messrs Thomas Cook & Sons, Rome, where 
I shall stay till the 26th April, 1939. I am leaving Bombay on the 5th April by M. V. 
Victoria. After finishing Zürich I shall probably go to Poland if war conditions do 
not make my journey to that country impossible. 




S. N. Das Gupta 
 
[Adress added at the bottom of the page:] 







This is the point where things start to go wrong. Dasgupta is writing just before 
leaving Calcutta; he is obviously getting nervous because he has not heard from 
Jung for a few weeks, and he has not received any letter from Prof. Abegg either. 
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The fifth letter 
 
April 17th, 1939 
 
Professor S. N. Das Gupta, 





I had your second letter, but I couldn't answer it because I was afraid that the 
letter wouldn't reach you before your departure. 
I have arranged for you to lecture in the Psychological Club, Zürich, where you 
will find the best prepared and the most understanding audience. I shall also try 
to arrange for a lecture at the Federal Polytechnicum, where I am professor. I also 
have asked Prof. Abegg and Prof. Wehrli to arrange a lecture for you in the 
Society for Eastasiatic Culture. 
The lecture in the Psychological Club will take place on Saturday, May 6th at  
8 p.m. The lecture at the Federal Polytechnicum will be on Friday, May 5th at  
6 p.m. We should be much obliged to you if you would give us a talk about the 
relation of mind and body according to yoga in your Saturday lecture at the 
Psychol. Club. As a theme for the lecture at the Polytechnicum I would propose 
Psychology or Philosophy of the Yoga (specially Patanjali Yoga Sutra). 
I have given Prof. Wehrli your addres [sic] and I expect him to write to you 
directly. 
Please let me know at once when you arrive in Zürich. My Telephone number is 
910.809. 
I'm very disappointed to hear that Mrs. and Miss Das Gupta were unable to join 
you on your trip. I'm sure that Miss Das Gupta would have enjoyed Italy and 
Switzerland. But I understand that in these troubled times travelling includes a 
certain risk. Please give Mrs. and Miss Das Gupta my best regards when you 
write to them. 
 






It is impossible to know whether Jung really got Dasgupta's original second letter 
or not. If Jung got the original letter, it should have arrived early March (if mail 
was still as fast as earlier on in 1939, when Jung replied to Dasgupta's first letter, 
written on the 27th January, on the 2nd February), which would have left him 
enough time to respond (Dasgupta was planning to leave Calcutta on April 1st cf. 
1st letter). To me Jung's explanation for not having written any earlier (fear that 
his answer would not reach Calcutta in time) sounds a little bit like an excuse; 
after all he had Dasgupta's address in Italy and could have sent a letter to Rome. 
Maybe he simply forgot about the Indian professor, being busy with other things. 
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In any case he took action very quickly after receiving Dasgupta's letter dated 
April 1st, organising two lectures in the first week of May (as Dasgupta had 
requested) and getting in touch (again) with Prof. Abegg and Prof. Wehrli. 
 
As in his previous letter, Jung is very kind and polite, the only difference being 
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Dear Professor Jung, 
 
I have not yet received any letter from you at Rome. I shall be glad to know if it 
will be possible for you to arrange any lectures in Zurich. The subjects of the 
lectures may be as follows: 1. Psychology of yoga. 2. Yoga in relation to Indian 
Art, philosophy and religion. 3. Indian Mysticism. @ [sic] Principles of Indian Art 
and so on. The terms need not be anything more than first class travelling and 
hospitality during the days of stay. I shall leave Rome on the 28th and in case I do 
not hear anything satisfactory, I shall start for Warsaw Immediately [sic]. I shall 
be eagerly waiting for your letter. In the meanwhile I offer you my sincerest 
salutations. My daughter could not come with me but she particularly told me to 
be remembered to you. The function of the conferment of the Doctorate Honris 
[sic] Causa by the University comes on the 26th April. 
 
With best regards, 
yours sincerely 
S. N. Das Gupta 
 






Dasgupta has not heard from Jung since February (he only got one letter so far) 
and has no idea whether by the end of April he will be able to go to Zurich or not. 
Apparently he is organising his trip onward to Poland (as announced in his letter 
dated April 1st). Possibly he is beginning to feel slightly uneasy about his trip to 
Zurich; in any case he multiplies the topics on which he is ready to talk and he 
reduces his expectations as far as his fees are concerned. 
 
Dasgupta is residing at the Hotel Excelsior and not at the Istituto Italiano per il 
Medio Ed Estremo Oriente. 
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My dear Professor Jung, 
Many thanks for your kind letter. I shall finish Milan on the 29th and may leave 
Milan the same night and arrive in Zürich on the 30th morning, or I may leave 
Milan on the 30th and arrive in Zürich on the 1st. Kindly advise me what I should 
do. 
I shall also be glad if you will kindly suggest the name of any Hotel where I may 
go from the station. This is necessary for two reasons, firstly because I am new to 
Zürich and do not know which hotel is likely to be good and comfortable. 
Moreover as the organisers of the lectures should bear the hospitality, I do not 
wish to be too expensive to them. 
Since my stay in Zürich is limited to 30th – 3rd May, I can give any lectures on any 
of these days. I propose to leave Zurich for Warsaw on the 4th May. 
Many thanks for your kind invitation. I gather from your letter that your house is 
far away from the town. So please as arrange that I may be kept informed of 
everything about the meeting and some one may take me to the place of the 
meeting. 
I have heard that Zürich is a great centre of medical studies. Do you know of any 
one who is a recognised expert in blood-pressure. I am suffering from this trouble 
for the last 15 years and shall be glad to consult a really good expert. If there is 
any such expert, I shall be glad if you will kindly fin [sic] a time with him for me. 
I am sorry that I am troubling you in many ways for which please accept my 
humble apologies. 
 
With best regards, 
yours sincerely 





Dasgupta's relief about finally getting an answer seems to have found expression 
in his addressing Jung as "My dear...". He even feels encouraged to ask Jung to fix 
an appointment with a heart specialist. 
 
Because Dasgupta has not heard from Jung for such a long time, he seems to have 
made his plans for Warsaw, cutting his (hypothetical) stay in Zurich short by a 
few days, thus bringing to naught Jung's arrangements for the 5th and 6th of May. 
 
From the extant letters we cannot understand why Dasgupta refers to an 
invitation by Jung or why he thinks that Jung's house is far from Zurich. Was 
there another letter of which no copy was kept? 
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Dear Professor Jung, 
 
Many thanks for your letter of the 20th April. Since I am not so sure about the 
Sunday trains, I propose to arrive in Zurich on the 1st May Monday at 15.43 and 
shall stay there till the 3rd inst. I am free for lectures on any of these days. I have 
heard from Miss Wolff but have not heard anything from Professor Wehali [sic]. 
 
With best regards, 
yours sincerely 
S. N. das Gupta 
 
P. S. If you wish you may [one word cut out due to the perforation of the sheet for 
the file; probably “get”] a lecture on the 1st also – say on Indian Mysticism. 
 






There is no copy of a letter by Jung written on the 20th April. 
 
Dasgupta seems to be slightly ill at ease, cutting his stay in Zurich even shorter 
and suggesting yet another lecture, maybe trying to make up for the troubles he is 
causing Jung. 
 
Neither Prof. Abegg nor Prof. Wehrli ever contacted Dasgupta – their interest in 
meeting him seems not to have been very keen (contrary to Jung’s assumptions). 
 
The P. S. is added by hand. 
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The ninth letter 
 
April 25th, 1939 
 
Professor S. N. Das Gupta,  
Hotel Excelsior,  
Roma. 
 
Dear Professor Das Gupta, 
 
As I shall still be away on Sunday April 30th I should prefer if you would come to 
Zürich on May 1st. I expect you to stay at my house. The distance from town is 
not very great and my car will take care of you. Please let me know the time of 
your arrival in Zürich on Monday, so that I can fetch you at the station. 
As you know your lecture will be on Wednesday 8 p.m. at the Psychological 
Club. I haven't heard from Prof. Wehrli, so I'm afraid that will be the only lecture 
I could arrange for you, unless you have heard from Prof. Wehrli directly. 
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My dear Professor Jung, 
 
Many thanks for your kind letter of the 24th inst and for the very kind hospitality 
that you have offered me in your own house for which I feel extremely grateful to 
you. I hope to star [sic] from Milan on the 1st May Monday and to arrive at 
Zurich at 15.43 that is 3.43 p.m. the same day. If you wish me to arrive on the 3rd 
instead of on the 1st kindly wire on receipt of this letter. I am very thankful for 
your kind proposal to send your car to the station to fetch me. 
 
With best regards, 
yours sincerely  





I think that by now Dasgupta feels so indebted to Jung (for organising and 
reorganising lectures, for [maybe] fixing a date with a heart-specialist, for inviting 
him to his home and fetching him at the station) that he might have wished he 
had never suggested to go to Zurich. In any case his proposal to arrive on the 
very day of his lecture, thus reducing his stay in Zurich to just one day, could 
have been triggered off by a wish not to burden Jung any more with his presence. 
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6.3. Conclusions 
 
In an age of e-mail correspondence the exchange of letters between Dasgupta and 
Jung is nearly painful to read, with its inefficiency due to the lack of immediacy in 
communication. After a quick and enthusiastic start, things ground to a halt 
because either Dasgupta’s original second letter had got lost in the mail or was 
misplaced in Jung’s office, or because Jung had failed to reply to it in time and 
then was afraid that his answer would not reach Calcutta before Dasgupta’s 
departure. In case Jung got the original letter (as he claimed) it is not clear why he 
did not send a reply to Dasgupta’s address in Rome. Whatever may have 
happened, the fact remains that between early February and the second half of 
April 1939 Dasgupta did not hear from Jung. By then his planned visit to Zurich 
was only two weeks away and he had no idea whether he would be able to go to 
Switzerland at all. This is the reason why he preponed his trip to Warsaw. When 
he finally received a letter from Jung in Rome (Jung’s second letter), where the 
Swiss psychologist announced to the Indian philosopher that he had organised 
two lectures for him, on May 5th  and 6th, Dasgupta could not (or did not want to) 
change his arrangements for Poland and replied that he would have to leave 
Zurich on May 4th (cf. Dasgupta’s fifth letter). Thus, Jung’s plans were annihilated 
and he had to organise another lecture. 
 
Because of Jung’s long silence Dasgupta had started feeling slightly awkward 
(after all it had been his idea to go to Zurich and not Jung’s). This is reflected in 
his endeavour to multiply possible topics on which he could speak and in the 
increasing modesty of his expectation as far as remuneration is concerned (only 
travelling and lodging). On the other hand he does not hesitate to ask Jung for an 
appointment with a heart specialist (apologising for the troubles he is causing). 
This is possibly an indication of the seriousness and medical acuteness of his high 
blood-pressure but also of his trust in Jung. 
 
Unfortunately we do not know anything about Jung’s reaction when he saw that 
he had to reorganise the lectures at short notice and also to look for a heart 
specialist. He always remained very polite in his letters to Dasgupta and even 
invited him to stay at his home. This kindness seemed to have increased 
Dasgupta’s sense of embarrassment – in the end he went so far as to suggest to go 
to Zurich just for one day, the day of his lecture. 
 
Nothing is known about Dasgupta’s visit to Zurich and to Jung’s house. In 
Dasgupta’s letters written in 1939 and published by Surama, Jung is not 
mentioned once, and, as far as I know, Jung does not refer to Dasgupta in his 
writings on India and Yoga. Their exchange of letters seems to have ended with 
Dasgupta’s missive sent just before leaving Italy for Switzerland; no letter dating 
from afterwards has been preserved.  
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